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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the “public face of memory,” the visual elements of cultural memory going 
beyond the simple structure of a statue or a plaque to tell a story about the politics of remembrance. 
The structure of cultural memory is determined by ongoing struggles between social groups for 
power over memory itself (Müller 2009) to secure the power to endure (Hearn 2014), thus 
binding memory and identity over space and time.  
 
My study of the structures of power and memory in Croatia highlights the role of social responses 
to the past in determining local, national and supranational identities. Since the end of the Croatian 
War of Independence or “Homeland War” in 1995, much has been remembered and more 
forgotten for the sake of a united national identity. Monuments have been constructed to remind 
passers-by of the nation, its defenders and its victims, yet the meaning these concrete 
manifestations of memory impart depends on how a given audience interacts with them. This 
results in plural and contradictory iterations of cultural memory, contrary to the intent of those 
exercising power over memory to forge a unitary image of the nation. 
 
In this thesis, I address the following core research questions: 
 
• How is memory visualised in public spaces, and how does the construction of particular 
monuments or the commemoration of certain events reflect social behaviours toward the 
past?  
• How does Croatia’s visual culture of remembrance illustrate the relationships between 
power, violence, memory and identity? 
• How, and by whom, is memory constructed to perpetuate social divisions, based on 
nationality, ethnicity or religion?  
• Using a concept of “memory abuse” in post-conflict settings, what are the normative 
expectations of remembrance and what form does resistance to specific memorialisations 
take? 
• How do processes of social differentiation elevate or exclude specific historical narratives 
from commemorative processes? 
 
My point of departure is the construction of cultural memory, as described by Aleida Assmann 
(1999; 2006) and Jan Assmann (2000). I address the neglect and subsequent lack of development 
of Todorov’s term, “memory abuse” (1995). I find the transitions between forms of memory 
provide voids in which various actors exercise power over memory to mould narratives of the past 
to serve their vision of the present and future. These transitions and abuses are made visible 
through public memorials. Through my work on capturing its public display and performance, I 
advance a method for the documentation of memory. Through the case study of Croatia, this work 
highlights patterns of memorialisation that perpetuate violence and provides a template to identify 
memory abuse elsewhere.  
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My key arguments are: 
 
• Memory can be “abused” when processes of memorialisation are manipulated in ways that 
result in violence; 
• Privileged groups (in this case, the ruling Croatian Democratic Union and veterans of the 
Homeland War) exercise power over memory to construct an exclusive narrative of 
national identity and belonging; this is represented in memorial spaces; 
• There is no singular “cultural memory,” rather cultures of memory intersect or align at key 
points in the mnemonic calendar, with groups seeking power over memory to ensure the 
persistence of their own identity;  
• The process of making “Croatian” identity shares similar characteristics with other 
national groups in that much of this identity is formed by the drawing of strict ethnic, 
political, religious or related boundaries through negation. In marking these boundaries, 
those with greater influence over the mnemonic landscape deny opportunities for some of 
those most affected by the violent destruction of Yugoslavia to contribute to the formation 
of shared cultural memory of the past at the level of the Republic of Croatia, ultimately, 
and a corresponding inclusive national identity.		
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Lay Summary 
 
This thesis is about the public face of memory in Croatia, that is, what we see, what we hear and 
what we touch that reminds us of the past. The public face of memory is something intentionally 
constructed over time by various actors – politicians, activists, artists and so on – who attempt to 
implant their vision of history onto the wider cultural sphere. In the case of Croatia, as in other 
countries, this takes shape in monuments, historical plaques, museums, newspapers, graffiti and 
public commemorations.  
 
The purpose of this work is to investigate the nuances of public rehearsals of memory in post-
conflict settings. Having secured its independence from Yugoslavia in what is known domestically 
as the “Homeland War,” Croatia remembers its violent past – including the memories of the 
Second World War and beyond – in ways that stoke controversy at home and abroad. Particularly 
amongst the Serb community in Croatia, which has viewed itself as the victim of violent expressions 
of Croatian nationalism in the 1940s and again in the 1990s, the memories of the Homeland War 
have been brought to their front doors, with monuments to Croatian victories constructed in 
villages from which the vast majority of the Serb population has fled. The voices of victims – both 
Serb and Croat – have been drowned out by an overwhelming tide of memorial acts praising the 
Croatian “defenders,” the soldiers who fought on the side of Croatian independence from 1991 
to 1995, and criticisms from liberal civil society of this rather uncritical approach to the past are 
ignored.  
 
This thesis presents the “public face of memory” as an analytical tool to capture memory, a rather 
personal and ephemeral phenomenon, in its visual forms. I also reintroduce the term “memory 
abuse” as a means to uncover patterns of social behaviour that lead to the misappropriation of the 
memory of the past as a tool to instigate violence in the present. This term has been used rather 
uncritically in recent scholarly works, and my hope here is to give it new meaning for those 
interested in using memory as a tool for peace rather than division. Throughout this work, I present 
dozens of monuments I documented in eleven field visits to all regions of Croatia, from the smallest 
remnants of pre-war villages to large urban areas like Zagreb, Split, Osijek and Pula. Special 
attention is given to commemorative events in Knin marking the anniversary of 1995’s Operation 
Storm, which saw the return of Serb-controlled territory to the Republic of Croatia, and in 
Vukovar, the site of a massacre of 264 civilians and soldiers by the Yugoslav People’s Army and 
Serb paramilitary forces at the start of the war.  
 
In whole, this thesis lays a groundwork for future explorations of memory in post-conflict settings 
and to create a useful theoretical frame through which the public presentation, use and abuse of 
memory can be critically evaluated. The key findings here are first and foremost that memory can 
be “abused” in the sense that processes of remembrance can be manipulated by those who exercise 
power over memory to exclude others from their vision of the in-group through violent means. 
Resistance to this forceful approach to memory- and identity-making, however, is presented by 
pro-European human rights activists and associations of the Serb ethnic minority. This results in 
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the presence of many cultures of memory in Croatia but no singular “Croatian” cultural memory 
or identity, much to the chagrin of extreme nationalists, both past and present. 
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Pronunciation Guide 
 
Croatian, like Serbian and Bosnian, is among the simpler Slavic languages to read and pronounce 
given the use of the Latin alphabet and a one-letter-one-sound rule, with the exception of the 
digraphs dj, dž, nj and lj, that allows for consistent spelling.  
 
C  “ts” as in tsar     Kumrovec 
Ć  harder “ch” as in church   Ćevapi 
Č  softer “ch” as in chocolate   Krojač 
Dj/Dž/Đ soft “g” as in George    Djurdjević/Džep/Tuđman 
G  hard “g” as in grow    Generalštab 
J  “y” as in yellow     Josip 
Lj  “lya” as in million    Ljubljana 
Nj  “nya” as in Kenya    Njegoš 
R  “ur” as in “hurt” if between consonants  Trg 
Š  “sh” as in shore     Šolta 
Ž  “zh” as in measure    Željeznice 
 
A  “ah” as in hall     Agresor 
E  “eh” as in elevator    Zagreb 
I  “ee” as in cheer     Riba 
O  “oh” as in home    Omišalj 
U  “oo” as in whom    Dubrovnik 
 
The letters q, w, x and y appear only in non-transliterated foreign loanwords. 
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Counties and Regions of Croatia 
 









Siniša Glavašević was a journalist from the town of Vukovar, the site of the worst atrocities of the 
Croatian War of Independence. In the early days of the conflict, he relayed stories from the war via 
radio to Zagreb, many of which were later published by the Matica hrvatska in the volume Priče iz 
Vukovara, “Voices from Vukovar.”  
 
Siniša was murdered at the Ovčara farm outside Vukovar on 20 November 1991, his remains later 
uncovered in a mass grave and reburied in the Mirogoj cemetery in Zagreb in 1997. His writing 
appeals to basic human values and reminds us of our common humanity, even in the darkest of 
times. 
 
This work is written in memory of Siniša Glavašević and of the many others whose stories can no 
longer be told. Glavašević’s “Story about the War” and “Story about the Enemy” bookend this 
thesis, bringing the innately human nature of memory and violence to the forefront. 
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“The Story about the War,” Siniša Glavašević (1960-1991), Voices from Vukovar 
 
Image: Vukovar, 1991. Author unknown. 
 
War is the worst thing to befall humanity. But humans seem unable to do anything but to go to war 
with one another and to kill. The question is, “Is that not just simply normal?”  
 
If it is normal to put science in the service of weapons, if it is normal to engage in shooting for 
sport, if it is normal to boast about it, then it is also normal to wage war. That is certainly a natural 
way to free the world from all evil that affects it. Unfortunately, many people die in the course of 
war, and we only lay them to rest against our will. But that is the price of progress; there is no 
bargaining. Take it or leave it! Or: Go or leave it! Don’t go! Die in your city, in your street, in your 
house! But never at the hand of your own friend. Friends are there for everything but to decide on 
your death.  
 
War selects. It separates the good from the bad, the strong from the weak, beautiful from ugly, 
honourable from less honourable, capable from incapable. And the longer war lasts, the stronger 
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this selection becomes. And there are naturally more victims. One has to have a good sense of 
direction to find his way in war.  
 
Where to flee, whom to trust, what to do?  
 
How, above all else, to be amongst those who win?  
 
How to be among the first, just when it is most necessary?  
 
I knew many intelligent people who were not fast enough for this war. I knew many capable people 
who were, however, too dumb to grasp the repulsiveness of war. I also knew many brave people, 
without whom I and this city would still not be. Who knows where they all are now, those whom I 
knew and to whom I so often listened?  
 
They and the echo that resonated from their boastful beating of their chests. Where are they all 
now, as Vukovar lies bleeding? Why are they not screaming? Why are they not helping to push the 
enemy from here with their shouting? Why are they not here now, when it most depends on 
them, to repay their debts to the earth, now that this city that made them rich must carry their 
burden? But war is merciless. It is the lash that beats with all its strings. War is simultaneously 
power and powerlessness. For one it is hell, for the other, and we all know who these people are, it 
is a gift from God.  
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Your memory is a monster; you forget—it doesn’t. It 
simply files things away. It keeps things for you, or 
hides things from you—and summons them to your 
recall with a will of its own. You think you have a 
memory; but it has you! 
 
– John Irving, A Prayer for Owen Meany (1989) 
 
 
Humans are memory machines.  
 
We remember the things that shock us, haunt us, please us, scare us, help us and hinder us. We 
remember those in our past in the hope that we learn from them in our future. We remember the 
joy of family, the joy of love and the joy of friendship, but we also remember pain, loss and sorrow. 
What we remember is an inherently personal experience, the most intimate function of cognition. 
But we also are taught how to remember, and conversely, we are taught how to forget. Our 
memories are social memories. 
 
In the aftermath of war, much is remembered and more is forgotten – the stories of the victims of 
war have been erased as their houses burned, the suffering of individual soldiers ignored for the 
sake of a united national identity. Monuments have been constructed intentionally – in both 
physical and social terms - to remind passers-by of the nation, of its defenders and of its victims, 
yet the meaning these concrete manifestations of memory can impart depends heavily on how 
particular audiences interact with them. This results in various, often contradictory iterations of 
cultural memory in spite of the demands of those who exercise power over memory to forge a 
unitary image of the nation. 
 
At the outset of my research, I wanted to explore what it meant to abuse memory, to twist it in such 
a way that violence was an inevitable result. How could people like Slobodan Milošević in Serbia 
and Franjo Tuđman in Croatia use their power to convince others that the historical injustices 
enacted upon them by the “Other,” the “enemy,” were justifiable means to seek vengeance for the 
past? What were the theoretical underpinnings of memory abuse, a term coined by Tzvetan 
Todorov (1995), and why as a term has it seldom been applied critically in memory studies? 
Ultimately, this thesis addresses the following core research questions: 
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• How is memory visualised in public spaces, and how does the construction of particular 
monuments or the commemoration of certain events reflect social behaviours toward the 
past?  
• How does Croatia’s visual culture of remembrance illustrate the relationships between 
power, violence, memory and identity? 
• How, and by whom, is memory constructed to perpetuate social divisions, based on 
nationality, ethnicity or religion?  
• Using a concept of “memory abuse” in post-conflict settings, what are the normative 
expectations of remembrance and what form does resistance to specific memorialisations 
take? 
• How do processes of social differentiation elevate or exclude specific historical narratives 
from commemorative processes? 
 
My theoretical point of departure is the construction of cultural memory, as described by Aleida 
Assmann (1999; 2006) and Jan Assmann (2000), building from the works of Émile Durkheim 
(1893; [1915] 1964), Maurice Halbwachs ([1941, 1952] 1992) and Pierre Nora (1989). I 
address the lack of academic investigations of “memory abuse,’’ a term first brought about by 
Tzvetan Todorov (1995) and since much abandoned, and how the transitions between forms of 
memory provide voids in which various actors can exercise power over memory to mould narratives 
of the past to their vision of the present and future, and how these transitions and abuses are 
reflected in public memorials. I also advance methodological considerations on the documentation 
of memory, a rather fleeting and personal phenomenon, through my work on capturing its public 
performance in 614 monuments, 27 museums and two key commemorative events in Knin and 
Vukovar. This work should help others to identify patterns of memory abuse and suggest places 
for intervention (however loaded the term, especially in the former Yugoslavia) and to highlight 
patterns of memorialisation that can and do perpetuate violence in its many forms. The earthquake 
that rattled Zagreb in the early hours of 22 March 2020 has also made the documentation of 
construction, evolution and potential destruction of memorial spaces ever more prescient, as have 
the George Floyd protests against policy brutality, white supremacy and racial injustice in the 
United States from May 2020 to the present day. 
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This is a work on the “public face of memory,” that is, the visual elements of cultural memory in 
the Republic of Croatia, which go beyond the simple structure of a statue or a plaque and tell us a 
story about the social dynamics of remembrance in a space impacted by conflict within our lifetime. 
The public face of memory is revealed in museums, parks, cemeteries, newspapers, celebrations, 
religious celebrations, street art, television and advertisements. This thesis focuses mainly on the 
links between power, memory, identity and violence in the aftermath of war, using Croatia’s 
emergence from the “Homeland War” of 1991 to 1995 as a case study. The structure of cultural 
memory itself is one determined by ongoing struggles for power over memory (Müller 2009), a 
longstanding battle between various social groups, however defined, to assure these groups the 
power to endure (Hearn 2014), binding memory and identity as they shift over space and time. By 
studying public manifestations of these social interrelations, we can begin to understand how 
cultural memory can be used and, importantly for this work, “abused” to perpetuate divisions and 
violence in post-conflict settings.  
 
The key findings of this work are: 
 
• Memory can be “abused” in that the processes of memorialisation, i.e. monument 
construction, the creation of historical narratives or the resignification or relativisation of 
historical facts and events, can be manipulated (not only but in the context of this research) 
primarily by those who exercise power over memory in ways that results in violence. This 
adds to the sociological literature on memory by demonstrating the repercussions of its 
intersections with power and violence; 
• Privileged groups, most notably veterans of the Homeland War and the ruling nationalist 
Croatian Democratic Union, exercise their power over memory to construct an exclusive 
narrative of national identity and belonging, and this is represented in a wealth of memorial 
spaces across Croatia; 
• There is no singular “cultural memory” in Croatia, let alone “collective memory,” rather, 
various cultures of memory intersect or align at key points in the mnemonic calendar, with 
each group seeking relatively greater power over memory to ensure the persistence of its 
own identity. In these instances, violence can be used as a transformative force, 
particularly in those situations where a gap emerges between the idealised, singular vision 
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of “Croatian” identity and those marginalised voices forcibly excluded from the 
interlinked processes of memory- and identity-making; 
• The process of making “Croatian” identity shares similar characteristics with other 
national groups in that much of this identity is formed by the drawing of strict ethnic, 
political, religious or related boundaries through negation. In marking these boundaries, 
however, those with greater influence over the mnemonic landscape deny opportunities 
for those most affected by the violent destruction of Yugoslavia – here, looking at civilian 
victims, women and ethnic Serbs – to contribute to the formation of a cohesive national 
identity/shared “Croatian” cultural memory of the past. 
 
From 2014 to 2016, prior to my doctoral studies, I worked at the Post-Conflict Research Center 
in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and was faced day-to-day with the consequences of war fought 
within living memory and how it impacted my relationships to friends and colleagues and their 
relationships amongst one another. “War is the worst thing to befall humanity” (Glavašević 1994, 
52) – it is unnecessary, it is unjust and it is blind, a violence guided by greed and hatred. I saw how 
war was remembered and how the violence of the past only served to beget further violence. I 
watched as a crowd of mourners attacked the then Serbian prime minister, now president, at 
Srebrenica in 2015, a consequence of his refusal to acknowledge the suffering forced upon their 
home twenty years earlier by Serbs. I felt angry, too, that nothing much had changed in the 
intervening years. As I spent more time in the former Yugoslavia, I realised the inherent complexity 
of the various conflicts that took place throughout the 1990s, a time where I was enjoying my 
childhood in Pennsylvania, free from the burdens of war that my friends had to face in their youth. 
I realised that Serbs, too, had their unresolved grievances with Bosniaks, with Albanians and with 
Croats, and that each of these groups had their own grievances in one form or another. After I left 
Sarajevo in 2016 to pursue my PhD on cultural memory in the former Yugoslavia, I noticed how 
silent issues of the past had been made in Croatia, at least relative to the daily bombardment of 
visual nationalism in Sarajevo, and chose to explore monuments and memorial spaces there 
instead, inspired by the work of Vjeran Pavlaković at the University of Rijeka. 
 
This thesis is a highly visual piece of work, and my findings are interspersed with a curated 
selection from the thousands of images of the 614 memorial sites I documented during the course 
of this research. The purpose of the images is to highlight patterns of memorialisation, showcase 
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particular elements of the public face of memory in Croatia and to provide room for comparison 
amongst the various kinds of monumental forms to be found across the country. While such 
striking visuals might evoke different interpretations for different audiences, I provide context to 
each of the monuments or other memorial works depicted to demonstrate the threads that bind or 
the lines that divide various memorial cultures in Croatia. At the beginning of each chapter, I have 
included a map showing the locations of the monuments included throughout the text to give the 
reader a sense of the spatial dispersion or concentration of these sites of memory.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
I divide my work into six chapters, three framing the research and three discussing the empirical 
findings and conclusions I draw from my extensive fieldwork and the implications they have for 
commemorative practices and identity-making in Croatia and more widely in the former 
Yugoslavia. The lessons learned in this research, however, do have wider repercussions for the 
fields of memory, peace/conflict and nationalism studies. 
 
Chapter 1 discusses the theoretical framework I developed to address cultural memory in Croatia, 
its public presentation and its potential for abuse. This chapter in particular applies sociological 
literature on power (see Foucault 1978; 1980) and identity (see Durkheim 1893; J. Assmann 
2011) to memory studies, pointing towards the link between memory and the creation and 
perpetuation of national (or other) communities through violence. From this discussion, I employ 
the term “memory abuse” (borrowing from Todorov 1995) to capture the interrelations between 
power, violence, memory and identity, core concepts in my study of the public face of memory in 
Croatia. I also present concept models linking memory, power and identity, and the interactions 
between the various forms of memory the Assmanns have described in their works and how the 
potential for memory abuse arises from the transitions between these forms. Throughout the 
chapter, power in various forms is revisited continuously, as it is among the most crucial elements 
of the puzzle that is understanding the creation, sharing and destruction of public forms of 
memory. This contributes to extant memory literature by offering a focus on power and its applied 
role in determining identity outcomes that is underplayed in existing work. 
 
Chapter 2 provides some necessary historical context, tracing the “millennial statehood” narrative 
prevalent in conservative nationalist interpretations of the Croatian past from the founding of the 
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medieval Kingdom of Croatia in 925 CE to the present day. Great attention is given to the events 
of the Second World War, the Yugoslav period and the Croatian War of Independence/Homeland 
War, as it is the memory of these eras that overwhelmingly populate memorial spaces in Croatia 
today.  
 
Chapter 3 describes my methodological approach to the study of memory in Croatia. The majority 
of the data collected come from visual studies of memorial spaces in all regions of Croatia, 
concentrating primarily on the areas most directly impacted by the Croatian War of Independence. 
This type of “monument hunting” proved incredibly fruitful, and I was able to uncover memorials 
long forgotten, whether intentionally or otherwise.1 I also adopted participant-observation 
methods for the public commemorations of Operation Storm in Knin (Dalmatia) on 5 August 
2017 and of the fall of Vukovar (Slavonia) on 18 November 2017. Data from other 
commemorative events, namely the controversial ceremonies in Bleiburg, Austria, and at the site 
of the former Jasenovac concentration camps, were provided by the FRAMNAT (Framing the 
Nation) research group at the University of Rijeka. 
 
My understanding of the “big picture” of the public face of memory, most notably of what was 
present and what curiously was missing from today’s mnemonic landscape in Croatia, framed the 
structure of the content of the empirical chapters. Each of these chapters directly addresses the 
question, “How is memory visualised in public spaces, and how does the construction of particular 
monuments or the commemoration of certain events reflect social behaviours toward the past?”  
 
Chapter 4 starts with the most prevalent theme in contemporary Croatian cultural memory, the 
branitelji/“defenders” of the Homeland War. Here, I ask and answer most clearly, “How, and by 
whom, is memory constructed to perpetuate social divisions, based on nationality, ethnicity or 
religion?” and “How do processes of social differentiation elevate or exclude specific historical 
narratives from commemorative processes?” Approximately one-fifth of all the memorial spaces I 
documented were related to the 1990s conflict, uncritically praising those who fought for Croatian 
                                                
1 The term “monument hunting” appears in (Goggins 1998, 54) but in reference to the removal of 
Mayan monuments by looters and plunderers. Rather, colleagues like Vjeran Pavlaković and Ana 
Milošević have used the term in the context of our shared work on documenting hidden 
monuments in the former Yugoslavia, which forms the core set of data presented in this 
dissertation. 
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independence in the face of “Greater Serbian aggression.” Here, I discuss the political framework 
in place during and after the war that contributed to this privileged view of the branitelji and how 
their status in Croatian society has been legitimised. Though many monuments are introduced 
throughout this chapter, the core subject of my analysis here is the annual commemoration of 
Operation Storm in Knin on 5 August, the “Day of Homeland Victory and Thanksgiving and the 
Day of Croatian Defenders.” As well, I present the challenges to the defenders’ power by various 
elements of civil society, including peace activists and minority groups. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the role of gender in remembering combatants in Croatia and earlier in Yugoslavia 
after the Second World War and the near total absence of the voices of female defenders in modern 
memorial spaces. In this chapter, I argue that veterans’ associations, supported by the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ), enjoy a great level of social privilege and accordingly greater power 
over memory to construct a more exclusive image of the Croatian nation by influencing the 
outcomes of various memorial initiatives (museums, monuments, commemorations), even twenty-
five years after the end of the Homeland War. This then leads to my subsequent examination of 
absences, namely of Serbs and civilian victims, from this interpretation of Croatian cultural 
memory in Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the selective remembrance of victims of the Homeland War, Serbs in 
particular. Here, I address the question, “Using a concept of ‘memory abuse’ in post-conflict 
settings, what are the normative expectations of remembrance and what form does resistance to 
specific memorialisations take?” This chapter nevertheless presents how civilian victims from both 
sides of the conflict are remembered – or forgotten – and how the Yugoslav narratives of the 
Second World War have been modified, challenged or erased in today’s Croatia. Specifically, the 
commemoration of the 1991 siege of Vukovar, various monuments to civilian victims of the 
Second World War and Homeland War, retributive violence against Serbs in Dalmatia in 1995 
and the 1991 and 1995 rocket attacks on Zagreb are discussed here. The core controversy 
surrounding the memorialisation of victims I discuss is the appropriation of unique victim 
narratives (individual histories and familial remembrances) by nationalist actors as narratives of 
“martyrdom,” suggesting a false sense of agency in an unchosen death. I argue that given these 
forcible identity constructions, there can be no singular “Croatian” cultural memory, as the 
presence of boundaries around the “in-group” – the defenders and “true patriots” – demands the 
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existence of counter-narratives, which are now slowly eroding some of the foundations of the post-
war state identity. 
 
Finally, Chapter 6 takes a step back to view the public face of memory in its entirety; the chapter is 
simply titled, “Croatia.” In it, I break down various core elements of Croatian identity as they are 
represented in material form, matching each section to an adapted version of the wedding rhyme, 
“something old, something new, something borrowed and something blue.” Respectively, I 
analyse the narrative of millennial Croatian statehood, the challenges of the Europeanisation of 
memory (or lack thereof) in Croatia, the rejection of all things Yugoslav from contemporary 
cultural memory and the pervasiveness of national conservatism and its proximity to Croatia’s 
fascist past. This chapter provides more answers to the question, “How does Croatia’s visual 
culture of remembrance illustrate the relationships between power, violence, memory and 
identity?” The role of Catholicism in shaping Croatian identity, aesthetically and socially, is 
discussed throughout the chapter, as is the tension between groups’ power over memory (Müller 
2009) and their power to endure (Hearn 2014). The overarching argument in this chapter is one 
of identity-making through the public face of memory; here I demonstrate how the creation of 
Croatian national identity is a process that is not too dissimilar from other national groups while 
advancing the discussion of memory and identity by incorporating the concept of power over 
memory and the resulting exclusions of those most affected by the violence of the Homeland War 
– Serbs, women, and civilian victims. 
 
Ultimately, this is a thesis on war memory, as despite the diversity of mnemonic communities 
within Croatia, that which is presented publicly remains defined by the struggles of the 1940s and 
the 1990s. This, too, is a thesis on transitions – between various forms of memories, between 
identities and between states – and the impact of violence as a transformative, or even as a 
“generative” (Bergholz 2016), force. It is not a pleasant topic, nor is it something that this work 
can address holistically. It is nonetheless worth the endeavour to understand how memory, 
identity, violence and power interplay in post-conflict societies like Croatia, and I hope this text 















Chapter 1: Memory, Identity and Power 
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Introduction 
Understanding memory, a seemingly ephemeral and highly personal phenomenon, requires an 
interdisciplinary look into the creation, dissemination and perpetuation of myths and histories by 
various actors scattered across time and location. As Zheng Wang notes,  
 
One of the important reasons why few scholars have used historical memory as a 
variable in their research is because it does not fit neatly in one specific academic 
discipline; the subject and its implications are scattered throughout many 
academic fields. Insights into its theories are strewn across diverse bodies of 
literature on anthropology, culture, history, literature, politics, psychology, and 
sociology (Wang 2018, 2).  
 
In the context of my work on varied approaches to cultural memory in Croatia, I intertwine 
literatures of sociology (i.e. McCrone 1998; Smith 2003), political science (i.e. Müller 2009), 
philosophy (i.e. Hegel 1971; Foucault 1978)  and history (i.e. Todorova  1997; Bet-El 2009), 
but ground my functional definitions of memory, whether cultural, collective, communicative, 
political, public or national, in the sociological work of authors like Émile Durkheim (1893; 
[1915] 1964), Maurice Halbwachs ([1941, 1952] 1992), Pierre Nora  (1989) and Aleida 
Assmann (1999; 2006). To first understand how memory is politicised and how it can be used as 
a tool to achieve political or social aims, I will examine the concept of power and relations between 
various competing actors in the process of shaping of the “public face of memory,” that is, the 
publicly accessible, visible manifestations of cultural, national and political memory. The practical 
implications of these interrelations will then be examined in Chapter 4, 5 and 6.  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to document just one of many situations in which power, 
memory, politics and national identity, among myriad other elements of modern society, intersect 
in a post-conflict environment. I begin this chapter with a theoretical discussion of memory, 
whether political, national, cultural or collective, and address the various ways memory in its 
manifest forms intersects with and informs understandings of politics, violence, identity and 
culture. It is important to note, however, that these interactions are neither linear nor predictable 
but rather take their form only in relation to their immediate contexts. The politics of memory of 
genocide in Croatia, for example, does not match the politics of memory of genocide in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Canada or Israel. Croatia serves here as a case study to highlight particular post-
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Yugoslav and post-socialist idiosyncrasies but also to observe and evaluate wider patterns of 
commemoration and negotiations of power and identity. This chapter introduces sociological 
literature on power and identity to the interdisciplinary field of memory studies, pointing toward a 
process through which memory is linked to the creation and perpetuation of national (or other) 
communities through violence. From this discussion, I arrive at the term “memory abuse” to 
capture the interrelations between power, violence, memory and identity, core concepts in my 
study of the public face of memory in Croatia. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections, focusing first on how memory intersects with politics – 
the most relevant source of mnemonic conflict in Croatia today. I then continue the discussion of 
memory’s intersections secondly with culture and the process of identity-making and finally with 
violence. Throughout the chapter, the concept of power is revisited continuously, as it is (aside 
from memory, of course), the most crucial element of the puzzle that is understanding how 
memories are created, shared, challenged and destroyed in the public sphere. In the following 
section on memory, politics and power, I present a few, necessary working definitions of “cultural 
memory,” the major unit of analysis in this dissertation, with accompanying, primarily sociological, 
views on this highly interdisciplinary subject. The theoretical discussions presented here create 
the framework for my research questions set out in the introduction and lay out conceptual tools I 
have developed like the “public face of memory” (the methodological approach to which I present 
in Chapter 3) and “memory abuse,” a term I borrow from Tzvetan Todorov (1995), the 
implications of which become clear in my empirical analysis of Croatian cultural memory in the 
latter half of this dissertation.  
 
Memory, politics and power 
In this section, I lay out the historical development of theories of collective (and related forms of) 
memory from the late nineteenth century to the present day and present the various typologies of 
memory proposed by Jan and Aleida Assmann in the 1980s and 1990s. Given the exclusive nature 
of cultural memory (that is, it is particular to a specific ethnic, political or other social group), I use 
cultural memory as an analytical framework for understanding memory’s role in instigating and 
maintaining conflict through the mnemonic, and ultimately social, exorcism of the “Other.” As 
well, it is the contestations over the content of others’ cultural interpretations of a shared past that 
enable politicians and others who may exercise power to manipulate national narratives, where 
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possible, in a way that prevents the formation of a transcultural, collective memory of that past and, 
in extreme instances, foments violence. 
 
Development of cultural memory theory 
The origins of collective (and by extension, cultural) memory theory can be traced to Émile 
Durkheim’s The Division of Labour in Society (1893) most notably through the work of French 
philosopher Maurice Halbwachs (see Halbwachs 1925; [1941] 1971). Halbwachs built upon 
Durkheim’s understanding of collective conscience in the early twentieth century by positing that 
individuals’ memories are socially conditioned and only have true meaning in relation to those of 
their wider social groups. Durkheim, using examples of various methods of dealing with crime and 
punishment, reflects on societies’ relative degrees of cohesiveness; in older, simpler societies in 
which little value is placed on the individual, there exists a “mechanical solidarity” that is based 
primarily in shared experiences and in religious beliefs (Durkheim 1893, 73-117). This 
mechanical solidarity evolves with the gradual division of labour in productive societies into a more 
decentralised, “organic” solidarity, in which some degree of interdependence amongst individuals 
gains greater precedence over existing religious norms or individualistic values (ibid., 158-188). 
Collective consciousness emerges through solidarity, Durkheim argues, but with the reordering 
of society through increased production, the value of this consciousness becomes increasingly 
dependent on the relationship between the collective and individual consciences and the degree 
to which collective practices are prioritised over individual performances of identity (ibid., 118-
141).  
 
Durkheim’s later work, Elementary Forms of Religious Life, provides greater insight into the 
interrelatedness of individual and collective consciousness. Using evidence from totemic religious 
practices amongst Aboriginal Australians, he notes that while religion provides an externalised 
sense of belonging amongst disparate clans and individuals, “the clan, like every other sort of 
society, can live only through the individual consciousnesses that compose it” (Durkheim [1915] 
1964, 221). Totems, in these societies, mark the coming together of such individual 
“consciousnesses” in religious rituals. Durkheim writes, “This is what the totem really consists 
in: it is only the material form under which the imagination represents this immaterial substance, 
this energy diffused through all sorts of heterogeneous things, which alone is the real object of the 
cult” (ibid., 189). By transposing meaning onto static, inanimate objects, religious communities 
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create a place for shared meaning. The “collective effervescence” represented by these objects 
reflects the shared spirit of the group, one that is greater than the sum of the individual energies in 
that community as they gather in the performance of a religious ceremony. 
 
Halbwachs, a contemporary of Durkheim, developed from this notion of “collective 
effervescence” the theory of collective memory, the function of which derives from the lines of 
group belonging and meaning provided solely through the immediate context of the individual. 
He writes,  
 
A child nine or ten years old possesses many recollections, both recent and fairly 
old. What will this child be able to retain if he is abruptly separated from his 
family, transported to a country where his language is not spoken, where neither 
the appearance of people and places, nor their customs, resemble in any way that 
which was familiar to him up to this moment? […] In order to retrieve some of these 
uncertain and incomplete memories [of his past] it is necessary that the child, in the 
new society of which he is part, at least be shown images reconstructing for a 
moment the group and the milieu from which the child had been torn ([1941, 
1952] 1992, 38, parentheses in the original). 
 
In this instance, Halbwachs appears to argue that memories, while they can be retained and 
remembered by individuals, have no meaning to other individuals in one’s current environment if 
they were not formed there originally. In arguing for the social conditioning of memory, 
Halbwachs breaks with his tutor, Henri Bergson, who earlier posited the concept of “pure 
memory” deriving from individual, rather than social, experiences, instead framing memory as a 
“reconstruction of a past in accordance with the present vision of the society” (Jaisson 1999, 
167). Halbwachs argues that there exists a common – collective – performance of cognition within 
a group of people, summarised by Aleida Assmann as one “in which the participants could link 
back to a common store of experience that had been stabilized by communication – e.g. family 
members, school classes, military regiments, travel groups” (A. Assmann 2012, 175).  
 
One’s ability to retrieve and store memories is dependent on the ability of the society, or in 
Halbwachs’ terms, milieu, to remember and recall those same memories. These mnemonic 
communities (families, school groups, and so on) and the ability to store memory socially allow 
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individuals to interpret and order their immediate surroundings, their relations to the past and 
their roles in the present.  
 
Building from Halbwachs’ argument on the social storage of memory, French sociologist Pierre 
Nora has commented,  
 
Memory is blind to all but the group it binds – which is to say […] that there are as 
many memories as there are groups, that memory is by nature multiple and yet 
specific; collective, plural, and yet individual. […] Memory takes root in the 
concrete, in spaces, gestures, images and objects […]” (Nora 1989, 9).  
 
In this light, memory, or more actively, remembering, is an action and a process rather than any 
particular end product. Nora’s contribution to the burgeoning study of memory is that of lieux de 
mémoire, or points/locations/sites of memory, which are formed around “a turning point of a 
break with the past […] with the sense that memory has been torn – but torn in such a way as to 
post the problem of the embodiment of memory in certain sites where a sense of historical 
continuity persists. There are lieux de mémoire, sites of memory, because there are no longer 
milieux de mémoire, real environments of memory” (ibid., 7). Nora’s sites of memory, though, do 
represent a degree of continuity with the Durkheimian tradition of “collective effervescence” and 
the use of totems as symbols of a community’s spirit. Sites of memory are similarly a particular 
location, object or point of history (for example a battlefield, the parchment of a declaration of 
independence or the end of a war) with concentrated meaning for a defined social group (or 
groups). They and other manifestations of cultural memory (books, image, dance, 
commemorations, etc.) represent Durkheim’s totems as mediated, externalised forms of memory. 
Their existence is premised on the need to instil renewed meaning in spaces and events created by 
no longer extant societies or regimes, and the cultural value attached to each site of memory 
derives from its active interpretation by the community that acknowledges the necessity of that site 
for the continuity, however disrupted in reality, of its history. The relationship of the palace of 
Versailles to the people of France, for example, has shifted dramatically from the acien régime, the 
Napoleonic dynasty and the various French governments in place during the First and Second 
World Wars and the current Fifth Republic. Nora writes, 
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Lieux de mémoire originate with the sense that there is no spontaneous memory, that 
we must deliberately create archives, maintain anniversaries, organize celebrations, 
pronounce eulogies, and notarize bills because such activities no longer occur 
naturally. The defense, by certain minorities, of a privileged memory that has 
retreated to jealously protected enclaves in this sense intensely illuminates the truth 
of lieux de mémoire – that without commemorative vigilance, history would soon 
sweep them away (Nora 1989, 12). 
 
Lieux de mémoire arise from wider social patterns of remembrance and provide a useful approach 
for selecting sites, like commemorations, museums or monuments, for analysis, and ultimately 
build what I call in this work the “public face of memory.” While Nora addresses wider public 
forms of memory in his work, Halbwachs’ focus remains at the level of the microenvironment, like 
church groups and nuclear families, something outside the scope of this research, and ignores the 
exchange of information between both neighbouring and foreign communities. This, however, is 
somewhat striking given the degree of mobility in people and capital in the 1920s, around which 
time his early work, The Social Frames of Memory (see Halbwachs 1925), was written. In the 
context of my work, I more closely adopt Nora’s lieux de mémoire frame to single out key locations 
or events around which elements of Croatian cultural memory and national identity are built. It is 
the collection of these spaces that signifies what parts of the past are shared and how this 
contributes to a greater sense of the “nation” in its imagined form (see Anderson 1983). Aleida 
Assmann summarises Halbwachs’ work as a “radical thesis […] that people do not build up an 
individual memory but are always enclosed in memory communities […] a completely isolated 
human, according to Halbwachs, therefore could not build up a memory at all” (A. Assmann 2012, 
175). On this, Halbwachs notes,  
 
To be sure, everyone has a capacity for memory (mémoire) that is unlike that of 
anyone else […]. But individual memory is nevertheless a part or an aspect of group 
memory, since each impression and each fact […] leaves a lasting memory only to 
the extent that one has thought it over – to the extent that it is connected with the 
thoughts that come to us from the social milieu. […] In this way the framework of 
collective memory confines and binds our most intimate remembrances to each other 
(Halbwachs [1941, 1952] 1992, 53). 
 
It is in this regard that my study of memory in Croatia must focus on the power over memory 
through strucutres of power, like state institutions or privileged groups, (discussed later in this 
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chapter), which is characterised by relations of domination, subordination and legitimasation (of 
violence, for example) and not by individual memory alone. The interactions between various 
individual, communicative memories in the public sphere are ultimately those that determine 
cultural memory, and similarly the links between cultural and collective memory, which I 
summarise in the next section, are the outcomes of negotiations of power and identity in an even 
greater social context.  
 
Assmann and Assmann’s framework of collective memory 
This section lays out my framework for applying the study of cultural memory, as defined by Jan 
and Aleida Assmann, to its public performance, use and abuse in Croatia.  The social construction 
and management of collective memories occurs in myriad ways, and the mode of diffusion differs 
significantly by group, location and intent; memory construction also is intricately tied to the 
process of identity formation. Aleida Assmann and Jan Assmann have written extensively on three 
notable categories or forms of memories and consciences – the communicative, cultural and 
collective – that facilitate the understanding of the creation of memories and mnemonic 
communities.2 Their work builds upon Halbwachs’ framework of collective memory by providing 
these more useful analytical categories, which facilitate the sorting and selection of potential data 
sources in this project (physical manifestations of memory like monuments and museums over 
more fleeting and adaptable oral traditions, for example). This work leaves open the possibility for 
conceptualising what I prefer to call “memory abuse” (following Todorov 1995, to be discussed 
below), which focuses on the transitions and interactions between these three forms of memory, 
that is, the acts performed in transition and those who exercise power responsible for shaping 
those acts.  
                                                
2 It is important to note the somewhat conflated use of the German terms Assmann and Assmann 
employ in their descriptions of collective memory. While Erinnerung often refers to a singular 
memory (hence the translation of Nora’s lieux de mémoire as Erinnerungsort), the reflexive verb 
(sich) erinnern highlights the storage or retrieval of a memory from the individual conscience. 
Gedächtnis more generally refers to conscience, as defined above; this contrasts to Bewusstsein, 
consciousness (literally “being conscious”), which often is not found in this literature. The authors 
often use Erinnerung and Gedächtnis interchangeably, but I contend that this is an intentional 
distinction between an individual memory best managed within a particular conscience, or set of 
memories actively managed by the collective, such as “a collective memory of” the Holocaust, 
part of the larger German (or European) “collective conscience” or the “collective memory” more 
generally. Snyder (2009) correlates the French mémoire with Gedächtnis and souvenir with 
Erinnerung. 
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Varying degrees of transparency and democratic memory construction, i.e. through public 
consultation over the outcomes of memorial projects or official inquiries into the past and the 
preservation of archives, determine the ultimate content of cultural and collective memory, and the 
transitions between various forms of memory invariably involve intergroup negotiations and 
contestations. Here, I conceptualise collective memory at its minimum as a mutual 
acknowledgement and commemoration by more than one social group of the same elements of 
their shared past. The term “collective,” however, rather weakly describes how I envision wider 
processes of memory exchange, at the very least in Croatia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, 
as “collective” implies something more monolithic than extant mnemonic tensions between 
various social or national groups would currently allow. A more apt term that might guide future 
research into boundary-transcending patterns of commemoration would be “transcultural 
memory,” which Erll describes as “a certain research perspective, a focus of attention, which is 
directed towards mnemonic processes unfolding across and beyond cultures [author’s emphasis]” 
(Erll 2011, 9). Transculturality, or perhaps intercommunality, would suggest a greater dynamic 
capability of memory which researchers can capture through the shifts and adaptations of shared 
memories as they cross or are transmitted across borders. Though not pursued in my research, an 
ambitious goal of future memory work in the region should be (and already has been) to achieve 
some sense of mutual understanding of the past that overcomes harsh boundaries between the 
various cultures of memory, like those I do explore here, and fosters what could then be more 
reasonably termed a collective approach to a common, painful history. 
 
Returning to other forms of memory explored by the Assmanns, the communicative conscience 
consists of personal memories within a particular social context (time and place) and is primarily 
built upon day-to-day communications amongst individuals in that setting. As “the mnemonic 
profile of a society changes drastically with each generational shift,” Assmann and Frevert claim 
that the communicative conscience symbolises the “short-term conscience of a society” (A. 
Assmann and Frevert 1999, 37). The memories contained within this communicative conscience 
are rather fleeting, personal remembrances of past exchanges with friends or colleagues and are 
largely based on yet unrecorded oral histories. Cultural memories, part of a “cultural conscience,” 
are on the other hand those that have been recorded externally and manifested in institutions that 
function across the medium- to long-term in order to transmit memories across generations (A. 
Assmann 1999, 19). The transition from communicative to cultural memory represents an act of 
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making more permanent those fleeting memories of the communicative conscience, through 
publication or open display, which necessitates an investigation of a society’s power structures to 
determine the role of individual actors and institutions in the management of memory discourse. 
Jan Assmann (2011, 41) makes clear the differences between the communicative and the cultural 
conscience (or memory), summarised in Figure 1.1: 
 
Figure 1.1: Communicative and cultural memory, according to Jan Assmann (2011) 
 Communicative Memory Cultural Memory 
Content Historical experiences in the 
framework of individual biographies 
Mythical history of origins 
Forms Informal, without much form, natural 
growth, arising from interaction, 
everyday 
Organized, extremely formal, 
ceremonial communication, festival 
Media Living, organic memories, 
experiences, hearsay 
Fixed objectifications, traditional 
symbolic classification and staging 




80-100 years, with a progressive 
present spanning three-four 
generations 
Absolute past of a mythical, 
primeval age 
Carriers Nonspecific, contemporary witnesses 
within a memory community 
Specialised tradition bearers 
 
Here we see the degree to which “cultural memory” takes on a deeply rooted, transgenerational 
meaning; it is through cultural memory that nations create, remember and commemorate their 
origin stories (McCrone 1998, 44-63; see Connerton 1989). Müller similarly states that cultural 
memory “lack[s] the immediacy of [the] first-hand recollection” of communicative memories 
(2009, 14). Sani et al. describe the purpose of such transgenerational transmissions of the past in 
the form of cultural memory, noting that,  
 
perceived collective continuity has two main dimensions […] The first dimension is 
concerned with the perceptions that core values, beliefs, traditions, habits, 
mentalities, and inclinations are trans-generationally transmitted within the group. 
That means that the group is perceived as having deep, essential cultural traits that 
have a degree of permanence. The second dimension is related to the perception that 
the different ages, periods, and events in the history of the group are causally linked 
to one another, that they form a coherent narrative (Sani et al. 2007, 1120). 
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For instance, the date 28 June 1389 (Vidovdan/“St. Vitus Day”) has a strong resonance among 
ethnic Serbs as a date of reckoning for the nation and a symbol of their perceived perpetual 
victimhood through their initial defeat by the Ottomans at Kosovo Polje. The legends of Battle of 
Kosovo, those of betrayal, cowardice, martyrdom and sacrifice, have been transmitted through the 
centuries through oral epics, poetry, tapestry, literature, film and song. This represents what 
Volkan terms the “transgenerational transmission of shared traumas,” linking past to present over 
more than six centuries (Volkan 2001, 85). The year 1389 marks both a rupture with Serbia’s 
past and its relationship to Kosovo as a place of national origin and a symbol of the continuity and 
persistence of the nation in spite of foreign occupation, instilling hope for the rebirth of Serbia as 
an independent nation, something only achieved again in 1804. Similar events, such as the fall of 
Vukovar in 1991 and the victory of Operation Storm in August 1995, play critical roles in 
observing processes that relate to memory and identity in Croatia, as will be explored more 
thoroughly in Chapters 4 to 6. More recent communicative memories, like personal histories of 
the Croatian War of Independence, in contrast, have been swept aside by what Bet-El aptly 
describes as “a truly impressive mountain of books, magazine essays and newspaper columns” 
about the dissolution of Yugoslavia which recall “the most dramatic and romantic images of the 
century” (2009, 216). The prevalence of state-supported media in the former Yugoslavia from 
the 1980s onward also limits to a great degree the narrative power of communicative memory. 
Given the evolution of communications technologies in the intervening centuries, it is unlikely 
that the epic poetry surrounding the Battle of Kosovo will come back to life in new myths of the 
Kosovo War of 1999; these legends, however, might take a different form. Rather, as Jan Assmann 
argues, cultural memory is transmitted by “specialised tradition bearers” (J. Assmann 2011, 41), 
which may manifest both in chosen representatives of defined social groups or, thinking toward 
the future of memory, in newer forms of “external media” that take on a critical role in mediating 
memory across generations (A. Assmann 1999, 19). Modern technologies, particularly on the 
Internet, have helped to an extent to democratise the commemorative process, with the immediate 
dissemination of images, videos and text that otherwise would have taken decades or centuries to 
emerge in the cruder and often artistically filtered forms of poetry and painting. Nonetheless, the 
photographs and archival footage of the wars of the 1990s represent selective periods or events, 
determined by the photographer, editor, journalist or passer-by as important enough to be shared.  
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In comparison, assessing communicative memories (e.g. oral histories passed down generation-
by-generation) involves a deeper ethnographic study of localised or familial mnemonic practices, 
which opens up different forms of memory to description and interpretation. Rather than taking 
this approach, I address wider, social, memorial practices that allow for a degree of generalisation 
across time and location within Croatia. Further, it is hard to claim that there is a collective memory 
shared between Croats and Serbs of the Yugoslav past, resulting from culturally-specific and 
inherently ethnonationalist, exclusive interpretations of their respective histories. These clashes 
in narrative arise from power contestations over memory and its public performance, as I discuss 
later. 
 
Cultural memory, in contrast to communicative memory, can be studied through visual studies of 
memorial spaces and public events, such as those I describe in Knin in Chapter 4 and Vukovar in 
Chapter 5. Cultural memory often is defined in the wider context of collective identity, shedding 
light on its social conditioning as described above. Jan Assmann describes the relationship 
between personal and collective identity as interdependent, stating:  
 
There is a strange, seemingly paradoxical relationship between the two forms of 
identity. I would like to define this by way of two theses that seem to contradict each 
other: 
 
1. A self grows from the outside in. It builds itself up individually by participating 
in the interactive and communicative patterns of the group to which it belongs and 
by contributing to that group’s self-image. Therefore, the ‘we’ identity of the group 
takes precedence over the ‘I’ of the individual – in other words, identity is a social 
phenomenon, or what we might term ‘sociogenic.’  
 
2. The collective ‘we’ identity does not exist outside of the individuals who constitute 
and represent it. ‘We’ is a matter of individual knowledge and awareness (J. 
Assmann 2011, 130-112). 
 
Collective identity, and by extension cultural and collective memory, therefore, relies on the 
interaction of individuals who adopt a shared identity. This collective nature is an emergent 
property that is constantly negotiated between individuals and groups across time and space. 
Personal identities and the labels one chooses to adopt, however, are also formed socially; 
individuality is therefore dependent on social belonging or not-belonging. As Benedict Anderson 
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argues that nations represent “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983), Jan Assmann describes 
the term “collective identity” as “something fictive – a product of social imagination” (J. Assmann 
2011, 114). He also states that cultural memory as a term encompasses mnemonic processes, 
including “The positive new forms of retention and realization across the millennia [which] are 
counterbalanced by the negative forms of loss through forgetting and through suppression by way 
of manipulation, censorship, destruction, circumscription, and substitution” and the evolution of 
“storage technologies […] in short, [encompassing] such functional concepts as tradition forming, 
past reference, and political identity or imagination” (ibid., 9). Cultural memory as a process of 
social imagination therefore appears particularly susceptible to shifts created through such 
negotiation and imagination as these mnemonic communities, that is, nations, are formed, defined 
and challenged. 
 
Transitions between communicative, cultural and collective forms of memory are generally fluid 
but can be envisioned circularly as a process involving various actors at various stages of transition. 
As described above, the point of entry of a memory into the cultural sphere involves the mediation 
or externalisation of a communicative memory, whether oral tradition, family secret or other 
individually-oriented remembrance, be it through the publication of word or image in a setting 
where that memory becomes available to a wider but still exclusive group as determined by 
language, religion, ethnicity or some other limiting factor. This transition involves many different 
actors and, as illustrated in Figure 1, “power holders,” that is, those who may exercise power, be 
they individual authors, independent or mass media publishers, community organisations and so 
forth. Jelin defines such characters as “memory entrepeneurs,” that is, those “who seek social 
recognition and political legitimacy of one (their own) interpretation or narrative of the past” (Jelin 
2003, 33-34). These include political élites and others in positions of relative power who can and 
do influence the processes of identity- and memory-making through acts of public policy and 
diplomacy. The shift from the cultural to collective memory, in comparison, is a process driven to 
a higher degree by state or related political actors, who may wield greater influence in ongoing 
negotiations or contestations of memory with groups external to those whose cultural memories 
they represent. Therefore, cultural memory represents a formalised or institutionalised form of 
communicative memory, which then produces collective (or intercommunal/transcultural) 
memory. This, then, can feed back into communicative memory as the external paramaters in 
which individuals remember have been adapted over time.  
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Figure 1.2 visualises this concept vis-à-vis Jan and Aleida Assmann’s framework of memory, 
highlighting the transitions between various forms of memory in ths process of memory formation, 
from which the susceptibility to “abuse” arises. This is not to suggest that memory abuse does not 
occur in the transition from the communicative to the cultural as well, but the focus of this 
research, as highlighted here, is in the construction of Croatian cultural memory and the 
ostensible lack of transition from cultural to collective or, following Erll (2011), transcultural 
memory between various social groups in Croatia and the wider region. The model, though 
representing a circular model, has been presented here linerally for sake of simplicity, noting 
specifically where I argue the observed patterns of memory abuse emerge, as I discuss below. 
 
Figure 1.2: Memory construction and memory abuse concept model 
Collective memories of past atrocities are particularly lacking in the former Yugoslavia. During 
Tito’s presidency there was little public discussion of grievances between the state’s varied ethnic 
groups for the sake of forging a unitary, future-oriented “Yugoslav” identity at the cost of 
suppressing national identities (see Ramet 2013). The memory of the Second World War across 
the Yugoslav successor states arguably is not a collective one. These contestations arise in the 
points of transition between forms of memory, given the dynamics of power, identity and historical 
interpretation inherent in the process of remembering. Despite the victory of Tito’s Partisans in 
the mid-1940s, the foundation of a communist state and the subsequent creation of a superficially 
  53 
collective memory of the war premised on the Partisan experience, lingering inter-ethnic tensions 
– most notably between Croats and Serbs – prevented that memory construct from ever becoming 
a singular narrative palatable to all Yugoslav citizens.  
 
Compare this with the collective memory of the Holocaust and the lessons and mnemonic practices 
that have emerged from decades of debate and critique. One might imagine there to be a 
comparably monolithic system of remembrance, noting, however, the existence of current 
challenges by historical relativists who force a false equivalence between fascist crimes and crimes 
commited by post-war communist totalitatian regimes. Within this greater structure of Holocaust 
memory lie nested cultural memories specific to particular nations, ethnicities and social groups 
(religious or sexual minorities, for instance) which remain contested from within and without those 
groups. While the Holocaust itself still is denied by many to this day, the mnemonic practices 
created around it – the central role it played in the creation of the forerunners to today’s European 
Union, the international Holocaust institutions (legal and memorial), the wealth of museums and 
exhibitions dedicated to its memory and the unending literature assessing its impact from all 
imaginable angles – have proven unshakable. The same cannot be said about even the distant past 
in Serbia; the word “Kosovo” elicits not only a sharp debate about the status of a partially-
recognised independent country in the Balkan peninsula but also invites controversy about the 
events of a fourteenth-century battle as a foundational myth of the Serb nation. The mnemonic 
battles that surround much of Yugoslav history therefore place cultural memory in a decisive 
position for contemporary analysis of the creation of identity and violence in the region, given the 
lack of consensus over how a collective memory of the past may appear. These tensions form a 
central part of my research, and in the empirical discussion of Croatia’s public face of memory, 
particularly in Chapter 6, I demonstrate how they physically manifest and how these manifestations 
reflect undercurrents in the identity making process in the Yugoslav successor states. The next 
section ties in the sociological concept of power and various iterations thereof (power over 
memory and power to endure) to concurrent processes of identity and memory formation, in doing 
so highlighting the influence of various social groups over these negotiations. 
 
Power 
My thesis is grounded in the study of cultural memory and the transition (or lack thereof) from 
cultural to collective memories of twentieth-century traumas in Croatia. Cultural memories 
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themselves are often the most contested of the three predominant categories of memory – 
communicative, cultural, and collective – put forward by the Assmanns. This contestation in the 
transitions from communicative to cultural and from cultural to collective memory can be guided 
by a wide range of actors, whether public or private, from inside and outside the relevant social 
group. In the case of the communicative memory “becoming” cultural, we must ask who 
determines the communicative memories that ought to be published, mediated or externalised in 
one way or another. Further, we must note how social groups (ethnic groups or nations in this 
instance) come to accept those memories as their own and to perceive events the individual 
members of that group did not witness as fundamental to their own identities, and what media are 
used to transmit such communicative memories temporally and spatially. Who, for example, 
decides to publish a story, and in what form – news article, book, film, memorial? (Why did the 
Grimm Brothers select one region’s oral retelling of Snow White to include in their Children’s and 
Household Tales over another? Why is the šahovnica a contemporary symbol of ethnic Croats, the 
water tower in Vukovar one of their suffering, and the fortress in Knin one of victory and 
thanksgiving?) Why are these symbols unique to one group and not shared with others?  
 
Power and its various manifestations, then, must be examined more critically in the context of 
memory- and identity-formation. Power as a factor of identity and memory is given limited 
attention in extant memory studies literature, but the interdisciplinary nature of memory studies 
allows me here to import useful concepts from sociological literature. Sociological approaches to 
power, however, are divded into Foucauldian and Weberian accounts, but in this thesis, I draw 
from each to synthesis how power is both an omnipresent force (from Foucault) and a consequence 
of social relations and interactions between agents, like soldiers, politicians or activists (from 
Weber).  
 
Michel Foucault defines power often in what it is not, that is not a “group of institutions and 
mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state” or a “general system of 
domination exerted by one group over another;” rather, he argues that “power must be understood 
in the first instance as a multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate 
and which constitute their own organization” (Foucault 1978, 92). Power, therefore, is not static 
but rather an ephemeral and dynamic phenomenon, much like memory, one that is “produced from 
one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another” (ibid., 
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93). As well, power is difficult to measure outside the realm of physics but socially does not 
necessarily result in a zero-sum game; power relationships are instead “an ensemble of actions 
which induce others and follow from one another” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 217). To this, 
Foucault states, “we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse 
and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated one; but as a 
multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies” (Foucault 1978, 
100). 
 
Here, I do not seek to explore who exercises power for the sake of power (a rather lengthy 
philosophical discussion), but who exercises power over something or someone, as a Foucauldian 
analysis of power relations in the context of memory politics may suggest. Whence power emerges 
is less relevant to this case study than how relative balances of power are negotiated – whether 
peacefully or violently – and such an examination of power over memory (see Müller 2009), if at 
all possible, brings together narrative(s) and counter-narrative(s). Weber, in contrast to Foucault, 
defines power as “the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to 
carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” 
(Weber [1922] 1978, 53). Hearn notes that Weber’s conceptualisation of power (“Macht”) must 
be coupled with the notion of dominantion or authority (“Herrschaft”), which is built on the lack 
or presence of some form of legitimacy and the probability that particular commands will by 
followed by the dominated group (Hearn 2012, 29). The concept of counter-narrative (see Y. 
Zerubavel 1995, below) neatly encapsulates Weber’s notion of resistance to authority, that is, 
subversion, within power relations as they apply to the field of memory. In Croatia, for example, 
despite the dominance of a very centralised, conservative retelling of the recent past (see Chapter 
6), and despite the near-total overlap of national, political, linguistic, and cultural identities and 
memories, it is not fruitful to assume that this vision is one defined by one clear “Other” or one 
clear counter-narrative. Instead, a myriad of contestations arises from varying social groups – 
Serbs, civilian victims, pro-Europeans, Yugonostalgics, women, LGBT+ groups, and so on – each 
striving for some relative degree of power over, if not a total dominance of, memory. This, in 
essence, is memory politics.  
 
Contestations of power invariably involve contestations of memory, and such clashes between 
different social groups prevent the formation of a collective or perhaps transnational memory or 
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consciousness of the historical event at the root of that conflict. Further, some memories are 
formed around events particular to one site or cultural group and have no role in an outgroup’s 
archive of cultural memories. Where such events involve more than one party, however, the 
meanings and contemporary interpretations of that past by each group may diverge, also 
preventing a collectivisation of that memory. Cultural memories, I contend, can only become 
collective through transcultural or intergroup consensus forming, tacitly, if not explicitly, 
approved by the state. This process of consensus forming, however, is inherently political and 
requires a deeper understanding of the ability of the state and of state actors (institutions and 
politicians) to influence memory and identity construction, as empirical analyses of the “defender” 
narrative (Chapter 4) and the formation of post-war Croatian identity (Chapter 6) will 
demonstrate. It, too, demands an understanding of the dynamics of power to allow for the relative 
or total domination of cultural memory and identity by particular groups across time. 
 
To examine the link between power and identity, I continue briefly with Foucault, who claims that 
such struggles “revolve around the question, ‘Who are we?’” while also questioning “the status of 
the individual” (1983, 211-212). Much as memory is an individual capacity performed in the 
social, identity, whether individual or collective, is a result of various, dynamic power 
contestations. The struggle for power over memory is inherently tied to the process of identity 
formation, which transforms “power-over” into “power-to” (see Hearn 2014); following the work 
of Anthony Smith, “cultural identity generates power – the power to endure” (Hearn 2018, 288). 
As processes of transgenerational cultural transmission, memory (internalisation) and 
remembrance (rehearsal) are therefore a form of treasure trove, in Jan and Aleida Assmann’s terms 
“an archive” (see J. Assmann and Hölscher 1988, 13; A. Assmann 1995), through which 
identities can be shaped, broken and reborn. Müller refers to this archive as the “grab-bag of 
history” that policymakers use “for viable historical analogies and political orientation” (Müller 
2009, 7). Hearn notes further, “in the ethnosymbolic approach [which Hearn, a modernist, 
criticises, discussed below], the strength of symbols, myths and memories explains the persistence 
of nations” (ibid.).  
 
Demonstrating power over memory necessitates the production of material symbolic 
representations of the in-group, here “nations” or “cultures.” In this thesis, I use physical, visual 
manifestations of memory – monuments, museums, street art – and the employment of symbols in 
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public performances of memory – that is, in annual commemorative events – to highlight the 
various relations between social groups in their competition for power over memory. 
Transformations of symbols and monuments over various historical eras, for example, show us who 
determines the contemporary “public face of memory,” how these aims are achieved – whether 
through peaceful or, in the case of the Homeland War, violent means, like the destruction of 
monuments – and why. Smith suggests to the latter question that,  
 
... the more of the different kinds of sacred foundations a given nation possesses, 
and the richer and more varied their cultural resources, the more persistent and 
adaptable to change is the corresponding national identity likely to be. The 
members of those present day nations that can boast a rich heritage of such cultural 
resources in relation to community, territory, history, and destiny are more likely 
to retain their sense of national identity and ensure the survival of their national 
community, despite the increasing pressures for radical change and cosmopolitan 
assimilation (Smith 2003: 260). 
 
Here, he points to the necessity of material markers of identity to show the dominance of the public 
mnemonic sphere (power over memory) to “ensure the survival of their national community,” that 
is the “power to endure.” This, too, relates to Foucault’s argument that “there is no power that is 
exercised without a series of aims and objectives” (Foucault 1978, 95). While the base aim of 
power over memory is the survival of the national or ethnic group in the cases I examine here, those 
aims do expand as power-over and power-to expand to include further mnemonic, territorial and 
political goals. As I discuss later, this need for survival endurance becomes a source of pride around 
which identities, particularly in Croatia, can be and are centred.  
 
Memory abuse 
Memory informs perceptions of the contemporary affairs of the state and can influence 
policymaking depending on how exactly these memories are instrumentalised. Accordingly, 
politicians and others with the ability to exercise power are able to use (or abuse) memory in such 
a way as to morph policy outcomes to their own desires and imaginations. By controlling access to 
public spaces, funding monument and museum construction, and determining censorable taboos, 
politicians – or more generally the state, in the case of Croatia as an institutional representation of 
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the national majority ethnic group3 – plays an important role in the commemorative process. 
Painful and controversial subjects, in the case of the former Yugoslavia including the massacres in 
Srebrenica, Jasenovac and Bleiburg, often comprise the bulk of cultural memory and to a great 
extent have been employed by state actors (here, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and 
Croatian President Franjo Tuđman come to mind) as material in the “memory wars” that either 
preceded or emerged from Yugoslavia’s violent demise. 
 
Cultural memory, as this shows, is highly susceptible to manipulation and can be put to nefarious 
purposes. Here I present “memory abuse” as an innovative use of a term introduced by Tzvetan 
Todorov in 1995 and a concept to understand how certain properties of memory can be used in a 
detrimental fashion, including, but not limited to, inciting ethnic conflict or violence, defaming 
others – individuals or peoples – along historical enmities that are no longer reflected in 
contemporary situations, or justifying military or armed defensive actions through the 
construction of cultural paranoia. The latter, for example, was the premise upon which Serbs in 
areas of what is now Croatia attacked their Croat neighbours, using the term čišćenje terena/“the 
cleansing of the earth” to remove Croats from the map of “Greater Serbia.” Much of the ethnicised 
hatred incited prior to the outbreak of war in Croatia in March 1991 was brought on by Serb 
propaganda, in which Croats were called Ustaše, a term referring to the ultranationalist Croatian 
Revolutionary Movement of Ante Pavelić. Pavelić controlled the Independent State of Croatia 
(Nezavisna država Hrvatska, NDH), a Nazi puppet state erected in 1941 that covered much of 
the territory of modern Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and northern Serbia and carried out acts of 
mass murder and ethnic cleansing against Serbs until its defeat in 1945. By reintroducing the term 
Ustaše, Serb politicians, among them Slobodan Milošević, used the “othering” of ethnic Serbs 
from their Croat and Bosniak neighbours to push the notion of a “Greater Serbia” stretching from 
Croatia to Kosovo amongst the scattered Serb population of Yugoslavia. Though this 
appropriation of a cultural and collective point of memory as a tool for ostensibly nefarious 
                                                
3 Article I of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia defines the state as “the nation state of the 
Croatian nation and the state of the members of its national minorities: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, 
Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians, Rusyns, Bosniaks, Slovenians, 
Montenegrins, Macedonians, Russians, Bulgarians, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Turks, Vlachs, 
Albanians and others who are its citizens and who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian 
nationality and the exercise of their national rights in compliance with the democratic norms of the 
United Nations and the countries of the free world” (Sabor 2010). 
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reasons, Milošević could arouse his audience, striking at the core of their ethnic identities to incite 
them to act in self-defence against these supposed historical enemies. 
 
The first published use of the term “memory abuse” can be found in the realm of psychoanalysis 
(see Shevrin 1994), but in the social sciences, I address the more impactful introduction of 
“memory abuse” by Tzvetan Todorov in his work, Les abus de la mémoire, in 1995. The term, 
however, has hardly been used in any critical form in the past quarter-century. Todorov himself 
does not apply the term in his own work, rather relying on “the abuses of memory” as a catchy 
phrase to draw attention to forcible constructions or destructions of memory in twentieth-century 
totalitarian regimes (see Todorov 2001, 11). Berliner similarly adopted the phrase “the abuses of 
memory,” in which he addresses the rather flagrant introduction of poorly-defined or analytically 
unsound forms of memory and the “danger of overextension” of the concept in related fields at the 
turn of the memory boom in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Berliner 2005, 198). Margaret 
MacMillan more closely adopts the term “abuse of history” in her work to address forms of 
historical manipulation by nationalists and autocrats but without linking these sorts of narrative 
construction to violence (see MacMillan 2009). While these authors ultimately point toward the 
form of manipulation I address in this thesis, none truly guide the reader through the term 
“memory abuse,” and it is in this gap in the links between memory, identity, power and violence 
that my theoretical contribution through the analytical concept of “memory abuse” is embedded. 
 
Certain properties of cultural memory allow for this manipulation to take place. Aleida Assmann 
and Linda Shortt state that memory has “plastic” and “dynamic” properties, as “individual memory 
is itself volatile and transient; it is constantly in flux” (Assmann and Shortt 2012, 3). As a 
publicised and mediated form of individual communicative memory/-ies, the meaning and content 
of cultural memory is highly dependent on those who exercise power to initiate the transition from 
the communicative into the cultural. Hence, it is important to consider the potential of memory 
abuse in this transition as well as that between the cultural and collective. Abuse in the transition 
from communicative to cultural memory might, for example, be maintained through violence in 
order to perpetuate social divisions which directly affect the individual. In the transition from 
cultural to collective memory, however, abuse would serve to undermine or to block the 
establishment of a truly “collective,” transcultural or intercommunal memory. In the former 
instance, a wide variety of actors may influence such transition, such as authors, publishers, 
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photographers and others who mediate or connect disparate communicative memories (and 
therefore have some degree of power over memory, as discussed above). In the tradition of 
Halbwachs, memory also is socially constructed and given its meaning only in the social sphere. 
Individual memory, a phenomenon which Halbwachs otherwise repudiates, is informed by the 
individual’s process of socialisation, e.g. the environment and conditions in which he or she grew 
up and was educated. 
 
Jan Assmann also describes “reconstructivity” as a property of memory that lends itself to 
malleability, stating,  
 
The cultural memory acts reconstructively, i.e. its knowledge is always in reference 
to a current, contemporary situation. […] It exists in two modi: one in the modus of 
its potentiality as an archive, as a total horizon of collected texts, pictures, patterns 
of behaviour, and the second in the modus of actuality, as a body of objectified 
sense that is made current and given perspective by a respective present (J. 
Assmann and Hölscher 1988, 13).  
  
The ability to reconstruct events of the past to mirror, for example, frustrations of the present – be 
they political, economic or social – through a cultural and thereby ethnic lens, provides room for 
manipulation. The ostensible objectification of historical fact – and, indeed, history is inherently 
subjective – gives those who use cultural memory as a political tool some convincing power in the 
context (time and space) in which they operate. By exploiting the history of late 14th century 
Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, for example, was able to use a cultural filter of Serbdom and a narrative 
of victimhood to use the memory of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo as a tool for convincing Serbs in 
Bosnia and Kosovo to defend themselves against the Turks, cast contemporarily as the mortal 
enemies of the Serb people. By obscuring the fact that Serbia’s gradual defeat and annexation by 
the Ottoman Empire would not occur until the 1450s, Milošević and the media outlets he 
controlled managed to create a sense of urgency and immediate threat by reconstructing Serb 
cultural history in terms favourable to his political mission to carve a Serb state from the crumbling 
Yugoslavia. 
 
The second property of cultural memory that enables its abuse is its inherent inconsistency over 
time. As Aleida Assmann writes, “The form and quality of cultural memory spaces […] are 
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determined both by political and social changes as well as by change in technical media” (A. 
Assmann 1999, 408). Through various interpretations and reiterations of history over time and 
across generations, it appears that the first to transform the communicative memory of the past 
into the cultural determines to a large part the meaning that these memories will carry into 
perpetuity. Vuk Karadžić (*1787-†1864), for example, was amongst the first Serb philologists to 
collect and publish the oral histories of Serbia, including that of the Battle of Kosovo, into a 
tangible and accessible form of epic poetry for the growing literate masses. Like the tales of the 
Brothers Grimm, however, Karadžić’s stories and the Serbian epics were still subject to nefarious 
forms of manipulation after his death, providing cultural and literary fodder for the Milošević 
regime to reinterpret as a nationalist tool to incite violence against others (see Greenawalt 2001, 
50).  
 
However, I must problematise the term “nefarious” in my definition of memory abuse, as the role 
of national narratives is not to be underestimated in determining the actions of a state or 
individuals that may be met with contempt elsewhere. A more recent example of conflicting 
national narratives is to be found in the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia in South Ossetia, 
as described by James V. Wertsch. Wertsch explains that the Western perspective of Russian 
aggression in the former Soviet realm may not hold or be convincing to Russians themselves, as 
their worldview has been framed by the “Expulsion of Foreign Enemies narrative template” over 
decades and centuries, sharpening since the end of the Second World War (Wertsch 2012, 178). 
The framing of the conflict over Russophile territory in modern Georgia through an ingrained 
national narrative of self-defence, informed by personal and collective experiences of warfare, 
denies the relevance of a Western narrative of neo-colonial expansionism. Wertsch writes,  
 
They also dismiss claims that Georgia is some kind of laboratory for democracy 
as naïve, if not transparently dishonest. Instead, the Expulsion of Foreign Enemies 
narrative template was harnessed to present a picture in which the real agenda in 
Georgia was to create a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) outpost that 
could eventually serve as a site for launching aggression against Russia. From this 
perspective, the Russian incursion into the breakaway Georgian enclave of South 
Ossetia was an act of legitimate pre-emption against an aggressor, and also 
liberation for the Ossetian population, many of which indeed did side with Russia 
(ibid., 179). 
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Whether the use of cultural memory tools like national narratives in this sense is truly nefarious is 
in the eye of the memory holder. In my research, this demands reflexively understanding the 
framing of “right” and “wrong” or “appropriate” and “inappropriate” uses of memory, as 
discussed in Chapter 3. The memory “holder,” however, becomes a person or collective body of 
interest, and in many instances, I conceptualise memory holders as those with the power over 
memory in whose image monuments and museums are designed and constructed. 
 
The return of competitive, and ultimately violent, expressions of nationalism in Yugoslavia in the 
late twentieth century was, much to the dismay of sensationalist authors, not the result of “ancient 
hatreds” that had existed in the region since time immemorial. Rather, Malešević (2017a) argues 
that nationalism itself was not a guiding or even useful political principle in the Western Balkans 
during its heyday elsewhere in Europe in the mid-nineteenth century. Gellner comments in this 
light, “[…] nationalism is not [author’s emphasis] the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, 
though that is how it does indeed present itself. It is in reality the consequence of a new form of 
social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each 
protected by its own state” (1983, 48). The lack of suitable communication infrastructure in the 
newly independent Serbian state of 1804 prevented the spread of news and ideas or the spirit of a 
wider, “imagined” community in Anderson’s (1983) sense beyond the local or provincial level. 
This, however, is not particular to Serbia in the general sense of early stages of widening national 
identity, but when compared to the more rapid development of communication technologies in, 
for example, Britain or Germany at the turn of the nineteenth century, the growth of Serbia as an 
imagined community appears rather latent. Low literacy rates and the inability (or perhaps 
unwillingness) to provide education to anyone but the sons of the élite combined with a dearth of 
paved roads or railways to inhibit state intervention in the socialisation process of young Serbian 
peasants through universal education in language, history, religion or culture. As communication 
technologies evolved, then, the Serbian government gained the ability to “[nationalise] the masses 
[…] at the end of nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, reaching its peak on the eve 
of and during the Balkan wars (1912–3) when the Serbian establishment put a great deal of effort 
into developing the ideological narratives that would legitimise territorial expansion throughout 
the Balkans” (Malešević 2017a, 137). It is this process of mobilising the wider populace itself 
toward self-identification with the nation that Reicher and Hopkins describe as “nationalism” 
(2001, 54).  
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Expressions of a different, more militaristic vein of expansionist nationalism often derive from Ilija 
Garašanin’s 1844 Načertanije, a policy document which espoused a Велика Србија/“Greater 
Serbia” stretching from Hungary to Bulgaria; this vision of a “Greater Serbia,” suppressed like 
other nationalist undercurrents in Titoist Yugoslavia, was revived in the wars of the 1990s by far-
right-wing supporters of the Serbian Radical Party. Concurrently, images of a Velika Hrvatska/ 
“Greater Croatia” were spread by Croatian nationalists during the 1991-1995 Croatian War of 
Independence, who had brought back to life the NDH policy of Croatian expansionism that had 
also emerged during the early nineteenth century. This appropriation or reinterpretation of 
historical manifestations of fledgling nationalism in Croatia and Serbia underscores McCrone’s 
analysis of the invention of the past and the intersections of history and nationalism. He writes that 
“this mobilisation of history is […] an exercise in legitimation” and that “tradition is an appeal to 
the present, not the past” (McCrone 1998, 51). Thus, the use of nineteenth-century expansionist 
ideologies in the late twentieth was not intended to push for historical continuity but rather to 
reclaim a lost past for present and future gain in the name of the nation, again reaffirming the right 
for a nation to endure. The post-independence Croatian state has also used the language of “the 
millennial national identity of the Croatian nation and the continuity of its statehood” in the 
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (Sabor 2010, 1) to legitimate and ground the future-facing 
identity of “the Croatian nation” in a historical context dating to the seventh century CE. This 
phenomenon will be examined more thoroughly in Chapter 6, in which I examine the HDZ’s  active 
use of history through post-independence memorial spaces and practices. 
 
In this section, I have laid out the framework of communicative, cultural and collective memory 
and how the spaces between them are those in which motivated individuals can seize power over 
memory, in the context of my research in order to instil their vision of the world in the public 
sphere. The above definition of “memory abuse” may appear to be a more extreme interpretation 
of manipulation, but it is through the transformation of memory as a tool for achieving violent aims, 
even if in the struggle for “power to endure,” that this term may gain greater currency. In the 
following section, I discuss how matters of memory, power and violence combine to shape culture 




  64 
Memory, culture and identity 
The process of creating an identity requires recollections of who one “was,” and in this way, 
memory and identity are tightly bound. The question of belonging is central to the study of nations 
and nationalism, a sociological discourse with divergent approachs, most crucially between 
Smith’s ethnosymbolism, modernist interpretations of nationhood, and (though mostly rejected in 
contemporary literature) the primordialist argument based on theories of human evolution. 
Modernists, such as Jonathan Hearn, David McCrone, Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm, 
among others, assert that nations are a recent construct that emerged through the centralisation of 
authority and the modernisation of a self-sustaining economy. These developments necessitated 
the use of standardised language, currency, measures and other values that provide room for 
common identities to be sustained. Durkheim, who may be classified as a modernist thinker, 
demonstrates this through his typologies, noted above, of traditional societies built on 
“mechanical solidarity” and productive (that is, modern) societies that emerge through “organic” 
solidarity (Durkheim 1893, 158-188). The limitations of modernist theories of nationalism lie 
primarily in their attention to the rather short-term view they take on the emergence, development, 
maintenance and contestation of national identities. Anthony Smith, whose ethnosymbolic 
approach I describe later in this section, criticised this rather short-sighted view of nationhood and 
belonging, arguing that attention should be drawn, too, to the longue durée of a group’s history 
(Smith 1998, 170), which proves rather fruitful when studying the narrative of Croatia’s 
“millennial nationhood”.  
 
Smith notes, “The sense of ‘whence we came’ is central to the definition of ‘who we are’” (Smith 
1991, 22). This relationship also feeds backward; one’s memories are informed by one’s identity 
and ingrained social frames of reference, which can and often do change over time. The common 
conscience shared by a particular community, whether family or nation, therefore refers to the 
store of memories and commemorative practices actively produced by the group. Aleida Assmann 
writes, “ethnic groups, nations and states […] do not have a collective memory, but make one with 
the aid of various symbolic media, such as texts, images, monuments, anniversaries and 
commemorative festivals. […] Such common and for each community binding links to the past and 
to cultural tradition are what give these collectives their identity as ‘we.’ This is not a matter of 
individual origins but something acquired through learning, participation in the rituals, and all the 
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other practical ways in which people integrate into a community [author’s emphasis]” (A. Assmann 
2012, 175). 
 
Identity formation also involves identifying what a nation is not, which invariably creates an 
exclusive identity of the “self” and of the “other.” The contestations between Croats and Serbs 
over their respective national identities has emerged from the disentanglement of an earlier 
recognition of shared Slavic (or Yugoslav, “South Slavic”) roots. In doing so, former neighbours 
become foreigners, identities which crystallised in the course of the wars in the former Yugoslavia 
throughout the 1990s. Reicher and Hopkins discuss at length the role of (new, post-conflict) 
national identities in international or intergroup relations (2001, 77-99) but do not directly 
address how the “other” is created in contrast to someone’s chosen national identity. Todorova 
(1997; see also Bakić-Hayden 1995), in comparison, details the processes of othering of and 
within the Balkans and postulates “Balkanism” as a European post-colonial and orientalist 
approach to solidifying European identity/-ies around what Europeans are not: brutish, violent, 
divided, uncivilised. As discussed previously, the struggle for power to endure helps to perpetuate 
or reform existing identities that, if not formed in affirmation of their continuity, are defined by 
contrast. Hearn comments that “power creates identity […] in opposition”: 
  
When the people in one organisation or group hold power over others, those so 
dominated will tend to construct identities as counterfoils to that domination, to 
define their identities against their oppressors. And this of course is a central motif 
in nationalism studies, in the appeals to local, authentic folk cultures that resist the 
powers of colonising civilisations. But here, the very intensity of identification is 
understood as an effect of the power relationship and how it is met, not a pre-
existing resource that then determines survival (Hearn 2018, 288).  
 
Jenkins’ survey of social identity (2014) describes processes of determining and institutionalising 
identity at the collective level, which may mimic those of collective memory, yet the author does 
not differentiate identity and memory at any point in the book. He nonetheless states, “Identity 
can only be understood as a process of ‘being’ or ‘becoming.’ One’s identity […] is never a final or 
settled matter” (18). This inherent dynamism of identity fits neatly with the definition of memory 
as a process of remembering, but remembering and being necessarily involve two different 
timespans. Remembering involves the time between the event being recalled or commemorated 
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and the present but need not speak to the future; Schwartz notes to this effect that collective 
memory employs “symbols to awaken ideas and feelings about the past” (2000, 9). Identity, on 
the other hand, bridges the gap from the present state of “being” or “becoming” to an 
indeterminate future, generally someone’s lifespan or the duration of their post-mortem legacy.  
 
Political actors also significantly influence the content of national identities and often use memory 
as a tool for such narrative construction. The susceptibilities of cultural memory and its power to 
inform and shape personal and collective identities lend cultural memory to manipulation and 
abuse by nefarious power holders or influencers in the transitions between the various forms of 
memory discussed above. In contrast to “violence,” I use the term “abuse” in the strictest 
dictionary sense, that is, to “use (something) to bad effect or for a bad purpose; misuse” (Oxford 
Dictionary 2017). In the context of this research, “memory abuse” hence refers to the intentional 
manipulation of memory past a particular threshold, beyond which violence may result. I also 
acknowledge the normativity of the phrase “memory abuse,” particularly as an outsider to the 
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, but I maintain that those “bad purposes” include any action that 
leads to violence. While memory studies itself has yet to face such a divergence in approaches as 
has, for example, nationalism studies (compare the primordialist, modernist and ethnosymbolic 
approaches), my use of the term “memory abuse” represents a break from standard Durkheimian 
studies of cultural memory and takes a more critical stance not only on the function of memory but 
also on the role of the researcher as an activist and possible interventionist. In the case of 
Yugoslavia’s dissolution, the mnemonic battles that framed much of the discourse that led to the 
outbreak of war represents memory abuse in the clearest way. Bet-El summarises this point: 
 
Large chunks of verbal agony, beginning with the words ‘I remember,’ and often 
ending with a sharp admonition: Remember! These were memories of aggressive acts 
committed by the others: Croats upon Serbs and Muslims; Muslims upon Croats and 
Serbs; Serbs upon Croats and Muslims and Albanian Kosovars; Albanian Kosovars 
upon Serbs. Sin upon sin, national memories conjured up as if they were real, 
personal memories, locking each ethnicity into itself, making all the others 
abhorrent, unjust and fearful. Words of the past became weapons of war (Bet-El 
2009, 206). 
 
In his discussion of the fall of Yugoslavia, Müller similarly has commented, “[…] Yugoslavia has 
horrifically demonstrated what happens when memory wars turn into real wars” (2009, 17). The 
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ability of politicians, through authoritarian control over the creation of new identities and cultural 
memories, to convince co-ethnics to commit acts of violence against neighbours and friends 
certainly justifies the use of the words “nefarious” and “bad” in this definition of memory abuse. 
It is in the ongoing gap in post-conflict memory literature on the relationship between power (or 
absolute power) and memory that the concept of “memory abuse” is situated, not only addressing 
and challenging the pervasive “ancient hatreds” narrative (e.g. Kaplan 1993) that permeated much 
of the early writing on the fall of Yugoslavia but also the dearth of literature on the role of the 
Croatian state in the mnemonic and physical wars of the 1990s. 
 
If the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s were models of contemporary “memory wars,” then the role 
of identity in shaping conflict and, vice versa, the role of conflict in shaping identity is not to be 
underappreciated. The struggle for power to endure is central to understanding the Croatian 
“millennial” narrative, linking various Croatian states over time to preserve a vision of Croatian 
independence no matter the cost. Indeed, much of the tension that emerged in the 1980s prior to 
Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution related back to the existence of an “Independent State of Croatia” 
in the 1940s, one responsible for genocide against Serbs, Jews, Roma and other minority groups. 
The use (or abuse) of religious symbols in the NDH and in modern Croatia call into question the 
role of symbols in determining and signalling national identity. Anthony Smith’s 
“ethnosymbolism” serves as a useful analytical term in this context to assess visual representations 
of the nation, which he defines as “a named human population sharing an historic territory, 
common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common 
legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith 1991, 14). For Smith, ethnosymbolism functions 
as “an approach that [seeks] to establish relations between the different kinds of collective cultural 
identity by focusing on elements of myth, memory, value, symbol and tradition that tended to 
change more slowly, and were more flexible in meaning, than the processes in other domains” 
(Smith 2004, 196). This means that studying markers and performances of memory, among 
others, helps us understand better the nature of identity as well as clashes of identities over time 
and space. Hearn nonetheless criticises Smith’s past-oriented approach to nationalism through 
ethnosymbolism, noting that Smith’s claim that cultural identities “serve a fundamental 
ontological need for ‘authenticity’ and orientation in this world” toe the line of primordial thinking 
(Hearn 2018, 288). 
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Mass commemorative events such as those held in Knin (see Chapter 4) and Vukovar (see Chapter 
5) are useful sources of information on social behaviours surrounding public memory and how they 
intersect with personal beliefs and identities, whether religious, ethnic, national or political. 
Sumartojo notes, “the gathered actions, narratives, symbols and environments of commemoration 
are employed to help reinforce versions of national identity that can have wide social ramifications” 
(Sumartojo 2016, 541). As these various identities closely overlap in the public face of memory in 
Croatia, it is important to examine how such conformity, one of these “wide social ramifications,” 
has come to be. It is also important to note exceptions to the rules that are indeed marginalised or 
directly call into question the content of state narratives of the past. This conformity is a result of 
the consolidation of the power of the HDZ and the defenders through their symbiotic relationship 
and aggressive approach to deflecting or rejecting external criticisms to their narratives, detailed 
in Chapter 4. More widely in the realm of memory studies, much as national identities require some 
“Other” to provide delineation (Dervin 2012, 187-187; Anderson 1983), the patterns of 
negotiation that result in the formation of cultural, collective or other public forms of memory 
depend on the existence of a mainstream narrative and one or more that challenge it.  
 
These narratives are supported by symbols, slogans and songs commemorating a nation’s past, 
which serve as critical elements of national identity and a nation’s unique set of shared memories. 
As such, these symbols are susceptible to manipulation or abuse (Swidler 1986). In the late 1980s 
and throughout the course of the 1990s wars in the former Yugoslavia, many contested symbols 
from the Second World War were revived by nationalist actors in both Croatia and Serbia that were 
used to rally co-ethnics to the defence, respectively, of the “homeland” (domovina) or “fatherland” 
(otadžbina/отаџбина). In Croatia, flags depicting the chequerboard šahovnica and the crossed 
U of the Ustaša regime of the NDH were flown, seen by ethnic Serbs as a provocation that invoked 
the memories of the Jasenovac extermination camp in which an estimated 100,000 Serbs, Roma, 
Jews and Muslims were murdered between 1941 and 1945 (USHMM 2020a); the death tolls of 
the massacres at Jasenovac, Kragujevac, Bleiburg and several other sites near or within the former 
Yugoslavia remain heavily contested. Similarly, in Serbia and areas across Yugoslavia populated by 
ethnic Serbs, symbols of the royalist Četnik troops who in the course of the Second World War 
collaborated with Axis powers to create an ethnically pure “Greater Serbia,” were worn by 
supporters of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), founded in 1991 from a merger between two far-
right movements, including Vojislav Šešelj’s “Serbian National Renewal” (Srpska narodna 
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obnova/Cрпска народна обнова, SNO); the uniforms of the White Eagles (Beli orlovi/Бели 
орлови), a paramilitary wing of the SRS, also bore the double-headed eagle of the Serbian royal 
coat of arms that emerged from the reign of the Nemanjić dynasty in the Middle Ages. Whilst both 
the šahovnica and the double-headed eagle date several hundred years prior to the wars of the 
twentieth century, their appropriation by both the NDH and the Četniks during the Second World 
War have shifted public perceptions of these symbols. Since the conflicts of the 1990s, these 
symbols have remained present in everyday life, either as antagonisms at football matches, in 
nationalist graffiti or as national symbols integrated into the flags and currencies of each country.  
 
More recently, movements to rehabilitate war-time Axis collaborators have rekindled deeper 
historical grievances in Croatia and Serbia. On 15 May 2015, the Belgrade Higher Court 
rehabilitated Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović, leader of the Četniks in the Second World War, who 
was executed in 1946 by the Yugoslav government under Josip Broz Tito for treason and 
collaboration with the Third Reich (Ristić and Milekić 2015). As well, the Zagreb District Court 
overturned in July 2016 a Yugoslav-era conviction of Alojzije Cardinal Stepinac, sentenced to 
prison for collaboration with the Ustaša regime but later beatified by Pope John Paul II (Vasović 
2016); the resulting exchange of diplomatic protest notes between Serbia and Croatia highlights 
the sensitive nature of these legal decisions to the families of the victims of the respective states’ 
war-time predecessors. In February 2017, In the Name of the Family (U ime obitelji), a Croatian 
conservative/traditionalist NGO, filed a request to the Zagreb District Court to consider the 
rehabilitation of Filip Lukas, president of the Matica hrvatska Croatian cultural institute during 
the Second World War who was aligned with NDH leader Ante Pavelić; Lukas fled Yugoslavia 
before he could be executed and died in Rome in 1958 (Milekić 2017a). As these cases suggest, 
contestations of memory have proven key to perpetuating ongoing social divisions in the region, 
and it is particularly the use and abuse by state actors of cultural memories of the Second World 
War during and after the wars of the 1990s that have driven these tensions, which continue to 
serve as markers of ethnic identity. How memory abuse manifests in violence is explored in the 
next section, and I return to Foucault to highlight how the process of othering is a paramount 
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Memory and violence 
Cultural memory, when examined as a tool rather than a process, can become a motivating force to 
turn otherwise friendly or indifferent neighbours into mortal enemies. Here, I envision violence as 
a process that runs concurrently to that of identity formation, one in which memory is transformed 
from a binding element to a divisive weapon; as well, violence is a strategy in the competition for 
power. Violence can manifest in many forms and does not always result in physical destruction, 
bodily harm or death. As Malešević notes, “Violence […] is a scalar concept: it includes diverse 
practices which vary in scale, magnitude and intensity of physical, moral or emotional damage” 
(Malešević 2017b, 10). 
 
My work goes beyond the Oxford Dictionary (2019) definition of violence as “behaviour involving 
physical force intended to hurt, damage, or kill someone or something,” as the focus on intent to 
harm is quite subjective and more appropriate for a legal examination of conflict. My vision of 
violence, as stated above, is one of a force that divides and is a strategy to achieve power (see May 
1972, 147-164). As well, violence is enacted upon various levels of society, with each 
experiencing the same act of violence in often wildly different ways. That is, “To properly 
understand violence, it is necessary to compare and contrast its historical transformation at the 
interpersonal and intra-group (micro), the inter-group and intra-polity (mezzo), and inter-
polity (macro) levels [emphasis own]” (Malešević 2013, 273). The levels of analysis in this work, 
when viewing memory abuse and social conflict through a national lens, target the latter macro 
level in Chapter 6 with a focus on the construction of Croatian national identity and the mezzo 
level in Chapters 4 and 5, where tensions within Croatian society between men and women, 
civilians and soldiers come into play. Particularly in my examination of inter-group social violence, 
I look at the struggle for recognition of victims’ groups by the Croatian state and how their neglect 
perpetuates or exacerbates power struggles within a divided civil society.  
 
The intersection of violence and identity occurs where an act of violence alters someone’s 
perception of the self and the other. The creation of opposing forces, however artificial or 
superficial their differences, both reaffirms and negates various elements of personal, and 
eventually, social identities. Exercising power over memory allows different actors varying levels 
of resistance or “insubordination” to attempts to seize public space for the performance and 
demonstration of memory, this resistance a refusal to accommodate the Other’s identity. 
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Foucault’s term “counter-memory” proves useful in these contexts. While Foucault describes 
“counter-memory” as “a transformation of history into a totally different form of time” (Foucault 
1980, 160), and though this definitional aspect of temporal transformation is not quite relevant to 
my own work, I find the notion of resistance that “counter-memory” implies and the element of 
transformation at its core of critical importance. A similar term emerges from Zerubavel’s work on 
“counter-narrative,” (Y. Zerubavel 1995) which more closely captures the discourse of resistance 
in the wider context of identity formation. If the purpose of violence (itself a transformative force) 
resulting from memory abuse is to mark mnemonic territory, then identities will be impacted 
accordingly by the outcomes of that violence. This process is summarised in Figure 1.3 below, 
which shows the links between cultural memory, the power over memory, the power to endure and 
resulting identities, which, as in Figure 1.2, are not strictly linear and can work in opposing 
directions. This back-and-forth between memory and identity, particularly where violence is 
initiated or perpetuated, becomes apparent in Chapters 4 to 6, again reinforcing the need for some 
“counter” or “Other” to push the (trans)formation of identity. 
 
Figure 1.3: Relationship between memory, power and identity 
 
 
The process of othering and related forms of cultural differentiation and identity construction, 
however, can be and often are achieved through non-violent means. Nonetheless, the primary 
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focus of my research is to assess how violence impacts identities and mnemonic behaviours (and 
vice-versa) as they are represented visually in the aftermath of war. I am less interested in the 
physical destruction caused by war than in the rhetoric and political decision-making that furthers 
more silent forms of violence that interweave with social transformation in the years that follow. 
Malešević notes, “Although in modernity violence has become less publicly visible, it is, in fact, 
much more prevalent […] as both killing and dying are removed from the public eye” (Malešević 
2013, 285). This is true of inter-group violence as demonstrated in the mnemonic conflicts I 
describe throughout this thesis, particularly as clear instances of inter-personal violence as would 
be seen in war have declined. The near-total absence of images of Croatian suffering that I will 
demonstrate in memorial spaces dedicated to the Homeland War and the abstraction of death into 
purely symbolic reductions may attest to this claim. The abstract nature of social violence, that is, 
actions that harm social cohesion and over time negatively impact particular communities, also 
requires a more process-oriented view that is better addressed through sociological, historical and 
political lenses, a multidisciplinary approach I employ throughout my research. 
 
In the immediate pre- and post-war periods of the 1940s and 1990s in Yugoslavia and Croatia, 
the absence of large-scale physical violence did not mean the absence of social forms of violence, 
framed as means of justice, most notably in the maintenance of forced labour in prison camps like 
Goli otok or in anti-Serb violence since the conclusion of the Homeland War. In the mid- to late 
1980s, the loud, public embrace of othering and the transformation of religious identities into 
more hardened ethnic or national ones, defined by political rather than spiritual boundaries, 
brought about the end of the Titoist project of “Brotherhood and Unity.” The above-mentioned 
examples from Serbia’s rediscovery of the medieval Battle of Kosovo and the resulting definition 
of Kosovar Albanians, Bosniaks and other perceived enemies of the Serb nation as “Turks” 
demonstrate this process. As well, mnemonic divisions and more exclusive definitions of 
citizenship in the aftermath of the Homeland War represent obstacles for the creation of a memory 
of the war that transcends territorial, ethnic, national, religious and cultural boundaries. Identities 
formed through violent means, as I contend is the case in Croatia (see also Tanner 2010), are often 
those defined by opposition and negation rather than affirmation of unique or perhaps more 
universal features of those identities.  
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Returning to the above discussion of power, Foucault notes that, “Power exists only when it is put 
into action,” that is, “power is not a function of consent” (quoted in Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 
219-220). Seeking a monopoly over memory, then, is a forceful act that disrupts existing power 
relations, here through violence. Foucault continues,  
 
A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it 
breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities. Its opposite 
pole can only be passivity, and if it comes up against any resistance, it has no other 
option but to try to minimize it. On the other hand, a power relationship can only 
be articulated on the basis of two elements which are each indispensable if it is 
really to be a power relationship: that “the other” (the one over whom power is 
exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a person 
who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, 
reactions, results, and possible inventions may open (quoted in Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1983, 220). 
 
In this thesis, I use power and the quest to wield or exercise power over memory and, ultimately, 
others, to frame violence as a transformative tool rather than as an ends in and of itself. Power over 
memory, which secures groups’ power to endure, also secures the definition of some “Other,” 
against which the in-group is defined. The “Other” must not necessarily consent to its being 
defined as such, when we follow the logic of Foucault. Therefore, while the content of the “Other” 
may be changed constantly (as in the Croatian example where various “Others” exist), the 
existence of the “Other” is always necessary for identities to remain unique and to endure across 
generations. This notion further derives from Hegel’s differentiation of the Self and Other, which 
underscores the importance of an “Other,” without which any sense of self would be lost (see 
Hegel 1971; Berenson 1982). However, the purpose of “othering” is often unclear beyond 
tactically striving for narrative independence in the process of identity construction. The violence 
(social, physical, psychological or other) that is involved here is neither just for the sake of violence 
(as is seeking power for the sake of power) nor is it alone self-perpetuating. Various motives come 
to play out on both the individual actor – a soldier, a politician, a police officer, and so on – and at 
the wider social level. For some, violence may be retributive, for others pre-emptive, and for others 
still for the sake of maintaining honour. If – only conceptually – we reduce the motivation for 
violence as one of seeking the power to endure, then cultural differentiation, an act that plays out 
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in the mnemonic sphere as well as the physical realm, is a process that can to a great degree be 
achieved through memory abuse.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter addressed the core theoretical arguments I will elucidate throughout this work, 
namely: 
 
1) Memory is a social phenomenon that builds from interactions between individuals and 
groups across space and time and is supported by various structures (political systems, 
religion, tradition, etc.) that can be analysed for their role in the creation of national 
identities. As it is a malleable construct susceptible to manipulation by particular groups 
with relative degrees of influence, memory can be “abused.” “Memory abuse” as a term 
ought to be applied more strictly to contexts where memory, power and violence intersect 
to provide a better understanding of the mechanisms and actors that give rise to violence 
through the manipulation of shared remembrances of the past.  
2) Cultural memory can be used as a tool to foment or exacerbate social tensions that are 
inherently violent in the process of identity formation. Identity formation, however, is a 
result of the shift from the struggle for the power over memory to the power to endure. 
That is, as a group seeks to ensure its preservation, it uses aspects of its past to justify 
violence that asserts not only its dominance over particular cultural narratives but affirms, 
reshapes or destroys the identities of the Self and of the Other in the process of 
transitioning from cultural to collective memory. 
3) Symbolic representations of the nation – in the context of this work, monuments, 
museums, street art or public commemorations – serve to maintain that nation and 
transmit memory and identity over generations. Such works are (quite literally) concrete 
evidence of cultural memory, and the interactions of various groups with them reflect the 
dynamics of memory politics and the “plasticity” of cultural memory itself.  
 
These theoretical arguments will allow me to isolate various processes that run concurrently to 
identity formation in and around conflict, including memory abuse, narrative construction, 
remembering and forgetting. The next chapter explores the historical background of the Croatian 
case study that forms the basis of my research, detailing the various events that led to violence 
  75 
before, during and after war in the twentieth century and continue to guide the formation of 
Croatian national identity through the present day. ★	
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Introduction 
The history of Croatia is not just one of the Croats but of the many peoples and states that have 
come and gone through the Adriatic coast and in the Slavonian countryside in the past 1100 years. 
This chapter will focus more closely on those critical junctures in Croatian history that have 
determined to a significant degree the mnemonic content of Croatia’s collective conscience and 
speak to the various themes of identity, politics and violence that underpin this research. 
Fundamentally, this retelling of Croatia’s past is as much about the Croat(ian) narod/“nation” as 
much as it is of the Serbs and others who have cohabitated with Croats since at least the early 
sixteenth century. The trajectory of the Second World War and its aftermath, however, represent 
the most significant turning points in Serbian-Croatian relations and in turn have solidified major 
elements of the contemporary and predominantly conservative national identity of Croats in 
Croatia and the diaspora. Here, I organise the chapter into sections that separately discuss the 
foundations of the Croatian “nation,” the histories of violence in the 1940s and 1990s in Croatia 
and finally the politics of memory and identity that emerge from them, particularly in light of 
Croatia’s 2013 accession to the European Union. Each section will highlight the various layers of 
Croatian identity that have formed around those historical events and in their aftermaths.  
 
The creation of “Croatia,” 925 to 1941 CE 
This brief review of relevant moments in Croatia’s past begins with an overview of the origins of 
“Croatia” as an independent kingdom and its evolution through various changes in power, from 
the tenth century to the beginning of the Second World War in Yugoslavia. While such a large 
span of this chronicle may have been crucial in the formation of contemporary elements of Croatian 
identity, as I will discuss in Chapter 6, much of this past has been overlooked in the public face of 
memory we see today.  
 
Croatian history dates back more than a millennium to at least the eighth century CE, and 
depending on the historical approach taken, the Croat nation has been theorised to descend 
variously from tribes that migrated from what is now Iran, Bulgaria, Italy, Ukraine or Poland or 
formerly was part of Roman Illyria, now the Western Balkans (Tanner 2010, 2). No matter the 
historical origins of what could have been an early Croatian tribe, what is known for certain is that 
a Slavic group known as the bijeli Hrvati/“White Croats” was first recognised in Central Europe 
around modern Slovakia, Poland and Ukraine by the seventh century, at which point a number 
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among them, along with the Pannonian Avars, migrated south to what is now Croatia (Heršak and 
Silić 2002). At this point, various Roman-cum-Ostrogoth-cum-Byzantine cities existed across the 
Dalmatian littoral and Pannonian inland areas, including major trading outposts like Ragusa 
(Dubrovnik) and Salona (Solin), near Spalatum (Split). The year 925 CE represents perhaps the 
first major lieu de mémoire (Nora 1989) of modern Croatian cultural memory, namely with the 
founding of the Kingdom of Croatia under King Tomislav I and his recognition as ruler by Pope 
John X. This point is a vital marker of the persistent relationship between the church and the state 
in Croatia and the longevity of the Croatian “millennial” narrative. Shortly before the foundation 
of Tomislav’s kingdom, the Glagolitic script, the first Slavic alphabet, was created by Saint Cyril 
for the spreading of popular liturgy, and only in Croatia has a modified variant of the script been 
preserved for religious use through the present day.4 The state created by Tomislav, a 
knez/“duke” from 910, would last until 1102 and the union of the Croatian monarchy with 
Hungary, while coastal regions fell under the influence of the Republic of Venice, marking the 
continuation of a long-standing on-and-off relationship between Italy and Croatia on the Adriatic 
(Tanner 1997). Only in 1954 with the resolution to hand back the Free Territory of Trieste, 
established in the aftermath of the Second World War, to Italy would the ongoing renaming of 
towns like Zara/Zadar, Fiume/Rijeka, Spalato/Split and Ragusa/Dubrovnik end.  
 
With both the gradual decay of the Venetian trade empire and the fall of the Hungarians to the 
Ottoman invasions of the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century and their defeat at the 1526 Battle of 
Mohács, rule over what is now Croatia shifted once more. On invitation by the severely neutered 
Croatian Sabor/“Parliament,” the Habsburg monarchy established a large Vojna 
Krajina/“Military Frontier” across Slavonia, Srijem and Baranja and the Una and Sava rivers 
bordering Ottoman Bosnia. Keeping the Ottomans at bay also involved the recruitment of Serb, 
Croat, Austrian and Hungarian soldiers, the Grenzer or graničari, whose inevitably prolonged stay 
led to the formation of multicultural settlements in Croatia’s agricultural heartland (Goldstein 
2001, 34-53). This first integration of Serbian Orthodox Slavs into the Croatian landscape also 
plays a critical role in determining the territory marked for “ethnic cleansing” (the term originating 
from the Croatian etničko čišćenje) in the Second World War and the Croatian War of 
                                                
4 In several monuments across the country today, the Glagolitic script still can be found, often 
applied to the quote, “Navik on živi ki zgine pošteno”/ “He who dies honourably lives forever,” 
attributed to the seventeenth-century noble Petar Zrinski, discussed below. 
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Independence in the twentieth century. 
 
Figure 2.1: Map of Habsburg territory in Croatia, 1785 CE 
 
Legend: Pink – Zagreb environs; Green – Pecs (Hungary) environs; Brown – Military Frontier/Vojna Krajina;  
Red – Hungarian littoral; Purple – Dalmatia and Venetian Istria 
Source: Zamolčana Istra (2008). 
 
Throughout the period of rule by the Habsburg Monarchy, Croatia served as Europe’s “Christian 
bulwark,” an antemurale christianitatis, a critical piece in the ever-changing puzzle of European 
sovereignty (Housley 2014). Until the late seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire fought for 
greater territorial control in what is today Slavonia and in Vojvodina in northern Serbia, before 
their defeat at Vienna in 1683. Wars in Slavonia and Srijem, as well as in parts of northern Bosnia, 
then an Ottoman eyalet, continued into the 1700s, but by 1689 the vast majority of Croatia’s 
Muslim population fled south into central Bosnia. At the same time, the Great Serb Migrations 
from the territories of the Serbian Despotate in Kosovo northward into what is now Serbia, 
Vojvodina and Slavonia, had begun (Tanner 2010, 52-56). An estimated 37,000 families of 
Orthodox Serbs émigrés led by Patriarch Arsenije III Čarnojević arrived with the Austrian army in 
Belgrade by June 1690 and were recognised by the Habsburg monarchs as a corpus separatum, an 
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autonomous community governed by the Serbian Orthodox Church. A series of forced 
conversions by Roman Catholic clergymen in the Habsburg periphery, primarily in the territory of 
Vojvodina and in modern-day southwestern Hungary, across the Danube from Croatia, led to 
imperial interventions in the early 1690s that ensured the religious freedoms of the newly-arrived 
Serbs (Melichárek 2017; Prelić 2011). Another migration followed in 1739 with Serbs settling in 
Srijem, the territory between the Danube and Sava rivers in contemporary Croatia and Serbia 
(Jelavich 1954, 148).  
 
Military interventions, too, played a crucial role in the national awakening in the region. By the 
1790s, much of the Ottoman possessions in Croatia had been taken over by the Venetians on the 
Adriatic and the Habsburgs in the north, and the French Revolution and the successive Napoleonic 
Wars saw the continued strengthening of the Habsburg hand. Many Croatian soldiers of the Dual 
Monarchy fought alongside Austria and Great Britain against Napoleon and the Bavarians in the 
1809 War of the Fifth Coalition as part of the Dalmatian Campaign. While the French occupied 
Dubrovnik and the Croatian littoral from 1808 to 1814, the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15 
affirmed Habsburg control over Dalmatia, which would be divided into the subordinate Kingdoms 
of Dalmatia, Illyria and Croatia (Botwen and Tarbox 1980; Smith 1998). Administrative boundary 
shifts occurred throughout the nineteenth century; Croatia and Slavonia merged in 1868, placing 
the new kingdom’s capital in Zagreb. With the beginning of the First World War, instigated by the 
assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenburg, 
in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, the territory of modern Croatia was divided into the Austrian littoral 
(Küstenland), the Kingdom of Dalmatia and the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia. 
 
Linguistic developments as a precursor to modern identity formation, 1500s to 1860s 
Between the sixteenth and the late nineteenth centuries, Croatian national identity developed with 
the growing use of the printing press. Marko Marulić’s Judita, a retelling of the Biblical story of 
Judith in the vernacular Croatian language, was the first epic poem published in Croatian in 1501 
(Gutsche 1975). Novels like Petar Zoranić’s Planine/“Mountains” followed in the mid-sixteenth 
century, and by the late eighteenth century, Baroque literature highlighting the importance of 
Croatia as a bulwark of Christianity began to transition into romantic nationalism, in line with 
wider trends in Central European literature at the time (see Grubišić and Grubišić 2007; Šabić 
2019). The Illyrian movement, referring to one of several origin theories of South Slavs, emerged 
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in Croatian literary circles in the mid-1830s, advocating the ethnolinguistic unity of the South 
Slavs in the Austrian (and later Austro-Hungarian) Empire and resistance to ongoing processes of 
Germanisation and Magyarisation. These processes were seen from Croatia – and elsewhere in the 
Hungarian parts of the Dual Monarchy – as a form of aggression against majority populations by a 
powerful but distant kingdom (Dragojević 2005, 65-67; M. Greenberg 2011). Initial resistance 
to external pressures came with the revocation of reforms put in place under Marshal Auguste de 
Marmont, titled the “Duke of Ragusa [Dubrovnik],” who in his role as Marshal of the French 
Empire introduced the standardisation of the Croatian language in administration around the 
štokavian dialect. As well, Marmont oversaw the reunification into a single “Illyrian” province of 
the five Croatian kingdoms that had been divided under earlier Habsburg rule. With Napoleon’s 
defeat and exile, the return of Hungarian administration saw the revocation of Marmont’s reforms 
and a push for greater Magyarisation in an attempt to build a united Kingdom of Hungary 
stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains (Bellamy 2003, 42-43). Under 
Hungarian rule, Croatia was governed by a ban, or viceroy, and the Sabor, the parliament from 
which the current legislative chambers take their name. The first notable attempt to overthrow this 
nobility came with the Croatian-Slovene Peasant Revolt in early 1573, a short-lived rebellion to 
establish direct links between the peasantry to the imperial court rather than through the feudal 
arrangements then in place. Such demands for greater autonomy did not cease, however, and in 
the late seventeenth century the Croatian nobility, too, sought to expel foreign powers from the 
kingdom. The Frankopan and Zrinski families, two long-standing noble houses that emerged in 
the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, respectively, conspired to free Hungary and Croatia from 
Habsburg rule in response to the increasing centralisation of the Empire’s administration in 
Vienna in the aftermath of the Ottoman invasion of Transylvania. No concrete, violent action was 
ever taken by the conspirators, and the plot was foiled in 1670 with the executions of Petar IV 
Zrinski, Fran Krsto Frankopan and other affiliated nobles. Consequently, no ban of Croatian 
origin was appointed until 1732.  
 
Anti-Hungarian sentiment ultimately manifested in the Illyrian national movement of the 1830s 
and 1840s. In 1868, an agreement was reached with the Habsburg authorities on the status of 
Croatia within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and use of Croatian as a language of administration, 
also returning the lands of the Military Frontier to civil administration in Zagreb. However, the 
pact maintained the division of the lands of the medieval kingdom, troubling those who sought 
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greater autonomy for Croatia (Bellamy 2003, 43). Among the most important figures of this 
movement for Croatian linguistic and administrative autonomy was the linguist Ljudevit Gaj, who 
in 1830 published the first orthography of the language (see Mosely 1935) that has since come to 
be known variously as Serbo-Croatian, “Serbian or Croatian,” Bosnian, Montenegrin, 
naški/“our,” zajednički/“the together language” or “the polycentric language.”5 Gaj advocated 
linguistic reforms to simplify and Slavicise the vernacular in order to promote wider literacy, in 
doing so facilitating the creation of an “imagined” South Slavic community, as distinct from one of 
peripheral Magyarised Slavs (see Anderson 1983). Hungarian (and similar Slovak) digraphs like 
sz or cz were to be replaced with diacritical marks – š and ž (Žagarová and Pintarić 1998), and in 
later reforms, including those by Đuro Daničić, a Serbian philologist from Novi Sad, additional 
letters, including đ (dj) and ć (ch), were added, thus creating the modern South Slavic alphabet (see 
Daničić 1847). In 1866, Daničić was elected Secretary General of the newly-established Yugoslav 
Academy of Sciences and Arts (JAZU), a cultural centre founded with the donations of Josip Juraj 
Strossmayer, the bishop of the then-named Diocese of Bosna (Djakovo) et Srijem. Strossmayer 
was also instrumental in the construction of the seat of the diocese, the Đakovo Cathedral, a 
massive brick construction visible from afar along the Slavonian countryside. JAZU epitomised the 
cultural desire for a pan-Slavic movement in Croatia and continues its work in preserving cultural 
heritage and scientific discovery as HAZU, the Croatian Academy for Sciences and Arts (Dulibić 
2002; Tanner 2010, 100-102).  
 
The rise of Croatian nationalism, 1860s to 1920s 
Tensions slowly developed between the pan-Slavists and Croatian nationalists throughout the 
Romantic period of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth. Ante Starčević, an author, 
linguist and politician from near Gospić in Lika developed from the works of Ljudevit Gaj a more 
refined definition of the “Croatian” language and national identity. Starčević’s understanding of 
Croatian identity generally fell along pan-Slavic lines, denying the individuality of ethnic groups 
like Serbs, Slovenes or Bosniaks, whom he deemed to be “Croats” rather than “Yugoslavs,” yet in 
a pattern that would emerge throughout the twentieth century, his definition of the Croat nation 
also involved definition in opposition to something or someone else (Spalatin 1975; Tanner 
1997; 2010, 102). To him, the Habsburgs were the ultimate foe who sought to undermine the 
                                                
5 For simplicity, I will refer to this language as “Croatian” when referring to its use by ethnic Croats 
or “Serbian” in the context of Serbia, Serbs or the application of Cyrillic alphabet in this language. 
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sovereignty of the Croat nation through their undemocratic, monarchical rule. For his emphatic 
works on the Croatian nation, eventually resulting in rivalry with Strossmayer, Starčević is often 
referred to in monuments and history books as the otac domovine/“father of the homeland.” His 
Serbian contemporary Vuk Karadžić was similarly involved in reforming the Serbian language in a 
way to make it accessible to all Serbs and refining the Cyrillic alphabet from liturgical into 
vernacular use. Starčević denied the viability of Karadžić’s work, which had been supported by 
Strossmayer and Gaj, and in 1861 founded with Eugen Kvaternik the Stranka prava/“Party of 
Rights,” which advocated strong Croatian national rights. Kvaternik later split with the Party and 
launched a revolt against the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the village of Rakovica in 1871, which 
was summarily put down and Kvaternik and his co-conspirators executed on the fourth day of the 
attempted revolution (Tanner 2010, 105). Several monuments near Rakovica and squares and 
streets across Croatia remember Kvaternik and his uprising (see Chapter 6). 
 
Starčević, however, was noted for his racist, anti-Semitic and anti-Serb views; extreme right-wing 
supporters of the Party of Rights would eventually form the Ustaša paramilitary movement, 
discussed below (Trbovich 2008, 136). Starčević also sought to assimilate Serbs as “Orthodox 
Croats,” Slovenes as “Alpine Croats,” and Muslims, later termed “Bosniaks” in Yugoslavia, as 
“flower[s] of the Croatian people” (Macdonald 2002, 87). Macdonald notes,  
 
For some Serbian historians, Starčević’s programme consisted exclusively of 
‘denying and exterminating the Serbian people’ as a precondition to Croatian self-
determination. Again, the idea of denying the existence of cultural, linguistic and 
historic ties between Serbs and Croats, was presented as the first major step in 
Serbophobia, a step that led inexorably to genocide (Macdonald 2002, 86-87). 
 
Stjepan Radić was another contemporary who played a similarly key role in the development of 
Croatian national identity and opposition to the pan-Slavic notions of Ljudevit Gaj. In his twenties, 
Radić had been imprisoned multiple times for speaking against the Dual Monarchy and for burning 
a Hungarian flag upon the visit of Kaiser Franz Joseph to Zagreb in 1895. After traveling and 
studying in Russia and France, Radić returned to Croatia, founding the Hrvatska pučka seljačka 
stranka (HPSS)/“Croatian Peoples’ Peasant Party” in reaction to the Monarchy’s limited interest 
in improving the lives of those ineligible to vote; at the time, only two to three percent of the male 
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population could participate in elections (Tanner 2010, 107). 
 
The end of Austria-Hungary and the birth (and first death) of Yugoslavia, 1914-1941 
The outbreak of the First World War in 1914 brought with it the final deathblow of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, which collapsed in January 1918. The war itself, despite the unprecedented 
human and environmental toll, is evidently of little mnemonic consequence for modern Croatia. 
Of 614 monuments surveyed in the course of my fieldwork, only five were dedicated to the 
memories of the First World War. Of these, one incorporated the war with the remembrance of 
“all the victims of the First and Second World War, the death marches, communist terror, and 
especially the Croatian defenders of the Homeland War who gave their lives on the altar of the 
Homeland.” The lack of relevance of the First World War to today’s mnemonic landscape in 
Croatia fits the pattern of removing the Yugoslav past since the 1990s, which I discuss in Chapter 
6. The end of the war and the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire led to the creation of what 
would eventually become known as “Yugoslavia” in the form of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes (SHS). This incorporated the vast majority of the territory of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo. Only the territory surrounding the 
Istrian peninsula and the northern Adriatic coast, the missing puzzle piece of the state that would 
last in various forms until 1992, belonged to Italy.  
 
The early years of the SHS state were marked by strained negotiations amongst representatives of 
the constituent peoples over the nature of political rule and the identity of this South Slavic state. 
Stjepan Radić and his party resisted Croatia’s integration into the new kingdom, ruled by the 
Serbian Karađorđević dynasty, which they viewed as illegitimate rulers over a Croatia that had not 
willingly acceded to the union (Schoflin 1993; Biondich 2000, 91-119; Brkljačić 2003, 44). 
When the Kingdom’s first parliamentary session was held in December 1920, the renamed 
Croatian Republican Peasant Party and Starčević’s Party of Rights did not take their seats. 
Subsequent elections saw greater returns for Radić, particularly in Slavonia, but by 1924, Radić 
was once again imprisoned, this time for alleged conspiracy with Communists after his return from 
a prolonged visit to the Soviet Union. For a brief term in 1925, the Peasant Party entered 
government in a coalition with the Serbian People’s Radical Party, the largest conservative party in 
the parliament, and Stjepan Radić served as Minister of Education until his return to the opposition 
in 1926. A new coalition with the Independent Democratic Party, also a leading Serbian political 
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party but one with which the Peasants Party had been allied during Habsburg rule, nearly led to the 
formation of a new parliamentary majority, but government formation proved elusive (Biondich 
2000, 207-244). Crisis erupted with Radić’s assassination at the hand of Puniša Račić, a 
Montenegrin member of the People’s Radical Party, on 20 June 1928. Radić was shot in the 
stomach but survived until 8 August 1928, succumbing to his wounds.  
 
The assassination of Stjepan Radić was among the most notable events of the early Yugoslav period 
that marked the fraught relations between Serbs, who supported a more central state, and Croats 
in the newly centralised monarchy, many of whom had supported Radić’s desire for an autonomous 
or independent Croatian state (Božić 2010, 204). His death was met with a harsh reaction by 
Yugoslav King Aleksandar (the state having been renamed to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929), 
who dissolved parliament and established a royal dictatorship, intolerant of national outbursts. 
Renaming the kingdom to “Yugoslavia” led to the removal of “Croatia” from the political map for 
the first time in over one-thousand years and the renewed division of Croatia and Dalmatia into 
banovine named after the region’s rivers and not its historical political communities (Bellamy 
2003, 49-50). Aleksandar’s 1931 constitution concentrated executive power in his own hands, 
using it to nominate half of the upper chamber of parliament. The further centralisation of power 
in Belgrade fomented tensions with Croats and other constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, and in 
1934, the King was assassinated in Marseille by a Bulgarian revolutionary who supported the 
independence of Macedonia, often perceived as an ethnic kin state of Bulgaria (Nielsen 2009; see 
also Seton-Watson 1935). Aleksandar was succeeded by his eleven-year-old son Petar II, whose 
regent, his father’s cousin Paul, forged an agreement with the Croatian Peasant Party for greater 
home-rule for Croatia as an autonomous banovina, which incorporated large swaths of Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The 1939 Cvetković-Maček Agreement gave powers back to the Croatian Sabor to 
manage the banovina’s internal affairs while retaining jurisdiction over national and foreign policy 
in Belgrade. Intended to placate Croatian demands for autonomy and reduce the ongoing tensions 
between Croats and the Yugoslav government (and Serbs by proxy), the Agreement, however, had 
the unintended effect of strengthening the Croatian desire for independence (Biondich 2007; 
Ramet 2007), fitting the narrative of Croatia’s millennial existence as a rightfully independent 
nation from Tomislav’s kingdom of 925 CE onward. 
 
Petar II was the last King of Yugoslavia. The rise of the NSDAP in Germany in the 1930s, Hitler’s 
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seizure of power and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939 spelled the end of peaceful 
coexistence of the various constituent nations of Yugoslavia. Fascist paramilitaries emerged across 
Central Europe throughout the late 1920s and into the 1930s, among them the Ustaša – Croatian 
Revolutionary Movement led by Ante Pavelić. The Ustaše6 promoted an ethnically pure vision of 
an independent Croatian nation-state and was premised on an anti-Serb, anti-Semitic and anti-
Orthodox worldview. The ethnicisation of religion, the invasion of Yugoslavia by the Third Reich 
in 1941 and the monarchy’s flight into exile in London would drag Croatia into its darkest period 
yet and irrevocably shift the mnemonic landscape of both Croatia and Serbia and their constituent 
ethnic groups.  
 
A history of violence: Croatia in the Second World War 
The vast majority of the content of Croatia and Serbia’s ongoing struggles over the past derives 
from the Second World War in Yugoslavia. This section highlights those points of memory in the 
Croatian cultural conscience that underpin the violent uses of memory in the region and how this 
violence manifested in the course of the Second World War and the Croatian War of 
Independence/Homeland War from 1991 to 1995.  
 
The Second World War in Yugoslavia began with the Nazi bombardment of Belgrade on 6 April 
1941. The turbulence of the monarchy led to the swift capitulation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
to the Third Reich. Puppet governments were installed in Croatia and Serbia, in the latter 
controlled by the Wehrmacht and in the former as the Nezavisna država Hrvatska 
(NDH)/“Independent State of Croatia,” with Ante Pavelić installed as poglavnik, the “chief” and 
head of state. Pavelić’s Ustaša movement underpinned the armed forces of the Axis powers in 
Yugoslavia and quickly endeavoured to build an ethnically pure Croatian state, as had been the 
movement’s aspiration since its founding in 1929 (Frucht Levy 2009; Korb 2010). The brutality 
of the Holocaust and the genocide of Roma, Slavs and other “non-Aryans” in the course of the 
Second World War extended to the NDH, which operated numerous labour and extermination 
camps in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the most infamous of them all at Jasenovac. By copying 
and extending the racial policies of the Third Reich, the NDH took aim at the destruction of the 
                                                
6 “Ustaša,” a Croatian feminine noun, refers to the Movement in the singular, while “Ustaše/ustaše” 
refers more widely to the members of the paramilitary group in the plural. The group’s name 
derives from the verb ustati, to “rise up,” as in an insurgency.  
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Serb population of Yugoslavia (see Ramet and Listhaug 2011).  
 
The town of Jasenovac is a small settlement at the confluence of the Una and Sava rivers facing 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is also the site of the greatest human tragedies and act of targeted violence 
directed against ethnic minorities during the course of the Second World War in Yugoslavia. The 
exact toll of human loss has been perhaps the greatest source of mnemonic disputes between 
Croatia and Serbia since the 1940s. Croatian estimates tend to fall below 100,000 victims of the 
NDH regime, the vast majority among them Serbs then equally Jews and Roma, followed by 
political dissidents of Croat or Muslim (Bosniak) background (see Ciliga 1998). Serbian 
historians, however, have claimed that over one million individuals were murdered in Jasenovac 
and its sub-camps (Tomasevich 2001, 725-726). The first president of post-Yugoslav Croatia, 
Franjo Tuđman, himself a controversial historian, claimed an estimate of only 30,000 to 60,000 
victims, including Serbs, Jews and Roma, further stoking the problematic relationship of Serbia 
and Croatia with their shared tragic past (Kolstø 2011; see Tuđman 1989); a more commonly 
accepted estimate lies between 77,000 and 99,000 victims, with 83,837 directly named by the 
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM 2020a; 2020b). Those who fell victim to 
the NDH and the Ustaša were often tortured and murdered in a brutal fashion; among the most 
notable symbols of the brutality of the Ustaše was the srbosjek, the “Serb cutter,” a small knife 
attached to a leather glove typically employed in the harvest of wheat. Slashings and stabbings were 
common methods used to kill inmates, as were live cremations and mass gassing as was common 
in the extermination camps of the Third Reich (Dulić 2006; Korb 2010; Levy 2009).  
 
The NDH operated around the ideology of a “Greater Croatia,” the creation of an ethnically pure 
Croat(ian) state, covering Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and most of Serbia, which the Ustaše saw 
as rightful Croatian land. The Greater Croatia ideology originated in the works of the nineteenth-
century writer Pavao Ritter Vitezović. Vitezović followed the Illyrian origin theory of the South 
Slavs, claiming all Slavs as Croats and delineating the territory of the Croat nation as the vast 
majority of the Balkan Peninsula and parts of Central Europe farther to the north (Tanner 1997, 
50-51). The 1939 Cvetković-Maček Agreement created the Banovina of Croatia, which covered 
a large portion of the territory the NDH would come to occupy. The NDH would eventually take 
over more of the land in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia that Vitezović had described as Croatian. 
By 1943, the NDH had expanded to the immediate suburbs of Belgrade, taking control of the 
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Gestapo concentration camp in Staro Sajmište, across the Sava River from the heart of the city 
(Kolstø 2011, 226). Similar fates to those who were brought to Jasenovac befell the Serbs, 
captured Partisans, Jews and Roma, including women and the elderly, at Staro Sajmište. Serbs in 
Vukovar, a Croatian Baroque town on the Danube facing the forested Serbian countryside, had 
issued a resolution in 1939 as a reaction to the Cvetković-Maček Agreement, seeking an 
exemption from its inclusion in the Banovina of Croatia and decrying the lack of Serb input on the 
outcomes of the negotiations between the Peasant Party and the Yugoslav government (Regan 
2008). Vukovar and many smaller locales in Western (i.e. Croatian) Srijem and Eastern Slavonia 
had held a Serbian majority or plurality population, which even after the destruction across the 
region in the 1990s still maintain a significant political and social presence today. A Serbian 
banovina was never established, however, and the Danube banovina that comprised much of the 
territory facing Vukovar was among the first to fall to German, Hungarian and NDH occupation in 
1941.  
 
Figure 2.2: Map of Independent State of Croatia territory, 1941-1945 
 
Source: Opačić, Tamara (2018). 
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The NDH also employed visual symbols from the medieval past and slogans of the “homeland” to 
maintain the narrative of Croatia’s millennial independence, many of which are viewed today as 
equivalent to the Nazi use of the swastika or chants of “Sieg Heil!” but retain their popularity in 
far-right, nationalist circles in Croatia and its diasporic communities. Among these, the red-and-
white chequerboard coat of arms, the šahovnica (from šah/“chess”), was incorporated into the 
NDH flag. The oldest existing šahovnica dates to 1495 in Innsbruck, Austria (von Hye 1993), 
and was used by noble and royal families in Croatia throughout the Habsburg period, the 1939 
Banovina of Croatia and the Socialist Republic of Croatia during the late twentieth century. The 
šahovnica remains a constituent element of the Croatian coat of arms, now crowned by symbols 
representing the country’s five traditional regions – Croatia proper, Slavonia, Istria, Dalmatia and 
Dubrovnik. The NDH šahovnica differed from the modern use of the pattern by placing a white 
square in the top-left of the chequerboard, while today the pattern followed red-then-white (see 
Figure 2.3). This minor detail, however, plays an important role in differentiating fascist from 
other uses of the šahovnica; its revival as part of the original flag of the Republic of Croatia in the 
early 1990s employed the more problematic white-then-red pattern, further stoking mnemonic 
tensions with ethnic Serbs in and outside the young (old) country (Pavlaković 2008a; 2008b).  
 
Figure 2.3: Use of the šahovnica in Croatian coats of arms by the NDH and Republic of Croatia 
 
Source, left: Wikimedia Commons user Barryob (2007). Source, right: Wikimedia Commons user Shokatz (2013).  
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Ustaša symbols were also incorporated into the state coat of arms, signifying the importance of the 
paramilitary movement to the foundation of the Independent State of Croatia. In the NDH coat of 
arms, the “U” is surrounded by the Croatian pleter, or wattle, an interlace pattern that also dates 
to the early Croatian Kingdom around the time of Zvonimir in the late eleventh century. A 
commonly sprayed graffiti tag of the Croatian far-right today also employs the “U” of the Ustaša, 
with a Christian cross inserted in the middle of the letter.  
 
Figure 2.4: Ustaša graffiti tag: Žažvić 
 
Above: Fascist symbol copied from graffiti sprayed onto communist-era monument in Žažvić (Dalmatia),  
20 March 2018. 
 
Ustaše and Croatian nationalists promoted the identity of the NDH as the Croatian homeland with 
the chant “Za dom spremni” – “Ready for the Homeland.” The chant was used to intimidate Serbs 
and other minorities deemed unfit for the Independent State of Croatia, signifying the 
“Homeland” as Croatian and nothing else. The inherent exclusivity of the NDH’s ideal and 
imagined community (Anderson 1983) also touched on political boundaries; those unwilling to 
fight for the cause of the Ustaša were murdered.  
 
The Ustaše were not, however, the sole military power in the NDH. The 
Domobranstvo/“Homeland Defence” served as a regular army partially detached from the radical 
ideology of the Ustaša, which was more ruthless and disorganised in its brutality. Michele Frucht 
Levy notes, “Ideologically motivated militias, working with local Croats and Muslim recruits, 
generally carried out the massacres against Serbs. This frequently created tension with the less 
ideologically motivated Domobranstvo, which sometimes participated in killings but more often 
than not attempted to restore order after violence had devastated an area” (Levy 2009, 818). By 
1944, the Domobranstvo would be folded into the Ustaša Obrana/“Defence,” responsible for the 
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construction and operation of Croatia’s concentration camps, removing the last few internal 
barriers to unchecked mass violence in the NDH (ibid.). At times, even the German occupation 
forces signalled that the Ustaša had gone too far in its murderous campaigns, and by 1942, the 
pace of the Ustaša’s genocidal campaign against the Serbs slowed relative to the year prior. 
 
The targeting of Serbs occurred primarily in the former Military Frontier regions, known locally 
as the Krajina, which includes territory in the regions of Western Slavonia, Kordun, Lika and 
north-eastern Dalmatia, where Serbs had settled from the sixteenth century onward. Despite their 
long shared history with Croats in the region, the Serbs were treated as the “Other” throughout 
the war and referred to as “Greek Easterners” to deny their identity and to transform them into 
enemies (Barić 2011, 176). The Ustaša appealed to the German forces and identity politics by 
following a Gothic origin theory of the Croats, in disagreement with Vitezović’s Illyrian 
hypothesis, positing the Croats as an Aryan race; within a month of its establishment, the NDH 
had come to define its citizens as loyal Aryans, and through its denial of the Serbs as a constituent 
Croatian people prohibited them from the rights and privileges of NDH citizenship (Levy 2009, 
809-814). Milovan Žanić, NDH Minister-President of the Legislative Committee, proclaimed the 
racial purity of the state:  
 
This has to be a country of Croats and nobody else, and the method does not exist 
which we as Ustaša would not use in order to make this country truly Croatian 
and cleanse it from the Serbs, who have threatened us for centuries and would 
threaten us at the first opportunity (Žanić, quoted in Levy 2009, 813).  
 
It was in the context of the genocide of Serbs in Croatia that the term “ethnic cleansing” entered 
common parlance, from the Croatian čišćenje terena, the “cleansing of the terrain” in the name of 
racial purity. As noted in Chapter 1, this term was also used in the reverse direction during the 
Croatian War of Independence. Iterations of the term “ethnic cleansing” existed from the early 
twentieth century, yet it was during the Second World War where global powers sought to achieve 
extreme racial/national aims through mass atrocities in such scale. The violence of the NDH 
matched, and sometimes exceeded, the pattern of wider violence committed by the Axis powers. 
 
Resistance and the rise of the Partisans 
The violence of the Ustaša instigated wide-spread resistance and insurrection among the Serbs 
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who had survived the original onslaught of violence in 1941. In a micro-level analysis of the origins 
of violence in Serb communities along the Bosnian-Croatian border, Max Bergholz (2016) 
identified those actions and memories that mobilised Serb resistance to Croatian attempts to 
ethnically cleanse the area. The community of Kulen Vakuf, a small village in north-western 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, saw the processes of retribution and identity formation intertwine to force 
perpetuated violence. The micro-analysis of violence, power and memory in the territory of the 
NDH calls into question grander generalisations, often repeated by Western journalists and 
transitory scholars like Robert Kaplan (see Kaplan 1993), of “ancient hatreds” that did not, in fact, 
exist. While tensions amongst Serbs and Croats had occurred throughout their shared history, it 
was not until the First World War and the formation of the first Yugoslav state that those struggles 
became prominent. The sheer chaos of NDH brutality also becomes clear in the work Bergholz 
presents, his text indicating how the initial wave of violence proved a “generative force” that shifted 
identity away from religion to ethnicity (and accordingly political conviction) and challenged 
assumptions of authority in the NDH between the fascist authorities in Zagreb and local Ustaša 
fighters in Kulen Vakuf. This would upend the previous indifference of local populations to 
matters of nationality in multi-ethnic communities across NDH territory.  
 
The aforementioned intra-ethnic fighting amongst Serbs in the Second World War was the catalyst 
for the split between Četnik and Partisan support, as the rapid escalation of conflict in 1941 
allowed little time for building a united resistance amongst the persecuted minorities. The Četnik 
movement, formally the Četnik Detachments of the Yugoslav Army and later the “Yugoslav Army 
in the Fatherland”/Jugoslavenska vojska u otadžbini, were a Serbian irredentist group aligned 
with the royal Yugoslav government in exile in London, where King Petar II fled soon after his 
coup in April 1941. The Četniks were led by Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović, who organised 
guerrilla brigades to fend off the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia. His troops were motivated primarily 
by the preservation of the Yugoslav monarchy and operated in tandem but not necessarily in 
alliance with the Partisans in the early stages of war in the summer of 1941. Over time, however, 
the mass retributive murder of Serbs by the German occupiers convinced the Četniks to diminish 
their attacks on Axis soldiers, and by August 1941, the movement shifted allegiances against the 
Partisans while maintaining its opposition to the Ustaša, as well (see Hoare 2006). This change 
was also provoked by the adoption of a “Greater Serbian” ideology developed by Stevan Moljević 
in the early 1940s, the realisation of which necessitated the ethnic cleansing of non-Serb 
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populations in much the same territory as had been claimed by the proponents of Greater Croatian 
and Yugoslav ideals. Moljević’s ideological predecessor Ilija Garašanin, Serbian Prime Minister 
from 1861 to 1867, published a similar document referred to as Načertanije/“The Draft,” which 
promoted the establishment of a Serbian nation-state following French, Italian and German 
models (Dragović-Soso 2004, 171-173). Moljević’s expanded “Homogenous Serbia” was 
adopted as the guiding principle of the Četnik movement by mid-1941, by which time Mihailović 
and his troops began engaging in violent campaigns against ethnic Muslims and Croats, primarily 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina (and in the Kulen Vakuf region described by Bergholz). This organisation 
of Četnik – and eventually some Partisan – brigades marked a departure from the original chaos of 
the initial Serb insurgencies that reacted to violence in the NDH.  
 
The Četniks were opportunistic in their allegiances and, in comparison to the Partisans, much 
more disorganised in their approach to gaining control over contested territory in Yugoslavia 
(Jareb 2011; Trew 1998). Throughout the Second World War, Mihailović attempted alliances 
with the Partisans, which failed by winter of 1941-42; the Allied powers, who dismissed him in 
favour of the Partisans in 1943; and even the Ustaše, with whom the Četniks collaborated in 
violence across Bosnia-Herzegovina with the support of the German forces. Massacres occurred 
primarily in Herzegovina along the Croatian border and in eastern Bosnia, including in the towns 
of Srebrenica and Foča, which would become major sites of violence in the wars in BiH during the 
early 1990s (Dulić 2005). The unreliability of the Četniks as allies – taking support from the 
British and Soviets while failing to deliver on action against the NDH in some cases – ultimately 
convinced King Petar II’s government to legitimise the Partisans as the forces responsible for the 
liberation of Yugoslavia.  
 
Tito and the Partisans drew many of their recruits from the Serb populations that had been 
terrorised by the NDH in 1941 and had not joined willingly the Četnik paramilitaries. 
Ideologically driven by the liberation of the Yugoslav people under the banner of communism and 
anti-fascism, the Partisans represented the largest and most successful resistance group in Europe 
during the Second World War, which they framed as the Narodnooslobodilačka borba 
(NOB)/“National (or People’s) Liberation Struggle” (Hoare 2002). Breaking from military 
tradition, the Partisans also drew in large numbers of women – by the end of the war up to two 
million – into their ranks, who in the years following the war came to be honoured as heroines of 
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Yugoslavia for both the active fighting and auxiliary (primarily medical) duties they performed 
(Batinić 2015; Jancar-Webster 1990). In the initial phases of the war, Serbs – and nominally Serbs 
from Croatia – formed a notable plurality of Partisan forces, but as fighting progressed across the 
region, this ethnic makeup shifted. That the movement was not defined by ethnic exclusion and 
genocidal intent against any particular segment of the pre-war Yugoslav population also widened 
its appeal in Slovenia, BiH, Vojvodina, Montenegro and Macedonia. The organisation of Partisan 
troops mirrored the federal structure of what Yugoslavia would become after the end of the war, 
laying aside ethnic boundaries for republican ones. Hoare notes,  
 
Serbs in Croatia would fight as Croatian Partisans in the People’s Liberation 
Army of Croatia [… and] in Bosnia-Herzegovina […] as Bosnian Partisans […] 
There would be no Serbian Partisan or Serbian communist leadership or control 
of ethnic-Serb Partisans or civilians outside Serbia proper, nor of the Yugoslav 
peoples generally (Hoare 2011, 205). 
 
The diverse nature of the Partisan resistance allowed it great flexibility to fight on various fronts 
across Yugoslavia – in Croatia against the Ustaše, in Dalmatia against Italians until 1943 and in 
Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Germans and Četniks, among others (Hoare 2002, 
25). Though not strictly aligned with Allied forces until later in the Second World War, support 
from the British and Soviets provided the Partisans with tactical advantages over their enemies, 
particularly after the royal government’s disavowal of the Četniks in 1944 (Biber 1988). Their 
defeat was secured by attacks from both the Partisans and the Ustaša toward the end of the war in 
Europe in 1945. The NDH had also been weakened by the capitulation of the Italians in 1943 and 
were similarly defeated by the Partisans in 1945. Though forced to flee with their families north 
toward Austria, a column of soldiers of the Hrvatski oružane snage/“Croatian Armed Forces” 
(HOS) were made by the British to surrender to the Partisans near the village of Bleiburg, near the 
southern border with Slovenia. On their march back to Yugoslavia, the remnants of the Ustaše 
forces, along with captured German and Italian soldiers, Slovene, Serb and Montenegrin 
collaborators, were massacred by the Partisans, their bodies buried in mass graves in forests and 
coal mines throughout southern and eastern Slovenia (Kolstø 2010, 1158).  
 
The “martyrdom” of Croatian fascism 
The Bleiburg repatriations represent another major lieu de mémoire in Croatia’s twentieth-century 
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history (Đureinović 2018; Jareb and Omrčanin 1977/78). As with other mass atrocities 
committed during the Second World War, estimates of the number of victims of the repatriations, 
known allegorically in Croatia as the križni put/“Way of the Cross,” range widely. Many estimates 
claim a total of at least 70,000 military and civilian casualties, with some potentially exaggerated 
claims of near 250,000 casualties (Kostø 2010). The commemoration of this period was 
repressed throughout the existence of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ), the 
state established in the aftermath of war, from 1945 to 1992, and as a result of this repression, 
commemorative events were and continue to be held in Bleiburg annually on 15 May, as well as in 
other Croatian diasporic communities. Despite the restrictions on nationalist rehearsals of the 
past, as today, during the Yugoslav period multiple, competing narratives of “Croatianhood” 
existed, some more closely aligned with socialist principles than fascist; national identity then as it 
is now was never a homogenous phenomenon. While a crackdown by Austrian authorities on the 
use of fascist symbols and the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic prevented a commemorative 
mass in Bleiburg in 2020, a controversial ceremony was held in Sarajevo at the central cathedral, 
met by thousands of counter-protestors who rejected the relativisation of the Ustaša’s legacy in 
their city (Dervišbegović 2020).  
 
The defeat of the NDH and the establishment of Tito’s Socialist Federal Republic led to swift 
action against the perpetrators of mass violence during the Second World War. Draža Mihailović 
was captured and executed in 1946, while Stevan Moljević, his ideological counterpart, was 
sentenced to twenty years in prison, where he died in 1959. Ante Pavelić, poglavnik of the 
Independent State of Croatia, was able to flee via Austria and Italy to Argentina, where a failed 
assassination attempt was made against him in April 1957. Pavelić later was granted asylum in 
Francoist Spain, where he died in 1959 as a result of the wounds sustained in the attempted 
assassination. Similar acts of retributive justice occurred in the years immediately following the 
Second World War. Tito’s primary targets were nationalists who fought against the “brotherhood 
and unity” of the new Yugoslavia, which until 1948 fell in line with the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet 
Union under Joseph Stalin (Banac 1988). Initial repression of religion in Yugoslavia also resulted 
from the experiences of forced conversions and religious-cum-ethnic violence that had been the 
hallmark of the NDH. Among those convicted of treason against the Yugoslav state was Alojzije 
Stepinac, a Croatian Catholic priest, later made cardinal in 1952, who played an uncertain but 
controversial role as Archbishop of Zagreb during Ustaša rule in the Second World War (see 
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Chapter 6; see also Buchenau 2006; Gitman 2007; Iveković 2002). Stepinac, after whom many 
major roads and squares across Croatia are named, maintained a close relationship with the rulers 
of the NDH throughout its existence but at times resisted their more violent policies; however, he 
never directly denounced the state and was arrested along with the rest of the Catholic leadership 
of Zagreb on 17 May 1945, two days after the final capitulation of the Ustaša in Bleiburg, but 
released the following day, only to be arrested again in September 1946 (Goldstein 2001, 157; 
Tanner 2010, 179-181). After his conviction for high treason and war crimes for his collaboration 
with the NDH, Stepinac was sentenced to sixteen years in prison, of which he served five before 
being transferred to his home parish, where he died in 1960. 
 
Tito’s Yugoslavia and the Croatian Spring, 1945-1990 
The second Yugoslavia presented various dilemmas to the makers of Croatian national identity, 
many of whom were silenced or had left in exile after the war. Creating a Yugoslav identity that 
transcended national boundaries required trade-offs, whether forced or negotiated, between 
regional and republican autonomy and the “brotherhood and unity” of the Slovenes, Croats, 
Bosnians, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Albanians and other national groups that the 
country now comprised. Events which signalled the heightened demand for a Croatian identity 
independent of the socialist “Yugoslav,” including the Croatian Spring movement of the late 
1960s and early 1970s, will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 6. Despite the various 
projects to unite former combatants, whether through the construction of the Autoput Bratstvo i 
Jedinstvo/“Highway of Brotherhood and Unity” linking the various republics or the massive rail 
infrastructure joining hinterlands with urban populations, tensions still remained amongst the 
various ethnic groups as a result of the violence of the Second World War. As in the first 
Yugoslavia, Croat politicians viewed the SFRJ as a Serb-centric creation bent on suppressing their 
own identities, putting a stop to Croatia’s “millennial dream” of independent statehood. Serbs, on 
the other hand, viewed Yugoslavia as a protective measure against the resurgence of fascism in 
Europe (Judah 2008, 137-141). The only independent Croatian state under which they Croatian 
Serbs had lived, the NDH, was premised on their destruction, so Tito’s Yugoslavia was by any cost 
a more favourable alternative. 
 
The early years of post-war Yugoslavia saw close ties between Tito’s government and Stalin’s 
regime in the Soviet Union. In 1948, however, Yugoslavia was dismissed from Cominform, 
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formally, the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties, the key coordinating 
body of Marxist-Leninist states in Central and Eastern Europe, and the organisation’s seat move 
from Belgrade to Bucharest. This break from Soviet influence was premised on Tito’s refusal to 
accept Moscow as the primary source of communist authority in the whole of Europe and his 
(ultimately failed) aspirations to incorporate Bulgaria, then more closely allied with Stalin, into 
Yugoslavia. Tito’s cult of personality, already established in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War, continued to grow, and the more virulent critics of his embrace of a “third way” – 
which manifested in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 – were imprisoned.  
 
Tito’s Yugoslavia had little tolerance for nationalist sentiments, which challenged the central 
bratstvo i jedinstvo/“Brotherhood and Unity” ideal promoted since the end of the Second World 
War. Nationalist agitators, and, after 1948, Stalinists, were often imprisoned and served sentences 
in the labour camps on barren islands in the Adriatic, including the infamous Goli otok/“Naked 
Island,” near the Croatian island of Rab (Antić 2006, 180). Nationalism was treated as a form of 
“chauvinism” (see Allcock 1989), and instances of attempted national uprisings, generally in the 
form of demands for greater autonomy as in Croatia and Kosovo, were repressed. The resistance 
to Albanian and Croatian nationalisms was directed heavily by Aleksandar Ranković, seen widely 
as the third greatest builder of the new Yugoslav state after Tito and economist Edvard Kardelj. 
Ranković, an ethnic Serb, in his various roles as Minister of the Interior and ultimately as 
Yugoslavia’s first vice-president oversaw the centralisation of power in Belgrade as well as the 
operations of the secret police, UDBA, in the southern republics and the autonomous region of 
Kosovo (Zacharias 2001, 145-147). Ranković’s mistrust of Albanians stemmed from the still-
close relations between Stalin and Enver Hoxha, the Albanian dictator, and wide-spread repression 
of any expressions of Albanian national identity became the norm under his supervision. In 1966, 
however, Ranković was dismissed from all positions in the Yugoslav government for overstepping 
his surveillance boundaries, supposedly even against Tito, and was forced into private life until his 
death in 1983. 
 
The dismissal of Alkesandar Ranković signalled the beginning of the end of the first phase of Tito’s 
Yugoslavia and its central authority in Belgrade. In Croatia, demands for greater autonomy and the 
recognition of particular civil and political rights emerged, including the right to celebrate 
Croatia’s own history rather than Yugoslavia’s alone. In March 1967, a large group of signatories, 
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including Croatian authors, linguists and politicians, issued the “Declaration on the Status and 
Name of the Croatian Standard Language,” demanding the separate recognition of Croatian as a 
language in its own right. This represented a break from the “Serbo-Croatian” standard, despite 
nearly full mutual intelligibility between what were then seen as Serbian and Croatian dialects. The 
Declaration sparked wider protests against centralising forces in Yugoslavia, and from it emerged 
the Croatian Spring movement, known locally as Masovni pokret (MASPOK)/“Mass Movement,” 
among the most important events in post-war Yugoslav history (Zubak 2005, 197-199). Despite 
wide public support for constitutional reforms to allow for greater political and cultural autonomy, 
the Yugoslav state cracked down on what it saw as yet another “chauvinist” reaction. Though mass 
arrests in the early 1970s, including that of Franjo Tuđman (ibid., 210), put an end to the 
movement, the calls for greater autonomy and the decentralisation of Yugoslav administration 
ultimately were recognised in the revised 1974 federal constitution (ibid, 216).  
 
Aleksandar Ranković died in Dubrovnik on 19 August 1983, just three years after Tito. His 
funeral in Belgrade, meant to be limited to a small group of family mourners, turned rapidly into a 
wider protest of nationalists who had supported his policies on preserving Serb identity in Kosovo 
and the maintenance of central authority over the Yugoslav state in the capital. These policies 
provided a framework for Slobodan Milošević, in a sense his spiritual successor, to continue the 
suppression of Kosovar Albanians upon his rise to power in the mid-1980s (Cohen 2002, 98). 
The reawakening of national identities in Yugoslavia in the years leading up to Tito’s demise 
spelled the dramatic end for his project of “Brotherhood and Unity.” 
 
The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the (re)birth of Croatia 
Despite relative peace from the 1950s through the 1980s, the violent legacy of the Second World 
War returned in full force with the rise of nationalist leaders (in Croatia, Franjo Tuđman and in 
Serbia, Slobodan Milošević). The socialist ban on any hint of nationalist irredentism during the 
mid-twentieth century did not prevent or eradicate all national sentiment, and by century’s end, 
the fear of a new war erupted into outright conflict. On this, Levy writes, “if Tito’s goal of a multi-
ethnic communist state demanded that Yugoslavs forget the past, Freud taught us the power and 
cost of memories repressed” (Levy 2009, 817). The manipulation of memories of the Second 
World War, above all, played a critical role in spreading nationalist myths and mobilising Serbs 
and Croats toward violence by the late 1980s. After the consolidation of power in Serbia, Kosovo 
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and Vojvodina, and to an extent in Montenegro, under Milošević and his “anti-bureaucratic 
revolution” allies, by 1987 much of the media landscape in Serbia had fallen under his control 
(Božić-Roberson 2005, 400). This consolidation of power was made possible through Milošević’s 
tactical use of the post-Tito rotational presidency; having revoked Kosovo’s status as autonomous 
provinces of Yugoslavia in March 1989 and replaced the heads of Vojvodina and Montenegro with 
sympathetic “reformer” allies, Milošević quickly gained control of four of the eight possible votes 
in the collective Presidium (see N. Vladislavljević 2008, 145-178). 
 
Though he framed much of his opposition to the extant political system in Yugoslavia through the 
lens of centralising the Yugoslav state in reaction to the devolutionary reforms of the 1974 
constitution, Milošević’s ambitions were marked by provocations in Kosovo in 1987 and 1989 
that attracted large crowds of ethnic Serbs. On 28 June 1989, Milošević presided over 
commemorations in Gazimestan, Kosovo, of the 600th anniversary of the defeat of the medieval 
Serbian kingdom under Prince Lazar by the Ottomans, led by Sultan Murad I; both Lazar and 
Murad were killed in the Battle of Kosovo Field, their deaths entering the Serbian cultural 
conscience through folklore and epic poetry, particularly around the Romantic period (Pavlović 
and Atanasovski 2016). In his speech, he called for Serbian unity and national reconciliation, 
which Ana Milošević and Heleen Touquet note “opened the door for legal and symbolic acts 
aiming to rehabilitate the Četniks – to restore the former privileges and the reputation of the 
movement, and its members prosecuted or exiled during the communist Yugoslav period” 
(Milošević and Touquet 2018, 386). In Croatia, too, Serbs reacted to Slobodan Milošević’s appeal 
to uniting the Serb nation and looked to Belgrade for guidance as communist regimes in Europe 
rapidly crumbled. In early 1990, the Savez komunista Jugoslavije (SKJ)/League of Communists 
of Yugoslavia dissolved under disagreement between Serbian and Slovenian delegates over the 
centralisation or devolution of political power in the country, and in April 1990, the first free, 
multi-party elections since 1938 were held in Croatia. The elections were won primarily by the 
Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (HDZ)/Croatian Democratic Union under Dr. Franjo Tuđman, 
the aforementioned controversial historian who had spent nine months of a two-year sentence in 
prison for his participation in the Croatian Spring movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
 
Parliamentary elections in 1990 highlighted the social and political rifts in Croatia that had been 
muted in the period of communist rule from the end of the Second World War. While the HDZ 
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won seats in areas predominantly populated by ethnic Croats, citizens in areas with noticeable Serb 
populations voted for the Savez komunista Hrvatske (SKH)/League of Communists of Croatia, 
the remnant republic-level branch of the SKJ (see Figure 2.5 below). The SKH would eventually 
dissolve and re-emerge as the pro-European Social Democratic Party in November 1990, 
shedding much of its former communist, Yugoslav identity (Pickering and Baskin 2008). The Serb 
Democratic Party (SDS), the party which would ultimately lead the Republika Srpska Krajina 
during the Homeland War, however, polled rather weakly in areas with a greater Serb population 
like Lika and Kordun, suggesting that Milošević’s attempts to consolidate and play up Serb identity 
in Croatia had not yet taken effect to the extent to which he might have aspired. 
 
Figure 2.5: Results of 1990 Croatian parliamentary election by party (left) and Serb population 




Party key, left: HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union; SKH-SDP – League of Communists of Croatia/Social 
Democratic Party; SS-SSH – Socialist Alliance/Alliance of Socialists of Croatia; SDS – Serb Democratic Party; KNS 
– Coalition of People’s Accord; ZA – Green Action (Split); Nezavisni - Independent 
Source, left: Wikimedia Commons user Tzowu (2014).  
Source, right: Wikimedia Commons user MirkoS18 (2013). 
 
Like Milošević, Tuđman sought to centralise power in Croatia not only in the hands of the HDZ 
but in his own person, building a cult of personality not unlike that of Tito. Ramet states, “What 
made Tudjman seem larger than life was his self-concept as Father of this country,” here borrowing 
the label often applied to Ante Starčević, “and the way he projected that self-concept. His Tito-like 
poses before the camera, for which he sometimes donned white uniforms reminiscent of those 
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worn by Tito, were a part of this” (2010, 259). Tuđman’s election to the Croatian presidency in 
May 1990 and the promulgation of a new constitution that December granted him wide-reaching 
powers to install party loyalists in important cabinet and other ministerial positions. This meant 
removing a large number of Serbs from public service and replacing them with ethnic Croats who 
supported Tuđman’s ambitions for an autonomous, if not independent, Croatian state. In Serbia, 
however, the media under Milošević’s control began propaganda campaigns against Tuđman, 
accusing him of Ustaša sympathies and “scheming with Germany to impose ‘a Fourth Reich’” 
(Engelberg 1991, n.p.). The pronounced, public revival of the violent memories of the Second 
World War stoked fears amongst the Serb population of Croatia, especially near the Serbian and 
Bosnian borders in Slavonia, Lika, Banija, Kordun and northern Dalmatia, that a second genocidal 
campaign by the Croats was imminent. Serbs began to arm themselves, in part through the support 
of Milošević’s Ministry of the Interior and the Jugoslovenka narodna armija (JNA)/Yugoslav 
People’s Army, in the case of an attack, while the newly democratic Croatian government sought 
to take control of JNA assets in Croatia. Before the first round of elections in April 1990, Serbs in 
the village of Berak in eastern Slavonia installed wooden barricades along the road leading toward 
Vinkovci and Vukovar to prevent the elections from taking place. That August, Serbs established 
similar road blocks along major roads joining Dalmatia with northern Croatia in the Balvan 
revolucija/“Log Revolution.” This insurrection was supported by Milan Babić and Milan Martić, 
Croatian Serbs who would establish the breakaway Serbian Autonomous Oblast (SAO) of Kninska 
Krajina, the forerunner of the Republika Srpska Krajina and the primary target of the Croatian 
armed forces in the Homeland War. Small-scale skirmishes like the Log Revolution and an armed 
clash of Croatian police with SAO Krajina paramilitaries at the Plitvice Lakes National Park on 31 
March 1991 marked the slow start to the Croatian War of Independence, a nearly five-year conflict 
that was never formally declared by either the Croatian Sabor or the rump Yugoslav parliament in 
Belgrade. 
 
As the JNA had seized weapons from the Croatian Territorial Defences (republic-level reserve 
guards) around the time of the 1990 elections, Croatian defence was predicated on the 
participation of local police forces under the guise of the Croatian Ministry of the Interior (MUP). 
The first Croatian police officer to die in the war was Josip Jović, whose convoy had been ambushed 
by the SAO Krajina forces in the Plitvice Lakes incident of 31 March 1991. In the same skirmish, 
one Serb fighting for the SAO Krajina was also killed, marking the first Serb fatality in the war. 
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Shortly thereafter, on 25 June 1991, Croatia unilaterally declared independence from Yugoslavia. 
While neighbouring Slovenia, which also declared independence that same day, had taken 
measures to secure its Territorial Defence and seize major border posts – sparking a ten-day war 
against the JNA that led to the swift recognition of its declaration of independence – Croatia was 
significantly less prepared for violent conflict. Larger-scale violence began in the summer of 1991 
around Pakrac in central Slavonia and the village of Dalj in the east (Tanner 2010, 253). By 
autumn, the Yugoslav Navy’s bombardment of Dubrovnik had begun, with rocket strikes from the 
Adriatic Sea and nearby strategic sites close to the borders with Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Montenegro. The skirmish at Plitvice Lakes that March had sparked a reaction from Serbia, where 
while avoiding the proposal for uniting the breakaway SAOs in Krajina, Slavonia and Syrmia 
(Srijem/Srem), “the parliament offered Krajina ‘all necessary help,’ with all that that implied in 
terms of arms and money” (Tanner 2010, 244). The siege of Dubrovnik, which lasted from 1 
October 1991 to 31 May 1992, was the first major battle in Croatia to grab international attention, 
given Dubrovnik’s famed reputation as the “pearl of the Adriatic.” In the nearly eight months of 
shelling, almost ninety civilians were killed, including photographer Pavo Urban, whose final 
images captured a mortar attack on Stradun, the major artery of Dubrovnik’s Old Town, seconds 
before he was killed by shrapnel from the explosion (see Maračić 1998; Figure 2.6).  
 
Figure 2.6: Pavo Urban’s final photograph, Dubrovnik, 6 December 1991 
 
Source: Flickr user Andrew Hunter1 (2005).  
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The bombardment of Dubrovnik marked the first of three major lieux de mémoire (borrowing from 
Nora 1989, as discussed in Chapter 1) of the Homeland War. In November 1991, the city of 
Vukovar fell to attacks by both the JNA and irregular Serb paramilitaries, including Željko “Arkan” 
Ražnatović’s Tigrovi/“Tigers,” a squad formally known as the Srpska dobrovoljačka garda/“Serb 
Volunteer Guard.”7 The Battle of Vukovar, which had begun in August 1991, culminated in the 
capture of the Vukovar hospital and the massacre of 264 civilians and soldiers at the nearby Ovčara 
farm, among the victims Siniša Glavašević, a local journalist whose reports from the besieged town 
were disseminated by radio to counterparts in Zagreb and eventually published in the collection 
Priče iz Vukovara/“Voices from Vukovar;” his stories bookend this dissertation. Vukovar, 
another critical lieu de mémoire in both the temporal and spatial meanings of the phrase, marked a 
circling back to the memories of Second World War atrocities and, until the fall of Srebrenica in 
July 1995, was the site of the worst massacre on European soil since the 1940s. The once beautiful 
Baroque town on the Danube was reduced to ash and rubble, the scars of its destruction still 
lingering in many spaces today. Its role in the mnemonic landscape of contemporary Croatia is 
central to the state narrative of legitimate defence against “Greater Serbian aggression” (Sabor 
2000).  
 
The war in Croatia would see upwards of ten-thousand civilian deaths – both Croat and Serb – and 
the displacement of a further 700,000 individuals. The Homeland War and the contemporaneous 
wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina represented a human catastrophe of a proportion unprecedented in 
post-war Europe as well as a noticeable break from comparably more peaceful transitions from 
socialist to democratic rule in much of central and eastern Europe. For much of the war in Croatia, 
territories with large Serb populations, namely in Slavonia, northern Dalmatia, Banija, Lika and 
Kordun, fell under the control of the Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK), which, as noted above, 
received financial and military support from Serbia despite Milošević’s insistence that Serbia 
played no role in the conflict. These sites, too, were those where the vast majority of fighting 
occurred, with limited attacks on military barracks or other important strategic points in the 
territory held by the new Republic of Croatia and its fledgling army (Hrvatska vojska – HV). 
                                                
7 Arkan, as Ražnatović was popularly known, later would play a role in the wars in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and was indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). He married the (in)famous turbofolk singer Svetlana “Ceca” Ražnatović in 1995 
and was assassinated in Belgrade in January 2000 and buried with military honours. 
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Zagreb was bombarded twice during the war, first on 7 October 1991 with the Yugoslav Air Force 
targeting the then-official residence of President Franjo Tuđman, who was in the building at the 
time of the attack but was left unharmed, and again on 2 and 3 May 1995 by the RSK Army, leading 
to seven civilian deaths not far from the central Ban Jelačić Square. While violence lessened 
throughout 1992 with occasional ceasefires, by 1993, the Croatian Army made advances against 
the RSK, which at its peak controlled nearly one-third of Croatian territory. In Operation 
Maslenica from late January to early February 1993, the Croatian government regained control of 
a land route from Dalmatia back into Croatia proper after the earlier destruction of the Maslenica 
bridge, linking coastal areas around Zadar to the interior.  
 
In 1994, the RSK forces faced increasing pressure from within Croatia and across the Una from 
the wartime Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ARBiH) and the Croatian Army (HV) 
that had allied against Republika Srpska (breakaway Bosnian Serb) forces and Serb paramilitaries 
in BiH by 1993.8 Through its participation in campaigns near Bihać in north-western BiH and the 
city of Livno in western Herzegovina, the Croatian Army was able to begin cornering the RSK 
across the border, preparing the final “liberation” of Croatia in the summer of 1995. Operation 
Bljesak/“Flash” in early May 1995 secured the territory in western Slavonia near Pakrac, where 
the first larger battles of the Homeland War took place, in retaliation to which the RSK launched 
its final rocket attacks on Zagreb. On 4 August 1995, after over a year of support from American 
military contractors as a result of the peace agreement that ended the Croat-Bosniak War, and with 
direct assistance from the ARBiH, the Croatian Army launched Operation Oluja/“Storm.” With 
Knin, the wartime capital of the RSK, surrounded to the south, east and west by the HV and to the 
north by the Bosnian forces in the Bihać pocket, the remnants of the RSK armed forces swiftly fell. 
Confident of the success of Storm, President Tuđman travelled to Knin, kissing and hoisting a 
massive Croatian flag over the fortress that towers over the town centre. Croatian Defence Minister 
Gojko Šušak declared a successful end to Operation Storm on the evening of 7 August, and the 
next day, negotiated terms of surrender were signed outside Sisak. 
 
                                                
8 The Croatian Army and other Croat forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina originally fought against the 
ARBiH in the 1992-1994 Croat-Bosniak War, with animosities peaking in 1993 with the destruction 
of Mostar’s Stari most (Old Bridge). The Old Bridge, which had stood since its completion by the 
Ottomans in 1566, is one of the most notable symbols of Bosnia-Herzegovina and would be 
restored partly from the rubble found in the Neretva River in 2004.  
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Operation Storm, the final key lieu de mémoire in the Croatian narrative of the Homeland War, 
remains a contentious point in the troubled shared history of Serbs and Croats in Croatia and 
abroad. While the territorial integrity of Croatia was re-established with the success of the 
Croatian armed forces, thousands of Serbs fled their homes toward the Republika Srpska or further 
into Serbia; today, two major settlements outside Belgrade – Busije and Grmovac – remain 
predominantly populated by those Serbs displaced during Operations Flash and Storm. As with 
the number of Serb victims of the NDH at Jasenovac, the number of those displaced during the end 
phases of the Homeland War are still contested between Serbia and Croatia (Milekić 2017). After 
Storm, too, Serb civilians – often elderly and rural – were murdered by Croatian soldiers, as in the 
case of Varivode, a small village in the Dalmatian hinterlands, where on 28 September 1995, nine 
Serbs aged between 60 and 85 were killed. The October 2010 erection of a monument recalling 
their deaths was marked by controversy, as the first iteration of the monument had been destroyed 
six months before. While anti-Serb genocidal intent has not been proven in the ICTY and in 
domestic courts, the central role of Operation Storm in the cultural memory of Croatian Serbs runs 
parallel to the memories of Jasenovac in the Second World War (Susnjic 2011). The nature of 
commemorative events around Operation Storm in both Croatia and Serbia will be discussed more 
thoroughly in Chapters 4 (“Branitelji/Defenders”) and Chapter 5 (“Žrtve/Victims”). 
 
Operation Storm marked the closing act of the Homeland War, which ended on 12 November 
1995 with the signing of the Erdut Agreement (formally the Basic Agreement on the Region of 
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium). While the defeat of the RSK in Dalmatia and 
Lika was secured by force, peace was achieved in Slavonia primarily through diplomatic means, 
with smaller skirmishes marking the sputtering end of the war. The Erdut Agreement foresaw a 
more gradual re-integration of the territory held by the RSK in Eastern Slavonia, which was placed 
under United Nations transitional administration until January 1998. 
 
Negotiating post-war Croatian identity/-ies 
The restoration of Croatia’s territorial integrity completed Franjo Tuđman’s vision of 
independence and the preservation of the state’s “millennial dream” of liberation from foreign 
powers (see Bellamy 2003; Pavasović Trošt 2018). Croatia’s recent history of violence, that is, the 
long and painful history of the twentieth century, highlights the critical points in the past that have 
played conclusive roles in forming the content of Croatian cultural memory and, simultaneously, 
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of a mainstream Croatian identity. This identity is formed through contrasts to some group of 
“Others,” be they Hungarian or Habsburg, Serb or Slovene, Yugoslav or European (see Chapter 
6); this process of delineation is not dissimilar to other patterns of identity construction in other 
national groups. The origins of Croatian nationalism indeed lie in opposition to attempts for 
greater Magyarisation in the Austro-Hungarian period, and the end of the Homeland War signified 
Croatia’s ultimate refusal of its Yugoslav past. Croatia is Christian, because it was not Muslim 
(Ottoman); Croatia is Catholic, because it is not Orthodox (Serb); Croatia is European, because it 
is not Balkan (Yugoslav). This awkward positioning as a transitory point “between the Balkans and 
Europe,” however this trope explanation may manifest (see Milekić 2018a; Bartlett 2006), 
continues to present challenges to the formation of a unitary Croatian identity today, despite the 
centrality of the Homeland War to the narrative of the modern state.  
 
Franjo Tuđman, Croatia’s first president and the spiritual (if self-declared) successor to Ante 
Starčević as the “father of the homeland,” ruled the country until his death on 10 December 1999. 
The latter years of his presidency were marked by a troubled transition into a fledgling market 
economy through the privatisation of state assets, often into the hands of his accomplices (see 
Čengić 1996; Čučković 1993). If not for his death, it is perceived that Tuđman would have been 
indicted by the ICTY for participation in a “joint criminal enterprise” along similar charges as had 
been pressed against Slobodan Milošević before his own death in The Hague in 2006 (Maass 
1999; Moore 1999; Milekić 2016a). While the economy slowly recovered in the aftermath of war, 
the political landscape shifted after Tuđman’s death, and in the 2000 elections, Stjepan Mesić of 
the liberal-democratic Hrvatska narodna stranka (HNS)/“Croatian People’s Party” was chosen 
as Tuđman’s successor. Under Mesić, the presidency was reformed to grant more powers to the 
office of the prime minister, transforming the role of the president into a more performative head 
of state within a stronger parliamentary republic. Mesić, though politically distant from the HDZ 
from which he split in 1994, like Tuđman preserved the vision of “national reconciliation” of 
Croatia’s fascist and partisan pasts and had similarly and controversially challenged the number of 
Serbs, Jews and Roma murdered at Jasenovac in the Second World War (Czerwiński 2016).  
 
In the ten years of the Mesić presidency, however, various governments shifted between centre-
left coalitions from 2000 to 2003 and centre-right, HDZ-led cabinets through 2011, swinging 
the focus of memory politics between coming to terms with the NDH and Yugoslav pasts, 
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respectively, more of which will be discussed in Chapters 4 through 6. Above all else, however, the 
Mesić years were marked by Croatia’s negotiations to accede to the European Union, with many 
elements of the process, most notably the requirement for Croatia to adhere to the demands to 
hand over various indicted generals to the ICTY, furthering rifts within Croatian society. The most 
controversial of the ICTY’s demands was the arrest of General Ante Gotovina, who had overseen 
Operation Storm and the final defeat of the Republika Srpska Krajina in the summer of 1995. After 
his forced retirement at the insistence of Mesić in 2001, Gotovina went into hiding and was 
ultimately arrested in the Canary Islands in 2005, where he voluntarily surrendered, and was 
extradited to The Hague. Despite an initial guilty verdict for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, among others, Gotovina was ultimately acquitted on appeal in November 2012, which 
caused the Serbian government to suspend negotiations temporarily with the Tribunal (Flego 
2012). Gotovina and Mladen Markač, who had similarly been sentenced for war crimes committed 
during Storm, received a heroes’ welcome in Zagreb upon their return from the Netherlands on a 
Croatian government jet, with banners by joyful defenders claiming “Gotovina – Hero” or 
“Croatia’s pride” marking the event across the country (Pavelić and Barlovac 2012).  
 
Not only the acquittals of Markač and Gotovina but also the accession of Croatia to the European 
Union on 1 July 2013 granted Croatia greater leverage against Serbia in the ongoing memory wars 
between the two post-Yugoslav states. The soured relations between Serbia and Croatia have 
limited the emergence of a potential reconciliatory narrative of the 1990s and further of their 
shared Yugoslav experiences. Whereas Slovenian insistence on the settling of territorial disputes 
with Croatia over the Piran Bay dampened the pace of Croatia’s EU accession negotiations, Croatia 
today (noting, too, that the government is again led by the HDZ) is in a position to see its demands 
on legal reforms and border disputes along the Danube met as part of Serbia’s accession process, 
which began in 2007. Milošević and Touquet (2018) note, however, that Croatia’s leverage in this 
context allows it greater room to “upload” its memory content to the European memory 
framework, which Serbia upon eventual accession would be made to “download.” This content 
could include a “final” accepted number of victims of the atrocities in Jasenovac and Srebrenica, 
the Croatian retelling of the Yugoslav story and the narrative of the Homeland War as one of 
“legitimate defence against Greater Serbian aggression,” following earlier declarations by the 
Croatian Sabor (see Sabor 2000; 2006). Whether Croatian “wins” its everlasting memory war 
with Serbia remains to be seen, and the manifestations and repercussions of such a conclusion 
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While mnemonic tensions remain between Serbia and Croatia over the symbolic and physical 
violence of the past, the current state of affairs looks peaceful when compared to the destruction 
of the Second World War and the fall of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Though both parties’ histories 
have intertwined for centuries, on the whole it is wider European processes and events from the 
nineteenth-century onward that have conclusively formed much of the content of Croatia’s modern 
memory landscape. The scars of the past, marked now by monuments, museums and 
commemorations across Croatia, show the difficulties inherent in the coupling of nationalism and 
violence that marked much of this period.  
 
This chapter has addressed the key turning points in Croatia’s millennial past, from the founding 
of the medieval Kingdom of Croatia in 925 CE to the origins of Croatian nationalism in 
nineteenth-century literature and politics and the First and Second World War in the early 
twentieth century. The legacy of Croatia’s Yugoslav past, however, plays a prominent role in 
determining some of the most important shifts in Croatian identity, particularly as a result of the 
Croatian Spring movement and the demands for greater cultural and political autonomy, which 
ultimately manifested in Croatia’s declaration of independence from Yugoslavia on 25 June 1991. 
The outbreak of the Homeland War in that same year has resulted in a wealth of memorial sites and 
commemorative events, which form the greatest bulk of my data to be analysed in Chapter 4, 5 and 
6. These are first and foremost the intial sieges and defeats of Croatian forces of 1991 in 
Dubrovnik and Vukovar and the ultimate victory over the Republika Srpska Krajina in Knin in 
August 1995, but other critical events in Croatia’s recent past like its accession to the European 
Union in July 2013 are presented throughout my analysis.  
 
The following chapters will detail more specifically how Croatia today marks its past, who is 
remembered, who is forgotten, how and why, and what these choices mean for the contemporary 
self-imagination of a state in the early years of its membership in the European Union. The purpose 
of this chapter was to lay out those events that emerge again and again in the physical 
manifestations of memory, that is, the “public face of memory,” as I will refer to them throughout 
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this text, that are inescapable in the context of Croatian history. How I approach, document and 
analyse these sites and events will be discussed in the following chapter. ★  
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Introduction 
This research focused on the links between memory, identity, power and conflict by suggesting 
how the construction of the post-independence Croatian commemorative narrative exacerbates 
tensions in spaces formerly heavily populated by ethnic Serbs in Dalmatia and Slavonia. 
 
In the course of my work, I aimed to address the following questions: 
 
• How is memory visualised in public spaces, and how does the construction of particular 
monuments or the commemoration of certain events reflect social behaviours toward the 
past?  
• How does Croatia’s visual culture of remembrance illustrate the relationships between 
power, violence, memory and identity? 
• How, and by whom, is memory constructed to perpetuate social divisions, based on 
nationality, ethnicity or religion?  
• Using a concept of “memory abuse” in post-conflict settings, what are the normative 
expectations of remembrance and what form does resistance to specific memorialisations 
take? 
• How do processes of social differentiation elevate or exclude specific historical narratives 
from commemorative processes? 
 
To answer these questions, my research relied primarily on qualitative methods and visual data; 
while quantitative strands of research may be suitable for larger-scale studies of memory (Keightley 
2010, 65) or to triangulate results of qualitative research (Deacon et al. 1998), the particular 
historical and social dimensions of this work create a lack of fit for statistical approaches to lived 
and living memory. The embeddedness of social interactions in memory studies necessitates 
qualitative methods to explore not only personal and minute instances of behaviour relevant to the 
process of remembrance (Keightley 2010, 65), but also wider patterns of social behaviour as I 
analyse here with the use of visual methods. To this end, I employed mixed methods, including 
informal ethnography, visual methods, and relatively standardised text-based approaches to 
describing and analysing memory and its many uses in a post-conflict environment like Croatia. 
The use of Croatia as my key field site presented significant challenges and opportunities in 
expanding contemporary memory research; continued exposure to active participants in the 
  113 
commemorative processes taking place in post-independence Croatia also forced a serious 
reconsideration of existing themes within the Croatian collective conscience and assumptions of 
Croatia as a transitory space “between Europe and the Balkans” (Bartlett 2006), “between Central 
Europe and the Balkans” (Vukadinović 2003), or as the “fragile heart of the Balkans” (Engel 
2018). 
 
Most notably, this project broke from a more common use of élite interviews found in political 
research on memory (e.g. Milošević and Touquet 2018) and instead relied on capturing the 
“public face” of memory, that is, that which is visible and accessible to all within a designated 
community, here limited by knowledge of the Croatian language. Élite interviews may be a valuable 
source of information relating to various levels of state or regional policy (Beamer 2002), recent 
historical shifts in social or mnemonic processes (Hochschild 2009), and determining both formal 
and informal hierarchies and networks embedded in decision-making processes (Parry 1998). 
However, I intended with this research to relate to more publicly accessible and socially defining 
forms of data but over which ownership or decision-making structures may be blurred, 
undocumented or forgotten, most notably in memorial construction. The temporally and spatially 
dispersed nature of my data also limits the explanatory capacity of interviews and may provide an 
unbalanced view of the memorialisation process in Croatia and more widely in the former 
Yugoslavia.  
 
My data are a collection of documented monuments, museum exhibits, commemorative speeches, 
newspaper articles and ethnographic observations made during eleven field visits to Croatia 
between May 2017 and September 2019 (see Appendix 1), which collectively triangulate points 
of contention in contemporary memory politics across generations, religious and ethnic 
communities and political affiliations, among other markers of identity. I also explored visual 
elements of memory (street art, posters, informal monuments, etc.) and how their construction (or 
destruction) reflects shifts in the content of Croatia’s cultural memory over time. The use of 
publicly accessible information, like monuments, museums or published transcripts, allows for a 
degree of verifiability, if not replicability, of the objective and descriptive elements of my research. 
Below, I explore the various considerations taken in developing my methodological approach to 
studying memory in post-independence Croatia and discuss the manner in which data were 
collected and analysed as well as the ethics of researching memory in post-conflict spaces. 
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Data collection 
Case selection 
The selection of Croatia as my key case study derives from my prior working experience at the Post-
Conflict Research Center in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), from June 2014 to May 2016. 
During my time as an intern and later as Communications Manager from February 2015, I became 
aware of major ongoing negotiations of identity and politics centred around commemorative 
practices, including national holidays and the remembrance or denial of the Srebrenica massacre, 
defined in accordance with international law as a genocide (Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, IT-98-
33-A, 2004). My master’s dissertation for the University of Edinburgh (McConnell 2015) 
focussed on how these mnemonic tensions are reflected in media and politics in BiH, highlighting 
not only inter-ethnic tensions between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks but also intra-ethnic struggles 
for influence between nominally ethnic Bosniak parties in the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (FBiH). Over time, I noticed a strong focus in literature and day-to-day discourse on 
memory struggles in and between BiH and Serbia, but comparatively little had been written on the 
tensions between BiH and Croatia beyond matters of identity between Croats in Croatia and the 
Croat population of Herzegovina. The multi-layered complexities of a comprehensive Bosnian 
case study, with overlapping elements of religion, ethnicity, international intervention and a 
convoluted domestic political structure, also limited the feasibility of a holistic approach to post-
war memory in the confines of a doctoral thesis. Croatia, by comparison, faced similar challenges 
to post-war reconstruction and regional reconciliation, but the country’s post-war population is 
significantly more ethnically and religiously homogeneous than that of BiH (Toe 2016), allowing 
for a faster synthesis of a uniquely Croatian narrative of the recent conflict by the ruling party and, 
eventually, of the Yugoslav past. Nevertheless, internal divides remain along political and 
socioeconomic lines amongst ethnic Croats and more widely between Croats and ethnic 
minorities, among them Serbs, Hungarians, Czechs and others. Croatia’s 2013 accession to the 
European Union (EU) also represents a useful historical turn, around which much of my analysis 
centres. While I aimed to incorporate as much context from monuments dating from Croatia’s 
Austro-Hungarian past through Yugoslav history and into the present, the years 1991 (start of the 
Homeland War), 1995 (Operation Storm and the end of the war), 1999 (the death of President 
Franjo Tuđman) and 2013 (EU accession) are the most important for this research. 
 
  115 
The nature of this case study is such that I did not aim to be comprehensive in my documentation 
of monuments (which are innumerable) or of the entirety of Croatia’s commemorative processes 
but rather that I intended to indicate major and often problematic themes within Croatian cultural 
memory. This research represents a single-country case study that highlights the idiosyncrasies of 
the rehearsal of memory in Croatia but may also demonstrate parallels or contrasts with the 
commemorative practices of other post-Yugoslav, post-communist or post-war societies. Croatia 
matters in that its often contradictory history and narratives of the past provide useful fodder for 
an engagement with the literatures of memory, power, identity and violence, grounding the 
intersection between them in a tangible, real-world setting known to many.  
 
While I did travel to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Slovenia during my field visits, this research 
takes the shape of a single-country study, as a wider comparative study would not have been best 
served with the constraints of a doctoral thesis. Culpepper argues, “Comparative politics is 
fundamentally about using comparison across different units of analysis to delineate the causal 
mechanisms that explain variation among political, social, and economic outcomes in those units 
and beyond them” (Culpepper 2005, 2). As my work spans both political and sociological themes, 
the validity and necessity of a single-country study becomes more apparent as the internal 
complexities of that case intensify. Particularly case studies of the former Yugoslavia – either as a 
whole or in individual studies of the constituent republics - provide broad strokes of comparison 
between what are now six or seven independent states (recalling the question of recognition of 
Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia); this can blur more important 
distinctions between the Yugoslav successor states and their various idiosyncrasies that a deeper 
examination of just one of these countries may address. Nonetheless, I intended for this research 
to speak to the necessity of ongoing comparative research in the region and further in post-conflict 
and post-socialist societies by providing a unique unit of analysis – here, the “public face of 
memory” – upon which future investigations may build. From this single-country study, I used 
extended case method to incorporate more reflexive (autoethnographic) elements of participant-
observation, particularly through the attendance of public commemorations in Knin and Vukovar 
in 2017. The aim of the extended case method is: 
  
to locate everyday life in its extralocal and historical context […] in order to extract 
the general from the unique, to move from the ‘micro’ to the ‘macro,’ and to connect 
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the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on pre-existing 
theory (Burawoy 1998, 4-5).  
 
This description of the extended case method is most fitting for how I conducted my research given 
my ambition to speak to ongoing tensions in Croatian memory politics through the theoretical lens 
of historical uses and abuses of the past for future gain. By viewing memory at the micro-level 
through individual monuments, museum exhibitions or other memorial artworks, I can piece 
together a more coherent image of the macro-level patterns of memory politics and social 
remembrance in a given space. 
 
Site selection 
During my fieldwork, I documented 614 monuments, memorial placards and other public physical 
manifestations of memory and visited 27 museums or exhibits on Croatian history or specifically 
on the Homeland War (1991-1995) (See Appendix 2). Figure 3.1 below traces the various routes 
I drove across the country in six of my field visits. In the course of these trips, I travelled across all 
major regions of Croatia, including the Istrian peninsula, which played a comparatively marginal 
role in the war. For the greatest part of my fieldwork, I concentrated on sites in the breakaway 
Republika Srpska Krajina (RSK), the internationally unrecognised Serb statelet that covered up to 
one-third of Croatian territory by 1993. Major research sites included Zagreb, Croatia’s capital 
city, Vukovar, a city on the Danube facing Serbia overrun and destroyed by the Yugoslav People’s 
Army (JNA) and Serb paramilitaries in 1991, Knin, the wartime capital of the RSK, and 
Dubrovnik, the famed “pearl of the Adriatic” besieged by Serb and Montenegrin forces in the early 
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Figure 3.1: Fieldwork routes, August 2017 – September 2019 
 
 
The selection of major memorial sites derives from their relative importance during Croatia’s 
Yugoslav history and its recent experiences in the Homeland War. During preliminary 
background research, I made note of important monuments or sites of battles during the 1990s, 
searching region by region for the most relevant sites. In the case of Slavonia, for instance, while 
Vukovar is the most notable city for the suffering endured in the early stages of the war, I also made 
sure to incorporate visits to Berak, where the “Log Revolution” began in August 1990. I 
additionally visited villages like Trpinja, Jagodnjak and Negoslavci that are members of the Joint 
Council of Municipalities (ZVO, association of municipalities with Serb-majority or –plurality 
populations), and Pakrac, the largest town in what was the breakaway Serbian Autonomous Oblast 
of Western Slavonia in 1991. Other factors considered in selecting particular research sites in 
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Croatia included public access, demographic makeup of the surrounding area, disparities between 
rural and urban war narratives, the presence of historical figures (i.e. Nikola Tesla, Stjepan Radić, 
Ante Starčević, Josip Broz Tito, Franjo Tuđman, etc.), and the relative impact of tourism, 
particularly around Plitvice Lakes National Park and the Croatian littoral. Figure 3.2 below shows 
the results of this preliminary site search, which contrasts with the final results of my fieldwork in 
Figure 3.3. Most of the original sites were indeed visited in the course of my fieldwork, and 
additional stops were made at monuments or in villages between sites planned for my daily 
itineraries.  
 
Figure 3.2: Initial research site selection results, by region 
 
Legend: Gold – Slavonia; Black – Central Croatia and Gorski kotar;  
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Figure 3.3: Final fieldwork results, by historical era commemorated 
 
Legend: Purple – Austro-Hungarian Empire (1526 – 1918); Blue – Yugoslavia (1918-1991);  
Red – Republic of Croatia (1991 – present); Grey – Other (pre-1526, incl. Greco-Roman memorials or medieval 
Kingdom of Croatia) 
 
Visual research methods and capturing the “public face of memory” 
Visual sociology involves, in part, the study of methods of communicating culture with media that 
expands beyond the purely textual (Pauwels 2010, 553). My analysis in this research centres on 
what I prefer to describe as the “public face of memory,” that is, those visual manifestations of 
memory which are generally accessible to all and are made with a public, rather than a private, 
audience in mind. The “public face of memory” here differs in its materiality from various 
theoretical definitions of “public memory” that exist and have been discussed in Chapter 1. As 
noted above, access to the latter may be limited by knowledge of the Croatian (or Serbian, Bosnian, 
Montenegrin, Serbo-Croatian, Yugoslav, “our,” “local,” “together” or “polycentric”) language 
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and a general familiarity with local histories. However, other monuments commemorating larger 
figures like Nikola Tesla or, most notably, Josip Broz Tito extend beyond the realm of Croatian 
cultural memory, as will be discussed in Chapter 6 (“Hrvatska”). The “public face of memory” 
expands beyond monuments to include local, regional and national museums, commemorative 
events – for the purposes of this research the 5 August commemoration in Knin of 1995’s 
Operation Storm and the 18 November commemoration of the 1991 fall of Vukovar – newspapers, 
cemeteries and street art. The highly visual nature of my data underscores the increasing relevance 
of visual methods in social research (see Banks and Zeitlyn 2015; Pauwels 2010), while these 
individual visual representations of memory point toward the wider unit of analysis of this project, 
Croatia’s “public face of memory.” Several related studies exist on the reception of visual 
representations of the nation in modern Croatia (Fernández 2017), 19th- and 21st-century Serbia 
and Croatia (Malešević 2017c) and 18th-century France (Landes 2001), among others, building 
from Anderson’s conceptualisation of the “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) and 
Hobsbawm’s “invented traditions” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). This work continues this 
discussion, using physical instances of memory rather than entire imagined national groups as 
conduits for remembering, forgetting, denying or determining historical events and future 
trajectories.  
 
Following Fernández (2017), I borrow from Victoria Alexander’s categorisation of visual 
approaches to the social sciences, namely:  
 
1. The analysis of existing visual materials (e.g. looking at the portrayal of gender 
or race on television). 
2. The use of visual materials to generate data (e.g. showing photos to an 
individual during an interview or a film to a focus group). 
3. Creating visual data to analyse (e.g. filming children on the playground to learn 
about their social interaction). 
4. Using images to present results. [author’s emphasis] (Alexander 2004, 344). 
 
While I had originally aimed to create visual data (Category 3) through video-recording 
interactions with monuments and participants at commemorative events, ethical considerations 
detailed below moved me toward building instead a database of monuments, memorial placards 
and street art using still images. Subsequent field visits to many of these monuments also 
invalidated the video-based approach I had originally planned, as most monuments were hardly 
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visited and often located in remote or poorly accessible areas of the countryside. More importantly, 
I pull from Alexander’s fourth category and use the images recorded and visual summaries (i.e. 
graphs, databases and maps) to present my findings. In the data collection process, I relied only on 
existing materials (Category 1) rather than generating my own beyond photographing these 
memorial sites, which only became relevant in the data analysis procedures detailed below. Visual 
manifestations of cultural memory and wider collective representations of groups, whether ethnic, 
national or religious, are central to understanding how memory is performed, negotiated and 
contested across time and space. Here, I justify the use of my chosen data sources, expanding from 
Jan Assmann’s definition of symbolic forms of “collective identity” as “not only words, sentences 
and texts, but also […] rituals and dances, patterns and ornaments, costumes and tattoos, food and 
drink, monuments, images, landscapes, way- and border markers” (J. Assmann 2000, 139). 
 
Monuments 
The most important sources of data for my research were to be found amongst the innumerable 
monuments scattered around Croatia. As noted, I documented 614 monuments, memorial 
placards or pieces of street art that recall historical events in Croatia or the former Yugoslavia. The 
monuments I recorded were publicly accessible, that is, no payment was necessary to visit the sites 
except in the case of museums (which were assessed separately from these monuments), were often 
found in central public areas or along major roads in and between towns and villages, and were 
generally visible to passers-by. There were certainly many exceptions to these guidelines, 
especially in the case of monuments constructed or placards installed during the socialist Yugoslav 
era (1943 – 1991). Many of these monuments commemorated battles outside major urban areas, 
but within localised contexts, particularly in smaller villages in Dalmatia and Slavonia, these 
criteria (central location, high visibility) were generally met. While the number of monuments 
recorded here does not exhaust the entire reservoir of monuments that may exist in the country – 
especially given the fluid nature of memory and the construction and destruction of monuments 
over time – the purpose of this fieldwork was not to achieve quantitative representativeness but to 
enable a qualitative assessment of major themes that emerge in the memory landscape of post-war 
Croatia. The manner in which I conducted my fieldwork allows for a high degree of replicability, 
as long as the materials documented remain intact. Further, the sheer volume of monuments 
documented allows for a thematic analysis of the contents of Croatian cultural memory, as will be 
discussed in Chapters 4 through 6.  
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My work with monuments closely follows that of Vjeran Pavlaković (2008a), Ana Milošević (2017) 
and Davor Pauković (Kolstø and Pauković 2014), among others, who in their work trace the 
construction, reconstruction and destruction of controversial monuments and the performance of 
contested memory at commemorative events in Croatia and more widely in the former Yugoslavia. 
Pavlaković was the first to introduce me to the world of “monument hunting,” as he and colleagues 
have described the sometimes unglamorous process of finding and documenting monuments and 
memorial placards across the Balkans, often driving several hundred kilometres per day to “bag a 
monument,” much as Scottish hikers “bag munros” when climbing what in Croatia can only be 
described as a pleasant hill. Field days generally involved advanced planning around key memory 
sites identified above or larger urban areas with intermediary stops for museum visits, allowing a 
generally high degree of flexibility when monuments not originally included in my itineraries were 
sighted along the road or while I wandered around towns. When visiting urban areas, I sought first 
the main public square and would then walk in the nearest streets immediately surrounding the 
square, particularly around churches, city halls or museums, where monuments were more 
commonly installed. Any monument spotted was photographed on my iPhone, enabling instant 
geotagging for later mapping. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show how this pattern emerges in Vukovar, 
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Figure 3.4: Documented monuments in Vukovar, by historical era commemorated 
 
Legend: Purple – Austro-Hungarian Empire (1526 – 1918); Blue – Yugoslavia (1918-1991);  
Red – Republic of Croatia (1991 – present); Grey – Other 
 
Of the 46 monuments recorded within the municipal boundaries of the city of Vukovar, 16 were 
located within a three-minute walk of the main square, Trg Republike Hrvatske, where the seat of 
the municipal government is based. In larger cities like Zagreb, Split or Osijek, monuments were 
more scattered around various neighbourhoods and squares, in courtyards or parks, along major 
arteries and by important buildings. Zagreb, the capital city, featured the greatest pattern of 
monument dispersal given its sheer geographic and population size relative to most other “large” 
cities in the region; while the 2011 census noted Zagreb’s municipal population as 790,017 
inhabitants, Split, the second largest city, only had 178,102 residents, and only Rijeka and Osijek 
in addition had populations greater than 100,000 (DZS RH 2011a). The 107 monuments I 
documented in Zagreb were similarly located in more heavily-trafficked commercial zones than in 
residential areas; Zagreb, like most European cities, however, features less significant zoning 
divides between living and working spaces than in the United States of America, my country of 
origin, so my perception may be slightly skewed. 
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Figure 3.5: Documented monuments in Vukovar city centre, by historical era commemorated 
 
Legend: Purple – Austro-Hungarian Empire (1526 – 1918); Blue – Yugoslavia (1918-1991);  
Red – Republic of Croatia (1991 – present); Grey – Other 
 
Museums 
Museum visits also provided insight on local variations of the Croatian narrative, with each site 
presenting local interpretations of, among other periods, the Austro-Hungarian administration of 
Croatia, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the different Yugoslavias that existed in Croatia and in 
which Croatia existed from 1918 to 1991, and, most importantly, the Homeland War. In many 
instances, the narratives presented overlapped, particularly when reference was made to the 
1990s, as will be discussed in Chapters 4 to 6. Museums were selected primarily by their relevance 
to major Croatian lieux de mémoire (sites of memory, see Nora 1989). Of the 27 museums visited, 
nine were entirely dedicated to the Homeland War in its entirety or at the time of visit featured 
large exhibits on events that occurred during the conflict, four more were local museums with 
partial exhibits or passing references to the war, and the fourteenth was a recreation of the birth 
house of Croatian President Franjo Tuđman in Veliko Trgovišće. Beyond this, I visited two 
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exhibits dedicated to Nikola Tesla, the famed scientist of Serbian ethnicity born in Smiljan, near 
Gospić, two to Josip Broz Tito, born in Kumrovec facing the Slovenian border, and the site of the 
former Jasenovac concentration camp across the river from BiH. The purpose of visiting sites 
identified with a particular historical figure was to highlight the often conflicting perceptions of 
the individual across the former Yugoslavia; both Tesla and Tito were born in Croatia but carry 
great cultural weight in Serbia, too. While I do not discuss in great comparative detail the different 
approaches to the memory of Tito, for example, in his hometown and the Museum of Yugoslav 
History in Belgrade, as this is not within the immediate scope of my research, visits to memorial 
sites outside of Croatia provided helpful background information on framing the presentation of 
certain individuals in Croatia itself. The remaining museums were either modern art or 
ethnographic museums with limited relevance to the overall themes of this research but were 
visited in order to find some elements of topical complementarity (individual items or paintings, 
temporary exhibitions). Appendix 2 provides the names of the museums and the dates visited. 
 
Given the varied nature of the museums visited, I prioritised discussing those with exhibits 
dedicated to the Homeland War in my empirical findings. Where possible, I photographed these 
exhibits and transcribed the text present into a workable word processing document for future key 
word in context (KWIC) analysis using NVivo, a software for managing and sorting qualitative 
data. For museums where photography was forbidden or where exhibits were not exhaustive or 
very detailed, field notes were taken immediately upon leaving. On one instance, I was guided 
through the Memorial Centre for the Rocket Attacks in Zagreb by a museum worker, who then 
engaged me in an insightful but politically and morally challenging conversation about the 
Independent State of Croatia (NDH), Serbs, the Siege of Vukovar and the Jasenovac concentration 
camp (discussed in Chapter 5); this was easily one of the most memorable moments in my 
fieldwork, but given the impromptu nature of this conversation, it will be considered as part of my 
ethnographic observations of commemorative practices discussed below. 
 
Museums function in similar ways as smaller physical monumental structures (columns, statues 
and plaques) but also feature dynamic social elements (curating temporary exhibitions, rotating 
staff, ongoing negotiations for funding, determining and communicating core values) that a study 
solely focusing on monuments would preclude (Fyfe 2011, 32). Their inclusion in my research 
represents an acknowledgement of the more immediately performative role of museums in the 
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process of memorialisation. Museums can speak to Assmann and Assmann’s definitions of both 
cultural and collective memory discussed in Chapter 2, as they can reflect the content of either one 
defined in-group as a primary audience (Croats, Catholics, archaeologists, geologists) or more 
generally to shared instances of memory that transcend group boundaries (experiences like the 
Holocaust, living in Yugoslavia, surviving post-Communism, immigrating and emigrating). 
Museums are also a fertile site for ethnographic observation, both as a researcher and as a 
participant. How museums are configured determines visitors’ behaviour and their interactions 
with the material presented; touch this, don’t touch that, take photos, flash forbidden, enter here, 
exit only, online tickets, ticket desk, your ticket provides a 5% discount at the museum shop, and 
so on. The presence or absence of security staff and the behaviour of other visitors, too, affect to a 
great degree how museums are received (Trondsen 1976). Most importantly, what is highlighted, 
what is obscured and what is left out are highly political decisions that speak to ongoing tensions 
in mnemonic debates, and museums – past, present and future – provide yet another insight into 
these discussions. My field notes from museum visits reflected on some of the feelings I 
experienced during the visit and the general impression I received given these many factors. 
 
Newspapers and related media 
Mass media are yet another tool of communicating cultural memory, and the contexts in which they 
emerge, including their political and social environments, authorship, ownership structures, 
framing, biases and audiences, highlight the differential approaches to constructing and 
remembering the past. Aleida Assmann classifies these media outlets (newspapers, television, film, 
radio, and so on) as “external storage media” that interpret and communicate across generational 
boundaries (A. Assmann 1999, 19). In this research, I analyse the visuals and narratives of major 
Croatian newspapers around key events in the commemorative timeline, namely the 
commemorative events held annually in Knin and Vukovar on 5 August and 18 November, 
respectively. Given my limited ability in Croatian (discussed later in this chapter), however, the 
role of newspapers and mass media is relatively diminished in comparison to that of monuments, 
museums and commemorations. In order to help contextualise the events in Knin, I asked a friend 
in Belgrade to purchase five major newspapers in Serbia during the Operation Storm 
commemoration, which I collected the next week. The manner of presentation in Croatian and 
Serbian newspapers taken together also provides a useful comparison against Western reporting 
on the former Yugoslavia, which, as discussed above, can be laden with simplistic tropes that 
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ignore subtler cultural insights present in the local papers. As well, I purchased four Croatian 
papers on the morning after Bosnian Serb general Ratko Mladić’s sentencing to life imprisonment 
on 22 November 2017, which given the comparatively limited interest in Croatia in the Srebrenica 
genocide (as Croatia did not participate in those events) may show some differential approach to 
Serbs as individuals or maintaining a “Serbs as a collective” narrative. On the whole, the 
newspapers selected have among the highest circulation in Croatia or Serbia and reflect a range of 
biases where possible (though many are right-of-centre or maintain a very close relationship with 
the government) and cater to various demographics, namely reflecting age, rural/urban or 
local/national divides. A list of the newspapers with dates and circulation numbers, which I analyse 
most directly in Chapter 4, is available in Appendix 3.  
 
In addition to newspapers, I also watched television reporting of the Vukovar commemoration on 
the afternoon 18 November 2017 from HRT, the state broadcaster, after having visited Vukovar 
during the morning for ethnographic observations. This decision emerged from the difficulty in 
accessing the memorial site (the Memorial Cemetery for the Victims of the Homeland War) on the 
outskirts of Vukovar by road, as the only thoroughfare leading southeast from the city centre was 
blocked for the five-kilometre memorial march of politicians, defenders, victims’ families and other 
willing participants to the cemetery. Instead, I drove back to Osijek, where I was staying during the 
memorial weekend, and watched the march, mass and commemorative speeches by local clergy as 
would most other Croats choosing to observe the day’s events without travelling to Vukovar. I 
recorded in my field notebook the tone, dress and framing of the events while comparing them to 
the commemoration of Operation Storm I attended with Vjeran Pavlaković in Knin earlier that 
summer.  
 
The use of television programming as a data source is common in marketing studies and dates from 
the early years of mass television ownership (see Krugman 1965; Resnik and Stern 1977) but 
since has expanded to wider fields, including memory studies, whether social, psychological or 
neurological (see Holdsworth 2011; Kim and Biocca 1997; Newhagen and Reeves 1992; van den 
Broek et al. 1996). That television is widely accessible either through cable, satellite or Internet 
also provides stations with significant influence in determining social discourse, as recent studies 
of Fox News and other conservative or far-right media in the United States have demonstrated 
(DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; de Zúñiga et al. 2012). In Croatia, as well as in Serbia, state 
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television played a very critical role in manipulating audiences’ imaginations of the Other (here, 
Serbs or Croats, respectively) (Livingstone 1996), hence the importance of its inclusion as a 
source in this research, too, however limited in scope. 
 
Commemorative events 
The Croatian commemorative calendar is dominated by the events of Operation Storm in 1995, 
marked annually as a public holiday on 5 August as Dan pobjede i domovinske zahvalnosti i Dan 
hrvatskih branitelja/“Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day and the Day of Croatian 
Defenders,” and the fall of Vukovar in 1991, remembered on 18 November. Beyond these events, 
the Framing the Nation and Collective Identity in Croatia (FRAMNAT) research project traced 
other commemorative events from 2013 to 2017 in Srb, Jasenovac, Jazovka, Brezovica and 
Bleiburg in Austria, which mark events during the Second World War and are of continued 
relevance in Croatia today. Given the general focus of my research on post-conflict memory and 
the events of and following the 1990s Homeland War, I chose to attend only the Knin and Vukovar 
commemorations during longer periods of fieldwork in 2017. The two provide interesting 
counterpoints in Croatian memory politics, as the Knin celebrations remember the end of the war 
and Croatia’s victory over the RSK and the “liberation” of large swaths of Lika and Dalmatia, while 
the events in Vukovar mark the tragic destruction of the city in 1991 and the massacre of 264 
civilians and soldiers at the Ovčara farm at the hands of Croatian Serbs, Serb paramilitaries and the 
Yugoslav People’s Army. While the mood in Knin is festive and patriotic, the tone in Vukovar is 
rather mournful and the commemoration led by religious rather than political figures, who are 
nonetheless in attendance. The differences in tone among these and other commemorations not 
attended in the course of this research (Bleiburg and Jasenovac, namely) are important in 
answering my fifth research question, that is, how certain social groups are or are not integrated 
into the mainstream Croatian narrative.  
 
Attending these events as an outsider without native language abilities (discussed below) posed 
certain challenges that in some instances were mitigated by the presence of Croatian-speaking 
colleagues or the ability to review materials on YouTube or other online portals at a later date. The 
FRAMNAT project also provides their own transcripts of speeches given at the events that can be 
more accurate than officially published transcripts, which I discussed with Vjeran Pavlaković, 
FRAMNAT’s principal investigator, while driving to Knin on the morning of 5 August. The 
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purpose of attending these events was to witness “live” memory and to see how the past was 
recalled and performed, whether through military parades, solemn marches, prayers, chants or 
songs. Having a general understanding of the language of remembrance sufficed in many instances 
to have a strong impression of the methods of commemoration and audiences of these memories, 
and I documented much of the events in photo and video to recall at a later time and to verify what 
I had witnessed.  
 
Ethnographic observations 
Beyond witnessing commemorative events in person and on television, I was interested in 
recording smaller-scale mnemonic practices in Croatia: how people spoke of the war, of 
Yugoslavia and of Serbs, if flowers were lain at memorial sites, whether young people had inherited 
the trauma of their parents or had formed their own opinions independent of family experiences, 
or, for example, if someone’s clothing reflected their political stances, something that again 
highlights the importance of visual methods in the social sciences. How or why individuals 
remember (or forget) the past highlights the social nature of memory and communal ties that bind 
strangers through shared practices and norms, as explained by Maurice Halbwachs in his 
cornerstone studies of collective memory (see Halbwachs 1925; [1941] 1971). Although 
individual and hyper-localised patterns of remembrance are constituent of communicative 
memory, which Aleida Assmann argues represents the “short-term conscience of society” (A. 
Assmann 2006, 37), the remarks or behaviours expressed by individuals speak to wider patterns 
of social discourse that sit at the cultural and collective levels.  
 
As mentioned above, I eschewed structured interviews in favour of documenting the “public face 
of memory,” so this definition may extend into the realm of public actions taken by private persons, 
as the decision to wear a controversial “Velika Hrvatska”/“Greater Croatia” or “Za dom 
spremni”/“Ready for the homeland” T-shirt in public is a conscious one made nonetheless by the 
individual. What we do in the public sphere is generally distinct from our behaviours behind closed 
doors. Accordingly, I found it appropriate and necessary to incorporate insights from these sorts 
of ethnographic observations into my research to establish a contextual background abstract from 
the more concrete mnemonic programming of monuments, museums and newspapers. The 
amount of time I dedicated to ethnographic observation, whether as a distant observer, sitting in a 
car or a café, or as a direct participant in Knin and Vukovar, would not qualify this research as 
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“deep hanging out,” to borrow from Clifford Geertz’s methodology of participant-observation 
(Geertz 1998), but my work touches on the very informal nature of observation upon which 
Geertz’s anthropology builds. While I did not actively seek out people or prompt certain actions, 
I noted instances of behaviour I found part and parcel of the Croatian commemorative experience, 
including flags and symbols, language, dress, action and reaction.  
 
Data analysis 
The primary goal of my data analysis was to identify key themes in contemporary Croatian cultural 
memory and the web of ideas and beliefs that underpin the mnemonic rituals and symbols of the 
modern state. To achieve this, I took various approaches to sort, code and interpret the assorted 
data I had collected during my field visits, including a custom-built database for monuments and 
use of NVivo for analysing text.  
 
As the largest source of data came from the 614 monuments, memorials and pieces of street art I 
documented, I spent an appropriately greater amount of time developing a database, coding system 
and interactive map of monuments, which took approximately seven months to complete. I built 
my database using Apple’s Numbers software, a more user-friendly competitor of Microsoft Excel 
that enables users to integrate images and links with greater ease. The final version of the database 
includes columns for the following values of each monument recorded: 
 
A. Given name of the monument (city/municipality and number) 
B. Municipality 
C. County 
D. Original Croatian text 
E. English/other text, if present 
F. Funder/builder, if known 
G. Theme (from own coding) 
H. Year of construction 
I. Coordinates 
J. Historical era commemorated (Austro-Hungarian, Yugoslav, Croatian, Other; see 
Appendix 4) 
K. Victim/defender keywords (from own observations, not post-analysis) 
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L. Local/national (nature of person, place or event commemorated) 
M. Notes 
N. Photo 
O. Date of visit 
P. Who is being commemorated? 
Q. Remembering which historical era (from own coding) 
R. Constructed during which historical era (from own coding) 
 
The first few rounds of edits left behind many blank spaces in the database where targeted 
information was unavailable or not directly noted at the memorial site. In later versions, I added 
web links to various news articles or other reports about the monuments visited, which helped to 
clarify or corroborate unclear information or add valuable historical context to the sites that will 
complement any analyses of individual monuments in subsequent chapters. Further, the database 
serves as a useful tool for comparison and clustering as well as thematic and chronological 
organisation. The coding system I developed emerged primarily from key themes I noticed in 
initial superficial overviews of the database and grew into a four-level analysis of the individual 
monuments recorded. Primary sorting determined whether a person, place, thing or abstract 
concept was remembered, followed by more specific themes, i.e. war, arts and science, religion, 
politics or other. Sub-strata coding beyond this second level identified, for example, which war was 
being commemorated, and if in case of a war, who (soldiers, victims, etc.) was being remembered. 
A parallel coding system was used to identify historical eras that the monuments recalled and 
during which period they were erected, stretching from ancient (Greco-Roman) times through the 
various Yugoslavias into the modern Croatian state and EU member. The coding legend is 
included in Appendix 4.  
 
In keeping with the visual elements of this project, my analysis included the creation of an 
interactive map of the monuments and art identified in the database, using Google Maps. The 
various layers of the map match the historical eras being commemorated identified in column J of 
the database; these are simplified into four categories for ease of visual summary. A second 
iteration of the map included categorisation by type of memorial (monument, memorial plaques, 
graffiti/street art, and a separate layer for busts of President Franjo Tuđman), but this proved less 
effective in terms of analysis than the former. A temporally-sorted map showed more clearly how 
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and where which memories of Croatia’s various pasts were preserved or forgotten, which was 
particularly noticeable when observing the destruction of socialist monuments in areas like 
Dalmatia and Lika where the Homeland War was fought most severely. This work pairs neatly with 
that of Donald Niebyl, whose “Spomenik Database” has become a growing resource on post-
Second World War monuments in the former Yugoslavia; Niebyl – who has no prior family or 
educational background in the region – became interested in the Yugoslav-era “spomenik” 
building frenzy from the 1960s until the country’s demise and has built a user-friendly website that 
traces the history and ongoing debates over some ninety large-scale monuments from Slovenia to 
Macedonia (Niebyl 2016). In my work, I borrow from Niebyl’s approach to contextualising 
individual monuments in Croatia and documenting plaques, engravings and graffiti or other 
textual elements of the monument, and I have often relied on his database for guidance in planning 
daily itineraries for my fieldwork. The analytical and descriptive patterns established in the 
Spomenik Database provide useful frameworks for expanding the work of memory scholars and 
monument hunters in the region and further afield. 
 
Beyond what I gathered from visiting Croatian monuments, the data collected in museums, 
newspapers and other relevant sources were treated on similar visual and textual levels, as their 
content and the visual framing of this content are of equal relevance in the study of contentious 
memories. For all museum exhibits, the most relevant news articles and transcripts from 
commemorative speeches, I aimed to put this data into a workable text format using Microsoft 
Word in order to facilitate the identification of key themes in the Croatian cultural memory. Doing 
so required the use of NVivo’s key-word-in-context function, which within these large text corpora 
immediately identified variations of the words Hrvatska/“Croatia” and branitelj/“defender” or 
odbrana/“defence” as the most commonly used words in all monuments and commemorative 
speeches, followed by domovina/“homeland,” which I incorporate into the “Croatia” narrative 
for the purpose of my analysis. Žrtva/“victim” trailed significantly, but the lack of a thorough 
victimhood narrative signalled such an important mnemopolitical decision that I dedicate an entire 
chapter of this dissertation to this phenomenon.9 KWIC searches (as explored in Wood 1984; 
                                                
9 The case structure of the Croatian language results in up to fourteen different declensions of a 
single noun (singular/plural across seven cases), but many of these declensions overlap. For the 
purpose of these KWIC searches, I simplified search terms to include only the unchangeable roots 
of each noun: “hrvat*,” “*bran*,” “domovin*,” “žrt*.” Any words with similar stems that did not refer 
to the intended term were removed from search results. 
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Garett 2006) also allowed me beyond identifying frequently-used words and phrases to situate 
these in the wider contexts of the speeches or monuments from which they emerged, which added 
a deeper sociological dimension to this research when combined with my ethnographic 
observations or relevant historical and political data. 
 
Alternatives and limitations 
As my research involved dealing with the past through the contested lens of cultural memory, I 
aimed to ensure that all those memories in their various forms are at the very least generally publicly 
accessible. Informal conversation with attendees of the commemorative events in Knin and 
Vukovar as well as day-to-day discussions with museum staff, friends or colleagues provided very 
intriguing insights on individuals’ perceptions of the Croatian War of Independence and of 
contemporary relations between Croatia and Serbia. This information, however, does not address 
directly my research questions that focus on the social, collective remembrance practices 
established around the memories of the Homeland War and the much longer process of creating 
Croatian identity, and given the lack of a structured interview approach in this research, I chose to 
incorporate the information provided through these interactions as contextual background rather 
than presenting it as a core component of my data. Mihelj (2013) questions the appropriateness 
of formal interviews for gauging public over vernacular (or communicative) memories. She notes 
that whilst “qualitative interviewing was seen as a research resource able to elicit accounts that 
eschew researcher’s [sic] expectations and reveal authentic emotions and attitudes,” data gleaned 
from interviews “cannot be treated as representative of social interaction” (Mihelj 2013, 62). The 
primary difficulty, therefore, lies in the inability of the researcher to attribute a personal memory 
to a function of more widely shared, social memories of a past event, as someone’s upbringing and 
own socialisation will differ significantly from informant to informant, even where family members 
or immediate neighbours are involved.  
 
Similarly, Bryman warns against pushing informants too far to retrieve memories from farther back 
in their timelines lest these memories be “inaccurate” (Bryman 2008, 243), to oversimplify here. 
As a researcher, I did not want to put myself into a position to determine whether someone’s 
personal memories of a particularly traumatic event like war, forced removal or the loss of a loved 
one was “accurate” or not. Therefore, I chose to analyse only those forms of memory that involve 
some social or political component, such as publication or commemoration. Potential future 
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research, however, could more directly address this gap between public and individual memories 
and to what degree this gap contributes to, for example, memory abuse or reconciliation processes 
in post-conflict settings. 
 
Further, I considered alternative case studies, such as post-war developments in Bosnia-
Herzegovina or Serbia, but, as noted above, these have been addressed to a much greater degree 
than the problems I chose to observe in Croatia. Serbia has often been accused of being the 
greatest contributor or the instigator of most of the violence in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, 
and while the role of the Milošević regime in fomenting hostilities in the region is unquestionable 
and evinced by the wide-reaching archives of the ICTY, the Croatian state under Franjo Tuđman 
certainly contributed to the violence, as well. As Tuđman died before an indictment was issued 
from the tribunal in The Hague, the degree of criminal responsibility of his government has not 
been questioned as rigorously as has that of Serbia or the breakaway statelets of the Republika 
Srpska (Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the Republika Srpska Krajina (central and western Croatia).10  
 
Nonetheless, my research faced several shortcomings, most notably in the risks of translation from 
Croatian into English and the generalisability of this research into wider post-conflict settings, 
within or outside of the former Yugoslavia. This research built heavily on interpreting visual and 
material objects, which adds the burden of potentially differing interpretations of the same 
memorial space between authors, yet acknowledging these biases is an inherent part of data 
analysis. 
 
Translation and the post-Yugoslav language(s) 
I estimate my Croatian language skills at B1-B2 (“independent user”) on the Common European 
Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFRL), with my reading and speaking skills somewhat 
stronger than my writing or listening. As a non-native, intermediate-level Croatian speaker, 
                                                
10 Franjo Tuđman died on 10 December 1999 in Zagreb. At the time of his death, the ICTY issued 
an indictment for Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, the first in international criminal law of a 
sitting head of state. Milošević died on 11 March 2006 in The Hague awaiting a verdict in (IT-02-
54), “Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia.” Before Tuđman’s death, no Croatian government officials had 
been indicted by the ICTY, but in the early 2000s, several indictments were handed down for cases 
related to Operation Medak Pocket (1993) and Operation Storm (1995). Other trials involved 
Bosnian Croat generals and political figures for war crimes in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 
and 1995.  
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conducting fieldwork in Croatia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia posed certain challenges 
that more fluent speakers of the local language may not face. While many residents of Zagreb or 
coastal towns do speak sufficient English, or in some cases amongst older populations, German, 
which I also speak at a native level, much of my research took me to smaller locales far away from 
the more frequented tourist areas of Croatia where neither language is as frequently understood. 
Having lived for fifteen months in BiH did prepare me, thankfully, for a great number of standard 
conversational situations in which I found myself, but more important for my region of study are 
the minor differences between what are now recognised as separate but mutually intelligible 
languages. Translation between the various post-Yugoslav languages and English was often 
completed through Google Translate and corroborated using the Hrvatski jezični portal/Croatian 
Language Portal, an online dictionary providing declensions and conjugations of nouns and verbs 
where needed. While Google Translate does not provide authoritative translations from many 
Slavic languages into English (even switching between the Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian options 
will provide different translations of the same text), I was confident enough with my own language 
skills to recognise where a false translation, which often arose in cases of negation, was provided. 
In rare instances, I asked for secondary translations or clarifications from friends from the region 
willing to assist. 
 
The more I travelled to Croatia, the more I noticed my vocabulary shift away from words more 
commonly used in Bosnia (for bread, kruh in Croatia vs. hl(j)eb in Bosnia and Serbia; povijest 
rather than istorija for history; zračna luka vs. aerodrom or aeroport for airport). In part, this is 
due to the stigma associated with the Bosnian and Serbian languages in Croatia as languages of 
refugees and “enemies;” when I lived in Sarajevo, one documentary I watched explained how child 
refugees were forced to leave shops when asking for hljeb or paradajz instead of rajčice (tomatoes). 
While I was aware of minor linguistic issues like this, that I do not speak Croatian fluently did limit 
some of my ability to make more thorough ethnographic observations; for example, a colleague in 
Zagreb explained how Serbs and Croats in Vukovar will frequent separate cafés and bars, living by 
one another but not together, something a purely visual observation would overlook. Had I more 
time or funding, I would have planned several months of continued residence in Croatia to learn 
the language more thoroughly to mitigate issues of translation and to be able to participate more 
actively in the places and events I was observing. As this research is driven by visual and 
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documentary evidence, however, these limitations did not confine my work to the degree it may 
were this project more strictly anthropological in nature.  
 
How one names the language(s) spoken in the region also serves as a marker of ethnic and/or 
political identities, adding not only to the complications of cross-cultural research but also 
providing useful insight into the day-to-day dynamics of identity in Croatia. For example, I noticed 
in Bosnia many of my friends or colleagues referring to the language as “naški,” “ours,” rather 
than strictly “bosanski,” “Bosnian” or Croatian or Serbian, despite markers – greetings, 
colloquialisms or grammar – that might indicate which of the three “new” languages were being 
spoken. In Croatia, this “naški” nomenclature was less popular, and given the more homogeneous 
ethnic make-up of the country, “hrvatski,” “Croatian,” was more common. Speaking “Serbian” 
in Croatia, whether unintentionally by forgetting the –ije sounds in words like “milk” (mlijeko in 
Croatia, mleko in Serbia) or “Germany” (Njemačka in Croatia, Nemačka in Serbia) or using a 
da/that construction with modal auxiliaries (“I want that I go” rather than “I want to go”), was 
sometimes met with suspicion but for the most part ignored. Nonetheless, the use of the Serbian 
language in Croatia by state or local authorities has been challenged in the near past, as explained 
in Chapters 2 and 5. The Croatian language has been constructed through the revival or creation 
of words with ties to proto-Slavic roots in a concerted effort to differentiate it from the 
Serbian/Bosnian/Montenegrin languages, as Snježana Kordić notes in her analysis of the ties 
between language and national identity in the post-Yugoslav space (Kordić 2010). As an outsider, 
I made a point to avoid contentious linguistic debates while on fieldwork, generally referring to the 
language spoken as “Croatian” while in Croatia and as “Serbian” in the few weeks I spent in 
Belgrade outside of my research.  
 
However, as noted above, translating across languages and cultures does carry the risk of 
misinterpreting coded language that only makes sense in the context of that particular mnemonic 
culture. The Croatian language, like English, has various terms relating to memory that in many 
cases are interchangeable when abstracted from nuances of direction (thought toward, recalling 
from) and number (memory in the collective, a memory): uspomena, spomenik, spomen, 
komemoracija, sjećanje, pamćenje, memorija, like memento, monument, remembrance, 
commemoration, reminiscence, recollection, memory. Incorporating German terms from the 
memory studies literature also complicated this picture: Speicher, Denkmal, Erinnerung, 
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Gedenken, Andenken, Gedächtnis. The biggest risk in employing all these terms is in conflating 
their specific meanings and applications in describing memorial practices, but in this research I 
reduce this list primarily to rather fixed terms like memory (the analytical concept), 
commemoration (an event), memorial (an object) and remembrance (a process). 
 
Generalisability of findings 
Generalisability of research findings also represents a wider problem amongst much qualitative 
research. While the highly theoretical nature of this allows me some comparative generalisability 
among post-conflict settings, as stated above, the aim of this research is to explore in greater depth 
the processes of commemoration (or forgetting) in Croatia and its immediate vicinity. Each (post-
)conflict situation is certainly empirically different, but many of the mnemonic tensions that arise 
from these conflicts do fit a wider model of cultural memory, and hopefully, therefore, of memory 
abuse in various national contexts. My observations on power and violence also advance the study 
of the theoretical links between memory and identity that transcend national boundaries. 
 
The content of cultural memory is never definite and never exclusive to one particular culture; 
some may claim for themselves a history shared with other social groups (key Partisan victories in 
the former Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union during the Second World War, for example). It is 
observing the pattern of remembrance and the potential for abuse within the commemorative 
framework, however, that motivates this research. Here, I test the limits and suggest the utility of 
Jan and Aleida Assmann’s definitions of communicative, cultural and collective memory, as 
described in Chapter 1, in post-conflict settings. This approach speaks to Yin’s definition of 
“analytical generalisation,” whereby I compare the results of one empirical case study (Croatia) to 
wider extant theory. Yin states that the purpose of case studies is “to expand and generalize 
theories (analytic generalization) and not to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)” by 
comparing one case against a given population (Yin 2009, 15). Similar work on shared memorial 
practices in the former Yugoslavia, or more widely in post-conflict environments, has been 
completed by Jelena Đureinović in Serbia (Đureinović 2018), Anida Sokol (Sokol 2014) and Max 
Bergholz in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bergholz 2010; 2016) and Jelena Subotić on the Holocaust 
legacy in Eastern Europe (Subotić 2019). 
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Further, I aim to expand the use of visual data and visual methods in memory studies and more 
widely in sociological and political research, as the study of the visual entails examinations of the 
construction, presentation and reception of the image (here, monuments, memorial placards, 
museum exhibitions and so on) across various social groups (Freedberg 1989; Robins 1996). 
While a document-based approach would support some of the main conclusions I present, the 
added narrative weight of visual data provides analytical depth that a study of memory without the 
study of visual representations of memory would certainly overlook. The added complexities and 
“thickness” that emerge through visual research are, if anything, welcome. Flyvbjerg notes,  
 
To the case-study researcher […] a particularly ‘thick’ and hard-to-summarize 
narrative is not a problem. […] The dense case study […] is more useful for the 
practitioner and more interesting for social theory than either factual ‘findings’ or 
the high-level generalizations of theory (Flyvbjerg 2006, 237-238).  
 
Nonetheless, my research strives for some degree of generalisability in speaking to the theoretical 
implications of the intersections between power, memory, identity and violence, particularly in as 
nascent a field as memory studies, where a balance has yet to be struck between the general (with 
infinite typologies of memory) and the particular (with infinite, disparate case studies). The visual 
nature of this work additionally heightens the importance of research undertaken in living, public 
environments like commemorations and museums, which bridge a gap between the academic 
world and the everyday lives of memorial participants. 
 
Reflexivity and positionality 
Conducting research in an environment in which one was not raised creates various challenges, as 
the researcher is generally considered an outsider to the contexts examined in the course of his or 
her own work (Becker 1963). While interviews involving definite power negotiations were not a 
component of this research, it was useful all the while to consider arguments over who can study 
whom and how (see Chavez 2008; Merriam et al. 2001). This phenomenon was particularly 
pronounced in my work in Croatia, first as a non-native speaker of the local language, second as 
someone with no familial ties to the region and third as a Westerner and American with an upper 
middle-class background. Overcoming these limitations required developing trust and 
recognition as a valid researcher with no hidden agenda, and whenever asked about my work, I was 
as transparent as necessary within the context of the individual, informal conversation, neither 
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disclosing information to which I had been privately entrusted nor taking sides on any particular 
debate to which I as a non-Croatian was not fully privy or to which I did not have a well-informed 
opinion (local electoral politics, Croatia’s accession to the EU, the Yugoslav past, etc.). An open 
ear proved to be the most useful tool in collective background ethnographic notes with which to 
contextualise the data more systematically gathered for this research.  
 
Having worked in Sarajevo immediately prior to the start of this research, I was aware of sensitive 
or taboo topics in the former Yugoslavia and sought to inform myself of the various approaches to 
these debates. As an American citizen, had I not already lived extensively in Europe, and 
particularly in BiH, I would have been at an information disadvantage, as little is known or 
discussed about European history; during my high school education, if European history was 
taught, it focused exclusively on Western European or Russian histories, ignoring the rich and 
complicated experiences of South-eastern Europe. Had I entered this research without the 
experiences I gathered in fifteen months of residence in BiH (and a further two years between 
Germany and Scotland), my approach may have remained ignorant toward important but 
commonly-overlooked phenomena, like the minor linguistic differences between Croatian, 
Bosnian and Serbian, the layered histories of actors in the Second World War in Yugoslavia or the 
regional differences in memory in Croatia, which often has been boiled down lazily to “ancient 
hatreds” in Western writing. However, my language skills, while sufficient to conduct the vast 
majority of my fieldwork only occasionally relying on online dictionaries or translation sources, 
still precluded me from enjoying a more thorough understanding of the cultural idiosyncrasies that 
inform studies of social memory that, as discussed above, a native speaker may have noted. In some 
instances, nonetheless, I felt more “insider” than “outsider,” and certainly more of an “insider” 
than many other North American and Western European scholars I have encountered in Sarajevo, 
Zagreb or Belgrade, whose fieldwork was concentrated in short, one-off bursts rather than a 
prolonged study of the region. This meant that I could more aptly navigate the pool of data I had 
amassed without the reliance on interpreters to guide me through the entire research process, 
allowing me, as well, to gain greater control over access to and interpretation of my own data. 
 
Other elements of my identity (gender, sexuality, political leanings, etc.) did come into play from 
time to time, particularly with regards toward the gender imbalance in Croatia’s commemorative 
process and the sometimes toxic masculine presence in the visuals of war and remembrance. I 
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found as someone more sensitive toward matters of gender and sexual inequalities the lack of a 
feminine narrative of war outside the realm of memoir writing – for example, in the works of 
Slavenka Drakulić (1993; 1996; 1999; 2004 [2015]) and Dubravka Ugrešić (1994; 1998; 
2005) – jarring, and have chosen to investigate this further throughout this dissertation, most 
notably in Chapter 4 (“Branitelji/Defenders”). As a pacifist, too, I am particularly critical of the 
patriotic narrative of war that dominates the Croatian (and other) commemorative process, but as 
a non-participant in the post-war creation of Croatia’s new narratives, I strive for a greater sense 
of objectivity in my descriptions and analysis of the histories I examined here. 
 
Finally, I conducted this research under full financial independence from external funding, public 
or private, which allowed a great degree of flexibility to explore mnemonic practices more critically 
than other funded projects may provide. Some considerations were made to mitigate excess costs, 
namely avoiding a prolonged residence in Croatia and instead choosing to make periodic, repeat 
visits throughout the year. However, my self-funding allowed me to visit more parts of Croatia 
more frequently than perhaps many Croatians themselves would have. My financial status and class 
background certainly altered the outcomes of this research, but reflecting on this and my 
independence from external funding obligations allowed me to interact with people of other class 
backgrounds, from the political élite to museum staff and human rights activists, enriching the 
depth and breadth of my analysis of social remembering. 
 
Ethical considerations 
This research conformed to Level 1 of ethical scrutiny of the School of Social and Political Science 
at the University of Edinburgh and posed little to no risk to any informants, whether formal or 
informal, or me. Names of those with whom I conversed informally have been altered if present in 
this research to maintain anonymity, and any identifying information has been removed where 
necessary and possible.  
 
As this research does incorporate a small amount of interpersonal interaction with private 
individuals, researching memory, particularly of a culture foreign to someone’s upbringing, does 
carry some ethical risks. These conversations, however, were often free-flowing and not sought 
out in my methodology, and therefore information sheets or consent forms were not deemed 
necessary. Among the most prevalent issues that arises when undertaking work in another culture 
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are matters of translation and value imposition. Given my work experience in BiH, I felt confident 
that my knowledge of the local language was sufficient for most day-to-day interactions and for 
understanding the general tone and message of memorial sites visited.  
 
The highly visual nature of this research also calls into question the nature of public memory and 
intellectual ownership of images and texts, particularly in larger memorial sites and museums. 
However, I do not aim to benefit commercially from any of the text replicated here from these sites, 
and there is an implicit tolerance of quoting from public sites like museums where photography is 
allowed without restriction. The images I use throughout this dissertation are my own, or 
permission has been sought where possible for photos or other intellectual property that do not 
belong to me, with appropriate citations added (see Image Credits toward the end of this thesis). 
Such images remain in their original appearance and have not been altered in any way. As with the 
majority of the data presented here, the images, including my own, are publicly accessible online 
without restriction. ★	
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Introduction 
This chapter provides an analysis of the visual aspects of the Croatian commemorative process I 
documented in the course of my fieldwork that focus on the narrative of the “defender,” the central 
– abstracted – figure of the Homeland War. Here, I demonstrate how the defender narrative came 
to dominate post-war cultural memory, how particular actors, namely veterans’ associations and 
conservative political and social organisations, have individually or collectively shaped this 
memory landscape, and how the politics of remembrance elevate the status of the defenders to 
those of near-mythical heroes. In doing so, as discussed in Chapter 1, I argue that those who 
exercise power over the (mainstream) commemorative process in Croatia either intentionally or 
unintentionally push away counter-narratives of civilian victims, most notably of the Serb minority 
in Croatia and of civilian victims more widely, whose suffering in the course of the Homeland War 
does not constitute a core element of the war’s history as it is repeated and performed in Croatia. 
As with Chapters 5 and 6, this chapter is informed by the public sites of memory, including 
monuments and museums, I documented across Croatia. Furthermore, I analyse the 2017 
commemoration of Operation Storm in Knin as a central element of contemporary Croatian 
cultural memory. This commemoration and the memorial events dedicated to the victims of the 
1991 fall of Vukovar, which I discuss in Chapter 5, mark the high points of the Croatian mnemonic 
calendar and allow my analysis of the Knin and Vukovar commemorations to serve as empirical 
points of contrast and comparison. The other memorial sites I incorporate into this chapter serve 
as examples of additional core elements of the “defender” identity and how they reflect – visually 
or otherwise – on intersecting social processes and contestations. 
 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the construction of the “defender” identity and how it has 
been legitimised in the face of internal and external criticism. I argue here that this label, first 
applied in the early stages of the Homeland War, has been constructed using some of the narrative 
framework of the Yugoslav Partisans during the Second World War. This process, however, is 
coupled with selectively applied cognitive dissonance (described below, see Festinger 1957) 
through the demonisation of the Serb minority and a general disregard toward the narratives of 
civilian victims more widely. This is followed by an examination of the knock-on effects of such 
identity construction in the public presentation of defenders’ and victims’ narratives (the latter 
expanded more in Chapter 5) and on the relationship between gender and power in Croatian 
cultural memory. Gender as an element of conflict is relevant in both this and the following chapter, 
  146 
as victimhood itself must be viewed from a gendered perspective, and in the case of veterans, it is 
useful to compare how the voices of female fighters of the Second World War and the Homeland 
War have been incorporated or ignored in grander, post-conflict narratives. 
 
Here, I address several key research questions by applying empirical findings to the theoretical 
discussion of memory, power and violence I present in Chapter 1. The questions are namely:  
 
• How does Croatia’s visual culture of remembrance illustrate the relationships between 
power, violence, memory and identity? 
• How, and by whom, is memory constructed to perpetuate social divisions, based on 
nationality, ethnicity or religion?  
• How do processes of social differentiation elevate or exclude specific historical narratives 
from commemorative processes? 
 
Throughout this chapter, I provide examples of how identity has been constructed and visually 
reflected in the public face of memory, that is, in monumental form. I argue that the narrative of 
the branitelji comprises the bulk of the modern Croatian cultural memory, as reflected in visual 
manifestations of memory and the mnemonic practices and behaviours of political and social élites 
who have either pushed for or challenged the predominance of the defenders. Their contentious 
status as victims of “Greater Serbian aggression,” defenders of the Croat(ian) nation, and 
perpetrators of violence against the Serb minority highlights the various social dynamics that 
interplay in the shared memory of the veterans of the Homeland War. These discussions build 
upon Aleida Assmann’s description of the “symbolic media” of cultural and collective memory (A. 
Assmann 2012, 175), and how such visual representations of the past are affected by the relative 
balance of power (see Hearn 2018; Roszko 2010) in the formation of group identities. My analysis 
of the struggles between the branitelji, their supporters and their critics demonstrates how the 
desire to exercise power over memory (Müller 2009) plays a determinant role in shaping the public 
face of memory in Croatia. 
 
Narrative/discourse markers 
Tracing the narrative of the Croatian defenders necessarily involves identifying key words or 
phrases as signals that link otherwise disjointed monuments or other edifices of memory to 
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construct one public face. In the context of this research, I noted the word branitelj/“defender” 
was used uniquely in reference to those who fought in the Homeland War on the side of the 
Republic of Croatia, whereas armed participants from other conflicts may have been called 
“veterans,” “fighters” or, simply, “soldiers.” Particularly in the Yugoslav post-war narrative of the 
Second World War, the word borac/“fighter” was used in reference to the men and women who 
fought for Tito’s Partisans, in line with the socialist vision of the war as a narodnooslobodilačka 
borba/“National Liberation Struggle” and not rat/“war” as in other instances. This necessarily 
shifts the language to reflect the scrappier, disjointed nature of the Second World War in 
Yugoslavia as a period of resistance than one of defence or offence, in order to create a new socialist 
Yugoslav state. This stands in stark contrast to the nationally legitimated narrative of the Homeland 
War, one fought to “reclaim” a state that had existed in some form for one-thousand years. The 
phrase domovina/“homeland,” too, is almost exclusively used in the monuments and museums I 
documented in the context of the Croatian War of Independence from 1991 to 1995; similar 
phrases like otadžbina/“fatherland” or zavičaj/“homeland” in the more nuanced sense of the 
German Heimat, are not used (the 1990s war is also referred to in the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as the otadžbinski rat/Fatherland War). 
 
When sorting and analysing the data I collected, I also noticed differences in the verbs and 
adjectives used to describe how combatants died in the course of the respective wars. In the 
Yugoslav retelling of the Second World War, fighters “had fallen” or “gave their lives” for 
“freedom” or “in the people’s/national revolution.” Several monuments make reference to 
Partisan fighters and “victims of fascist terror” who were “killed” during the war, providing a strict 
delineation between the two. Croatian defenders, on the other hand, were “killed” more 
frequently, while far fewer references are made to those who “fell” or “died.” This language 
suggests more that the narrative of the Homeland War is one of defence than one of revolution or 
active struggle for rather than against something, in this case against “(Greater) Serbian 
aggression.” Further, Croatian defenders are called “brave” less frequently than in Yugoslav 
monuments (see Figure 4.1), which indicates a shift in the public celebration of the defender as 
both victim and victor, neither term strictly accompanied by a concept of “bravery,” in contrast to 
the archetype of the heroic Partisan. 
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Figure 4.1: Frequency of descriptors in Yugoslav and Croatian war monuments 
Yugoslav term Frequency Croatian term Frequency 
pali(m)/“fallen” 26 in 148 monuments pali(m)/“fallen” 2 in 151 monuments 
dali svoje živote/ “gave 
their lives” 
11 in 148 monuments umrle/“died” 7 in 151 monuments 
žrtve fašističkog 
terora/“victims of fascist 
terror” 
13 in 148 monuments (veliko)srpska 
agresija/“(Greater) 
Serbian aggression” 
18 in 151 monuments 
poginuli/“killed” 17 in 148 monuments poginuli/“killed” 31 in 151 monuments 
hrabro/“brave” 23 in 148 monuments hrabro/“brave” 7 in 151 monuments 
 
Note: Total numbers relate only to war-specific monuments (for Yugoslavia, the Second World War; for Croatia, the 
Homeland War). 
 
Beyond these key words, little else is used to describe the Croatian defenders. Nonetheless, 
through visual cues (helmets, busts, military insignia or equipment), just over one-half of the 
monuments and other physical manifestations of memory I documented that were constructed in 
Croatia since 1991 appear to be dedicated to or at least mention the defenders (97 of 192 
documented) and the vast majority certainly to the Homeland War (151 of 192). Most 
monuments, however, feature little to no reference to civilian victims of the war, an aspect of this 
research that will be examined more thoroughly in Chapter 5. The inherent masculinity of the 
branitelj narrative, through linguistic signals or visual clues, also will be discussed toward the end 
of this chapter.  
 
Similar patterns emerge in speeches held annually from 2014 to 2017 in Knin on 5 August in 
commemoration of Operation Storm and on 18 November in Vukovar on the anniversary of the 
city’s fall in 1991. Concepts of nationhood and pride in the nation – “Croatia,” “Croat(s),” 
“homeland,” “state,” “freedom,” “victory” and “thanksgiving” – were mentioned in far greater 
frequency than words containing negative associations with war, such as “died,” “death,” “victim” 
or “regret.” Most notably, the concept of mourning of fallen Croatian soldiers is never mentioned. 
Rather, they are celebrated as defenders of the homeland and the victors against “Greater Serbian 
aggression.” Where massacred victims and defenders are mourned, as in Vukovar, there is no 
“grief” or “sadness.” For example, Archbishop of Zadar Želimir Puljić stated at the 2015 
commemoration in Vukovar, that “Our coming to this ceremony shows the other side that leads us 
to eternity. Therefore, on this sunny day our faces are not sad; we believe that our dear and beloved 
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are not missing [emphasis own], but rather that they have changed ways of life. They are no longer 
with us in space or time, but with God in eternity” (see FRAMNAT 2015)11. 
 
Following these trends, I contend that an element of cognitive dissonance, if not social selective 
amnesia, is inherently present in the commemorative process. Cognitive dissonance arises in 
situations where new information is presented that forces at the very least a short but potentially 
meaningful break with commonly accepted knowledge or opinions (Festinger 1957, 4). To reduce 
this momentary dissonance (that is, a lack of fit between new and existing knowledge), at least on 
the surface, the information that conflicts with current behaviours or beliefs may be denied or 
excised from those beliefs. Festinger notes, too, that “Dissonance may arise because of cultural 
mores” or “because of past experience” (ibid., 14), and that in reducing dissonance, “Changing 
the environment itself […] is more feasible when the social environment is in question than when 
the physical environment is involved” (ibid., 20). In public commemorations of the Homeland 
War, this is accomplished through the evocation of the divine and the nation, deflection of blame, 
the intentional construction of a narrative of active defence against a mortal enemy and the heavy 
reliance on defenders (through political arrangements that will be discussed below) for said 
narrative construction. Shifting the physical environment to suit particular narratives, however, 
involves more laborious negotiations of space and community, as I demonstrate in the next section.  
 
The necessity of cognitive dissonance, or of forgetting more generally, is part and parcel of the 
commemorative process around difficult pasts, not only in Croatia, but the degree to which 
neglecting particular elements of the past exists in this case becomes apparent in the construction 
of the “defender” narrative in the immediate aftermath of the Homeland War. Here, I have 
demonstrated how narratives and key discourse markers are constructed, repeated and adapted 
over time, applying my insights from fieldwork in Croatia to an extant body of literature on identity 
and memory. The discussion above of commemorative practices and narrative markers regarding 
the Croatian defenders and Yugoslav Partisans exemplifies Aleida Assmann’s description of the 
“making” of collective memory through “symbolic media” (A. Assmann 2012, 175), that is, 
through the physical application of particular descriptors of the past to memorial sites. I have also 
                                                
11 Original quote in Croatian: “Naš dolazak na ovu svečanost pokazuje onu drugu stranu koja nas 
upućuje prema vječnosti. Zato, na ovom sunčanom danu naša lica nisu tužna; mi vjerujemo kako 
naši dragi i mili nisu nestali, nego su promijenili način života. Nisu više u prostoru i vremenu s nama, 
nego u vječnosti kod Boga.” 
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advanced briefly various arguments on the construction of identity in opposition, here drawing out 
the different approaches taking to remembering veterans of the Second World War and the 
Homeland War, which depend on the dynamic power relations between in- and outgroups (Hearn 
2018; Smith 1991; Smith 2003), discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Defending Croatia: Physically constructing the narrative of the branitelji  
Here I present a brief overview of the history of the “defender” narrative during and in the 
aftermath of the Homeland War, addressing the close relationship between veterans’ groups and 
the ruling HDZ throughout the 1990s. This demands an applied examination of power relations 
and identity formation, as addressed in the literature review in Chapter 1, tying in empirical 
observations from commemorations and monuments built across Croatia since the 1990s.  
 
The predominance of the defender narrative is evident through my own research on memory and 
its physical manifestations in Croatia, reinforcing the understanding that monument construction 
is a form of (self-)legitimisation (see Roszko 2010). Roszko, using the example of post-conflict 
commemorations in Vietnam, demonstrates how the political use of symbolic images and the 
construction of memorials to fallen solders “legitimize[s] their power and engage[s] people in 
institutionalized and emotional forms of action” (Roszko 2010, 1). Through my work, I show how 
similar processes have emerged in Croatia, elevating the status of the branitelji to, as Roszko 
writes, the “most potent symbols of the official struggle over memory and legitimation of the war” 
(ibid.). This is the result of a long process of negotiating power and influence in the transition 
between various forms of memory, from the familiar – communicative (A. Assmann and Frevert 
1999) – to the public – cultural and collective (A. Assmann 1999; J. Assmann 2011). In the early 
phases of the Homeland War, Croatian police, military and paramilitary forces, given their official 
or unofficial proximity to the state then under HDZ (Croatian Democratic Union) rule, served not 
only as the defenders of the Croatian state but also of the government and the vision of Croatian 
independence espoused by Franjo Tuđman. Sharon Fisher describes the relationship between 
defender groups and the HDZ as one in which “most of the prominent veterans’ groups were 
hardly distinguishable from the ruling party itself,” calling into question their role in civil society, 
which she notes as a form of clearly voluntary association to the state (2003, 70). The HDZ-
branitelji relationship, therefore, consists of mutually beneficial arrangements that propped up the 
party throughout the post-war transition while guaranteeing rights to veterans, often involving 
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exorbitant financial costs in the process. Some of this money was used to build memorial spaces 
recalling the sacrifices of the defenders in the course of Croatia’s “liberation.” Monument 
construction began early on in the war, with the first memorial placard I recorded installed at the 
Imperijal Fortress above Dubrovnik in December 1993, recalling the loss of three “defenders” 
who died in 1991 and 1992 during the JNA’s siege of Dubrovnik (Figure 4.2); it is worth noting, 
then, that the terminology of “defenders” was present already by the midpoint of the Homeland 
War. 
 
Figure 4.2: Monument plaque dedicated in 1993 to fallen defenders: Srđ (Dubrovnik) 
 
Text: In memory of the Croatian Defenders  
Nenad Čorić, Ivo Koprivica, Robert Ivušić 
Rest in the Peace of God 
[From] Surviving Comrades 
6 December 1993 
Documented 12 May 2017 
 
Further, the integral role of the defenders, originally a mixture of local police forces, territorial 
defence units and irregular paramilitaries, became clearer over the course of the war as a 
centralised Croatian armed forces was steadily constructed. As fighting during the war peaked first 
with the seizure of upwards of one-third of Croatian territory by the JNA and Republika Srpska 
Krajina forces and the bombardments of Dubrovnik and Vukovar in 1991 and again with 
Operations Flash and Storm in 1995, so did the state’s actions toward securing the rights and 
privileges of the defenders. In early 1991, as Croatian leaders were rapidly building the republic’s 
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legal infrastructure in advance of the 25 June declaration of independence, the Law on Defence 
was among the first promulgated, on 28 June, to be revised twice in August 1993 and July 1996 
(Lozančić and Burđelez 1998, 47). This was followed with the Zakon o hrvatskim braniteljima iz 
Domovinskog rata i članovima njihovih obitelji/Law on Croatian Defenders of the Homeland War 
and Their Family Members, first promulgated in 1994 and subsequently amended in 2017, which 
provides more than six categories of “defender” for those who participated in the early war efforts 
in 1991 (Sabor 2017). Among these are combatants who participated in, were injured, detained, 
went missing or were killed in the early phase of the Homeland War, namely from 30 July to 31 
December 1991. The Law further defines eight other categories of participants in the Homeland 
War – those without “defender” status – and victims or stradalnici/“the suffered” of the 
Homeland War. It also details the many privileges and rights granted to these veterans and their 
families, among them medical care, social insurance, pensions and business grants, but says little 
about the rights of civilian war victims. Even twenty-four years after the end of the Homeland War, 
no such law on the rights of civilian victims has been enacted, as such a law would regenerate 
dissonance between the accepted narratives of the war and an acknowledgement of individual 
victimhoods, including those of the Serb population, that have been brushed aside for the sake of 
a forcibly consistent narrative of victory. Various groups, as I discuss below, would challenge the 
drafting and enacting of such a law given the necessity to create further provisions for the Serb 
minority in Croatia. 
 
Fisher (2003) provides a useful analysis of the symbiotic relationship between defender groups 
and HDZ officials. The number of local, regional and national associations of defenders and their 
families exploded in the immediate aftermath of the Homeland War. Their aims included moral, 
humanitarian and medical support, among others, but the overarching ambitions of these groups 
were political, namely in demanding rights for those who fought to defend Croatia’s independence 
(Fisher 2003, 72). Protests throughout the 2000s, even during periods of HDZ rule, were 
publicly supported, as many surrounded the ICTY indictments of Generals Ante Gotovina and 
Mladen Markač, the chief planners of 1995’s Operations Storm and Flash. Fisher notes that, “In 
its discourse, HDZ representatives presented the veterans as national heroes, and the ruling party 
tried to halt discussion of war crimes committed by Croatian soldiers in the apparent belief that 
questioning the sanctity of Croatia’s war for independence and the dignity of its defenders would 
threaten its own political monopoly” (Fisher 2003, 77). Acknowledging Croatian war crimes 
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throughout the Homeland War, such as the killing of 120 Serb civilians in Gospić in 1991, invited 
death threats and further protest from groups associated with the defenders. To open a discussion 
of war crimes was to call into question the sanctity of the defenders as Croatia’s lifeline in the war. 
In a letter to the public written by Croatian generals involved in the Homeland War, such criticisms 
were framed as an “assault on the army and […] ‘criminalisation’ of the Homeland War” (ibid., 
86). As a result of the continuous tensions and bouts of appeasement of the defenders’ demands, 
a Ministry of Croatian Veterans was established in 2003. War veterans also now enjoy some of the 
highest pensions in Croatia, already in 1999 nearly five times higher than that of the ordinary 
labourer (ibid., 79). While political shifts in the 2000s between HDZ and SPD rule effected 
gradual cuts to such welfare provisions, the narrative role of the defenders in Croatian society, if 
not the political, remains intact. This summary of the links between the branitelji and conservatives 
underscores my arguments laid out below that the public face of memory in Croatia is dominated 
by symbolic representations of Croatian soldiers and that this predominance provides little room 
for victim-oriented narratives in memorial spaces to the Homeland War, something only possible 
through targeted support by influential political and social actors. 
 
Monuments and museums 
How defenders exercise or maintain power over memory has depended heavily on the continuity 
of the HDZ-branitelji relationship. As discussed in Chapter 1, the power over memory ensures a 
group its power to endure, yet controlling mnemonic processes alone does not assure a group’s 
existence. This section addresses Müller’s work on the exercise of power over memory (Müller 
2009) and the transformation of the power over memory to Hearn’s notion of the “power to 
endure” (Hearn 2018) by assessing how defender-centric memorial spaces in Croatia mark some 
sort of mnemonic territory to assure the perpetuation of their narratives of the Croatian nation. 
The intervention of the HDZ and the institutions of the Croatian state in providing rights and 
public space for commemorating Croatian defenders at the cost of other social groups, most 
notably civilian victims and ethnic minorities, has given branitelji an upper hand in determining 
the “public face” of memory in Croatia. In my documentation of these memorial spaces, I noted 
where possible who or what groups funded their construction, and in many cases, the monuments 
to Croatian defenders were directly supported by associations linked to the HDZ or related 
nationalist or conservative parties, which I discuss below. 
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In Croatia, unlike in Serbia since the recent promulgation of memory laws centralising the 
approval of monument construction, the planning, funding and building of memorial spaces is 
heavily decentralised; no singular memorial authority exists in Croatia that regulates the 
appearance or content of memorial spaces, and this is reflected by the diversity of funding bodies 
named on the various monuments I have documented. The design and placement of monuments 
are often dependant on municipal organs or civil society groups willing to install new statues or 
plaques, yet despite the lack of memory laws regulating their content or visual appearance, many 
conform to national narratives of the Homeland War noted above and in Chapter 2. The power of 
local defender organisations, especially in areas affected by the war (Slavonia and Dalmatia above 
all) is signalled by this conformity and the near total lack of monuments that might suggest some 
element of criticism of defenders’ actions during the conflict. That is, the victims of Croatian 
soldiers, particularly Serb civilians killed during and in the aftermath of Operations Flash and 
Storm, represent a challenge to the sanctity of the public image of the defender, a quandary I 
discuss in the following chapter. During my fieldwork, I visited sites of war crimes committed 
against the Serb minority during and in the immediate aftermath of the Homeland War – namely 
Gospić, Varivode and Sisak (for information on other locations, see SNV 2018). In these sites, 
where I would have expected monuments dedicated to civilian victims to have been erected given 
the magnitude of these crimes, I saw none, save for a small memorial in Varivode, the history of 
which I discuss in Chapter 5. The absence of such memorial sites reinforces the role of cognitive 
dissonance or outright denial in preserving more powerful narratives of the in-group, in this case, 
the Croatian state, the Croat nation and its defenders. 
 
The visual conformity of Croatia’s “public face” of memory of the defenders is most clearly 
represented by the standardised monuments at the site of mass graves, designed by Slavomir 








  155 
Figure 4.3: Drinković’s “cracked bird” monuments: Ovčara, Mohovo, Škabrnja 
    
Left: Drinković monument at site of mass grave in Ovčara, 23 August 2017. Centre: A rosary hangs from the 
“cracked bird” in Mohovo, 16 March 2018. Right: Fresh flowers laid at the Drinković monument in Škabrnja, 20 
March 2018. 
 
The Croatian state commissioned Drinković to design these monuments, the first of which was 
dedicated near the Ovčara farm, site of the November 1991 massacre by the JNA and Serb 
paramilitaries of civilians and defenders from the Vukovar hospital. Though Drinković died in 
December 2016, his monuments, which also feature a Christian cross, highlighting the 
importance of Catholicism to Croatian identity, have been installed in at least 79 locations across 
Croatia, mostly rural (Hudelist 2019). Each monument features the same text: “In memory of the 
(number) Croatian (defenders and/or civilians) executed in (month and/or year/s) in the Greater 
Serbian aggression against the Republic of Croatia.”12 The monuments are dedicated in the name 
of the “Croatian people/nation” and represent the commonality of loss among the survivors of 
defenders and civilians, the latter whose memories are otherwise generally forgotten in the 
commemoration of the defenders.  
 
Other monuments, generally memorial plaques, feature the insignia of military divisions and 
paramilitary groups, some provoking controversy over the use of fascist slogans and symbols, to 
be discussed in Chapter 6. In some situations, military vehicles and other equipment – helicopters, 
tanks, boats, ambulances and weapons – serve as the monument to these divisions. In the Memorial 
                                                
12 Original text in Croatian (example from Tovarnik monument): “U spomen na 27 branitelja i civila 
pogubljenih 1991.-1992. u velikosrpskoj agresiji na Republiku Hrvatsku. Hravtski narod. Studeni 
1999. Škabrnja 18.11.1991.” 
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Centre for the Homeland War in Vukovar, too, the tail of a destroyed Yugoslav MiG fighter jet acts 
as a reminder of the eventual defeat of the the Republika Srpska Krajina in 1995 (see Figures 4.4 
and 4.5 below). The Memorial Centre itself was created in 2013 at the initiative of the Ministry of 
Croatian Defenders and is part of compulsory school tours for all eighth-grade pupils across 
Croatia (MHB RH 2020). 
 
Figure 4.4: Military equipment as memorials: Trpinjska cesta, Vukovar, Dubrovnik, Slatina 
 
   
Top left: Memorial House of Croatian Defenders, Tprinjska cesta (Vukovar), 18 November 2017. Top right: 
Memorial Centre for the Homeland War, Vukovar, 3 July 2017. Bottom left: Sveti Vlaho/St. Blaise battleship, 
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Figure 4.5: Yugoslav Air Force MiG fighter, Memorial Centre for the Homeland War: Vukovar 
  
Left: Tail of shot-down JNA MiG-21 fighter jet, Vukovar, 3 July 2017. Right: Information placard: “On November 
12, 1991, the Croatian Air Defense crew of the 64th AD light self-propelled artillery missile battalion (the Šokački 
battalion) brought down a MIG-21 of the Yugoslav Air Force near Đakovo,” Vukovar, 3 July 2017. 
 
While during the time of my fieldwork no singular museum to the Homeland War existed, by 
March 2018 construction was already underway in Turanj, a few minutes’ drive south of Karlovac, 
on an exhibition space and memorial hall to the war. The main hall is constructed in a former 
military barracks – during the war called the “Hotel Californija” – surrounded by a new metal-and-
glass frame with military vehicles and planes placed around the grounds. Across the street is a 
black-and-white monument with fourteen panels of names of fallen defenders from Karlovac, the 
bollards separating the grass from the walking path built from empty missile shells (Figure 4.6). 
The museum opened on 5 July 2019 with a dedication by then-Croatian President Kolinda 
Grabar-Kitarović, who called the space “our symbol of victory,” remarking that Karlovac served as 
a strategic location in the Homeland War, as “Croatia did not break there, rather Turanj became a 
symbol of victory for Croatia as a whole” (Direktno 2019). The opening ceremony and orchestra 
concert was attended by many defender groups and family members. The political relationship 
between the museum and the HDZ-led government is also evident in the funding of its 
construction; of a budget of 26.6 million kuna (£3.2 million), 8 million kuna (approximately 
£970,000) was granted by the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of Croatia, with the goal of 
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Top left: Museum of the Homeland War under construction, Turanj (Karlovac), 18 March 2018. Top right: Missile 
shells as monuments and boundary markers, Turanj (Karlovac), 18 March 2018. Bottom: Monument to 239 fallen 
defenders from the City of Karlovac, Turanj (Karlovac), 18 March 2018. 
 
Images taken during the museum’s dedication show a dimly-lit interior with a wall of faces of 
defenders, their names, birth and death dates, a common feature of victim-centred memorial 
spaces, including the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, the 9/11 Museum or Yad 
Vashem (see Radonić 2017), and in Croatia the Ovčara Memorial Center near Vukovar. This 
museum, like many of the monuments dedicated to fallen branitelji, co-opts the aesthetics of 
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victim-centred memorial spaces (see Figure 4.7 below) to position defenders as the ultimate 
victims of the Homeland War, continuing a wider pattern of neglecting the memory of civilian 
victims of conflict and actively occupying memorial space that otherwise would be afforded to 
victims. This pattern can also be seen in bookstores with titles boasting the triumphs of the 
defenders and Croatia’s victory in the Homeland War, with very few texts showing victims’ 
experiences of the conflict. Images of destroyed property, if anything, are more prevalent than 
images of civilians who perished in the war, widening the visual perspective of war destruction. 
This tension between the commemoration of defenders and the mourning of victims will be 
discussed more thoroughly below and again in Chapter 5.  
 
Figure 4.7: Walls of faces: Turanj and Vukovar 
  
Source (left): Direktno (2019). Then-President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović presents a flower at the newly opened 
Museum of the Homeland War in Turanj. Right: Image of Tomislav Baumgärtner, victim of the Ovčara massacre, 
Memorial House Ovčara, Vukovar, 23 August 2017. 
  
At the Imperijal Fortress near Dubrovnik, and in a smaller scale at the Croatian History Museum 
in Zagreb, the “Dubrovnik during the Homeland War, 1991-1995” exhibition depicts scenes of 
destruction during the shelling of the city by JNA and Serb and Montenegrin paramilitary forces in 
the early stages of the Homeland War. The museum in the fortress was opened on 10 July 2010 
and dedicated by then-Mayor of Dubrovnik Andro Vlahušić (HNS, Croatian People’s Party) and 
several Homeland War veterans (Marušić 2010). Images of burnt entryways, crumbled pillars and 
thick, black smoke billowing over the Adriatic are integrated into displays of the defence of 
Dubrovnik by Croatian forces, but again it is the faces of defenders and politicians, not civilians, 
that are to be seen. This reflects the power these defender groups exercise over the construction 
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of memory in their name, reaffirming their centrality to the story of Croatian independence. The 
text on the displays, in both Croatian and English, drearily recounts military actions during the 
Homeland War in and around Dubrovnik and southern Dalmatia, in some cases editorialising 
these dreary yet sensational events. Words like “heroism” and “sacrifice” are associated with the 
defenders, while Serbs and Montenegrins are only called “the aggressor” and “the enemy,” in line 
with the Croatian Sabor’s 2000 Declaration on the Homeland War, described below. Entry to 
both the Dubrovnik and Zagreb exhibitions is free of charge for Croatian veterans, as in many other 
locations.  
 
Returning briefly to smaller-scale memorials of the Homeland War, the placement of monuments 
to Croatian defenders – in central squares, parks, roundabouts, or graveyards – underscores the 
ubiquity of their narrative in the public face of memory. Unlike Yugoslav memorials, which today 
are often found at the periphery of villages or, as in the case of the large, abstract “spomenici” 
constructed throughout the communist period, in far-flung rural spaces that marked the sites of 
major battles in the Second World War, contemporary monuments occupy more heavily-trafficked 
areas. This positioning of monuments, occasionally through the removal of ground formerly 
occupied by an urban monument commissioned by Yugoslav authorities, symbolises the political 
relationship between sympathetic city planners and defender groups. That the tales of Yugoslavia 
past are pushed to the physical margins or even destroyed in the name of the makers of the present 
Croatian state neatly summarises one of the key elements of the post-war identity-making process 
as moulded by conservatives in various positions of power. Accordingly, several new monuments 
to Croatian defenders co-opt the abstract nature of older Yugoslav monuments by using symbolic 
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Figure 4.8: Abstract monuments to Croatian defenders: Osijek, Sisak 
  
Left: Monument to Defenders and Victims of the Homeland War, known colloquially as “The Radiator,” Osijek, 4 
July 2017. Right: Monument to Fallen Croatian Defenders in the Homeland War, Sisak, 24 August 2017. 
 
In Vukovar, nonetheless, occasional busts of individual defenders, mostly of those who died early 
in the Homeland War, occupy large public spaces (see Figure 4.9). The most notable example is 
that of Jean-Michel Nicolier, a French volunteer who was killed in the Vukovar massacre on 20 
November 1991, treated posthumously as an honorary Croat. On 3 May 2015, at the foot of the 
pedestrian bridge bearing his name, which crosses over the Vuka (a tributary of the Danube), a 
bust of Nicolier was dedicated. Not one-hundred meters from this sculpture is also a statue of 
Franjo Tuđman, again physically underpinning the close relationship between defenders and the 
HDZ during the Homeland War. Another bust, located at the Memorial House of Croatian 
Defenders on Trpinjska cesta, a major thoroughfare heading north from Vukovar toward Osijek, 
features the likeness of Blago Zadro, a Major General of the Croatian Army who died in action in 
October 1991. On the day of the annual commemoration of the victims of Vukovar in 2017, 
Zadro’s sculpture was surrounded by plastic memorial candles depicting the Croatian coat of arms 
or in the shape of the Vukovar water tower. Such candle holders were visible across Vukovar-
Sirmium County when driving back and forth between Vukovar and Osijek, often placed every few 
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Figure 4.9: Busts of Croatian defenders in or near Vukovar: Jean-Michel Nicolier, Blago Zadro 
  
Left: Bust of French “defender” Jean-Michel Nicolier, Vukovar, 3 July 2017. Right: Bust of Major General Blago 
Zadro, Memorial House of Croatian Defenders, Vukovar, 18 November 2017. 
 
A peculiar case is found in the bust of Niko Cigić in the village of Pakovo Selo near Drniš in north-
central Dalmatia. The bust (Figure 4.10), situated inside a small intersection, was installed 
sometime after 2008 in the place where a massive sculpture bearing the “U” of the fascist Ustaša 
paramilitary once stood. The original monument (also Figure 4.10) was dedicated in the midst of 
the Homeland War on 17 September 1993 and featured the text, “We stood up to defend our 
home. September 17, 1993, Sandokan Unit” (Jurković 2008), the original Croatian text 
linguistically tying the memory of Ustaše fighters to that of the branitelji of the Homeland War; “to 
stand up” in Croatian, ustati, forms the root of “Ustaša,” and “home” written on the former 
monument as dom, from the fascist chant za dom spremni, and not domovina, the form of “home” 
or “homeland” used in the Croatian name for the 1990s war. The monument’s removal on 21 
September 2008 was instigated by a journalist’s report from the village, located on an otherwise 
unremarkable country road with next to no through traffic. In the fifteen years that the monument 
stood, no state institution requested its removal, despite the clear link to the fascist past (ibid.; see 
also US Department of State 2010, 1235). 
 
 
  163 
Figure 4.10: The curious case of Pakovo Selo 
   
Left: Monument to Croatian defender Niko Cigić, Pakovo Selo, 5 August 2017. Source (right): Jurković, M. 
(2008). The former U-shaped monument installed in 1993 and removed in 2008. 
 
Finally, as in the case of the Drinković monuments to fallen defenders and civilians, Christian 
iconography is prevalent in many memorial spaces (Figure 4.11) In lieu of the bodies of fallen 
defenders, the body of Christ on the cross represents the “martyrdom” element of the branitelj 
narrative. Returning to the religious narratives of the war highlights the deaths of branitelji as 
having purpose, that is, the salvation and preservation of the Croat nation and the Croatian state. 
This framing, however, becomes particularly problematic when applied to the memories of civilian 
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Figure 4.11: Croatian defenders as Christian martyrs: Islam Grčki, Bjelovar, Jasenice, Hrvatska 
Kostajnica 
   
   
Top left: Memorial cross, Islam Grčki, 7 August 2017. Top right: Memorial cross with flowers, Barutana Memorial 
Park, Bjelovar, 22 August 2017. Bottom left: Memorial cross of “Croatian sons” with image of Christ, Maslenica 
bridge, Jasenice, 7 August 2017. Bottom right: Memorial cross to fallen and missing Croatian defenders, Hrvatska 
Kostajnica, 24 August 2017. 
 
The various themes visually represented in monuments and museums to the Croatian defenders 
suggest, in summary, the centrality and necessity of the defenders to the survival of Croatia as an 
independent, Christian state, with the defenders as the carriers of national identity in times of 
conflict. The actions of the defenders, when done in service of the state, are not called into 
question, and any negative consequences of the military defence of Croatia against “Greater 
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Serbian aggression” – namely the retaliatory murders of Serb civilians during and after Operations 
Flash and Storm and the destruction of private property – are downplayed, ignored or denied.  
 
The presentation of the monuments and museums noted above serves to contextualise physical 
manifestations of the power relations in the contestation of post-war memory discussed at the 
outset of this thesis and, more closely, to examine how social identities are mapped onto public 
memorial spaces. The Memorial Centre of the Homeland War in Vukovar perhaps most clearly 
demonstrates how certain historical narratives are included (Croatian defenders) or excluded 
(civilian victims, Yugoslavia, Serbs) through processes of social differentiation, addressing one of 
my core research questions, as the presentation of the wreckage of a JNA fighter jet symbolises the 
destruction of Yugoslavia itself – the “enemy” to Croatian ambitions of statehood – as an element 
of Croatian’s path to victory in the war. I have also addressed who has the power to construct 
memory in such ways – undeniably in top-down, state-centric approaches to the past. Finally, I 
provided a partial answer to how the interrelations of power, violence, memory and identity are 
manifested in the visual culture of remembrance in Croatia by showing which elements of Croatian 
identity are intentionally included in memorial spaces.  
 
Identifying an “enemy” as clearly as has been done in post-war memorial spaces in Croatia 
crystallises the identity of the defenders and provides this label greater power to endure, supported 
by the top-down project of narrative construction by the HDZ. An unwavering image of the 
“Other,” here Serbs, no matter their role in the Homeland War, excludes civilian casualties from 
the commemorative practices I documented and that continue still today, brushing their losses 
aside as a form of collateral damage, if it was framed as a loss at all. By remembering this violent 
past without acknowledging the cost of independence, key Croatian powerholders prevent the 
creation of a common understanding, if not a collective memory, of a shared historical experience. 
This pattern can be observed outside of the former Yugoslavia in other instances where victor 
narratives neglect to recognise the human toll of their victory, perhaps most clearly demonstrated 
in the presentation of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States Army 
Air Forces in American schoolchildren’s textbooks as a moment of patriotic action rather than a 
mass atrocity (see Crawford 2003; Kazemek 1994). 
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As I argue in the following analysis of the commemoration of Operation Storm (and in Chapter 5 
of the commemoration of the fall of Vukovar), the role of the defenders in shaping Croatian 
identity, as provided through their state-sanctioned power to endure through monopolising 
memorial space, has presented challenges to the ongoing Europeanisation process in Croatia and 
elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, primarily through the use of symbols of the past that continue 
to divide today. The purpose of this discussion is to frame resistance and opposition as a part of 
the identity-making process, which highlights the struggle for the power over memory as an 
ongoing process of negotiation rather than a static balance of strength and weakness. In Chapter 
6, then, I detail more closely how Europeanisation as a process impacts the formation of Croatian 
national identity on a wider scale. 
 
Commemorating Operation Storm 
The most striking element of the Croatian cultural memory of the Homeland War is the 
predominance of the narrative of legitimate self-defence against aggression by Serbia, Montenegro 
and the Yugoslav People’s Army. The annual commemoration on 5 August of the successful 
Operation Storm in Knin has been declared a national holiday as Dan pobjede i domovinske 
zahvalnosti i Dan hrvatskih branitelja/Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving Day and the Day of 
Croatian Defenders; the “Day of Croatian Defenders” title was added by parliamentary decree in 
2008 (Sabor 2008). On this date, politicians, members of civil society and the public gather at Trg 
Ante Starčevića in the town centre and observe a military parade leading up the winding path to the 
Knin fortress, from which one can view strategic routes leading toward the coast and into the 
mountains of Lika and Herzegovina. Throughout the town and at the fortress, crowds are greeted 
by hundreds of flags, whether state, military or paramilitary, and speeches are given in 
remembrance of the men (and in rare instances women) who “defended” and “liberated” Croatia 
from “Serbian aggression.” Knin is alive with song, dance and barbecue, with the occasional “Za 
dom spremni/Ready for the Homeland” salute (which until the recent election of a nonpartisan 
mayor was relatively tolerated behaviour) or folksong praising the NDH. Magnets are sold 
depicting President Tuđman and both the Croatian and NDH coat of arms, and T-shirts are widely 
available with various military insignia or nationalist slogans and images of Tuđman holding his 
hands high in victory at Knin in 1995. Major newspapers feature separate inserts and posters 
depicting maps of military movements during Storm and new Croatian Army uniforms with 
integrated technologies developed and built in Croatia, commemorating “Storm 2017” (Figure 
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4.12 below). The festivities in Knin reflect the desire by these various actors to “reinforce [their] 
versions of national identity” (Sumartojo 2016, 541) and make their indelible mark on the public 
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Figure 4.12: Poster insert in Jutarnji list, 5 August 2017  
 
Source: Jutarnji list, 5 August 2017. Poster of contemporary Croatian soldiers highlighting domestic technologies 
integrated into army uniforms. Text above reads “Croatian Army, Storm 2017.” 
 
During my visit to the celebrations in Knin on 5 August 2017, the whole town felt like one large 
party, reminiscent of the many Memorial Day parades I participated in during my time in high 
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school marching band in the United States. The visual bombardment of Croatian symbols and 
flags, not only on buildings, but also on T-shirts, hats, or, later at the beach, on revealing swimwear, 
was to me an instantaneous signifier of the patriotism underlined by nationalism that has become 
part and parcel of the Croatian commemorative experience. On the morning of the 
commemoration, my colleague and I drove from Šibenik on the Adriatic coast to Knin, passing 
abandoned villages in the Dalmatian hinterlands, with little indication of any major happening up 
the road in Knin.  
 
When we arrived, however, parking spaces filled quickly, and we hiked in 43˚C heat on a cloudless 
day to the fortress overlooking the town and the mountain passes to the south and east. On our way 
toward the staircase leading to the fortress, we passed the first large commemorative event on Trg 
Ante Starčevića, involving a parade of soldiers with their aforementioned barrage of flags, heading 
toward the top of the mountain. Flags displayed included those of military brigades and 
paramilitaries, including that of the Croatian Party of Right’s “Croatian Defence Forces” (HOS), 
who had controversially adopted the Ustaša battle cry “Za dom spremni”/“Ready for the 
Homeland” as its own, incorporating it into its insignia. HOS forces were present in Vukovar 
during the 1991 siege, and the group is viewed as one of the most important defender associations 
in the early phase of the Homeland War. The legacy of HOS and its relationship to the HDZ’s 
approach to reconciling the fascist and communist pasts will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Before we arrived at the fortress, we sought out our press accreditations at the local community 
college, which unfortunately were not received in time. Accordingly, we were not allowed to 
directly observe the speeches by President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović and other government 
representatives or by Nikolina Mataija, a daughter of a defender who died in Operation Storm 
twenty-two years earlier. As we walked toward another viewing area in the fortress, we encountered 
Zlatko Hasanbegović, among Croatia’s most controversial public figures, whose efforts to remove 
Yugoslavia from Croatia’s past will be examined in Chapter 6. Hasanbegović, a historian and 
former Minister of Culture during the short-lived Orešković government in 2016, greeted my 
colleague, also a historian, and shook hands with me before we moved on. Several massive screens 
were installed in the donji grad/lower fortress, which broadcast live feed from the upper fortress, 
where the speeches were held on the spot where Tuđman raised the Croatian flag on 6 August 
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1995. Unfortunately for the public crowded in the lower fortress, the speakers relayed sound at 
different rates, resulting in an incomprehensible blast of speech for nearly an hour, making hard 
work of my colleague’s transcription project.  
 
After the events on the mountaintop ended, the second memorial parade proceeded down toward 
the town centre, with various groups of defenders, current soldiers, firefighters, and historically 
costumed regiments marching in step back to the main square (see Figure 4.13).  
 
Figure 4.13: Commemoration participants from town centre to Knin fortress  
    
   
Top left: Parade observers hang a HOS flag featuring the slogan “za dom spremni” over Trg Ante Starčevića, Knin, 5 
August 2017. Top right: Parade observers line Ulica dr. Franje Tuđmana, many wearing clothing with Croatian 
symbols or flags, Knin, 5 August 2017. Bottom left and bottom right: Members of the Croatian army prepare for the 
march from Knin Fortress back to the town centre, many carrying flags of their respective battalions, Knin, 5 August 
2017. 
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Commemorations held in Knin and Vukovar since the war have varied in attendance and tone, but 
in general, the idolisation of Croatian veterans has been a consistent theme, particularly since 
Croatia’s accession to the EU in July 2013. I discuss the impact of the European Union on 
Croatian cultural memory more thoroughly in Chapter 6; here, however, Croatia’s accession 
should have marked a symbolic conclusion to the break with Tuđman’s policy of isolation in the 
1990s and therefore of a revocation, at least in part, of the more aggressive nationalist narratives 
that emerged during his rule. The prevalence of the defender narratives nonetheless is 
demonstrated in the overwhelming presence of the defenders in monuments built to remember 
the Homeland War between 1993 and 2018. The twentieth anniversary of the end of the 
Homeland War also contributed to the increase in monument construction in 2015, but it is 
important to note in the same year that the HDZ returned to power in the presidential and 
parliamentary elections (though an unstable coalition led to the government’s collapse and new 
elections in 2016). The chart below (Figure 4.14) shows the breakdown of 73 Homeland War 
monuments I documented with marked dedication dates by which groups are directly 
remembered.13 As the chart shows, the number of monuments dedicated in part or in whole to 
defenders has consistently outnumbered those built in memory of civilian victims of the Homeland 
War. The peaks in monument construction in 1999 and 2015 can be partly explained by an 
expansion of the Drinković memorial project (4 of 8 monuments dedicated in 1999) and the 












                                                
13 These correspond to codes 1A3, 2A3, 3A3 or 4A3 (General), 1A3-A (Defenders), 1A3-B (Civilians) 
or 1A3-C (Both) in my monument database. See Appendix 4. 
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Figure 4.14: Homeland War monuments, by group remembered 
 
 
In some ways, Croatia’s return to conservative politics, following a pattern in recent years across 
Central and Eastern EU member states, has fostered an environment more amenable to 
commemorating the military victories of the Croatian defenders over the victims of their and their 
enemies’ actions. Using transcripts of speeches made by politicians, veterans and religious figures 
at the commemorations in Knin and Vukovar collated by the Framing the Nation and Collective 
Identity in Croatia (FRAMNAT) project at the University of Rijeka, clear patterns emerge in the 
content of these events. Key-word-in-context (KWIC) analysis indicates, unsurprisingly, 493 
references to “Croat(s)” or “Croatia” in speeches made in Knin between 2014 and 2017, but also 
126 to the “homeland” or the “Homeland War,” 118 to “defenders” and 85 to the “state.” In 
comparison, only 27 references were made to “victims,” of which some reference was made to 
“victims for freedom” (not “martyrs”), “victims of Greater Serbian aggression,” “victims of the 
Homeland War” or “sacrificed [victims] in the dimension of Jesus’ cross.” Almost no reference 
was made to Serb victims of the war (see Chapter 5), which as noted above would call into question 
the honourable, venerated status of Croatian veterans, who in some instances have been referred 
to as “vitezi/knights,” indicating a narrative continuity with Croatia’s medieval past.14  
                                                
14 Three monuments in Split, Pakovo Selo and Bjelovar used the phrase “vitez” in reference to 
fallen Croatian defenders. Refer to points “Split 1,” “Pakovo Selo 1” and “Bjelovar 2” on the 
“Republic of Croatia” monument filter on www.taylormcconnell.com/croatian-monuments. 
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In 2017, the behaviour of the crowds gathered in Knin appeared to have shifted (only slightly) 
away from the images presented of prior commemorations, most prominently that of the twentieth 
anniversary of Operation Storm in 2015. That year, the commemorations were marked by anti-
Serb (“Kill a Serb!”) and fascist (“za dom spremni!”) chanting among concertgoers attending the 
performance by Marko Perković “Thompson,” a famous nationalist, folk rock singer and his 
eponymous band, which headlined the day’s events after political speeches had concluded in the 
early afternoon (Milekić 2015). In attendance at the commemorative events atop the fortress were 
then-President Grabar-Kitarović; former Prime Minister/now President Zoran Milanović and 
chairman of the Social Democratic Party, who was booed upon arrival by many in the crowd; and 
the recently acquitted General Ante Gotovina, who in contrast received mass applause (Nikolić 
and Milekić 2015). In the build-up to Thompson’s concert that evening, songs recalling the NDH 
and praising the Ustaša paramilitaries were sung in the streets of Knin (ibid.), with seemingly no 
interference from authorities. Two years later, however, I watched as a man playing an accordion 
singing similar songs was told off and eventually fined by the municipal police, who appeared to be 
under orders from the new, independent mayor to diminish the presence of NDH symbols during 
the course of the day. After my colleague and I left Knin early in the afternoon, seven people who 
shouted “za dom spremni!” on Trg Ante Starčevića, the site of most of the day’s in-town activities, 
were swiftly arrested (Milekić 2017c). The men were ultimately charged with a misdemeanour 
offense for “shouting inappropriate content” (HINA 2017). As I note in the following chapter, 
the legality of symbols and slogans of the Ustaša has been called into question in recent years, with 
a state inquiry into the “Rule of Non-Democratic Regimes” providing rather ambivalent guidelines 
for the use of such symbols in commemorative settings. The inquiry’s report was published in 
February 2018 and permitted the use of the “Za  dom spremni” text only in the insignia of the 
Croatian Defense Forces (HOS) (see Kusić 2018). 
 
Commemorations of Dan sjećanja na žrtvu Vukovara/the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of 
Vukovar, an unofficial holiday each 18 November, also elevate the defender narrative over that of 
(supposedly civilian) victims, to whom the date is dedicated. As the commemoration is nominally 
victim-centred, I will provide a more thorough description of the events and an analysis of the 
                                                
“Vitezovi” may also refer to the Postrojba posebne namjene/Special Purpose Unit “Vitezovi” (PPN 
Vitezovi), a paramilitary group active in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1993, but the 
monuments mentioned here do not refer to this group specifically. 
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visual content of this commemoration in the next chapter. Though the speeches take a more 
religious than political tone in comparison to the Knin celebrations (indeed, almost all speeches 
made since 2014 are by local or national Catholic leaders), branitelji are mentioned more 
frequently – 38 times from 2014 to 2017 – than victims/žrtve – 29 times. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
“Croat/s” and “Croatia” are the most frequent term used in these speeches – 99 times – closely 
followed by “Vukovar” – 93 times. In Chapter 5, as well, I trace the progress (or lack thereof) of 
the narrative conflict between defenders and the victims of the Homeland War, whose 
marginalisation in politics is reflected in their absence in Croatia’s visual memory culture today.  
 
Defending Themselves: Internal challenges to the narrative 
Here, I discuss challenges from within Croatia to the predominance of the “defender” narrative, 
given its central status through the 2000 Declaration of the Homeland War, discussed in this 
section. These include critiques from the left, particularly the Social Democratic Party of Croatia, 
pro-European human rights organisations seeking reconciliation between former combatants, and 
the post-war generation, here represented by examples from recent campaigns by the Youth 
Initiative for Human Rights. This section will give context to the concept of “counter-memory” 
(Foucault 1980) and “counter-narrative” (Y. Zerubavel 1995) by demonstrating instances of 
resistance to the prevalence of the “defender” narrative, which includes an internal critique thereof 
by a former soldier who participated in the early stages of the Homeland War and points toward 
wider domestic pressure from local youth activists. This section will again reinforce prior 
discussions of power and identity in this chapter and in the literature review and draws on 
reflections on and reactions to war narratives from below (individual testimony and resistance by 
civil society) and above (defenders’ associations and state institutions). 
 
The centralised nature of the public representation of Croatia’s defenders is in the first instance 
challenged at the private level, even among former combatants, for whom the decision to fight for 
their “homeland” or Yugoslavia was intimately linked with family histories. In this section, I 
incorporate personal recollections of the war and examples of resistance in civil society to the 
centralised defender narratives. One defender I met in Zagreb was raised in a socialist family in 
Croatia, his grandfather and great-uncle closely linked with Tito’s movements in the early stages 
of the Second World War. His father, born in the El Shatt refugee camp for Yugoslav Partisans in 
Egypt, was a committed supporter of the SFRJ, despite purges of family members by the new 
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communist government in the post-war years. During his obligatory military service in the late 
1980s, Marko15, my contact, was stationed in Kosovo, and recalled his decision to leave for 
Croatia in 1991, to fight for – in his words – his “home country.” His brother was among the first 
Croats to attend a mass recruitment at the Maksimir stadium, site of the Dinamo-Red Star riot of 
13 May 1990, in many ways a symbolic start to the wars in Yugoslavia; Marko’s father eventually 
joined the Croatian forces later in the conflict. Marko himself was the first of the Croats stationed 
in his unit in Kosovo to leave to fight in the Homeland War, but eventually the remaining soldiers 
also left, often by asking for rides from sympathetic Albanians to Belgrade, a sign that they were 
indeed headed onward to Zagreb.  
 
In 1993, Marko joined the United Nations peacekeeping forces as a translator, in part as a 
rejection of the nationalism that had become integral to the identity of many branitelji. Since the 
war, however, Marko sees little reason to ostracise right-wing fighters and inversely has 
experienced little criticism from nationalists for his personal politics. Rather, whenever he has 
encountered other branitelji or Serbs who also took part in the wars in the 1990s, Marko claims 
that there has been some sense of mutual understanding or acknowledgement of a shared 
experience, no matter how miserable it was. For right-wing Croats, political divides are brushed 
aside for the sake of national unity, in line with Franjo Tuđman’s vision of “reconciling” the sons 
and grandsons of communists and fascists, while for Serbs, the war was an experience in which they 
and Croats like Marko were pulled into unwillingly, that is, the war was not something they but 
rather the political élite had caused.  
 
These personal stories, that is, the communicative memories of Yugoslavia’s demise (see A. 
Assmann and Frevert 1999), get lost in the politics of nationalising memory that ultimately are 
reflected in the public face of memory, whether in Croatia or elsewhere. Such tales challenge at the 
most micro-level the narratives that have been crafted by master manipulators like Franjo Tuđman, 
Slobodan Milošević, their proxies and their successors, but given their highly intimate, 
autobiographic, and in many cases traumatising, nature, the power these stories and their authors 
have in influencing wider public discourses of the past is limited. This does not mean, however, 
                                                
15 Name altered to preserve anonymity.  
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that others have been more active and successful in challenging the centrality, exclusivity and 
nationalism of the defenders and their role in the formation of post-conflict identity in Croatia. 
 
The sanctity of the defender narrative is embodied in the 2000 Declaration on the Homeland War, 
which describes the war as “just and legitimate, and not an aggressive war or war of conquest 
against anyone, in which it [Croatia] defended its territory from Greater Serbian aggression within 
internationally recognised borders” (Sabor 2000. The 2006 Declaration on Operation Storm 
claimed to correct and “[defend] the historical truth” of Storm adopted by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and to acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
military action undertaken against the RSK in August 1995 (Sabor 2006). Storm had been 
coordinated in large part by Croatian General Ante Gotovina, indicted by the ICTY in 2001 for 
crimes against humanity, among other charges, during Storm; upon his subsequent arrest in the 
Canary Islands in 2005, initial guilty verdict in 2011 and sentencing to twenty-four years in 
prison, Croatian veterans mobilised to clear his name and to venerate him as a saviour of the 
fledgling Croatian state. This effort represents the impetus to preserve the defenders’ relative 
power over memory and their own narrative in light of real legal challenges to – in their eyes – an 
unblemished record of legitimate defence of the Croatian state and nation. When acquitted and 
released from The Hague the following year, Gotovina received a hero’s welcome in Zagreb, not 
unlike the reception granted to radical Serbian politician Vojislav Šešelj upon his return to 
Belgrade on temporary medical release from the United Nations Detention Unit of Scheveningen 
prison in 2014. I still recall “Gotovina – Heroj” posters depicting the general in full military 
uniform while travelling along the Adriatic coast from Zadar to Split in May 2013. 
 
The domestic imperative of defending the defenders’ legacy while conforming to the EU’s 
conditions for Croatian accession to the bloc in the early 2000s presented a challenge to the SDP-
led governments that succeeded Franjo Tuđman. The first government to form in the wake of his 
death in December 1999 was elected in January 2000, headed by Prime Minister Ivica Račan. 
Račan led with two cabinets of various coalitions with liberal democrats, the first also in 
cooperation with the Croatian Peasant Party until 2002. As the SDP was seen as a successor to the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and thereby as the “Other” and the political enemy of 
Croatian nationalists, its power was seen as a threat to that of the defenders and the HDZ’s legacy 
of leading Croatia through war and independence. Under Račan, Croatia signed the Stabilisation 
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and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, a precursor to accession negotiations that opened 
with a formal application for membership, again under Račan, in February 2003. As 
Europeanisation was a driving factor in the election of a social-democratic government, Račan 
faced heavy criticism from nationalist and far-right actors, who labelled him a traitor for pursuing 
those generals indicted by the ICTY. Cooperation with the ICTY was made a prerequisite for 
Croatian accession to the EU as part of the bloc’s interpretation of the Copenhagen criteria 
regarding rule of law (see Schimmelfennig 2008, 928-929). By demonstrating a willingness to 
conform to EU demands, however, the Croatian government would “[undertake] activities that 
clearly conflict[ed] with the self-conception of Croatia as a heroic and innocent nation” (Freyberg 
and Richter 2010, 271). Whereas the prevailing narrative of the defenders had represented a form 
of institutional memory, the challenges and criticisms toward this narrative were framed as a sort 
of “counter-narrative” that sought to modify, undermine or fully replace what had been built up as 
the sole acceptable account of the Homeland War. Defenders were framed as victims of the new 
government, with the sanctity of their sacrifices, their honour as soldiers, and ultimately their very 
identities called into question, with their power to endure removed by a foreign actor with no 
seeming stake in the matter of the Homeland War. Fisher notes,  
 
Instead of trying to form alliances with the current ruling parties, [war veterans’] 
groups have tried to mobilise the population in favour of radical activities that are 
apparently aimed at bringing down the current pro-Western government and 
reinstating HDZ. While under HDZ the veterans attained a privileged position 
mainly because their views were similar to or the same as those of HDZ, under the 
current leadership the veterans’ increasingly radical approach appears to be 
pushing them to the edge of society (Fisher 2003, 87).  
 
I address this perceived marginalisation in the following section. More widely, attempts by civil 
society organisations and social-democratic politicians to remember the war dead, including fallen 
Serbs, often have been met by protests in Zagreb. In October 2014, under another SDP-led 
coalition headed by Prime Minister Zoran, then-Assistant Minister of Croatian Defenders Bojan 
Glavašević claimed that Serb victims of the war should be treated equally as other war victims and, 
inter alia, be recognised as a traumatised group as had been the Croatian defenders. This, as 
described by Koska and Matan, was perceived by conservative groups (particularly veterans’ 
associations) as “blasphemy which inflicts damage to the very fibre of Croatian society” (2017, 
142). Glavašević’s father, Siniša (see Epilogue), was a renowned journalist who was murdered in 
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Ovčara in November 1991, yet Bojan Glavašević, a Social Democratic (SDP) parliamentarian, 
maintains a reconciliatory approach to Serbs. His remark provoked a series of protests involving 
veterans camping outside Ministry offices for several months, who demanded the resignation or 
sacking of Glavašević, the Minister of War Veterans Predrag Matić and his deputy Vesna Nađ. The 
protests ultimately ended in April 2016, eighteen months later, and eventually led to the creation 
of the 2017 Law on Croatian Veterans noted above; the SDP lost national elections in 2015, and 
Matić, Nađ and Glavašević were replaced (Milekić 2016b). The violence that marked various 
periods of the protests underscores the tense situation that exists in public discourse about 
“defenders” and their current status as well as the lack of support for war victims across Croatia.  
 
Similarly, a 2016 campaign by the Youth Initiative for Human Rights/Inicijativa mladih za 
ljudska prava (YIHR Hrvatska), which featured advertisements in billboards and on public buses 
and trams across Zagreb asking forgiveness from victims for the suffering inflicted upon them 
during Operation Storm, was met by reactionary voices from the Croatian right. The #ISPRIKA 
(“excuse”) posters stated, “National interest is a confession, not a lie”16 over an image of large 
columns of Serbs evacuating Croatia after Operation Storm and “Nacionalni interes je 
prihvaćanje, a ne mržnja/National interest is acceptance, not hate” over the rainbow flag, 
symbolising both peace and LGBT+ individuals, who are often mistreated in Croatia as elsewhere 
in the former Yugoslavia (Figure 4.15). Then-program coordinator Joco Glavaš claimed, “If the 
liberation of Knin is celebrated, there should also be a commemoration for the victims of Storm” 
(Slobodna Dalmacija 2016). HDZ politician and former Split city council member Hrvoje Marušić 
replied via a post on Facebook, “You Yugoslav-Communist bastards, you should be sentenced, 
shot… If we were a democratic state, you would be tried for grand treason and shot. And probably 










                                                
16 Original text in Croatian: “Nacionalni interes je priznanje, a ne laž.” 
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Figure 4.15: YIHR 2016 apology campaign for victims of Operation Storm 
   
Source (left): Slobodna Dalmacija (2016). Source (right): Žapčić, A. (2016). 
 
The YIHR campaign represents a generational shift in the approach to Croatia’s past and a 
recognition of the suffering inflicted on others in the name of nationalism. Many of my friends and 
acquaintances from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Slovenia have expressed disinterest 
or outright intolerance of such behaviour from right-wing actors, who they have accused of 
apologising for fascism and genocide. One friend, admittedly a self-declared socialist, stated his 
frustration outright in a conversation over my research one evening: “I hate the branitelji!.” 
Others I have encountered have suggested that defenders have co-opted a narrative of victimhood 
that is not exclusively theirs (a phenomenon I discuss in Chapter 5) in order to gain public and 
material support, in doing so spinning conspiracy theories – many involving the Hungarian-
American philanthropist George Soros – about those who point out any self-contradictions or 
irregularities in their retellings of the past.  
 
In this section, I have provided an overview of various instances of resistance to the top-down 
constructed narrative of Homeland War veterans as the legitimate and infallible defenders of the 
Croatian nation, each chipping away at this rigid and uncritical framework of remembrance. 
Though no singular, coherent “counter-narrative” has emerged, I argue that given the disjointed 
nature of civil society in Croatia, various “counter-memories,” that is, interpretations of memory 
that challenge the conservative view of the defenders, do exist, across all levels of society. Marko’s 
role as a defender and his conversation with me about his past represent a small-scale intervention 
in the communicative memory of the Homeland War, while larger-scale domestic critiques by the 
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SDP and YIHR show how the defender narrative can be challenged at the level of cultural memory. 
Finally, the process of Europeanisation as it continues to play out in Croatia demonstrates the 
process of negotiating supranational or transnational memory, corresponding to Jan Assmann’s 
framework of collective memory (see J. Assmann 2011). The following section returns to the 
domestic arena of cultural memory and frames gender as another critical dividing line in the 
construction of a monolithic identity of the defenders.  
 
Masculinity and Heroism: Gendering the Croatian commemorative process 
The defender narrative is overwhelmingly masculine in tone and content, as reflected in 
commemorative events and memorial spaces across the country. While most war narratives are also 
marked by masculine voices, the presence of women as defenders, bystanders and victims of the 
Homeland War throws a metaphorical wrench in the predominant retelling of the war and its 
aftermath. This section explores the braniteljice, Croatia’s female defenders, their presence or 
absence in the public face of memory in Croatia, and what an examination of gender in the context 
of war adds to a wider understanding of post-war identity formation. Here, too, I suggest some 
similarities to other post-war narratives (namely Yugoslav) and idiosyncrasies of the Croatian 
commemoration of the Homeland War, focusing on the differential role gender has played in the 
remembrance of nation-founding wars.  
 
Of the approximately half-million defenders registered by the Republic of Croatia through 2013, 
only about 23,000 were women. Braniteljice, or women more generally who were not aristocrats, 
artists or authors (see below), are not mentioned, nor are they made visible in public memorial 
spaces in any particular way. Mayer describes the presentation of war as a masculine feat, not a 
realm of women, stating, “Masculinity is expressed in the ‘man’s’ world of the battlefield. While 
these expressions can be seen as typical of military rhetoric, they enter into the strategic language 
of ethnocracy as expressions selected for public consumption […]” (Mayer 2012, 93). This public 
consumption, “on television or in popular magazines and newspapers” (ibid.), also takes place in 
memorial spaces, all of these a form of Aleida Assmann’s “symbolic media” of cultural memory (A. 
Assmann 2012, 175). While the Croatian language, like German, may have a deference to 
masculine nouns in situations involving groups where men are present, there was no monument, 
no memorial placard, and no museum that retold the experiences of female fighters in the 
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Homeland War.17 It took until 2 June 2018 for a Trg hrvatskih braniteljica/“Square of Croatian 
(Female) Defenders” to be dedicated, and at that in the small village of Mošćenica (population 
2,471), at the initiative of Petrinja mayor Darinko Dumbović, whose mother Marija, a Croatian 
defender, officially dedicated the square (HINA 2018a; see Figure 4.16 below). 
 
Figure 4.16: Marija Dumbović dedicates Trg hrvatskih braniteljica: Mošćenica 
 
Source: Gršić, M. (2018b). 
 
A handful of organisations of female defenders does exist, particularly in the areas most directly 
impacted by the Homeland War, Dalmatia and Eastern Slavonia. There is a Women’s Club of the 
Association of Volunteers and Veterans of the Homeland War in Petrinja, an Association of Female 
Defenders of Vukovar-Srijem County, founded in 2010, and an Association of Women in the 
Homeland War in Zadar. These groups have organised Dani braniteljica/“Days of the Female 
Defenders,” hosted public talks and exhibitions and participated in commemorative events across 
Croatia (Gršić 2018a). The Association of Female Defenders of Vukovar-Srijem County 
                                                
17 Braniteljica also refers to female lawyers, which may limit the effectiveness of most cursory 
searches for information on those who participated in the Homeland War. 
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additionally hosts annual Festivali domoljubne poezije/“Festivals of Patriotic Poetry,” with the aim 
of preventing forgetting the sacrifices of the defenders (UBDRVSŽ 2016).  
 
Despite this work, the voices of the female defenders have not been integrated into the mainstream 
narrative of the Homeland War that is driven by (male) veterans’ associations, like those who led 
the 18-month protest against the Ministry of Croatian Defenders from 2014 to 2016. The only 
instance in my initial museum fieldwork from 2017 to 2018 where I noticed images of women in 
military fatigues was at an open exhibition at the Hrvatski dom Glina; of the hundreds of images 
placed on boards around the small gallery, only a few dozen featured women, where they appear to 
be performing auxiliary or secretarial roles rather than participating in active combat. This was 
only complemented by the Jutarnji list poster insert noted in Figure 4.12 above. Only one image 
depicts a woman holding a gun (Figure 4.17 below). As well, the only monument to make mention 
of women was in the context of war victims in Vukovar, which perpetuates the more prevalent 
narrative of women as passive victims with no agency to choose whether to participate in conflict – 
a history of war written and fought by men. Women in war have been subjected to humiliating rape 
and sexual abuse by men, whether professional soldiers, paramilitary forces or police, and the war 
in Croatia is no exception. While the Croatian state has passed a law for compensation of victims 
of wartime sexual violence, as I discuss in the following chapter, the lingering effects of such 
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Figure 4.17: Images of braniteljice: Hrvatski dom Glina 
  
   
Women depicted in various (but few) images at the temporary exhibition of war-time photography, many shown in 
auxiliary roles, Hrvatski dom Glina, 24 August 2017. 
 
Further, until very recently no monument to Croatia’s female defenders existed, as their stories 
were often co-opted into the wider branitelj narrative explained throughout this chapter. Until one 
of my last visits to Zagreb in June 2019, I noted no memorial placard, no monument, no museum, 
save for the seemingly impromptu photo exhibition in Glina, and no artwork commemorating 
women who fought in the Homeland War. However, a new monument to Nevenka Topalušić, a 
disabled braniteljica who died during the course of the defenders’ protests in 2014, was installed 
in front the building of the Ministry of Croatian Veterans, where the protests occurred. During the 
Homeland War, Topalušić fought in Vrbovec near Zagreb and in Operations Storm in Una, during 
which she was wounded (Rašović 2014). 
 
The monument to Topalušić (Figure 4.18), and the small square renamed in her memory at Savska 
cesta 66, features her face engraved into a slab of marble, accompanied by the text “za domovinu 
uvijek spremni, 20.X.2014, 100% za Hrvatsku,” in reference to the rallying call of the protests 
led by invalid war veterans. Her name, birth and death years are also noted in a small slab below. 
The text again highlights the problematic relationship between the narrative of the defenders and 
that of the Ustaša, also formerly (and among far-right circles, contemporarily) seen as liberators of 
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the Croatian nation. By selecting the text “za domovinu uvijek spremni”/“Always ready for the 
homeland” – that is, a slight modification of “za dom spremni” – the monument’s creators 
knowingly seek continuity in the narrative of Croatian independence, without any sense of critical 
regard to the fascist slogan’s impact on Croatian identity. Keeping in line with other monuments 
to the defenders across the country, a large metal cross strung with rosary beads has been placed 
in the very centre of the memorial courtyard, and flowers featuring the šahovnica, topped with 
small Croatian flags, and memorial candles with the slogan “100% for Croatia” surround the 
monument.  
 
Figure 4.18: Monument to braniteljica Nevenka Topalušić: Zagreb 
 
Monument to disabled veteran Nevenka Topalušić at Savska cesta 66, in front of the Ministry of Croatian Veterans, 
Zagreb, 16 June 2019. 
 
With the few exceptions above, the Croatian experience highlights a remarkable shift from the 
narrative of active female Partisan fighters in the Second World War, a total war in which anyone 
with the means to participate could and did. Chiara Bonfiglioli’s writing on these “dangerous 
women,” the Partizanke, demonstrates the degree to which women were integrated in the war 
  185 
effort to liberate Yugoslavia from enemy combatants. She notes, “The contribution of partizanke, 
[…] to the Yugoslav liberation war was unprecedented in occupied Europe: official statistics of the 
socialist period report 100,000 women fighting as partisans, and two million participating in 
various ways to the support of the National Liberation Movement. Approximately 25,000 women 
died in battle, 40,000 were wounded, and 2,000 of them acquired the officer’s rank, while 92 
women were designated as national heroes.” Partizanke were remembered as soldiers and 
volunteers in the anti-fascist struggle, and their memories are slowly being revived by memory 
activists across the region who seek to build “counter-memories […] as a repertoire against the 
post-socialist retraditionalisation of gender relations” (Bonfiglioli 2016). The image of the 
partizanka was also popularised in the post-war era through film and literature as a “Revolutionary 
Icon” in, for example, Vjekoslav Afrić’s Slavica (1947) or, only later in Lordan Zafranović’s film 
Pad Italije (1981) (see also Batinić 2015). The revolutionary nature of gender equality in socialist 
Yugoslavia, it appears, has been eschewed by the modern Croatian state in its commemorative 
practices. If any legacy of the Yugoslav era remains, it is in the narrative of “liberation” against an 
aggressor, here Serbia, but without the insights of the women who participated – whether willingly 
or not – in the Homeland War. 
 
It follows, too, that the gendered aspects of this narrative should be more thoroughly investigated 
in future research; as noted above, from my initial field visits, no monuments bore the feminine 
form of “defender,” braniteljica, but a memorial placard at the Ovčara Memorial Centre outside 
Vukovar noted, “On this place in 1991, Croatian defenders, children, women and the elderly were 
captured, tortured and killed in Ovčara.” On the other hand, the exhibition in the Hrvatski dom 
Glina did show images of women wearing combat fatigues, but this appears to be a rare exception 
to the otherwise male-dominant history of warfare. Some exceptions do exist, particularly in the 
more gender-neutral commemoration of the Yugoslav Partisan fighters, many of whom were 
women encouraged to participate in battle given the state of total warfare in Yugoslavia during the 
Second World War (Pantelić 2013). 
 
The role of women in the Croatian commemorative process is relegated to their functions as 
mothers, widows or daughters, and not as individuals with agency or the right to be remembered 
as individuals, with former President Grabar-Kitarović in her position as head of state as one of 
very few exceptions. Women, therefore, are defined in their relationships to men – and to male 
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defenders – rather than active participants in the mnemonic sphere. Collins (2009) describes the 
links between hierarchies in family life and their extensions to nations and other large social 
groups. The presentation of women as dependents of men in the Croatian mnemonic landscape 
stems from the socialisation of individuals in families, where hierarchical relationships between 
men and women   are viewed as “natural social arrangements, as compared to socially constructed 
ones” (Collins 2009, 64). The few remaining images of non-combatant women in the Homeland 
War I documented include the famous weeping mother mural in Vukovar, on the main road linking 
the town centre with the memorial cemetery near Ovčara, and a monument of a mourning woman 
holding a dying man in the Dalmatian city of Benkovac. These memorials in many ways mirror the 
images of the Mothers of Srebrenica in Bosnia-Herzegovina mourning over the graves of their 
family members who died in July 1995 (Figure 4.19). These reinforce the “traditional,” that is, 
hierarchical, image of the family, with mothers, wives, sisters and daughters acting subserviently 
to men, placing male needs before their own, extending the metaphor of “mothers of the nation” 
or such similar formulations through abstract visual depictions of women in these memorial sites. 
 
Figure 4.19: Gendered portrayals of mnemonic participants – women in mourning: Vukovar, 
Benkovac and Srebrenica  
    
Left: Mural of a weeping mother on Trg slavija, Vukovar, 3 July 2017. Centre: Monument of woman holding a dying 
man, dedicated to Croatian patriots, Benkovac, 20 March 2018. Right: A family member of a victim of the 
Srebrenica genocide kneels by a coffin containing recently unearthed remains in preparation for burial, Srebrenica 
(BiH), 11 July 2014 (from personal archive). 
 
Every other statue or image of a woman built or painted after the dissolution of Yugoslavia I 
documented featured an abstract, nameless person (Figure 4.20); artists and authors who 
predated Tito’s Yugoslavia, such as Ivana Brlić-Mažuranić (1874 – 1938, monument built 2004), 
the American-French dancer Isadora Duncan (1877 – 1927, monument built 2002), and the 
Croatian-American ballerina Mia Čorak Slavenska (1916 – 2002, memorial plaque installed 
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2004); or religious figures like the Virgin Mary, venerated medieval queens, and in an unusual 
case in Slavonia, Mother Teresa (1910 – 1997, from 1918 to 1948 a Yugoslav subject and citizen, 
monument built 2017). In total, of 614 monuments I recorded in Croatia between 2016 and 
2019, only 32 bore images of women, 22 of just women, and fourteen dedicated to specific 
historical women (not including the Virgin Mary). Of the six monuments I noted that were 
dedicated after Croatian independence in 1991, only two – those to Ivana Brlić-Mažuranić and to 
Nevenka Topalušić – remember women whose entire lives were spent in Croatia, and only the 
latter remembering a female political actor.  
 
Figure 4.20: Nameless women: Đakovo, Vidovec, Split 
     
Left: Monument to Croatian defenders depicting a woman kneeling on a šahovnica-patterned platform, Đakovo, 17 
November 2017. Centre: “Mati slobode” monument to all victims of Second World War, the Bleiburg repatriations, 
communist terror, and fallen defenders of the Homeland War, Vidovec, 18 March 2018. Right: Angel “Lumin,” 
dedicated to victims of Vukovar massacre, Split, 2 August 2017. 
 
All other extant busts or sculptures remembering individual women were created during the 
socialist period from 1943 to 1991 and are dedicated primarily to “national heroes,” that is, the 
partizanke, of the Second World War. Other Yugoslav depictions of women in groups are often 
abstracted, but in some instances feature women as equal citizens and fighters, standing before 
men or women holding weapons, in line with the abstract artistic style of socialist monuments in 
Southern and Eastern Europe in the post-Second World War era (Figure 4.21). The greatest 
number of these, however, are to be found in Istria, a stronghold of Yugoslav memory, in part due 
to its long history of multi-ethnic cohabitation amongst Croats, Italians and Slovenes, and the lack 
of violent action during the Homeland War on the peninsula. These monuments remember 
  188 
“national heroes,” “activists” and “fallen fighters,” suggesting quite literally the vision of a woman 
as an individual with agency to act in both her and the national interest.  
 
Figure 4.21: Yugoslav depictions of the partizanke: Sisak, Korenica, Buzet, Juricani  
  
   
Top left: Monument to Yugoslav partisan fighters depicting a woman holding a rifle, Dr. Franjo Tuđman Park, Sisak, 
24 August 2017. Top right: Bust of Zorica Stipančić. Yugoslav “activist,” Buzet, 5 May 2019. Bottom left: 
Yugoslav monument to Partisan commander Marko Orešković and other fighters in the “People’s/National 
Liberation Struggle,” Korenica, 6 August 2017. Bottom right: Monument to fallen fighters and victims of fascist 
terror, Juricani, 4 May 2019. 
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The role of gender in forming national identity in Croatia has been overshadowed by the action of 
men in the defence of Croatia during the Homeland War, and not by the actions of women who 
may also share in that victory. The public face of memory in Croatia is masculine, it does not cry, it 
does not suffer, it only sacrifices and is martyred for the good of the nation and of the Croatian 
state. Women, therefore, are seen as passive carriers of identity, borne in their bodies but not 
through their actions. In the next chapter, I will briefly discuss the implications of gender, 
victimhood and memory in Croatia and the use of women’s bodies as markers of identity, as there 
is already a wealth a literature on the intersection of gender and nationalism (see again Collins 
2009; Mostov 2012; see also Kaplan et al. 1999; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989). 
 
Conclusion 
The above analysis has shown how the identity of Croatian defenders has been constructed 
discursively and physically in the many monuments erected in their honour across the country. The 
near-impossible separation of the HDZ from the survival of the narrative of the branitelji has been 
one of the most important features of domestic policymaking and an ever-recurring element of the 
debate on who holds the power over memory in Croatia. By looking at the construction of the 
branitelji narrative first, I allow myself to return to this case again and again to show the contrasts 
and contradictions of Croatian memory politics as they relate to the defenders, the “Other,” in the 
next chapter Serbs, and similarly marginalised groups, including women (above) and civilian 
victims of the Homeland War. 
 
This chapter examined various concepts that address the intersections of memory, identity, 
violence and power, including the defenders’ construction of their own identity as one of both 
victor and victim. I argued that the framing of defenders as infallible saviours of the Croatian 
nation, borrowing from Christian iconography, has provided little room for public critique of the 
narrative of the Homeland War that has been enforced from the top down. The commemoration of 
Operation Storm held in Knin every August provides the clearest example of narrative 
construction through visual means, underpinned by the physical presence of monuments along the 
former frontlines dedicated almost entirely to the defenders and not the civilian victims of the 
conflict (see again Figure 4.14). Most importantly, the use of Serbs as the “Other” – more so as 
the “enemy” – serves as a major identity boundary for Croatian defenders and, following the 
narrative embodied in memorial spaces and commemorative events, further for the Croatian nation 
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as an “imagined community” (Anderson 1983). The impact of this framing has implications 
beyond the former Yugoslavia, as the perceived necessity of an “Other,” particularly one defined 
by historic violence, in creating an in-group identity poses serious challenges to mutual 
acknowledgement of suffering and the possible development of a shared, collective memory of that 
bloody past in all post-conflict societies. While I focused primarily on the visual manifestations of 
cultural memory (A. Assmann 1999), I also address how counter-narratives (Y. Zerubavel 1995) 
or at the very least counter-memories (Foucault 1980) have emerged at sub-, intra- and 
supranational levels, that is, narratives of resistance or change exist in the communicative (A. 
Assmann and Frevert 1999) and cultural (J. Assmann 2011) memory spheres, too. By 
acknowledging the multi-level process of memory- and identity-making, I complexify my rather 
linear model of the transformation of power over memory into the power to endure, deepening and 
physically contextualising the links of memory studies to the sociology of identity, whether 
national or individual. Finally, I have expanded the documentary work on Croatian historial 
monuments and commemorations similarly undertaken by Donald Niebyl in his Spomenik 
Database project and by the FRAMNAT research group in Rijeka by linking the patterns of 
memorialisation such monuments as those presented here and in the following two chapters to 
wider social dynamics of power and identity. Where these two projects selectively focus on 
Yugoslav spomenici and commemorative events of twentieth-century traumas in Croatia, 
respectively, I take a more holistic view of memorialisation and identity formation. This allows 
greater scope to bridge both methodological and theoretical gaps between various complementary 
disciplines (sociology, history, political science) that often intersect in the field of memory studies.  
 
In this thesis so far, I have focussed more directly on how the past is remembered, but in the next 
chapter, I will discuss how and why certain social groups are forgotten and the intentionality or 
lack thereof behind this process. This and the following chapters highlight social processes and 
political decision-making that emerge in the case study of Croatia as a site of mnemonic conflict, 
both internal and external, also demonstrating how nationalism and memory intersect in the public 
performance of memory. Chapter 5 builds from this analysis of the defender narrative and explores 
how it prevails over victim-centric memory, even in spaces where it might not be expected. ★  





Chapter 5: Žrtve 
Chapter 5: Victims 
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Introduction 
This chapter examines how victims of the Homeland War from both sides (Croats and Serbs) are 
remembered – or forgotten – and how the Yugoslav narratives of the Second World War, which 
incorporate more thoroughly both victims and fighters, have been modified, challenged or erased 
in today’s Croatia. Specifically, I analyse the commemoration of the 1991 siege of Vukovar and 
various monuments to civilian victims of the Second World War and Homeland War, retributive 
violence against Serbs in Dalmatia in 1995 and the 1991 and 1995 rocket attacks on Zagreb. The 
Vukovar commemoration acts as a point of comparison to the events on Victory Day in Knin 
presented in Chapter 4, with the added discussion of nominally victim-centric monuments 
highlighting again the centrality of the Catholic faith to Croatian identity. Here I discuss narratives 
of victimhood, competitive victimhood, othering, forced amnesia and denial, which demonstrate 
the difficulties in forming not only a wider collective memory of the Homeland War or of conflict 
in general but also in the creation of a singular, national identity. In both wars observed here, the 
memory of the individual victim had been subsumed by state narratives of collective suffering, but 
remembering both the individual and the collective victims has been overshadowed by the elevation 
of the combatant hero, as discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
This chapter addresses the following research questions through my observations of memorial 
events and spaces and by demonstrating the visual elements of the narratives at play: 
 
• How does Croatia’s visual culture of remembrance illustrate the relationships between 
power, violence, memory and identity? 
• How, and by whom, is memory constructed to perpetuate social divisions, based on 
nationality, ethnicity or religion?  
• Using a concept of “memory abuse” in post-conflict settings, what are the normative 
expectations of remembrance and what form does resistance to specific memorialisations 
take? 
 
Further, I ask how the continual divide between Serb and Croat victims harms the process of 
reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia and what the absence of victims’ voices means for the 
construction of post-conflict identity and particularly in Croatia to the promise of an open, 
“European” future. My key argument in this chapter is that the predominance of the defender 
  194 
narrative, in which not only civilians but also fallen soldiers are framed as “victims of Greater 
Serbian aggression,” provides little space for the creation of distinct narratives of civilian victims, 
both Croat and Serb, and this is reflected in the public face of memory in Croatia today. I also 
return to the question directly addressed in Chapter 4 on the elevation of the “defender” narrative 
in contemporary Croatian cultural memory and extend this to include the narrative of the 
“fighters” in the Yugoslav “National Liberation Struggle,” that is, the Second World War. I argue 
firstly how understandings of victimhood blur the line between victor, victim and vanquished; this 
is achieved through the commemoration of soldiers in memorial spaces that are otherwise 
nominally dedicated to civilian victims of war. Secondly, I discuss the resulting complications of 
historical revisionism (particularly toward the Bleiburg repatriations of May 1945), again 
discussing “memory abuse” in the context of contemporary clashes over Croatian cultural 
memory. Finally, I address the collectivisation of guilt toward Croatian Serbs that have arisen since 
the 1990s, which I argue is a result of conservative and nationalist groups exercising their power 
over memory to exclude and demonise the “Other.”  
 
This chapter is divided into two main sections, the first analysing the commemoration of the fall of 
Vukovar and the framing of this defeat as “martyrdom,” questioning the nature of civilian agency 
in times of war. The purpose of this first section is to show through ethnographic description how 
lieux de mémoire (Nora 1989) enter the cultural psyche and how local memories can develop into 
national or even supranational memories. In the second section, I look at how the narratives of 
victimhood in the aftermath of the Second World War and the Homeland War were constructed 
and more carefully at how the use of European anti-totalitarian discourse has allowed modern 
Croatian politicians to reshape and relativise the history of the “victims” of the Bleiburg 
repatriations in 1945. This allows me to return to the concept of “memory abuse” I presented in 
Chapter 1 (see also McConnell 2019) in the context of erasure or denial of victims’ narratives of 
suffering brought about in the pursuit of Croatian independence. In doing so, I expand upon 
Jelin’s conceptualisation of “memory entrepreneurs” (see Jelin 2003) as those opportunists who 
use memory to advance agendas from which only they, and not Croatian society more widely, 
profit. A brief insight into how I encountered this sort of disregard for the victimhood of the 
“Other” in the Memorial Centre for the Rocket Attacks in Zagreb is provided at the end of the 
chapter. This chapter advances knowledge on Croatian memory politics as a substantive case by 
applying the exercise of power by privileged groups like the “defenders” to the process of national 
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identity formation while suppressing marginal voices and marginal memories of those whose 
experiences clash with the narratives presented in Chapter 4. My analysis here also complements 
existing documentary work on Homeland War memorialisation by the FRAMNAT research group 
(i.e. FRAMNAT 2015; 2017) and various authors in the fields of political and social science (i.e. 
Kardov 2007; Schellenberg 2015; Banjeglav 2019). 
 
Remembering Vukovar: Victims, martyrs and the (selective) memory of war suffering 
In this section, I provide a detailed description of the November 2017 commemoration in 
Vukovar, which serves as a foundation for analysis later in the chapter of “martyrdom,” agency and 
the making of cultural memory. The ethnographic insights here build a case study of one of the 
three major commemorative events (Bleiburg, Knin, Vukovar) in the Croatian mnemonic 
calendar, which functions as a moment to record both oral/communicative and visual/cultural 
manifestations of memory and to show how identity boundaries are performed and contested. I 
address again the characteristics of cultural memory (see Assmann and Shortt 2012, 3) that allow 
for the manipulation of certain narratives to fit commemorations and memorial spaces around 
certain group identities, be they “Yugoslav,” “Croatian,” or other.  
 
The annual commemoration of the 1991 fall of Vukovar takes place on 18 November, officially 
Dan sjećanja na žrtvu Vukovara 1991. godine/“Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Vukovar 
1991,” the day on which Croatian fighters surrendered to JNA forces who had besieged the city 
since that August. Several thousand Croatian civilians and defenders were killed in the three-
month siege in Vukovar and in further fighting across eastern Slavonia, with reports of summary 
executions of Croatian soldiers in the battle’s aftermath (Sudetic 1991). On 20 November 1991, 
over 200 civilians and Croatian prisoners of war were taken from the local hospital by JNA, Serb 
paramilitary and Territorial Defence soldiers and murdered in the nearby Ovčara farm, the largest 
death toll of any of the war crimes committed against the Croatian civilian population during the 
Homeland War. Throughout the siege, the majority of private and commercial property in 
Vukovar was partially or totally destroyed, including the Eltz Manor (now the Vukovar City 
Museum), the Hotel Nacional, later the House of Workers, and the Vodotoranj, the now 
pockmarked brick-and-concrete water tower that looms over the Danube (Seeney 2006) (see 
Figure 5.1).  
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Figure 5.1: Physical damage sustained during the Siege of Vukovar, August to November 1991 
  
  
Source, top row: Images by Ron Haviv. Top left: A father and son fighting in a Serb paramilitary unit smile at the 
destruction of Vukovar. Top right: Vukovar residents flee the city amongst its rubble. Source, bottom left: Image by 
Miloš Cvetković (all present in the “up close and personal: war in croatia” exhibition, Image of War Photography 
Museum Zagreb); destroyed storefront in the centre of Vukovar. Bottom right, Vukovar Vodotoranj, 3 July 2017. 
 
Each year in the weeks surrounding the commemoration, especially on All Saint’s Day on 1 
November, memorial candles are lit and wreaths laid on freshly swept graves and monuments 
across Croatia; in many towns in Slavonia, candles in the shape of the Vodotoranj and the colours 
of the Croatian flag line the roads heading into Vukovar from Vinkovci, Ilok and Osijek, 
commercial products that advance the memory of wartime suffering. While other municipalities 
across the country hold smaller-scale commemorative events on 18 November, the ceremonies in 
Vukovar continue to draw tens of thousands each year, including a wide array of defenders, their 
families and friends, public and religious figures, as well as a small collection of peace activists. 
When I travelled to Vukovar for the commemoration in November 2017, events had been 
underway for five days, beginning with a two-day conference on “Vukovar 1991: Public 
Discourses and Positions of Power,” hosted by the Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Sciences. Events on 
16 and 17 November included a poetry recital by the Association of Female Defenders of the 
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Homeland War, prayer ceremonies at the Memorial Cemetery for Victims of the Homeland War 
in Vukovar (where the main commemoration would take place on the eighteenth) and a symposium 
on the hospital from which the victims of the Vukovar massacre were taken. Of the nine events 
preceding the larger ceremonies on 18 November, five were organised by defender or police 
associations, representing the soldiers who fought and died in the siege. Around the main 
cathedral in nearby Đakovo, I also noticed a small gathering of motorcycle enthusiasts heading 
toward Vukovar in time for the commemorations the following morning; many of the men in the 
crowd sported black leather jackets with the large insignia of the Gladijatori/“gladiators” along 
the backs, a large white-then-red šahovnica framed with golden wings and topped with a Croatian 
flag featuring a cross in the middle. The Gladijatori are a motorcycle club founded in 2012 in 
Vinkovci by former members of the Fifth Guard Brigade (“The Falcons”), a military unit active in 
eastern Slavonia from October 1992, notably during Operation Flash toward the end of the 
Homeland War. Other jackets depicted similar nationalist symbols, presumably the insignia of 
fellow defender groups active in the region during the Homeland War. 
 
On 18 November 2017, I drove to Vukovar from Osijek, Croatia’s fourth largest city 45 minutes 
away, passing through a row of small villages where the Vodotoranj candles had been placed 
meticulously every few metres. The first signs of commemorative activities appeared past Trpinja, 
a predominantly Serb municipality and member of the Joint Council of Municipalities established 
in the 1995 Erdut Agreement. Along the main road leading from Trpinja into Vukovar stands the 
Spomen dom hrvatskih branitelja na Trpinjskoj cesti/“Memorial House of Croatian Defenders on 
Trpinjska cesta [Trpinja Road],” where by 7:30am a large crowd had gathered in advance of the 
memorial parade to Vukovar. The weather was rather downcast that morning, but despite the rain 
and mud, I noted a large number of memorial candles had been laid in front of the building before 
the bust of Blago Zadro, a Croatian general who died midway through the Battle of Vukovar (see 
Figure 5.2). Several groups had their photos taken by the main feature of the memorial house, a 
dark green tank with its barrel pointed toward Vukovar, which serves as a monument to the 
defenders of Trpinjska cesta and the “tank graveyard” that the street colloquially had become 
during the war. By the time I returned to my car, the parade had left, headed by a man carrying a 
cross with rows of rather young participants draped in Croatian flags, many wearing camouflage or 
black clothing, following him and their police escort (Figure 5.3). 
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Figure 5.2: Memorial House of Croatian Defenders on Trpinjska cesta 
   
Left: Bust of Blago Zadro adorned with memorial candles, Trpinjska cesta, 18 November 2017. Right: Memorial to 
the “Tank Graveyard,” Trpinjska cesta, 18 November 2017. 
 
Figure 5.3: Memorial parade from Trpinjska cesta to Vukovar, 18 November 2017 
   
 
Upon arrival in Vukovar, I headed toward the bridges over the Vuka River and to the memorial 
cross on the confluence of the Vuka and the Danube. The cross, installed in October 1998, faces 
across the river toward Serbia upstream and a sliver of Croatian territory directly downstream. Its 
inscription, “Žrtvama za slobodnu Hrvatsku”/“To the victims for free Croatia,” is accompanied 
by text in the Glagolitic script developed by Saint Cyril in the ninth century CE, which states, 
“Navik on živi ki zgine pošteno”/ “He who dies honourably lives forever,” noted in Chapter 2 as 
a quote attributed to the seventeenth-century noble Petar Zrinski. The cross serves as one of the 
two central monuments to the 1991 siege in the town centre, the other being the Vodotoranj, a 
fifteen-minute walk south toward the outskirts of Vukovar, and on the day of the commemoration 
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was a meeting point for many defender groups and their families, who were ceremoniously 
welcomed at the town hospital at 9:30am. As a participant-observer in the day’s events (and an odd 
one out as a person walking unaccompanied through the town), I helped take photos for some of 
the groups around the memorial cross, only noticing the controversial phrase “Za dom 
spremni”/“Ready for the Homeland” on some of the flags and T-shirts of the group members after 
the fact. I had unintentionally photographed members of the Croatian Defence Forces (HOS), an 
early paramilitary group active in the defence of Vukovar that had adopted symbols and slogans 
from the quisling Independent State of Croatia (NDH). 
 
Around the town centre, multiple exhibitions were displayed, including a display of images from 
Vukovar in 1991 and 2017 (there was a sticker placed over “2017” suggesting that this had been 
used in years past) in the main square, as well as smaller symbolic displays of national pride or 
mourning. Shop fronts, bars and restaurants, at least those owned by Croats (as those owned by 
Serbs would not participate in the day’s events; see Banjeglav 2019, 197), hung flags or laid out 
memorial candles (see Figure 5.4 below). Vukovar remains a divided city, though many of the 
social boundaries are invisible to the untrained eye, and despite widespread demographic shifts 
during and in the immediate aftermath of the Homeland War, Serbs still make up approximately 
one-third of the local population (DZS RH 2011c). Their memories of the 1990s, which will be 
discussed later, come into direct conflict with the Croatian state narratives present at 
commemorative events like those in Knin and Vukovar, and during the annual processions in 
Vukovar each November, Serbs are seldom seen or heard. Outside of this week of 
commemoration, Serb spaces in Vukovar are marked partially by the absence of Croatian symbols 
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Figure 5.4: Memorial displays in Vukovar town centre 
  
Left: Photo exhibition “Vukovar 1991 – 2017” along Vuka River, Vukovar, 18 November 2017. Right: 
“VUKOVAR” spelled out in Vodotoranj-shaped memorial candles, Vukovar, 18 November 2017. 
 
Throughout the morning of the commemoration, I walked around Vukovar, from the bus station 
where free parking spots were rapidly diminishing, to the town centre and along the main road 
toward the Vodotoranj, where a massive Croatian flag with “Vukovar ‘91” printed over it was being 
unfurled, and back toward the hospital from which the victims of the Ovčara massacre were taken. 
A new monument had been installed next to the police presidium by the hospital that September, 
remembering the fallen officers who fought against JNA forces and the Serb paramilitaries who had 
besieged Vukovar twenty-six years earlier. A large crowd gathered along the street by the 
presidium awaiting the start of the memorial walk to the cemetery five kilometres away. As in 
Trpinjska cesta and Đakovo, many were wearing black jackets with various insignia, and several 
men carried large Croatian flags, some with town names written over them. These included Livno 
and Travnik, two towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina with larger Croat populations that were claimed 
early on by the wartime Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna; Travnik would later be fought over by 
Bosnian Croat forces and the ARBiH, ending in Bosniak control over the town by the war’s end, 
creating various obstacles to peaceful reintegration of Croat returnees (ICG 1998). Also gathered 
were participants in the Marš mira/Peace March (separate from the Kolona mira, as the main 
memorial walk in Vukovar is called), a group of peace activists, war survivors and family members, 
Bosnians and foreigners who walk annually through the woods from Sapla, near Tuzla in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, to the Potočari Memorial Cemetery for the 11 July commemoration of the 1995 
Srebrenica genocide. As I discuss below, the narrative of victimhood varies across ethnic and state 
boundaries, but the presence of Marš mira activists indicates some degree of solidarity among 
victim groups in the former Yugoslavia, or at least those who view themselves as victims of “Serbian 
  201 
aggression.”  
 
As the memorial walk slowly started, I decided to drive back to Osijek to follow the procession and 
coverage of the day’s events on the state television and radio networks, Hrvatska Radiotelevizija 
(HRT) and Hrvatski radio 1 (HR 1). Rather than directly experience the rest of the day’s events in 
the increasingly bitter cold and wind, I chose to see the commemoration through the same media 
as most Croatians, who would not be attending in person but would certainly have been bombarded 
by the demand to “Remember Vukovar!,” a slogan that has appeared frequently in memorial 
graffiti throughout Croatia (Figure 5.5).18 
 
Figure 5.5: Memorial graffiti with themes from Vukovar: Benkovac, Slavonksi Brod, Zagreb 
   
  
Top: “VUKOVAR” written in colours of Croatian flag next to image of destroyed Vodotoranj, Benkovac, 20 March 
2018. Bottom left: “VUKOVAR NEPOKORENI”/“Vukovar unconquered,” Slavonski Brod, 17 November 2017. 
Bottom right: Silhouette of cheering football fans in front of the Vukovar Vodotoranj, Zagreb, 21 March 2018. 
                                                
18 Commemorative graffiti is a more informal manifestation of visual remembrance and has been 
documented in the aftermaths of protests (Abaza 2013), assassinations (Klingman and Shalev 
2001) and gang violence (Lübbers 2007) or as a way to present counter-narratives (see Moreau 
and Alderman 2012). 
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On the short drive back to Osijek, the HR 1 radio channel shared the stories of several people who 
lived in Vukovar during the siege, including an interview with a nurse who worked at the hospital 
when it was taken over by “Chetniks” on 20 November 1991, a man who has participated in the 
Kolona mira/Column of Peace memorial walk from the hospital to the victims’ cemetery every year 
since it was initiated, and a defender from Tenja, a village near Osijek Airport, who talked about 
his experiences fighting in the early stages of the Battle of Vukovar. On the television, dramatic 
classical music played over a split screen of the memorial walk and commemorative speeches on 
the left and images of Vukovar from 1991 on the right. The memorial walk was led by various 
defender groups and soldiers in military uniform, not unlike the more joyous victory parade in 
Knin I had watched in person that August. Short segments on various aspects of the fall of Vukovar 
played while the crowd moved toward the memorial cemetery, retelling the forced removal of 
hospital patients and staff and acts of torture committed by Serb fighters. Selected readings from 
Siniša Glavašević’s Voices from Vukovar were followed by cutaways to the memorial walk, now a 
nearly 2-kilometre trail of people walking past the Vodotoranj and a smaller memorial park on the 
way to the cemetery. Eerie organ music accompanied more scenes from 1991 and live feeds from 
the walk, showing the large rows of soldiers lining the long, shaded alley leading toward the 
monument at the centre of the cemetery (Figure 5.6). 
 
Figure 5.6: Memorial Cemetery for Victims of the Homeland War, Vukovar, 23 August 2017
   
 
By 12:30pm, the crowd had surrounded the memorial cemetery, and the memorial ceremony, 
officially entitled “Vukovar: Mjesto posebnog pijeteta”/“Vukovar: Place of Special Piety” since 
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2013 (see Banjeglav 2019, 199), began with a prayer “for the victims from the City of Vukovar 
during the Homeland War.” While political figures like President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, 
Prime Minister Andrej Plenković, and Speaker of the Croatian Sabor Gordan Jandroković were in 
attendance, the ceremony was of an almost entirely religious nature, with a sermon by Antun 
Škvorčević, Bishop of Požega. In his sermon, Škvorčević stated,  
 
We approach the victim of Vukovar with restraint and affection, with respect and 
admiration, with gratitude and with love. The sacrifice of Vukovar deserves to be 
celebrated, just as we celebrate the sacrifice of Vukovar – in this holy mass we unite 
it with the sacrifice of Jesus on the cross, entrusting it to His victory of the 
resurrection (FRAMNAT 2017). 
 
He continued by calling for social and political reconciliation between Serbs and Croats, above all 
in Vukovar, through recognition of their shared Christian heritage, hoping  
 
that the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Serbian Orthodox Church will find 
ways to work together for Jesus Christ to destroy evil and division in us so that we 
will not be against each other, that He may be truly our peace and Croatia as our 
common home (FRAMNAT 2017). 
 
Next came a sword display and wreath-laying ceremony by Grabar-Kitarović, Plenković and 
Jandroković followed by an organisation of injured and missing Croatian defenders, the mayor of 
Vukovar Ivan Penava (of the ruling HDZ) and various religious figures. Škvorčević’s sermon was 
followed by Holy Mass led by Đuro Hranić, Archbishop of the Đakovo-Osijek Diocese, who 
recalled the sacrifices of the defenders and the victims of the siege. The ceremony concluded with 
the reading of small prayers by a local youth group and – to my surprise – the singing of a Croatian 
version of “My Peace,” a Christian praise song I had only previously encountered in the United 
Methodist church my family attended in Pennsylvania.  
 
While this section describes just one instance of public memorialisation, the wider implications of 
this case study lie in the following analysis of two main aspects of this commemorative event. The 
first of these lies in the question of agency in death, that is, whether victims chose to die “for 
Croatia” or if this framing of civilian casualties as martyrs belies a more conflicted nature of the 
current balance of power over memory in Croatia. The second aspect I evaluate below is the 
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erasure of victims’ voices when their stories would challenge the foundation of Croatian cultural 
memory, and I provide examples of commemorations of Serb victims of the Homeland War and 
reactions to them by various social actors. 
 
Victimhood as a chosen fate  
This section provides an analysis of the contemporary framing of Croatian civilian victims as 
“martyrs” who chose to die for the state rather than as unfortunate collateral damage incurred in 
the course of the Homeland War or, more deliberately, as strategically targeted casualties. I build 
on the ethnographic detail on the Vukovar commemoration described above with examples of 
monuments to civilian victims that demonstrate how the martyr narrative is physically constructed 
in memorial spaces across Croatia. The narrative of victimhood present throughout the 
commemorative events and memorial spaces in Vukovar conflicts with a juridical understanding of 
victims as unwilling participants in war entitled to particular legal rights (see de Casadevante 
Romani 2010) or as losses that have no inherent political, social or religious meaning; victims – 
primarily civilian – did not choose to die for a cause, and if deliberately targeted by active 
combatants, they died with little to no control over their fate. As the various events surrounding 
the Vukovar commemorations show, victims in the Croatian sense were presented as having died 
for something, that is, the emphasis is placed on a choice to die to secure the independence of the 
Croatian state and/or nation. Kardov notes, “war victims are perceived primarily as sacrifices for 
the homeland, not as meaningless losses. And hence the symbol of the victim, so characteristic for 
religious and national narratives, is most often in the articulations of local Croatian memories” 
(Kardov 2007, 68). While I agree with Kardov’s framing of the victim as an abstracted and 
symbolic loss rather than as a personal tragedy, I contend throughout this thesis, and most clearly 
in Chapter 4, that is is the image of the defender, especially when framed as a victim, that takes 
precedence over all other memorialised elements of the Homeland War, including civilian 
casualties. 
 
The sacrificial imagery of the few monuments dedicated exclusively to civilian victims of the 
Homeland War is demonstrated in six of these ten monuments in the physical form of the cross or 
the dove of peace - reinforcing Škvorčević’s invocation of Christ’s crucifixion and the imagery of 
wartime sacrifice (Figure 5.7). Three memorial plaques are unadorned, and only one, that to the 
children killed during the Homeland War installed in a Slavonski Brod playground, features a more 
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abstract design, a puzzle with one fallen and one missing piece (Figure 5.8). 
 
Figure 5.7: Christian symbolism in monuments to civilian victims of the Homeland War: Široka 
Kula, Ilača, Vukovar 
   
Left: Memorial to civilian victims with recently laid memorial candles and wreaths, Široka Kula, 6 August 2017. 
Centre: Monument to victims of “Greater Serbian aggression,” Ilača, 16 March 2018. Right: Memorial cross to 
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On this, Kardov continues,  
 
The cross, compared to a statue, does not celebrate the bravery or heroism of the 
dead but precisely addresses the sacrifice – in this case not some useless sacrifice 
but the sacrifice for the homeland [...] Therefore, the local collective memories and 
their official articulations are, first of all, mythical in nature – not in the sense that 
they testify and represent false memory but […] that the fundamental cosmological 
sense that they are related to an order (Kardov 2007, 68-70).  
 
This speaks to the “dynamism” and “plasticity” of memory (see Assmann and Shortt 2012, 3), 
which allow powerful actors to morph or manipulate memory in ways that suit their own purposes 
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or narratives. By turning Vukovar into a sort of legendary space of victimhood and martyrdom, 
public figures can stretch the meaning of local memory to fit national and nationalist 
interpretations of the past by blurring the lines between lived and purported experience. The 
absence of a narrative unique to Vukovar and its inhabitants was caused by the mass dispersal and 
forced expulsion of residents in the aftermath of the 1991 siege. This has given room for the 
dominant, near mythical narratives constructed by Tuđman and the HDZ during the Homeland 
War of sacrifice and dedication to the Croatian state to fill in that void, rather than narratives of 
literal defence of one’s home, survival in times of war and the mourning of individual losses. The 
narratives of Croat returnees is also drowned out by the cacophony of conservative and nationalist 
voices exercising their power and influence over the construction of both local and national 
identities. While the fates of Vukovar and, for example, Sarajevo share many similarities, it is this 
absence of a local Vukovar narrative that is most striking. Were any of the 32 monuments I 
documented in Vukovar that were constructed since 1991 moved anywhere else in Croatia, few 
would feel out of place. Only the ruined Vodotoranj uniquely represents the local suffering of 
Vukovar, but it has also been appropriated as a national symbol for the victimhood of the Croatian 
people during the Homeland War. Other local monuments in Croatia employ similar Christian 
symbols or language of victims’ sacrifice that make regional distinctions within Croatia (i.e. 
linguistic or historical) of little importance, with the exception of Istria, where monuments neither 
to defenders nor to civilian victims of the Homeland War are markedly present. Such monuments 
stand in great contrast to other symbolic representations of war loss elsewhere in the former 
Yugoslavia, most notably in the “Sarajevo Roses,” an artistic endeavour to fill in all mortar craters 
throughout the city with a red resin to represent the blood of innocent victims of the 1992-1995 
siege (see Lukić 2014). 
 
The forms of formal monuments – crosses, obelisks, busts and undecorated plaques, as opposed 
to more informal memorials like graffiti or the Vodotoranj candles – do little to demonstrate the 
supposed uniqueness of Vukovar in the history of the Homeland War. It is more the destruction 
rather than the existence of Vukovar in 1991 that plays a central role in the predominant narrative 
of the foundation of the Croatian state. Of all the monuments in Vukovar that remember the city’s 
capture by the JNA and Serb paramilitaries, only those that feature the shape of the Vodotoranj 
show some divergence from similar monuments elsewhere in Croatia. Kardov, citing Nora, calls 
Vukovar “a ‘place of memory’ within the national space,” noting the fixed attachment to memories 
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of its destruction to the broader context of Croatian cultural memory and its lieux de mémoire 
(Kardov 2007, 26). Vukovar, then, becomes a critically important location and an event around 
which identities can be and have been moulded. Returning to my earlier arguments on power, 
however, it appears that the residents of Vukovar who survived the conflict lack much agency to 
shape those identities, as they are constructed more forcefully by the HDZ, other nationalist 
parties and defenders’ associations, who wield the greatest “power over memory” (Müller 2009) 
in Croatia post-independence. Rather than individually contributing to or “uploading” its unique 
narrative into the framework of Croatian memory, the memory of Vukovar was implanted or 
“downloaded” (see Milošević and Touquet 2018) from above and afar.  
 
The victim narratology that surrounds the myths of Vukovar relates to the centrality of the Catholic 
faith to contemporary Croatian politics, which will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 6. HDZ 
officials and far-right agents use memory as a tool to advance their conservative vision of the world, 
whether through the use of Catholicism as a tool of othering against Serbs and Bosniaks, among 
others, as a set of beliefs to resist progressive policies on abortion, sexual violence and LGBT+ 
rights, or, in the case of the Homeland War, as a language to frame the horrors of the war and give 
meaning to the deaths of civilians. By calling these casualties “martyrs,” that is, those persecuted 
for their convictions of faith, memory makers mythologise those who were killed; by calling them 
“martyrs for Croatia,” as in the case of the newly-constructed Church of the Croatian Martyrs in 
Udbina (Figure 5.9), memory makers appropriate religious symbolism to advance political 
agendas and a narrative of unique victimhood. In doing so, they brush over the real causes of these 
deaths and deflect criticism for actions by Croatian forces that lead to the deaths of Serb civilians 
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Figure 5.9: Church of the Croatian Martyrs, Udbina 
   
Left: Statue of Pope John Paul II before the Church of the Croatian Martyrs, Udbina, 6 August 2017. Middle: 
Memorial cross to “all Croatian martyrs,” Udbina, 29 August 2019. Right: Wall containing smaller memorial 
plaques, including one to “victims of communism,” Udbina, 29 August 2019. 
 
Vukovar as a martyred city, one sacrificed for the casue of Croatian independence, also 
complicates the remembrance of the dead, as commemorating the destruction of a city has come 
to supersede commemorating the thousands of civilian deaths, each loss as tragic as the collective 
destruction left in the wake of the siege. Even among the casualties remembered publicly, there is 
a hierarchy, beginning with the defenders, who even on the “Day of Remembrance of the Victims 
of Vukovar 1991” were mentioned in all public speeches before civilian victims, then Croat 
civilians and at the very lowest rung Serb victims of the Homeland War. The selective 
remembrance of the privileged few who fought and died for Croatia continues to exacerbate 
already strained relations between Croat and Serb populations within Croatia, most notably in 
places like Vukovar and Knin, where the recapture of territory from Republika Srpska Krajina 
forces signalled the symbolic completion of the millennial dream of a united Croatian state.  
 
This section has reviewed briefly the construction of the “martyrdom” narrative around Croatian 
civilian casualties of the Homeland War and how the power over the memory of victims is not 
exercised by victims themselves but rather by influential social actors at the national level. These 
are namely the Catholic Church, the Croatian Democratic Union and various defenders’ 
associations, who have similarly co-opted victim narratives for their own purpose. While the rather 
conciliatory tone of Škorčević’s sermon in Vukovar in 2017 marks some shift toward 
rapproachement between Croats and Serbs, his reaffirmation of the “sacrificial” nature of Vukovar 
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as a site of remembrance highlights the more central role of the Catholic Church in contemporary 
identity making over the potential roles that victims’ associations could play. This reflects more 
widely on the question of victims’ agency in post-conflict memory and identity construction, an 
issue that translates across borders in settings where the forcible creation of a national identity 
relies on the erasure or silencing of the darker side of victory. The next section discusses more 
thoroughly the ramifications of the discontinuity of a shared mnemonic community in spaces 
where Serbs and Croats once lived amicably, caused in part by Croatian nationalists’ resistance to 
rapprochement toward Croatian Serbs. My discussion of the anti-Cyrillic protests of 2013 in 
eastern Slavonia will demonstrate how this break in a once-shared community continues to 
threaten attempts to recognise mutual suffering in the aftermath of the Homeland War and 
Croatian independence.  
 
Threatening conflicting narratives: Anti-Serb sentiments in the aftermath of war 
As noted above, the national retelling of the Homeland War has come to subsume any local 
narrative that would have emerged in different circumstances, as the case of Vukovar has 
demonstrated and further instances of monuments to civilian victims discussed in this chapter will 
show. Particularly the continued multi-ethnic character of the city is glossed over in favour of 
nationalist visions of the “defence” of Vukovar, not its fall. The stories of Siniša Glavašević have 
entered the national canon as heroic retellings of the continual shelling by the enemy and not 
reflections of the once inter-ethnic way of life the city once enjoyed. While Serbs still make up a 
large segment of Vukovar’s population, their lives are lived parallel to and no longer intersecting 
with their Croat neighbours (Clark 2013, 1935; Schellenberg 2015, 20; Sokolić 2017). In this 
section, I discuss the identity of Serbs in Croatia today and how various elements of this identity is 
challenged or threatened by certain political and civil society actors. Having shown the absence of 
Serbs in memorial spaces, I briefly show the legal correlary of such absence by giving context to 
the rather marginal provision of rights to civilian victims of the Homeland War, drawing out the 
power state bodies exercise in memory-making processes. This in theory covers Croatian Serbs 
who fled their homes in the late stages of the conflict but in practice has done little to address social, 
political and economic (let alone mnemonic) divisions between Serbs and Croats since the final 
reintegration of Croatian territory in 1998. Serbs, I contend, cannot mourn their victims without 
fear of retribution despite the limited state support given to the Serb minority as outlined in the 
Erdut Agreement and recent victim-focused legislation. 
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Kardov wrote of the social divisions in these formerly shared spaces that have perpetuated into the 
twenty-first century, retelling stories from Vukovar residents who worry about revealing their 
identities in public, a place he describes as an “undesirable heterogeneity”:  
 
Whenever you meet someone, you ask yourself, ‘Who is he?’ What if he asks 
something, how to answer? Will he recognize that you are a Serb or a Croat? How 
to behave? (Nikola, a Serb from a mixed marriage) 
 
I’m afraid that someone could object to me about something, or that someone could 
say something, not necessarily directly to me, by which I could be offended. In such 
situations I have a feeling that everyone knows who I am [i.e., that everyone 
knows her [Nataša’s, another Serbian woman’s] nationality]. It is as if I’m marked 
[…] (Kardov 2007, 75-76). 
 
These views demonstrate the fear of retribution and widening the already massive social gap 
between Serbs and Croats (and Serb and Croat victims of the Homeland War more specifically) 
that have been perpetuated in the aftermath of violence. Kardov notes the similar example of a 
young boy who wished to join a football tournament but was rejected by the organiser as he was a 
Serb, and his presence would tarnish the memory of the fallen defenders in whose name the 
tournament was planned. Others worry about the mass migration of commemoration participants 
from elsewhere in Croatia to Vukovar each November who light candles in their front yards, 
turning a private space into a public cemetery (Kardov 2007, 77-81). These patterns witnessed 
in Vukovar – actively suppressing Serb participation in public life (as further evinced in the 2013 
anti-Cyrillic protests across eastern Slavonia, discussed below), replacing complicated local 
narratives with simpler, more conservative visions of the past and elevating fallen defenders over 
unwilling civilian victims – are visible across Croatia. Above all, the commemorations of Serb 
victims of the Homeland War (and, further, of the Second World War) have been ignored, 
disrupted and muted, either through intimidation by far-right groups and defender organisations, 
the destruction and desecration of monuments and graves and the public revision of Croatian 
history to reflect the narratives of power-exercising conservatives. Such erasure is part and parcel 
of what I term “memory abuse,” that is, these acts taken by state and non-state actors are 
undertaken with an intent to alter narratives that further social divisions and crystallise a 
destructive vision of the “Other,” without regard to individual agency and beliefs that may diverge 
from that singular vision. As a result, the gap between the cultural memories of Croatian Serbs and 
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Croats continues to grow and hardens identities that in the past were constructed through and 
resulted in violence; in this context, however, as I argued in Chapter 1, this muting of critical 
voices represents a less visible form of social violence that nonetheless harms social cohesion and 
polarises local communities. 
 
Of the 614 monuments I documented in Croatia, only one was dedicated specifically to Serb 
civilian victims of the Homeland War, nine elderly residents of the village of Varivode, near 
Šibenik and Krka National Park, who were killed by Croatian soldiers in an act of retribution in 
September 1995, soon after the conclusion of Operation Storm. Other monuments to Serbs 
civilian victims of the Homeland War do exist, as I discuss in the example of Uzdolje below, but 
the presence of such monuments is all but erased by the volume of Croat-centric memorial spaces. 
The stone memorial cross and plaque in Varivode, noted in Chapter 2, was actually the second 
monument installed in its current location, replacing a simpler, wooden, Orthodox cross 
destroyed in April 2010 by a Croatian defender (Blažević 2010). Varivode lies along a small 
country road branching from the D59, which links Knin from the southwest with the Adriatic 
motorway. Several houses along the road sit in decay, and only handful of local residents are to be 
seen wandering outside. The new monument to the victims of the 1995 massacre lies in the middle 
of a small intersection and is surrounded by a knee-high fence. Several plants, flowers, and a 
memorial candle had been placed recently at the base of the monument (Figure 5.10) and in the 
small niche above the inscriptions, in Latin and Cyrillic, along with a frame photo of one of the 
elderly victims. The existence of the monument and the lack of any desecration since its 
reinstallation represents a rare exception to ongoing patterns of removal or destruction of 
monuments dedicated either to Serbs or the shared Yugoslav past (see Figures 5.13, 6.10, 6.11 
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Figure 5.10: Monument to elderly Serb victims of the Varivode massacre 
 
Recently placed plants and a memorial candle at the monument in Varivode, 4 August 2017. 
 
The date of my visit was coincidentally timed around the commemoration of Operation Storm in 
Knin on 5 August, and elsewhere in the area, monuments to Croatian defenders and civilian 
victims were adorned similarly with candles, flowers and rosaries, so the presence of such items in 
Varivode was not unexpected. In the aftermath of Storm, rural Serbs feared retributive violence, 
as had occurred in Varivode on 28 September 1995. The Srpsko narodno vijeće/Serb National 
Council (SNV), the representative body for Serbs in Croatia founded in 1997 by various 
associations provided for through the Erdut Agreement, published in October 2018 a summary 
of various war crimes committed against Serbs during the Homeland War, including the Varivode 
massacre. The massacre was classified as a “collective execution,” with similar characteristics to 
further assaults in Mokro Polje, Gošić and Uzdolje, all small hamlets surrounding Knin and the 
rocky hinterlands toward Benkovac (SNV 2018, 4). The bodies of the nine civilians killed in 
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Varivode were taken to a mass grave in Knin and were not exhumed for identification and reburial 
until 2001. Legal proceedings against six Croatian defenders accused of the murders led to their 
eventual acquittal before a retrial was opened by the Croatian Supreme Court in January 2012, in 
which the Republic of Croatia was declared responsible for the crimes committed in Varivode. The 
civil lawsuit by the victims’ families against the Republic of Croatia ended with a payment of 
540,000 kuna (approximately €72,700 or £64,250 as of October 2019) to the children of 
Radivoj and Marija Berić, the ruling stating that the Republic of Croatia was responsible for “the 
principles of solidarity, equal bearing of the public burden and fair and prompt compensation” 
(SNV 2018, 76-77).  
 
The rights of civilian victims of the Homeland War, in comparison with those provided to Croatian 
defenders and their families, are relatively limited. While a law on defenders’ rights has existed in 
some form since the Homeland War and strengthened in 2017 following the eighteen-month 
protests in front of the Ministry of Croatian Veterans (discussed in Chapter 4), no comparable law 
on victims’ rights has been promulgated. The first regulations on the rights of returnees were 
issued in October 1995, one month before the signing of the Erdut Agreement which formally 
ended the Homeland War in Slavonia, enabling internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees 
a two-month window to apply for credit to repair or rebuild their properties, if necessary, or to 
seek temporary accommodation in liberated territory. These regulations also provided returnees 
the same rights as refugees and IDPs, namely financial, humanitarian, social, health and 
educational assistance, including tax relief to facilitate the return to their homes to rebuild their 
communities (Sabor 1995). This was amended in February 1996 to include a 50% 
reimbursement for hotel costs were alternative arrangements not possible, the money provided by 
the “King Zvonimir” republic fund (Sabor 1996a), and again that March to extend returnee 
deadlines in areas affected by operations Flash and Storm in various stages from May to December 
1996 (Sabor 1996b).  
 
While these laws did not directly address Serb victims of the Homeland War, they provided some 
space to allow for their return following the mass exodus of Serbs after Operation Storm in August 
1995. In 1997, however, a revised Decree on Returnee Rights made specific mention of Croat 
refugees who had fled the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as Serbia and 
Montenegro during the war, providing them the same rights as those who had fled or been 
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displaced within Croatia (Sabor 1997). The Erdut Agreement, a relatively brief document 
detailing the plan to gradually reintegrate Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium into the 
Republic of Croatia by 1998, provided more assurances for Serbs who had left the region toward 
the end of the war. These include, most notably, the provision for a Joint Council of Municipalities 
(Zajedničko vijeće općina/Заједничко веће општина – ZVO) in Eastern Slavonia, representing 
seven villages and towns that at the conclusion of the war in Croatia had retained a majority-Serb 
population. Officially founded in 1997, the Council’s responsibilities include the representation 
of Serb communities in the Osijek-Baranja and Vukovar-Sirmium counties and cooperation with 
the Croatian government and regional NGOs in the creation of policy affecting the lives of Serbs 
in Croatia. The ZVO continues to develop educational opportunities for young Serbs in these 
areas, promoting Serbian language, history and culture instruction for minority students in line 
with the national minority rights legislation. Among the rights guaranteed in Article 7 of the 
Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities are “the use of [minorities’] language and 
script, private and public, as well as official use,” “education in their language and script,” “access 
to the media and public information services […] in their language and script” and “self-
organisation and association in pursuance of their common interests” (Sabor 2002, 3). The 
Agreement also further secured the rights of return and property restitution for refugees and 
internally displaced persons – Serb and Croat alike – who had fled the area during the war, 
established a provisional police force and guaranteed international oversight of local elections. 
 
These legal guarantees, however, have been continuously challenged by both state and civil society 
actors through today, demonstrating widespread discrimination toward the Serb minority in 
Croatia beyond the confines of Slavonia (see Djurić 2010). Serb civic institutions have continued 
to develop despite these challenges and have grown in influence and acceptance amongst the 
political centre and left in Croatia; such institutions include the Joint Council of Municipalities, 
the Serb National Council (SNV) and the Serb Democratic Forum (SDF). The gradual silencing 
of Serb minority voices has resulted in part from actions taken by state and non-state actors against 
the community but also is a consequence of the relatively successful integration of Serbs in larger 
urban areas in Croatia, where they constitute a quite miniscule percentage of the population; while 
Serbs once constituted 15 percent of the Croatian population in the 1953 and 1961 Yugoslav 
censuses (peak population 626,789 in 1971), the 2011 census recorded a historic low of 
186,633 Serbs, 4.36 percent of the total population (DZS RH 2011b). The areas where Serbs 
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have retained their majority status are more rural, have smaller populations and have not yet 
attained development parity with other areas of Croatia (Vlada RH 2010, 1). In these areas, 
traditional elements of Serb identity are more explicitly pronounced. Škiljan (2014) claims 
Croatian Serbs’ traditional identity is founded primarily upon the use of the Cyrillic alphabet, 
Orthodox Christian faith and a celebration of the Serbs’ military traditions as soldiers in the former 
Habsburg “Military Frontier,” with which much of the RSK’s territory overlapped. The modern 
facets of Serb identity Škiljan identifies contrast heavily with the exclusionary nationalist lens many 
authors on Balkan affairs employ when discussing ethnic minorities in the region. He argues that 
throughout the twentieth century, Serbs have adopted a quasi-assimilated civic identity partly 
forced by historical expulsions from Croatia or conversions to Catholicism in the Second World 
War but to an extent driven by a sense of belonging to the state (2014, 124). 
 
The high degree of intermarriage between Yugoslavia’s constituent peoples in urban areas also 
limited the regeneration of a stronger sense of national identity amongst Croatia’s Serb 
population. This has contributed to a more widespread, multiethnic identity amongst urban Serbs, 
whom Škiljan describes as generally cooperative with the Croat majority; through the electoral 
system, Serbs also have a high degree of engagement in politics and civil society (Škiljan 2014, 
125-128). The perception of Serbs in Croatia by their Croat neighbours has nonetheless shifted 
dramatically since the Homeland War. Škiljan notes that, “because of the stigmatisation of Serbs, 
they [Serbs] hide their national affiliation, which is a consequence of the war in Croatia” (2014, 
125). Particularly traditional elements of Serb identity in Croatia have been attacked in recent 
years. Large scale demonstrations against the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in Vukovar, the site of 
the largest atrocity committed by the JNA and Serb paramilitaries during the war, erupted in 2013 
after bilingual signs had been installed following the 2011 census in accordance with the 
Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities. The Law mandates the installation of 
bilingual signs in locales with an ethnic minority population greater than one-third the total 
population; by 2011, the Serb population of Vukovar was 34.87 percent of the total (DZS 
2011c). Protests in Slavonia and Zagreb were accompanied by anti-Serb chanting and graffiti, 
including a common motto, “Vukovar a ne Вуковар,” “Vukovar and not [Cyrillic] Vukovar,” with 
the “u” of “Vukovar” marked with a cross, a nationalist symbol of the Ustaša of the Second World 
War. As I note particularly in Chapter 6, many monuments from the Yugoslav past written in 
Cyrillic have been defaced even years after these protests as a sign of indignation toward Serbs in 
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the spaces where they once lived, most visibly in Dalmatia. Public perceptions of Serbs in Croatia 
recorded in 2014 and 2015 reflect this resistance by Croats to the introduction of Cyrillic signs 
in Vukovar, with Sokolić noting various critical if not outright xenophobic remarks by Croat 
pensioners and veterans on the subject (Sokolić 2017, 808). The net result of this tolerance-with-
intimidation is a muted Serb minority, unable to claim reparations for suffering inflicted upon it by 
the Croatian state and its supporters during the Homeland War, with little recourse to help from 
the kin state, which also struggles with both its own crimes committed in Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo throughout the 1990s and its claim to victimhood in the 1999 NATO 
bombings of Milošević’s rump Yugoslavia. While civil society support for minorities exists across 
Croatia, threats to Serb life in Croatia remain. 
 
In 2019, several major incidents sparked a renewed discussion on Serbs and their place in 
Croatian society. On 24 April 2019, Ilija Glavić, a Croatian veteran suspected of war crimes 
committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1990s conflict, attacked Radoje Petković, vice 
president of the Serb National Minority Council of Kastav, a village in the vicinity of Rijeka, at a 
café in nearby Viskovo. Petković was beaten to unconsciousness by Glavić and ultimately died of 
his injuries on 10 June (Matković 2019). Throughout the summer, various attacks on Serbs in 
Croatia took place, primarily in Dalmatia, including one against water polo players from Red Star 
Belgrade in Split and another against seasonal workers on Brač, a popular tourist destination 
across the Brač Channel from Split. In August, a similar attack on Croatian Serbs gathered to watch 
a Red Star football match at a bar in Uzdolje, near Knin, by masked hooligans left five injured, 
followed shortly thereafter by another assault in the village of Đevrske. The events were decried as 
“unfortunately yet another attack on Serbs” and “another hate crime” by SNV President Boris 
Milošević (Milekić 2019). These attacks reinforce the view of Serbs as the ultimate “Other” among 
Croatian nationalists, who see the presence of Serbs in Croatia as a threat to the existence of the 
state. For these nationalists, the continued existence of Serbs in their state has delayed their 
idealised outcome of the Homeland War with the total removal of Serbs from the Republic’s 
territory. Framing Serbs as enemies perpetuates social – and in these instances physical – violence 
and transforms the opposition to all things Serb into a fundamental belief of such extreme 
nationalists. Violence serves here as the transformative force between the power over memory and 
the power for (Croatian) identity to endure in light of perceived threats against its own existence.  
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Shortly after the attacks in Split and Brač and the death of Radoje Petković, the SNV’s bilingual 
weekly newspaper Novosti/Нобости printed an unusually black-and-white cover with the 
provocative question “Who of you is a Serb?” (Figure 5.11), quoting the Brač hooligans as they 
passed by the seasonal workers from Vukovar and Varaždin whom they subsequently attacked. The 
by-line below reads, “The perennial anti-Serb campaign results in an escalation of physical 
violence,” recalling other instances of nationalist rhetoric since the end of the Homeland War that 
have exacerbated relations between Serbs and Croats in Croatia. The essay, written by Boris 
Dežulović, a renowned journalist and co-founder of the former satirical weekly magazine Feral 
Tribune, weaves a victim’s point of view of the attack with ongoing discussions of the politics of 
Serb identity in Croatia and questions of belonging to a minority group, continually repeating the 
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Figure 5.11: Novosti/Нобости cover page, 14 June 2019 
 
Source: Novosti (2019). “Who of you is a Serb?” 
 
That many of these attacks against Serbs appear to take place in Dalmatia is also of great 
importance to understanding the dynamics of memory, violence and identity, most crucially of the 
competitive nature of narratives of victimhood amongst Serbs and Croats in Croatia after both the 
Second World War and the Homeland War. Uzdolje, the site of the 21 August 2019 attack, is also 
the site of a counter-commemoration of Operation Storm, held annually on 6 August. The 
commemoration, organised by the SNV, serves as a memorial service for killed and missing victims 
of Storm, primarily Serb civilians. During the short ceremony (Figure 5.12), a small crowd of 
family members, elderly villagers and Orthodox clergy gather around a memorial plaque written in 
Cyrillic dedicated to eight villagers killed on 6 August 1995, the day after Storm’s conclusion, to 
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pray for the victims and lay flowers and memorial wreaths. The monument demands visitors to 
“forever remember!” the victims, its construction in 2017 funded by the Serb National Minority 
Council (VSNM) of the Biskupija municipality and the Organisation of Families against Forgetting 
(Jaramaz 2019).  
 
Figure 5.12: Scenes from Uzdolje commemoration of murdered Serb civilians, 6 August 2019  
 
  
Source: Jaramaz, D. (2019). 
 
Similar commemorative events take place on 5 August in Belgrade and in the Busije settlement 
outside the city centre built in response to the influx of Croatian Serb refugees throughout the 
Homeland War (Pantović 2016). These, however, are more often characterised by an 
ethnopolitical agenda of the ruling nationalist élites in Serbia. While many of the Croatian Serbs 
who fled in the aftermath of Operations Flash and Storm ultimately settled in Serbia, the Serbian 
government has done little to integrate Croatian Serbs, using them rather as pawns in the 
mnemopolitical arena; commemorations for the “Day of Remembrance of the Suffering and 
Persecution of Serbs” are held in Busije on 5 August, the same date as the Victory Day celebrations 
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in Knin (ibid.). Busije and its sister settlement Grmovac, both a short distance from Belgrade, were 
heavily underdeveloped until the last decade, as they were built as a response to the influx of 
Croatian Serb refugees, lacking most major infrastructure (water, electricity, paved roads, 
educational or medical facilities). Even in 2017, no post office, school or clinic had been built 
despite the presence of a relatively new Orthodox church (Vuković 2017). 
 
In Dalmatia, the prioritisation of rebuilding infrastructure after the Homeland War fell in some 
instances on ethnic boundaries, as the case of Islam Latinski and Islam Grčki, two villages near 
Zadar, highlights. The two Islams – Latinski referring to the “Latin” religious tradition of 
Catholicism and Grčki (“Greek”) referring to Orthodox Christianity – lie on a rural stretch of road 
near former war-time frontlines. Driving from Benkovac near the Dalmatian coast toward Zadar 
and the island of Pag, one passes through Smilčić and Donji Kašić before an abrupt change (or 
lack) of asphalt welcomes you to Islam Grčki. Prior to the Homeland War, Islam Grčki’s population 
was predominantly Serb; the village was destroyed in Operation Maslenica in January 1993 and 
has hardly been rebuilt, despite its proximity to the sea. Collapsed houses and churches lie on 
either side of the road, overgrown with vegetation. Less than two kilometres down the road, the 
pavement suddenly improves as one crosses into the municipal boundaries of Islam Latinski, a 
predominantly Croat village closer to the Maslenica Bridge and the Adriatic Road leading to Zadar 
(Figure 5.13). Most houses appear to have been recently reconstructed and repainted, with little 
to no signs of wartime damage, some advertising rooms for tourists heading toward the Adriatic. 
Keeping in mind the history of the two Islams, the fact that the Croatian state selectively rebuilt all 
but one of a string of villages along a 9-kilometre stretch of road does indicate a reluctance of the 
state to invest in areas with a Serb-majority population. Towns in eastern Slavonia with similar 
pasts, though hundreds of kilometres away, also have seen only slow developmental progress since 
the end of the war, with Serb Orthodox Churches such as the main church in Vukovar being 
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Figure 5.13: Islam Grčki, Islam Latinski 
   
Left: A ruined home in Islam Grčki, 7 August 2017. Right: A re-paved road with fully reconstructed homes in 
neighbouring Islam Latinski, 7 August 2017. 
 
All these issues – whether through outright acts of violence or more passive but intentional forms 
of neglect – contribute to the ongoing process of othering the Serbs in Croatia, a necessary 
component of my perspective of memory abuse. The decision to preclude Serbs from public spaces 
and commemorations forces them into a marginal position that leaves little room for the voices of 
civilian victims to be heard. Again, these narratives counter the prevailing vision of the Croatian 
state as one fought for through the sacrifice of the defenders and the martyrdom of Croat(ian) 
civilians. This discussion nevertheless does not absolve other Serbs of crimes that had been 
committed in line with the vision of a Greater Serbia or defending “Serb soil” or any other form of 
violence that was enacted upon the civilian population by Serb paramilitaries and JNA forces 
during the Homeland War. Rather, it brings into question the ways of managing conflicting 
victimhood narratives to dissuade nationalist interpretations of such violence while ensuring 
justice for war victims and their families through the individualisation of guilt. In the next section, 
I discuss how this problem of memorialising past atroticities against civilians was addressed in the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and how this past is or is not remembered in the Republic 
of Croatia today. In doing so, I intend to demonstrate a seeming lack of concern for civilian victims 
of the Homeland War on the part of the current Croatian state, marking yet another mnemonic 
turn away from the Yugoslav past. I present monuments built in the aftermath of the Second World 
War by Yugoslav authorities and modern memorials to the Homeland War, including two 
museums in Zagreb, to draw out overlaps and contrasts between communist and post-communist 
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narratives of conflict and victimhood. 
 
Sharing victimhood? Yugoslav memory politics and the modern Croatian response 
Yugoslav memory politics differed in their approach to integrating ethnic concerns over 
competing claims to victimhood by attempting to suppress nationalism as a viable political 
alternative in the first place. The early Bleiburg repatriations and subsequent murder of thousands 
of Ustaša prisoners and their families by Yugoslav Partisans in 1946 were followed by subtler and 
less violent repressions of nationalist outbursts in the later history of the country, while the project 
of creating a supranational “Yugoslav” identity continued. While the contexts of Bleiburg and 
later phases of Yugoslav history may differ, the resistance to nationalism stemmed from the 
experience of a long and bloody war fought along ethnic lines and premised in part on the 
genocidal ideology of Ante Pavelić and the NDH. The reactions of Belgrade élites to historical 
events like the Croatian Spring/MASPOK movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s, namely 
the imprisonment and isolation of those calling for greater autonomy of their respective republics, 
highlighted a disdain for “chauvinistic” political beliefs, which were viewed as a threat against 
Croatian Serbs (Batović 2009). 
 
Monuments to fallen soldiers and civilian victims of the Second World War, framed in Yugoslavia 
as the “Narodnooslobodliačka borba”/“National/People’s Liberation Struggle” (NOB)19, often 
avoid explicit mentions of the various constituent peoples in the post-war republic, instead using 
vague allusions to the collective narod/people or nation, or by referring to “Croatian (or Serbian, 
Bosnian, etc.) people” as “people of Croatia.” The modern Croatian interpretation of civilian 
victims as martyrs who chose to die for the country departs, too, from the Yugoslav framing of non-
combatant casualties as the “victims of fascism” or of “fascist terror.” In many monuments built 
under Yugoslav rule commemorating those who died in the Second World War, individual names 
are written, identifying the town’s or region’s fallen either as borci/“fighters” or žrtve fašističkog 
terora/“victims of fascist terror,” demonstrating the shared suffering of both groups (Figure 
5.14). In some monuments, these lists are separated, with often longer columns of fallen fighters 
and shorter lists of civilian victims, whereas in others the names are compiled alphabetically, with 
no distinction made between combatant and non-combatant. 
                                                
19 As noted in Chapter 2, narod refers both to “nation” and “people,” hence varied translations of 
the Yugoslav name of the Second World War. 
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Figure 5.14: Yugoslav monuments to war dead, listing “fighters” and “victims of fascist terror”: 
Trepča, Šibenik 
   
Left: Monument to Yugoslav war dead, showing an attack by firearms, Trepča, 29 August 2019. Right: An 
unblemished monument to fallen fighters and victims of fascist terror, Šibenik, 4 August 2017. 
 
Socialist realist monuments dating from the first two decades after the Second World War depict 
fallen soldiers and civilians dramatically, highlighting the anguish and physical stress of war that is 
not visible on Croatian monuments to fallen defenders from the Homeland War. While 
monuments became increasingly abstract as time passed, and particularly as the size of memorial 
sites enlarged, some retained images of Partisan fighters and Yugoslav civilians struggling 
together for “brotherhood and unity,” such as the monument to the National Liberation Struggle 
in Gračac shown below (Figure 5.15). As in later examples of monuments to civilian victims of the 
Homeland War, while these victims did not choose their deaths, these deaths were imbued with a 
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Figure 5.15: Yugoslav monuments of the Second World War with depictions of people 
(individual and collective): Pazin, Pakrac, Gračac 
   
 
Top left: “Death to fascism, freedom to the people!” engraved on realist monument, Pazin, 5 May 2019. Top right: 
Vanja Radauš’s “Wounded Fighter” sculpture, Pakrac, 22 August 2017. Bottom: Detail of relief on monument to 
National Liberation Struggle, Gračac, 31 August 2019. 
 
Monuments constructed in the latter half of socialist Yugoslav history represented an architectural 
turn away from realism to more abstract forms of modernism, as demonstrated by the large 
spomenici (monuments) across Yugoslavia built from the 1960s onwards. The monument in 
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Gračac above represents a hybrid of these, casting more abstract images of the Partisans while 
retaining the older stone and metal building blocks that had come to be replaced by concrete. Many 
of these monuments were dedicated, as had been older sites, to both the borci/fighters and the 
žrtve fašističkog terora/victims of fascist terror, some on sites of former hospitals, battlefields or 
other strategic locations from the Second World War. One of the largest memorial sites to civilian 
victims of the war is the Dotrščina Memorial Park on the outskirts of Zagreb, a massive forest park 
with trails leading over hills and through a winding valley marked with various monuments 
throughout. The site, first dedicated in 1968, marks the execution and burial sites of thousands of 
civilians killed by Nazi and Ustaša forces throughout the Second World War, with the Dolina 
grobova/Valley of the Graves featuring small blocks and shiny diamond-like structures that mark 
where the victims had fallen. The park features large, heavily abstract sculptures (Figure 5.16) 
along the “Path to Martyrdom,” including the “Monument to Those Who Died on the Streets of 
their City,” the “Monument to the Revolutionaries and Patriots Fallen in Zagreb,” the 
aforementioned “Valley of the Graves,” and the “Monument to the People of Zagreb Killed in the 
National Liberation Struggle 1941-1945” (see Niebyl 2017a). The individual forms of the all but 
the last of these monuments take on unusual shapes of smoothly polished, crystalline-shaped metal 
blocks, with the “Monument to Those Who Died on the Streets of their City” also taking on 
imagery of prison bars and thick, twisted wire. Vojin Bakić, architect and sculptor of many of these 
and other Yugoslav memorial structures, claimed the nature of such abstraction in the form of the 
metal crystal “represents for us the same thing as the victims that were executed [in Dotrščina]: 
purity and permanent, eternal light” (Bakić 2007, quoted in Martinović 2013). The final 
monument to the “People of Zagreb Killed in the National Liberation Struggle 1941-1945,” in 
contrast, features a long metal relief on a curved stone frame, depicting various scenes from the 
occupation of Zagreb in more understandable yet still abstract fashion through the use of human 
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Figure 5.16: Dotrščina Memorial Park, Zagreb 
  
  
Top left: Monument at entrance to Dotrščina Memorial Park, Zagreb, 21 March 2018. Top middle: “Monument to 
Those Who Died on the Streets of their City,” Zagreb, 13 October 2018. Top right: “Monument to the 
Revolutionaries and Patriots Fallen in Zagreb,” Zagreb, 13 October 2018. Bottom left: “Valley of the Graves” 
crystal monument, Zagreb, 13 October 2018. Bottom right: Sample from relief of “Monument to the People of 
Zagreb Killed in the National Liberation Struggle 1941-1945,” Zagreb, 13 October 2018. 
 
Among the 614 memorials I documented, however, in both the Yugoslav and Croatian monuments 
on, respectively, the Second World War and the Homeland War, those dedicated only to civilian 
victims were outnumbered four times over by monuments exclusively to fighters or defenders; 
otherwise, as many of the Yugoslav monuments depicted here show, the language of victim 
narratives has been adopted in monuments to both combatants and non-combatants. The largest 
difference between these trends in the past (Yugoslavia) and present (Croatia), however, lies in the 
naming of individual civilian victims in a larger number of Yugoslav monuments than Croatian, an 
element only noted in monuments to Croatian Serb victims as in Varivode and Uzdolje or at 
memorial sites dedicated to the victims of the 1991 Vukovar massacre.  
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Public national commemorations of Yugoslav memorial days effectively ceased with the 
establishment of the Republic of Croatia, particularly after the end of the Homeland War, with 
Yugoslav holidays like Dan republike/Republic Day (29 November), Dan narodne ustanke 
Hrvatske/Day of the Uprising of the People of Croatia (27 July) and Dan mladosti/Youth Day 
(25 May – Tito’s birthday) removed entirely from the Croatian commemorative calendar. In their 
place, holidays like 5 August as the Day of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving and the Day of 
Croatian Defenders, recalling the success of Operation Storm, were established; the Day of 
Remembrance of the Victims of Vukovar (18 November), to this date not an official public holiday, 
has been proposed by the current HDZ government to be made a national holiday in 2020, 
officially as the “Day of Remembrance of the Victims of the Homeland War and the Day of 
Remembrance of the Victims of Vukovar and Škabrnja” (Lozančić 2019)20. Zerubavel notes,  
 
By carving socially marked events out of essentially unmarked stretches of history, 
ritual commemoration helps articulate what groups collectively consider eventful. 
[…] Perhaps the most spectacular site of collective memory in this regard is the 
calendar. As a cycle of holidays specifically designed to commemorate socially 
marked events, the calendar year often encapsulates the conventional master 
narratives [emphasis own] constructed by mnemonic communities from their 
history (E. Zerubavel 2003, 317-317). 
 
In the Croatian context, this means that the creation of new public holidays solidifies their 
importance in the master commemorative narrative of the Croatian state, or in the very least of the 
Croatian government. Similarly, the removal of older holidays, particularly the Day of the Uprising 
of the People of Croatia, one on which many Yugoslav monuments to the Second World War were 
dedicated, signals a clear rejection of the narratives of the Other (here, of a socialist regime at odds 
with Croatian nationalism). The repurposing of the anti-fascist narrative in Croatia as an anti-
totalitarian one, as discussed below, is also reflected in the current government’s plan to adopt 9 
May as the “Day of Europe and the Day of Victory over Fascism” as a public holiday and 23 August 
                                                
20 The Škabrnja massacre occurred at the same time as the fall of Vukovar to JNA forces and Serb 
paramilitaries and resulted in the deaths of 67 Croatian civilians and prisoners of war at the hands 
of the SAO Krajina Territorial Defence and the JNA. Some bodies were later found in a mass grave, 
and the event is marked by several monuments in the village, including a “cracked bird” monument 
by Slavomir Drinković. 
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as a memorial day of lesser status, namely the “European Day of Remembrance of the Victims of 
Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes – Nazism, Fascism and Communism” (Lozančić 2019).  
 
Thus far, I have addressed in this chapter how memory, power, violence and identity intersect in 
the creation or denial of post-war narratives of victimhood, which in some instances has led to the 
widening of social divides forged through violent means in both the Second World War and the 
Homeland War. By comparing the construction of monuments and other memorial spaces to 
Croatian defenders and victims of the wars of the 1940s and 1990s, I demonstrated how visual 
manifestations of memory can be adapted to suit particular rhetorics, with some representing a 
potential “abuse” of memory as a tool for further violence. As the next section will show, the 
celebration of particular historical events can invite accusations of revisionism and a deflection of 
responsibility toward one set of victims by recasting those who committed the atrocities as those 
who truly suffered.  
 
“Totalitarianism” and revisionism: Bleiburg and the victims of communism 
Among the most controversial turns in Croatian memory politics away from the Yugoslav past 
recalls the fate of the victims of the Bleiburg repatriations of May 1945, when British armed forces 
handed over captured NDH soldiers, Ustaša fighters and many other combatant groups and 
civilians aligned with the Axis powers during the Second World War to the Yugoslav Partisan 
forces near the village of Bleiburg, Austria. What followed was the imprisonment and execution of 
tens of thousands of former combatants and civilians along with numerous deaths by disease and 
mistreatment on the march from Carinthia back over the Yugoslav border, with many mass graves 
unearthed in the 1990s in Slovenia. Many of those who died were ethnic Croats, the memory of 
their loss akin to a Croatian “Alamo” for the diaspora who felt forced from or unwelcome in their 
homeland (Hockenos 2003, 47-48). Discussion of these crimes committed by the Yugoslav state 
was made taboo throughout its rule and commemorations of the victims banned; it was in these 
instances where diasporic communities in Australia and the Americas filled in a form of memory 
gap by holding annual events to remember their dead as victims of communism, deflecting 
attention from their fascist beliefs (see Starčević 2019). 
 
Since independence, however, the Bleiburg repatriations have been commemorated annually at a 
mass gathering of descendants of the victims, Croatian nationalists and Croat diasporic groups. 
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The Communist suppression of open discussions of Bleiburg and other atrocities committed by 
Partisans during the Second World War created room for a mythology of the fate of the Ustaše 
fighters to emerge in what was otherwise an information vacuum (Đerić 2009). As had Tuđman 
and other political figures throughout the Yugoslav period, so too did Yugoslav state authorities 
inflate victim counts in Jasenovac and elsewhere under NDH rule and deflate them in cases of 
Partisan crimes to advance its own myths of the war (Karge 2009, 55). This clash of memory also 
provided leverage for the Croatian Catholic Church, more influential in diasporic communities 
than in Croatia itself, to contribute to the nationalist narrative of Bleiburg, as discussed above 
framing the fallen as “martyrs.” Kolstø notes, “Their death was expiatory: they died for the 
Croatian cause, so that the Croatian nation could live. Bleiburg is the Croatian Calvary, but, as all 
Catholics know, after Good Friday comes Easter Sunday. After half a century in the Yugoslav 
grave, Croatia has now finally reached Resurrection: the resurrection of the Croatian state” 
(Kolstø 2010, 1154-1155). Accordingly, the Bleiburg massacres are known in Croatian 
mnemopolitics as the križni put/the “Way of the Cross,” and is called such in memorials to that 
event. While several monuments have been installed in Austria, which were not in the purview of 
this research, the primary monument to the Bleiburg victims in Croatia is located in a central space 
at the Mirogoj cemetery in Zagreb, dedicated on 20 June 1994 (Figure 5.17). The monument, a 
large metal relief framed in stone, depicts depressed soldiers and civilians, some wearing caps with 
the Ustaša “U,” with the farthest soldier on the right kneeling and his arms crossed in prayer. Atop 
the stone frame is a Croatian šahovnica shield, and though a monotonous metal, the top left square 
appears to be white, a symbol of nationalism rather than the state. Below the relief to the left stands 
a memorial cross interwoven with the pleter/wattle rope, another symbol of Croatia. The memorial 
text reads, “To the Croatian victims in Bleiburg and on the Way of the Cross 1945,” below, “To 
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Figure 5.17: Memorial to the victims of the Bleiburg repatriations, Mirogoj cemetery, Zagreb 
 
 
Next to the memorial stands a large sculpture to the fallen Croatian soldiers of the First World 
War, again borrowing religious themes of the Pietà, with a mother holding her fallen son; 
interestingly, this monument is in direct line of sight from the grave of Franjo Tuđman at the 
cemetery’s entrance. Commemorative events held around the Bleiburg anniversary in recent years 
have been well documented (see Kolstø 2010; Pauković 2019; Pavlaković 2010), and those held 
in Austria have invited much controversy over the presence of fascist symbols and slogans on the 
banners and clothing of the participants (A. Vladislavljević 2019). The presence of Croatian state 
officials at these events has also received criticism from Jewish (BIRN 2008) and anti-fascist 
community leaders, who lambast “a particularly pathetic and perfidious attempt of equating 
fascism with communism” on the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and 
Nazism (Antifašistički vjesnik 2019). By framing those responsible for mass murder of Jews, Serbs 
and Roma, among others, as “martyrs,” this narratology erases and ultimately denies the suffering 
of those who were the focus of the NDH’s genocidal regime and constitutes an abject abuse of 
cultural memory by twisting a dark past into material for a better future at an unspoken human cost. 
This erasure begets social tensions like those witnessed during the demise of Yugoslavia, and its 
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continuation well into the twenty-first century has yet to be satisfactorily addressed and rectified 
by acknowledging the cost of the narrative of Croatian independence.  
 
Similar patterns of reframing memory of combatants have emerged in the contemporary Croatian 
commemorative process through the elevation of the defender narrative to a near mythological 
victor-victim status. A result of this is the acceptance and promotion of symbols adopted in the 
course of the Homeland War that recall imagery and slogans from the NDH. These include the 
“Za dom spremni” chant, and the white-and-red chequerboard featuring a white square in the top-
left. Both symbols featured predominantly on the insignia of the Croatian Defence Forces (HOS), 
a right-wing paramilitary that operated from 1991 to 1992 before merging in to the fledgling 
Croatian Army, and can be seen at the two largest annual commemorations of the Homeland War 
in Knin and Vukovar. In 2016, a memorial plaque featuring the HOS insignia was installed near a 
kindergarten in the town of Jasenovac, the site of the NDH’s most notorious concentration camp, 
sparking immediate controversy among the Serb and Jewish communities (Milekić 2016c). 
Though ultimately removed to the neighbouring city of Novska, the installation of the plaque and 
other instances where the “Za dom spremni” chant has been used, namely in football matches (see 
Brentin 2016) and at the 2015 Knin commemoration of Operation Storm, set off a debate on the 
persistence of fascist symbols in Croatia. This phenomenon has been described as “tolerance of 
otherwise unconstitutional practices” by constitutional lawyer Sanja Barić (HINA 2018b), a 
conclusion reached by the government’s “Council for Dealing with Consequences of the Rule of 
Non-Democratic Regimes,” established in response to the controversial plaque at Jasenovac. The 
Council’s work ended in February 2018, releasing a 29-page report on the constitutional limits 
(bans or tolerances) of various symbols of the Yugoslav monarchy, NDH and SFRJ (Kusić 2018). 
To date, no declaration has been made in the European Parliament or other major EU bodies that 
challenge the ongoing backsliding of memory politics in Croatia through such acts of historical 
revisionism. I discuss the impact of the European Union in causing shifts or motivating resistance 
to change in the Croatian memory landscape in greater detail in Chapter 6. 
 
By ignoring the ideals of the European project, Croatia and its “memory entrepreneurs” (see Jelin 
2003) – politicians like Zlatko Hasanbegović, long-time Zagreb mayor Milan Bandić or Franjo 
Tuđman – have been free to “hijack,” in the words of Jelena Subotić (2009), the process of coming 
to terms with its tumultuous past, whether in the judicial or legislative processes or in their roles 
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in developing the visual culture of remembrance in post-war Croatia (see Pavlaković 2008c; 
2010). Thus, a performative duality emerges in which memory is made palatable for international 
display but ultimately satisfying the demands of the local electorate, and more importantly 
nationalist political élites, in ways that remain hidden from the international community, as the 
troubled balancing act of the commemoration(s) of the atrocities at Jasenovac described in Chapter 
2 and the remembrance politics around the Homeland War has shown. While these actions do not 
strictly represent “memory abuse” in the terms I have set out throughout this thesis, they do 
nonetheless demonstrate the risks of exploiting memory’s malleable properties that give an 
advantage to those with relatively greater power over memory to shape it as they see fit and not to 
suit wider social ambitions for peace or reconciliation. Cultural memory, as Jan Assmann argues 
(2011, 41), is carried by “specialised tradition bearers,” in this case, the Croatian state and its 
national and local representatives with the ability to influence how memory is articulated in public 
spaces.  
 
Similarly, associations of Croatian defenders and their supporters present themselves those most 
able to exercise power in the formation of Croatia’s cultural memory of the recent past. The 
identity of the “defenders” is premised on their unique role in defending and liberating Croatia 
from “Greater Serbian aggression,” to which their newly independent country had fallen victim. 
By categorising Serbs, collectively, as the “Other” and the breakaway Republika Srpska Krajina as 
a criminal organisation, this constituent element of the post-war Croatian narrative frames Serbs, 
who had lived in Croatia for hundreds of years, not as neighbours but as enemy combatants who 
deserved their fate. Any civilian casualties were framed in a way to deflect blame onto the victims, 
and accusations of war crimes committed by Croatian forces were brushed aside until external 
pressure from the European Union in Croatia’s accession negotiations forced the state reluctantly 
to hand over those indicted by the ICTY and to pursue domestic prosecutions of war crimes. 
Instead, the description of both civilians and fallen soldiers as “victims of Greater Serbian 
aggression” prevents the further development of distinct, civilian-centric narratives of victimhood 
and their presentation to the public in the form of monuments, museums or other memorial spaces. 
Advancing the narrative of victimhood – and at that, an exclusive one – problematises any approach 
to reconcile competing narratives of the defenders, civilian victims, Serbs and other participants 
in the Homeland War and the related wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. One of 
Tuđman’s largest memory projects upon his election as Croatia’s first president involved the 
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“reconciliation” of the families of fascist and communist fighters for the sake of the Croatian 
nation. This would involve a forced cultural amnesia of the mass atrocities of the Second World 
War to secure the groundwork for an independent Croatian state defined rather by an ethnic 
boundary than a political one, something to achieve without the violence of the past (Hockenos 
2003, 46). Such an imagination of a homogenous Croatian state necessarily precluded Serbs from 
the framework of “national unity,” as their status in the new state was downgraded from that of a 
“constituent people” of Yugoslavia to a “national minority” in the Republic of Croatia. Serbs saw 
the rise of the HDZ as a potential risk to their personal safety, as the last “independent” Croatian 
state had shown. Serb media, much of which was disseminated from state-controlled outlets in 
Slobodan Milošević’s rump Yugoslavia, began amplifying the narrative of Serb victimhood in 
genocidal acts committed by Croats during the Second World War. This was echoed in Croatia by 
state broadcasters presenting stories of the desire for an independent Croatia, the martyrdom of 
Bleiburg and the importance of the HDZ in securing a state free of such violence, while advancing 
the numbers game around Second World War victim counts at places like Jasenovac, as discussed 
in Chapter 2. The capture of the media environment under the umbrella of HDZ narratology was 
almost total, with institutions like Hrvatska radiotelevizija (HRT), the Croatian cultural institute 
Matica hrvatska, and the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts (HAZU) toeing the HDZ party 
line throughout Tuđman’s rule in the 1990s (Macdonald 2002, 101-102).  
 
During the Homeland War, art came to reflect social and political messages in support of or against 
violence, presenting another form of mediated elements of cultural memory. One of the most 
popular pieces to emerge during the conflict was Boris Ljubičić’s 1991 “KRVATSKA!” poster, a 
portmanteau of the Croatian words krv/blood and Hrvatska/Croatia, the word splattered with 
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Figure 5.18: KRVATSKA!, Boris Ljubičić, 1991 
 
Source: MDC (2019). 
 
The poster has been displayed in many exhibits on the Homeland War, most notably at the 
Operation Storm memorial centre at the Knin Fortress, the Zagreb City Museum and the Siege of 
Dubrovnik exhibit at the Fortress Imperijal. The question that first arises in my mind when I see 
the poster is always, “Whose blood is this?” The answer depends on the setting – if in a museum 
to military actions like Storm and Flash, then the intent is to show that is it the blood of the Croatian 
defenders. In victim-centred memorial spaces, then it is the blood of innocent civilians caught up 
in the war, perhaps even Serbs, but then the secondary questions of whom amongst those victims 
is and deserves to be remembered remains unanswered.  
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In Croatia, conflicting narratives of victimhood – Serb or Croat, soldier or civilian, murdered or 
martyred – lead to mnemonic competitions over who has the right to be remembered in the first 
place. Nielsen defines “competitive victimhood [author’s emphasis] as a process in which the in-
group is not only focused exclusively on its own real and alleged suffering, but also aspires to 
demonstrate and assert that this suffering is greater than that of other groups. The in-group will 
hence tend to deny, question, or belittle the suffering of other groups” (Nielsen 2018, 177). This 
competition for supreme victimhood, to put it one way, highlights the necessity of examining 
cultural memory as a tool for political gain and shows us again why the particular case of the clash 
of Serb(ian) and Croat(ian) narratives is relevant. Roediger et al. describe how the repetitive 
retrieval or performance of particular memories strengthens their hold in the collective, here 
cultural, sphere (Roediger et al. 2009, 148). Nielsen warns, however,  
 
society does not tolerate ‘eternal victims,’ particularly if these are seen to be 
exploiting their status as victims for personal, political, or economic gain. Nor does 
society generally tolerate victims’ claims to exclusivity at the expense of other 
victims […] though most people would recognize that victims of violent crimes have 
suffered more than those of nonviolent crimes. In this sense, it is useful to contrast 
the acceptable but limited roles of victimhood with the open-ended and rather 
unlimited space afforded to collective victimhood in the former Yugoslavia 
(Nielsen 2018, 180).  
 
The lack of toleration toward narratives of perpetual victimhood is nonetheless a normative 
expectation established in societies external to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia during the 
twentieth century, yet the deviation from this norm as it has manifested in Croatia, Serbia and 
elsewhere has proven non-reconciliatory if not outright destructive. Similar examples can be found 
in the Palestinian-Israeli and Pakistani-Indian conflicts, which would merit wider comparative 
work on narrative construction in the Middle East, South Asia and the former Yugoslavia (see i.e. 
Górska 2016; J. Greenberg 2005). Croatian nationalists’ insistence on a supreme sense of 
victimhood advances the process of othering that has contributed to violence in the past and 
present. The denial of Serbs’ suffering and the rejection of the Yugoslav narrative of a common 
cause and shared trauma in favour of a nationalist interpretation of the Bleiburg victims as Croatian 
martyrs erases the political and social contexts of the groups, veiling their fascist beliefs as a minor 
aberration in the goal of creating a united, independent Croatian state. This othering, as achieved 
through the neglect or physical destruction of monuments to Croatian Serbs and Yugoslav 
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Partisans, which I demonstrate more clearly in Chapter 6, prevents the creation of a common, 
reconciliatory narrative of southeast European history from the early twentieth century to the 
present day. Instead, these processes exacerbate social frictions that emerged from conflict that 
otherwise may have been ameliorated through appropriate measures to address national 
grievances rather than simply silencing them, as had been the approach of the Yugoslav authorities 
in the aftermath of the Second World War. Nielsen states, “Together with the first decade of 
intensive Stalinist rule and oppression in Yugoslavia, these massacres came to constitute a kind of 
original sin,” crimes untouchable by critics and opponents of the Communist regime (Nielsen 
2018, 182-183). The Republic of Croatia in its early years received considerable support from 
diaspora communities, including those in Germany, Canada, the United States and Argentina, 
where the memory of the NDH lived on mostly intact, despite some clashes with earlier émigrés 
(Winland 2002, 698-702). Fascist collaborators sought asylum during the Cold War as “victims 
of communist terror,” repurposing the Yugoslav terminology of “victims of fascist terror” to suit 
their needs. This narrative, which can also be seen in other post-communist European states like 
Poland (see Bucholc 2019) and Hungary (see Rév 2018), has since been elevated in post-
independence Croatia, where the European model of remembering victims of totalitarian regimes 
has been adapted to force an untrue equivalence between the rule Ante Pavelić and the NDH and 
Tito’s socialist Yugoslavia. Such an approach represents yet another attempt to reframe a fascist 
past as anti-communist, making the state’s dark history more palatable for an international 
audience unfamiliar with the crimes committed by ultranationalists in the name of their imagined 
nation.  
 
While uncritical narratives of the past demonstrate an unwillingness to accept nuanced and 
challenging conceptions of the nation as both victim and victor, with all duties, responsibilities and 
privileges such titles would impose, especially toward the vanquished, some memorial spaces in 
Croatia are now pushing the boundaries of what victimhood looks like in the Croatian cultural 
memory sphere. In the following section, I discuss the work of two Zagreb museum, the Image of 
War Photography Museum, an independently funded initiative to visualise the human cost of 
violence, and the Memorial Centre to the Rocket Attacks on Zagreb 1991/1995, which takes a 
middle approach between nationalist narratives of the Homeland War and a more victim-centric 
view on the conflict. In examining these two cases, I provide room for comparison between 
established and alternative narratives of the Homeland War demonstrated concretely in the shape 
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of interactive museum spaces. The next section thus returns to my core research questions on the 
process of social differentiation – in the former case of the Image of War Photography Museum by 
blurring the distinction between Serb and Croat victims and in the latter, the Memorial Centre to 
the Rocket Attacks on Zagreb, by strengthening the image of the “Other” – and how the 
interrelations most closely between violence and memory manifest in the visual culture of 
remembrance in Croatia. 
 
Complicating images of victimhood: The tale of two Zagreb museums 
Of the many memorial institutions that deal with Croatia’s recent past, the Image of War 
Photography Museum in Zagreb, dedicated in 2018, is the most striking in its deviation from 
standard narratives of national, collective victimhood. The Museum, itself a result of a massive 
crowdsourced funding campaign, is located on the ground floor and in the basement of a relatively 
nondescript house on Hebrangova ulica, a major east-west artery in the heart of Zagreb. The 
inaugural (and current) exhibition, “izbliza i osobna: rat u hrvatskoj”/“up close and personal: war 
in croatia,” features many of the well-known images of the Homeland War, including those by Pavo 
Urban, the photographer who died while capturing the bombardment of Dubrovnik in December 
1991 (see Figure 2.6), Ron Haviv’s photograph of the forced expulsion of Croat residents of 
Vukovar (see Figure 5.1 above), and Mišo Lišanin’s image of a woman lying dead on the corner of 
Vlaška ulica and Šoštarićeva ulica in Zagreb, a casualty of the May 1995 rocket attacks on the city 
launched by Serb forces in retaliation for Operation Flash (not depicted here for its highly graphic 
content). Unlike exhibitions like those to Operation Storm in Knin, Dubrovnik and Karlovac, 
however, the photographs included at the Image of War Museum show the human cost of war and 
the universality of suffering. Some photos by an array of Croatian, Serbian and international 
photographers depict bleeding, wounded or dead civilians and soldiers, bridging narrative divides 
otherwise enforced in such memorial spaces. A graphic depiction of Lipizzaner horses, blown up 
in bombing raids in western Slavonia is followed in the exhibition book by a series of photos of 
basement windows lined with sand bags in case of mortar attacks on Zagreb. Other images show 
the burial of a soldier, a corpse with wire wrapped around its left wrist, nuns loading a car with 
firewood and a bus full of prisoners-of-war to be exchanged over boundary lines. Each image 
contributes to a wider visual imagination of the physical and emotional damage of war that less 
interactive spaces, like a monument or a piece of street art, can show. Accordingly, the museum’s 
goal is “to have an informed dialogue with visitors and educate them about the devastating 
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consequences of war and the imperative of peace for everyone” (Image of War 2019).  
 
The layout of the museum takes the visitor through a relatively straightforward chronology of the 
Homeland War and includes some images taken during the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The 
visit starts with the Log Revolution of August 1990 and follows through Croatia’s independence 
referendum of 19 May 1991 and the gradual outbreak of violence through that period, erupting 
in the cataclysmic scenes of the JNA sieges of Dubrovnik and Vukovar. Other crimes committed 
by Serb forces during the war are depicted on the edge of the first room, and as visitors pass the 
threshold toward the entry hallway, they see a large wall noting the dates of major events during 
the Homeland War in relation to other world news. A spiral staircase invites visitors to interact 
with wooden cards hung on pegs, each retelling personal stories of the war, from children, civilians 
and soldiers alike. Two smaller adjacent spaces feature videos, one a short documentary on the 
creation of the museum, featuring interviews from the curator and various photographers, the 
other a silent reel of quotes from first-hand accounts of the war. Before climbing back up the 
staircase, visitors may fill out five different cards, asking the following questions:  
 
- Is a future without war achievable? What would need to happen for this to occur? 
- What was the last war you learned about that truly shook you? 
- Which photo had the most profound impact on the way you view war, and why?  
- How has this museum affected the way you think about war? 
- Do you have your own war-related story? If so, share it with us. 
 
These cards serve in lieu of larger guestbooks that might invite more public displays of 
controversial thoughts; in both of the guestbooks at Operation Storm exhibitions in Knin and 
Dubrovnik, I saw a large number of nationalist remarks followed by “ZDS,” “Za dom spremni!” 
or the Ustaša’s crossed “U,” demonstrating a particular lack of restraint in commemorating the 
fascist past. Rather than archiving these cards for future exhibitions, the Museum anonymises, 
types and shares curated (and potentially edited) notes on the visitor cards on its social media 
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Figure 5.19: Visitor responses to question prompts on war and photography, Image of War 
Museum 
  
Source: Image of War Photography Museum (2019). 
 
The Image of War museum succeeds in breaking past a victim-perpetrator dichotomy and shows 
instead human stories of violence, its origins, consequences and afterlife. It provides an alternative 
vision of suffering as one beyond the scope of othering practices that perpetuate social divisions 
across generations, as has been demonstrated in the former Yugoslavia. In contrast, the Memorial 
Centre of the Rocket Attacks on Zagreb 1991/1995, opened in 2013, retains a more nationalist 
interpretation of Croatian victimhood while still giving some voice to the civilian victims of the 
attacks. The exhibition, located in a converted apartment overlooking Bogovićeva ulica, a major 
pedestrian thoroughfare full of bars and cafés, features images and artefacts from two attacks on 
the city by Serb and Yugoslav forces near the beginning and end of the Homeland War. The first 
attack on 7 October 1991, a direct bombing by the Yugoslav Air Force, hit Banski dvor, then the 
seat of the Croatian presidency on St. Mark’s Square in the Old Town. The bombing allegedly 
targeted President Franjo Tuđman, who was in the building at the time of the attack, meeting with 
Stjepan Mesić, at the time President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia (the rotational presidential 
council that succeeded Tito), thereby Commander in Chief of the Yugoslav armed forces, and later 
President of Croatia, and Ante Marković, the Yugoslav prime minister. While none of these 
political figures were injured in the bombing, a civilian passer-by was killed. Zagreb survived the 
rest of the Homeland War mostly unscathed, but on 2 and 3 May 1995, Serb forces launched a 
rocket attack on the city from Vojnić, 50 to 60 kilometres to the south, killing seven civilians and 
injuring over 200 others. The attack was launched in retaliation for Operation Flash, which had 
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seen the recapture of large swaths of territory by the Croatian military from RSK forces in western 
Slavonia from 1 to 3 May. The events of 1991 and 1995 are commemorated by memorial plaques 
at Banski dvor and at the intersection of Vlaška ulica and Šoštarićeva ulica, two major 
thoroughfares in the city centre (Figure 5.20). 
 
Figure 5.20: Memorial plaques to the rocket attacks on Zagreb of 1991 and 1995 
  
Left: Memorial plaque to bombing of Banski dvor, Zagreb, 27 August 2019. Right: Memorial plaque to 2-3 May 
1995 rocket attacks, Zagreb, 21 August 2017. 
 
The Memorial Centre itself was dedicated on the 18th anniversary of the 1995 attacks, and in 
2014, the Centre was taken over by the Zagreb City Museum (MGZ 2019). To enter, visitors must 
ring a private doorbell and are guided through the exhibition by one of two staff members present. 
The guide details the chain of events that led to the rocket attacks and shows first the couch taken 
from Banski dvor after its bombardment, a symbol of the attempt to destroy the Croatian state. The 
couch is placed in front of an illuminated photo of the damage caused to the courtyard and sits atop 
a glass case of rubble. Various video clips are projected onto three blank books on a large glass 
table in the centre of the first room, showing news reports from the attacks and personal 
testimonies of witnesses, not unlike other exhibits on the Homeland War in Knin and Dubrovnik. 
The room is framed by large cloth prints of images from the bombardments in lieu of window 
curtains, while the opposite walls show newspaper reports of the events, which follow into the next 
room. The second room, however, also features seven, black, waist-high, square pillars capped in 
red, each naming one of the civilian victims of the 1995 attacks. The second room, though 
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dedicated to civilian casualties, is much smaller than the first, and here the guide explains some of 
the life stories of the victims. One, Luka Skračić from Zadar, was studying film in Zagreb, while 
Ana Mutevelić, the woman whose body was photographed dead face-down in the street, was a 
lawyer from Sarajevo who had fled to Zagreb for medical treatment (see Ginsberg 1995; Starčević 
2018). The final room served as an educational space, with rows of chairs facing a small television 
screen, the walls lined with images of the modern Croatia – bridges, stadiums, parks, nature – 
while around the corner was a small display of the ICTY proceedings against RSK President Milan 
Martić and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia Momčilo Perišić. While 
Perišić was ultimately acquitted of war crimes and crimes against humanity on appeal (ICTY 
2013), Martić was sentenced to 35 years imprisonment for his role in the joint criminal enterprise 
of Slobodan Milošević and his associates (ICTY 2007).  
 
While the content of the Memorial Centre was easily digestible and presented in a straightforward, 
accessible manner to most visitors, the discussion I had with the staff member who showed me 
around was much more illuminating on the nature of the exhibition. For about forty-five minutes, 
Petra21 and I discussed the Homeland War and the tumultuous history of Yugoslavia, bringing up 
the role of the NDH, Tito, Tuđman and the Homeland War in forming Croatian identity. On the 
NDH, she avoided any comment on fascism and figures like Ante Pavelić or the Ustaša fighters, 
but did state that despite its issues, it was the first “independent” Croatian state in centuries, which 
in and of itself was important. “Not everyone bought into the idea, but they had to go along with 
the system just like in the Tito era,” she noted. She also expressed distaste for Tito and Yugoslav 
socialism and brought up the Bleiburg repatriations as support for her belief; Tito was “bad” and 
he “killed many Croats or made others disappear,” here vaguely referring to the prison island of 
Goli otok, where Stalinists and nationalists were sent by Yugoslav authorities in the early post-war 
years. When I showed her photos from my recent visits to Vukovar and Knin, she claimed that 
Serbs never belonged in Croatia and that the Yugoslav Army was just a Serb Army, as all the key 
military positions had been given to Serbs. To her, people like SDP politician Bojan Glavašević, 
whose father Siniša was killed in the 1991 Vukovar massacre, did not make sense, saying he sided 
with people whose family members were “Chetniks.”  
 
                                                
21 Name altered to preserve anonymity. 
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Much of this conversation made me feel uncomfortable, as her approach to our conversation 
throughout the visit slowly loosened, first taking me as a tourist before realising I knew more about 
Croatian history than most of the other visitors. Our discussions shifted as I brought up more 
events and places from the past, including the Jasenovac concentration camp, which she hardly 
acknowledged, merely saying, “Oh, you’ve been there.” This represents once again the clash of 
narratives that are part and parcel of the transition from communicative to cultural memory. We 
finished our conversation, exchanged pleasant goodbyes and I left to write up my field notes, 
reflecting on the distinct character of that visit. Entering the Image of War Photography Museum 
for the first time just over a year later felt like a breath of fresh air, as the absence of such an overt 
political narrative was profound. This, too, stems from the grassroots effort from various arts 
collectives, civil society groups and private donors who supported the creation of an independent 
museum to war. The Memorial Centre, in comparison, receives public (local, national and EU) 
funds and supplements its income through ticket sales and private donations through the larger 
Zagreb City Museum body that oversees it (MZG 2019).  
 
The work of these two memorial spaces, and of the many monuments shown in this chapter, 
highlights the various contentions that exist in remembering the victims of war, no matter how 
abstract or concrete these victims are represented. Dealing with tumultuous pasts such as 
Croatia’s invariably results in a wide array of insights and critiques of the narratives present on the 
many sides of these memory conflicts. The presence or absence of human voices in such spaces, 
particularly in the Memorial Centre above, grounds these perspectives in ways that political 
infighting over the past cannot. By examining these tensions, I return to the transitions between 
communicative, cultural and collective memory outlined in my concept model of memory abuse in 
Chapter 1; the contestations that emerge in the construction of these two memorial spaces reflects 
most clearly on the diffuse nature of power in the transition from the communicative to the cultural, 
where a wider array of actors, here the photographers, curators and museum guides, can influence 
the next set of outcomes in cultural memory. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how the narrative of victimhood in Croatia has been employed, 
modified and abused in memorial spaces and events since independence. At times, the definition 
of victimhood is made intentionally vague and coupled with religious symbolism to blur the lines 
  244 
between victor, victim and vanquished. The self-contradictions of nationalist interpretations of the 
past, namely of those who were killed during the Bleiburg repatriations and of Serb civilian 
casualties of the Homeland War, become apparent when contrasted with the narrative of Croatian 
independence at all costs. Croatian remembrances of victims are by all means not standard, as 
discrepancies in visual representations of the Second World War and the Homeland War in 
monuments, museums and gravesites highlighted here show. However, the approach taken by the 
HDZ and its supporters in recent years to vilifying the communist past constitutes a major threat 
to the anti-fascist narrative of the Yugoslav era, as the framing of the Ustaša dead as “martyrs” for 
the independence of Croatia and their celebration in events in Croatia, Austria and other diasporic 
communities immediately contradict the rejection of fascism as a core facet of identity. This 
analysis has shown how the malleable nature of cultural memory (see A. Assmann and Frevert 
1999) allows for its use by various powerful social actors as a tool for social differentiation, 
addressing one of my core research questions, while also demonstrating the interplays between 
power, memory, violence and identity in post-conflict settings. This chapter contributed to extant 
literatures on those various social phenomena (see again Hearn 2018; Müller 2009; A. Assmann 
1999) by showing specifically how narratives of victimhood in Croatia can only be constructed 
through such interplays, most crucially determined by the relative power over memory exercised 
by certain actors. 
 
My analysis of the various commemorative events, primarily that of Vukovar, and memorial spaces 
here has shown how the remembrance of civilian victims has been prioritised less by key memory 
actors in Croatia (as well as in the Yugoslav past) in order to advance the narrative of the 
“defenders” as the true guarantors of independence. Rather, Croat(ian) victims have been 
mythologised and abstracted from the overall image of Croatian memory of the Homeland War and 
have been constructed as “martyrs” who chose to die for their country, while the Serbs who were 
killed in the aftermath of Operation Storm have been relegated to a memory void. Among the key 
arguments made here has been that the predominance of the narrative of defender’s “martyrdom” 
has precluded the independent development of a victim-centric retelling of the past, thereby 
relegating civilian casualties to the bottom rung of the memorial ladder. The absence of victims’ 
voices from memorial spaces has aided a relativisation of the past by various elements of Croatian 
civil society, which I discuss in greater detail in the following chapter. This chapter has advanced 
my argument on memory as a tool for violence through the manipulation, or abuse, of historical 
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narratives around the presence of Serbs in Croatia to fit political aims, much as Bergholz has 
demonstrated the links between Ustaša violence and the bifurcation of Serb identities in BiH 
during the Second World War (see Bergholz 2016). Further, this work has demonstrated the 
methodological importance of the visual in memory studies through observing the “public face of 
memory” to reveal various iterations of power in both its concentrated, state-centric form in the 
transition from cultural to collective memory (in the case of the Vukovar commemoration) and in 
its more diffuse nature in the transition from the communicative to cultural (in the Zagreb 
museums discussed above).  
 
The next chapter will discuss in greater detail the intricate relationship between fascism and 
Croatian identity along with eradication of all things Yugoslav from Croatia’s past, with the wider 
aim to present the constituent elements of modern Croatian identity and cultural memory. I argue 
that the contemporary Croatian identity as documented through the public face of memory is a 
result of memory abuse on the part of certain conservatives, who blindly follow their nationalist 
interpretations of the past without consideration of potential negative social consequences. 
Cultural memory, then, becomes or continues to be the source of struggle for power over identity, 
a phenomenon that transcends national boundaries. This final chapter will tie together the various 
strands of Croatian identity that have been present throughout this work to provide an analysis not 
of whom specifically Croatia remembers, but of how Croatia remembers itself in the process of 
forming a national identity. This investigation into Croatian self-imagination allows me to address 
my core research questions on social differentiation (or definition) through the public 
performance of memory and how resistance to certain memorial norms (here, those determined at 
the EU level) manifests in visual memorial culture. ★	
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Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the various threads that bind Croatian cultural memory and its public 
performances. Key amongst these are the centrality of religion and national conservatism, the 
historical continuity of the Croatian state over one-thousand years and the rejection of the 
Yugoslav past as a disruptive anomaly to this heritage. I aim here to show how the public face of 
memory in Croatia reflects undercurrents in the process of identity-making, that is, how the state 
sees itself. Beginning with the foundation of an independent Croatian kingdom in 925 CE, 
through the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the early twentieth century, the creation and 
destruction of Yugoslavia, and continuing to the present day, Croatian cultural memory has 
accumulated various turning points that form critical elements of modern identity in a new-old 
state “forged in war” (Tanner 2010). How such points are received and handled in the 
contemporary mnemonic landscape highlights the centrality of Croatian identity as one defined by 
its opposition to being something else rather than being its own unique phenomenon, a common 
characteristic of national identity creation (Triandyfillidou 1998, 599-600). Here, I address first 
and foremost the question, “What is Croatian?” as reflected in memorial spaces and events and to 
clarify patterns of political and social negotiations that result in a deeply self-contradictory 
narrative of the nation and how these patterns can be observed in other post-conflict societies.  
 
This chapter returns to three of my five primary research questions, namely:  
 
• How does Croatia’s visual culture of remembrance illustrate the relationships between 
power, violence, memory and identity? 
• Using a concept of “memory abuse” in post-conflict settings, what are the normative 
expectations of remembrance and what form does resistance to specific memorialisations 
take? 
• How do processes of social differentiation elevate or exclude specific historical narratives 
from commemorative processes? 
 
In doing so, I return to the theoretical discussion of how the power over memory transforms into 
power for identities to endure and how memories of a distant past return time and time again to 
affix meaning to constituent elements of Croatian identity. Memory abuse also returns in this 
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chapter as an analytical lens to assess the role of fascism in the “thousand-year dream” narrative of 
Croatian independence as rehearsed by the HDZ and other conservative bodies.  
 
I have divided this chapter into four sections, following the traditional wedding rhyme, “something 
old, something new, something borrowed, something blue,” each adapted to address core 
elements of contemporary Croatian self-imagination, followed by a final comment on public 
memory in Istria. Respectively, these first four sections address the pervasiveness of the millennial 
narrative of the Croatian state; Croatian independence and the ongoing Europeanisation of 
cultural memory; the rejection of all (or most) things Yugoslav; and the power of conservatism in 
shaping Croatian identity, including the controversial manner in which fascism has or has not been 
dealt with by key memory actors.  
 
The first section, “Something old,” discusses the millennial history of the Croatian state and its 
role in shaping modern Croatian identity, which I demonstrate through monuments recently 
dedicated to persons, places or events that critically informed that millennial heritage. The second 
section, “Something new,” addresses my research question on the role of resistance to normative 
expectations of memorialisation vis-à-vis Croatia’s 2013 accession to the European Union and the 
resulting mnemonic debates from the process of “Europeanisation,” which is defined more closely 
below. In “Nothing borrowed?,” I question the legacy of the Yugoslav period and how 
contemporary social actors have sought to eradicate the memory of the period from 1918 to 1991 
(but more importantly from 1943 onward) from modern Croatian history, framing it as a sort of 
“aberration” that forced the removal of “Croatia” from political geography. Though many 
elements of Croatian identity and patterns of mnemonic behaviour seem to originate in this period, 
modern Yugosceptics deny that their memorial work is indeed “borrowed” from Croatia’s socialist 
history. This section invokes again the question of how power, violence, memory and identity 
intersect in memorial spaces and how narratives of conservatism and fascism, which I then discuss 
in detail in “Something (black and) blue,” intertwine through the work of noted wielders of power 
over memory who employ tactics reminiscent of memory abuse to deny historical wrongdoings. 
Finally, I end this chapter with a case study of the Istrian peninsula, a refuge of Yugoslav memory 
that poses a unique challenge to the consistency of a “one-nation” approach to cultural memory in 
Croatia. This final section builds on my documentation of memorial sites in Istria in May 2019, 
the only region in all of Croatia that appeared to be freed from the constraints of the hardened, 
  251 
nationalist rhetoric of the Homeland War and Croatian independence discussed throughout the 
rest of this thesis. 
 
This chapter demonstrates how difficult the formation of a singular, collective memory between 
various social groups within and outside Croatia appears and reinforces the need for alternative 
analytical concepts like “transcultural” memory (Erll 2011). As in the two previous chapters, I 
build on extant documentary work (see i.e. FRAMNAT 2015; Niebyl 2016) of public forms of 
memory in Croatia by expanding my view toward a rather holistic analysis of the key components 
of Croatian identity as reflected in various memorial spaces. Envisioning memory as a layered 
process of back-and-forth exchanges between various groups and determined by similarly varying 
power relations, as I argue in Chapter 1, is crucial in understanding how the clashes between 
different approaches to Croatia’s past determine the appearance of the Croatian “public face of 
memory.” The omnipresence of violence as a transformative force (see Bergholz 2016) in the 
varying narratives that do conflict with one another – be they socialist, fascist, Yugoslav, European, 
Serb, Croat, victor or victim – is also a theme that plays out subtly throughout this chapter, 
culminating in my discussion of the cognitive dissonance inherent in conservative visions of 
Croatia’s past, present and future. 
 
Something old: The millennial Croatian state 
As mentioned variously throughout this work, Croatian identity in many ways is predicated on the 
existence of some form of a Croatian political entity for the greater part of the past 1,095 years. 
While Croatian nationalism as it can be observed today has its origins as a nineteenth-century elite 
literary and political project, the origins of Croatian identity are tied concretely to the existence of 
the kingdom of Tomislav I, founded in 925 AD, and not in a more mythologised imagination of 
the past, as in the case of pre-imperial German identity (see Le Gloannec 1994; Vick 2003). The 
creation of the first Croatian state is remembered in various monuments around the country, the 
most notable to be found in the Sokolska mogila/“falcon’s mound” near the entrance to Maksimir 
Park in Zagreb (Figure 6.1). The Sokolska mogila was dedicated in 1925 by the Hrvatski 
sokoloski savez/“Croatian Falcon Association” and refurbished in 1995 by the Braće hrvatskog 
zmaja/“Brethren of the Croatian Dragon,” a historical organisation responsible for the 
installation of many monuments across Zagreb and elsewhere in Croatia. The monument features 
a large sculpture of a falcon on a base with four plaques recalling the years 925, 1925 (as a 
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celebration of millennial heritage) and 1995 CE, with the most recently installed plaque noting 
the “realisation of the dream of the Croats: the free, independent and internationally recognised 
Croatian state,” thereby linking the success of the Homeland War with the foundation of the first 
Croatian kingdom one millennium earlier. This newest plaque was provided along with 
reconstruction funds by the Croatian Ministry of Defence. The entire structure sits atop a mound 
of earth composed of soil samples from 155 historical locations across Croatia relevant to the 
state’s history, and at its dedication, the monument was originally surrounded by ten linden trees 
to mark each century of the existence some form of a Croatian state. An additional lump of soil, 
blessed by Pope John Paul II in 1994, was added to the mound before its rededication the following 
year (Javna Ustanova Maksimir 2020).  
 
Figure 6.1: Sokolska mogila, Maksimir Park, Zagreb 
   
Left: The mound of 156 soil samples from across Croatia, atop which stands the Hrvatski sokol (Croatian falcon). 
Right: Detail of the 1995 addition to the Sokolska mogila and the šahovnica, both images taken 21 August 2017. 
 
Similar monuments have been built in the aftermath of the Homeland War as a reaffirmation of the 
restoration of Croatian independence and of the millennial identity, but none so clearly bind the 
Homeland War with the first Kingdom as the Sokolska mogila. The first 900 of the 1,000 years of 
“Croatian” history are compressed in memorial form, with statues of the early kings installed at 
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various points in the recent past. These include prominent sculptures of King Tomislav I in the 
main square of Ogulin in Gorski kotar, installed in 1925 and restored in 1990, and another facing 
Zagreb’s main train station, dedicated in 1947 with a Croatian coat of arms added upon 
independence in 1991. As well, I documented two monuments to Petar Snačić (commonly known 
as Petar Svačić due to an early historical transcription error) in Brištane near Krka National Park, 
dedicated in 2002, and one in Vojnić, the nearest larger population centre to Petrova Gora and 
the site of the 1097 Battle of Gvozd Mountain, where Snačić, the last Croatian claimant to the first 
throne, was killed. Though the Croatian kingdom continued to exist after his death, all future 
Kings of Croatia through to 1918 would emerge from a personal or dynastic union with Hungary. 
Even Habsburg rule has been framed as voluntary, as the coronation of Ferdinand I as “King of 
Croatia” came as a result of an election rather than through forceful means (Bellamy 2003, 39).  
 
The persistence of a Croatian kingdom under Hungarian and later Habsburg rule for the vast 
majority of the supposed millennial history of the state highlights some of the self-contradictory 
nature of the modern rejection of the Yugoslav past, given the existence of the relatively 
autonomous Socialist Republic of Croatia, though primarily under rule from Belgrade and not 
Budapest. As throughout the later history of Yugoslavia, several attempts were made during 
Habsburg rule to restore full Croatian independence or to grant some higher degree of self-rule 
within the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, noted in Chapter 2. The push for 
autonomy and eventual independence over several centuries, however, has served to strengthen 
the narrative of defending Croatian autonomy at all costs, and in many monuments across the 
country, the slogan “Navik on živi ki zgine pošteno”/“He who dies honourably lives forever,” 
attributed to Petar IV Zrinski, appears as a reminder of the sacrifices made in the name of the state. 
As noted in Chapters 2 and 5, this text has been inscribed in both the Latin and Glagolitic 
alphabets, the latter noting the pervasiveness of the Catholic faith in shaping Croatian identity 
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Figure 6.2: Navik on živi ki zgine pošteno 
   
   
Top left: Monument to Eugen Kvaternik, nineteenth-century revolutionary, Rakovica, 18 March 2018. Top right: 
Monument to fallen Croatian soldiers of the Second World War, Lasinja, 29 August 2019. Bottom left: Memorial 
cross at the Church of the Croatian Martyrs, Udbina, 29 August 2019. Bottom right: Memorial cross for the 
“Victims for the freedom of Croatia,” Vukovar, 2 July 2017. 
 
Most interestingly, however, none of the monuments with this slogan are dedicated to Zrinski and 
the Zrinski-Frankopan conspiracy in the seventeenth-century but rather to historical events from 
the late nineteenth century onwards, thus linking the distant past to the present for sake of 
narrative continuity, a phenomenon Volkan refers to as “transgenerational transmission of shared 
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traumas” (see Volkan 2001, 85). Of all the monuments I documented, only two plaques directly 
recall Petar IV Zrinski, the first in Karlovac installed on the 300th anniversary of his marriage to 
Katarina Frankopan in 1641 and the second in Ogulin on the 320th anniversary of his and co-
conspirator Fran Krsto Frankopan’s execution. Neither memorial plaque is prominently 
displayed, the one in Ogulin hidden behind an overgrown tree on the grounds of the old Frankopan 
castle, indicating a degree of disinterest in more distant events in Croatia’s past (Figure 6.3). 
 
Figure 6.3: Monuments to Petar IV Zrinski: Karlovac, Ogulin 
   
Left: Historical plaque to wedding of Petar IV Zrinski and Katarina Frankopan, Karlovac, 26 August 2017. Right: 
Plaque dedicated on 320th anniversary of the execution of Petar IV Zrinski and Fran Krsto Frankopan, Ogulin, 2 
September 2019. 
 
The focus on historical continuity marks a shift away from modern elements of identity toward the 
creation of a narrative of longevity, past, present and future, forging a “degree of permanence” of 
the Croatian nation (see Sani et al. 2007, 1120). By presenting different elements of Croatian 
identity anachronistically, that is, by introducing seventeenth-century text written in ninth-century 
script to a twenty-first century monument remembering events from the twentieth, powerholders 
in the context of Croatian cultural memory reinforce the endurance of the nation. This also furthers 
my argument laid out in Chapter 1 that identities defined by their resistance to external influences 
(here, Zrinski’s opposition to Habsburg rule married with the Croatian struggle for independence 
in the 1990s) result from seizing the “power over memory” (Müller 2009) to assure the endurance 
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of these identities. Conversely, cultural identities generate their own power to endure through 
continual reinforcement, in this instance through the strengthening of historical bonds between 
various elements of Croatian identity and its creation through resistance to external force. 
 
The subjugation of the Croatian state in its many forms by various external powers over the past 
millennium stands in contrast to the unique persistence of the Catholic Church (something even 
older than the state itself) as an institutional marker of identity. The coupling of a political 
statement like “Navik on živi…” to the Glagolitic alphabet on the Homeland War memorials in 
Vukovar and Udbina, for example, or at least the blending of the cross and the quote as in the case 
of Lasinja, demonstrates the proximity of the church to the state. Particularly in the context of the 
Second World War, as will be discussed in the “Everything  (black and) blue” section of this 
chapter, the brushing over of religion’s use as a tool for othering and, later, forced conversions as 
a method of cultural genocide becomes highly problematic, however “necessary” the Catholic faith 
was in preserving what was then seen as “Croatian” identity.  
 
Religious figureheads also played a role in shaping earlier manifestations of Croatian identity and 
served as agents of widespread social and political change through their invocations of the 
uniqueness of Croatian or similar regional identities. Juraj Dobrila in Istria and Josip Juraj 
Strossmayer in Slavonia, nineteenth-century bishops and benefactors, worked to create a vision of 
wider Slavic identity in resistance to growing Italian and Hungarian influence in their respective 
dioceses. Strossmayer most notably aided in the founding of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences 
and Arts, as discussed in Chapter 2, using his resources and cultural capital as a religious figure to 
act in what he perceived as a renewed national interest. The sculpture of Strossmayer facing the 
Đakovo Cathedral where he worked from 1850 to his death in 1905 recalls his work “[…] for the 
faith and the homeland.” Similarly, the bust of Juraj Dobrila installed in the Istrian town of Poreč 
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Figure 6.4: Monuments to Josip Juraj Strossmayer and Juraj Dobrila: Đakovo, Poreč 
   
Left: Monument facing Đakovo Cathedral, Đakovo, 17 November 2017. Right: Bust of Juraj Dobrila, Poreč, 4 May 
2019. 
 
Figures like Dobrila and Strossmayer aimed to revive ties between the various kingdoms of Croatia 
that had been divided and sub-divided under Habsburg rule; Dalmatia in the mid- to late 
nineteenth century was administered primarily from Vienna, Slavonia and Croatia proper 
(primarily northern Croatia) from Budapest, and Civil Croatia (around the Zagreb capital region) 
from the Sabor in Zagreb. Despite the various origins of the national revivalist movements of the 
nineteenth century, all of these political movements called for the unification of the medieval 
Croatian kingdom, greater powers for the Sabor and a written constitution asserting “Croatia’s 
historic right to statehood” (Bellamy 2003, 46). The downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 
the early twentieth century came at a time where matters of national identity became more 
prevalent as the elite project of nationalism (see Chapter 2) devolved into more commonly shared 
political and social identities. The absence of the First World War and the end of Habsburg rule in 
the Croatian self-imagination is reflected in the memorial spaces and practices witnessed across 
the country. Despite the human toll of the war and of the birth of Croatian nationalism during this 
period, a sort of selective amnesia presents itself, with only those figures, such as Josip Juraj 
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Strossmayer, Eugen Kvaternik, Ante Starčević and Stjepan Radić, the “fathers” of the Croatian 
nation, remembered widely at the national level (see Figure 6.5). 
Figure 6.5: Monuments to the “Fathers of the Nation”: Gospić, Osijek, Rakovica 
 
 
Top left: A book-shaped monument to Ante Starčević, his nephew, linguist Šime Starčević, and philologist Fran 
Kurelac, Gospić, 6 August 2017. Top right: Statue to “Father of the Homeland” Ante Starčević, dedicated on 13 
June 2007, Osijek, 5 July 2017. Bottom: Memorial plaque dedicated to the house where Eugen Kvaternik declared 
the first independent “Croatian People’s Government” on 8 October 1871, marking the beginning of the Rakovica 
revolt (he was killed three days later), Rakovica, 18 March 2018. 
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While local memorial sites might address more concretely the Habsburg past in Croatia more 
notably in northern regions than elsewhere, on the whole, this era is relatively neglected and only 
tangentially incorporated into contemporary public memory. Of the 614 monuments I 
documented, only 133, that is just over one-fifth, were dedicated to persons, places or events of 
the nearly four centuries of the Habsburg era. 
 
More so, it is the cultural figures of the Austro-Hungarian period rather than the myriad local and 
regional political actors who are remembered, with numerous statues and plaques in prominent 
urban locations dedicated to authors (Ivana Brlić-Mažuranić, Antun Gustav Matoš, Janko Polić 
Kumov, Ivan Gundulić), musicians (Vatroslav Lisinski, Josip Runjanin, Dora Pejačević) and 
scientists (Nikola Tesla, Leopold Ružička, Vladimir Prelog) (Figure 6.6). It is in these spaces 
above all that women are remembered for their contributions to the Croatian heritage, in contrast 
to memorial spaces created post-independence (see Chapter 4). The marked turn toward 
commemorating politicians and state leaders in the early to mid-twentieth century demonstrates a 
greater social shift in awareness to matters of national and civic identities, much as the project of 
national identity making began in marginal cultural spheres, gaining political and intellectual 
traction throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century (see Hroch 1985, 22-24). Therefore, 
it would be expected that more attention was given to cultural developments and figures than the 
politics of the Austro-Hungarian period, which to the inhabitants of smaller urban locations like 
Đakovo, Vinkovci or Slavonski Brod would have felt more abstract and distant. During the Austro-
Hungarian period, several important national symbols emerged, beyond the already extant 
šahovnica and pleter. A large obelisk built in 1935 dedicated to poet Antun Mihanović’s 1835 
publication of what would become the Croatian national anthem, “Lijepa naša domovino”/“Our 
Beautiful Homeland,” stands at a junction near Josip Broz Tito’s birth village of Kumrovec. In 
recent years, a “musical fence” has been installed, with each of the thirty-five posts tuned to a note 
in the national anthem that can be played in order when brushed with an attached hanging mallet; 
this is the most purposefully interactive, “hands-on” memorial site I documented during my field 
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Figure 6.6: Monuments to cultural and scientific figures of the Austro-Hungarian period 
   
 
Top left: Historical plaque dedicated to Josip Runjanin, composer of the Croatian national anthem, Vinkovci, 23 
August 2017. Top right: Sculpture of author Ivana Brlić-Mažuranić, Slavonski Brod, 17 November 2017. Bottom: 
Memorial plaque to author Ivan Gundulić, Zagreb, 28 August 2019. 
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Figure 6.7: “Musical Fence” interactive memorial and monument to the Croatian national 
anthem, Zelenjak  
   
Left: Plaque describing the interactive Musical Fence, including musical notation for Lijepa naša domovino. Right: 
Monument dedicated to the Croatian national anthem. Both images 18 March 2018. 
 
The Old Croatia, despite its relevance to the perpetuation of the “millennial history” narrative and 
by laying many of the foundations for modern Croatian culture, appears nonetheless to be of little 
critical importance today, as the entire history of those 993 years spanning the founding of the 
Kingdom of Croatia to the creation of the first Yugoslavia is treated selectively and 
anachronistically. However, these foundations are essential to enable those actively constructing 
social identities and cultural memory to build using anachronistic juxtapositions and 
commemorations of historical events to suit their current objectives. The core elements of identity 
that have been preserved from this period, beyond the merely symbolic, are the resistance of 
attempts by foreign powers to absorb Croatia into their cultural sphere (Ottoman, Austrian, 
Hungarian, Yugoslav, Serb, and so on) and the persistence of Catholicism as a social marker. 
While the Croatian Catholic Church did not serve as the primary carrier of identity over the past 
millennium, as had the Serb Orthodox Church in the nearly four centuries of Ottoman occupation 
of the former medieval Kingdom of Serbia, the Catholic Church adapted its function as a supporter 
of the state through to the end of the Second World War. The difficult nature of this church-state 
relationship as embodied in the figure of Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac will be discussed toward the 
end of the chapter.  
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Nonetheless, the Church continues to play an important role in informing Croatian self-
imagination and its public expression in monumental form. This follows from Smith’s 
ethnosymbolc approach; Smith notes,  
 
For ethno-symbolists, what gives nationalism its power are the myths, memories, 
traditions, and symbols of ethnic heritages and the ways in which a popular living 
past has been, and can be, rediscovered and reinterpreted by modern nationalist 
intelligentsias. It is from these elements of myth, memory, symbol, and tradition 
that modern national identities are reconstituted in each generation, as the nation 
becomes more inclusive and as its members cope with new challenges (Smith 1999, 
9). 
 
Hearn summarises: “In the ethnosymbolic approach, the strength of symbols, myths and memories 
explains the persistence of nations,” and this includes “religious sources of national identity” 
(Hearn 2018, 288). He continues, “In this view, strong cultural identity generates power – the 
power to endure” (ibid.). In the case of Croatia, cultural identity is reinforced but not strictly 
defined by Catholicism. The strength of symbols of the Christian faith and their appearance 
throughout the Croatian mnemonic landscape, especially those containing ethnic or religious 
symbols like the cross, the pleter, the Glagolitic alphabet or the Virgin Mary, demonstrates an effort 
to prove the material wealth of Croatian culture and the links to its past and lends empirical support 
to Smith’s ethnosymbolic theory of national identity. Returning to the theoretical arguments I 
made in Chapter 1, the power to endure results from a control over the power over memory – the 
institutions that make and break memory, perpetuate or destroy it – and an institution as old as the 
Croatian Catholic Church, coupled with the thousand-year history of Croatian statehood, serves 
in this function to assure a durable identity.  
 
Something new: Croatia in the European Union  
In contrast to the limited scope of the memory of the Old Croatia, the “birth” or “re-birth” of 
Croatia and its independence in the course of the 1990s represents the core element of Croatian 
national self-imagination and cultural memory. This is joined by the stories of the branitelji, as 
discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Here, I forward the timeline to the mid- to late 2000s and assess 
the construction of the independent “Croatia” in light of its process to accede to the European 
Union in 2013. Most importantly, I address the role of the European Union in making a New 
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Croatia and how recent governments have used the guidelines of European memory to suit their 
own cultural demands. These guidelines fall in line with the EU’s values such as respecting “human 
dignity, freedom […] and human rights” (EU 2020), which are handled rather superficially or 
performatively in Croatian memorial spaces, as I discuss below. 
 
Radaelli defines Europeanisation as the 
 
processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalisation of formal 
and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things,’ 
and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the 
making of EU public policy and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies (Radaelli 2003, 30). 
 
The Europeanisation process as it has played out in the context of Croatian memory politics has 
provided Croatia leverage to reframe its national narratives in ways that are not only amenable to 
the makers of the European memory framework in Brussels, but also to those in Zagreb who 
demand a singular, coherent vision of the state. Among the primary elements of contemporary 
Croatian cultural memory are the celebration of independence and praising of the “defenders,” 
who fought for the “liberation of Croatia” from “Greater Serbian aggression” in the Homeland 
War, and the eradication of all things Yugoslav from the modern image of the Croatian state in the 
name of “anti-totalitarianism,” which I discuss in the next section. The most controversial element 
of Croatia’s accession process was, as noted in Chapter 4, the demanded handover of various 
Croatian military officials – that is, the “defenders” – to the ICTY to face criminal prosecution for 
crimes committed against the Serb civilian population and in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 
1990s conflicts.  
 
As part of its accession process, Croatia adopted (or, as viewed by Eurosceptics, was made to 
adopt) various European standards of rule of law, political and economic reform, and most 
critically here, memorialisation. Croatia’s conformity with the EU’s formal conditions for 
accession, however, represents a superficial act of “dressing up,” as the celebratory welcome of 
disgraced military and political figures also previously discussed shows. Here, however, the EU’s 
formal demands only worked to exacerbate nationalist resentments and further tensions between 
Croatia and Brussels as the accession process continued. The installation of the defenders as a 
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central pillar of Croatia’s modern vision of its past has come at the cost of the memory of over forty 
years of Yugoslav history, which conservative forces now seek to erase or deny. Doing so advances 
nationalist narratives, as noted above including those that brush aside the historical role of fascism 
in Croatian independence, that create contradictions in the “anti-totalitarian” framework recent 
governments have adopted to appeal to European policymakers. To a great degree, the removal of 
Yugoslavia from the retelling of Croatia’s past enhances the narrative of Croatia’s “millennial 
dream” of an independent state, a constituent element of President Franjo Tuđman’s ideology in 
the 1990s.  
 
Memory politics and Europeanisation 
These elements of Croatia’s transition away from the Yugoslav past towards a uniquely Croatian 
future highlight the contested nature of transition across time and space. The period of 
Europeanisation and harmonising soft memory laws (that is, informal rules or non-binding 
resolutions that bring about social behaviours or might induce particular actions without force) in 
Croatia with norms determined at a supra-national level has given rise to a fervent reconstruction 
and reframing of the Croatian collective conscience. The use of the European framework of 
memory at the national level represents a form of “downloading” values and memory content from 
a supranational, collective conscience, “as a means of aligning and confirming their EU values, and 
thus European identities” (Milošević and Touquet 2018, 384). The EU strictly defines its core 
values as “common to the EU countries in a society in which inclusion, tolerance, justice, solidarity 
and non-discrimination prevail;” these values are namely human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, rule of law and human rights (EU 2020). While attempting to forge a singular narrative 
based on these values, the European Union creates a well-defined “Other” as those states outside 
of the bloc that do not promote inclusion and tolerance and brushes over internal issues in states 
like Croatia, Hungary or Poland where intolerance and discrimination appear to flourish. If the 
Balkans is perceived as the ultimate “Other” in the European memory sphere (Todorova 1994; 
Đerić 2008), then Croatia’s gradual erasure of its Yugoslav past, through the destruction, 
repurposing or construction of monuments, museums and other memorial sites is an act of 
affirmation of its European identity (see Radonić 2010). Upon Croatia’s accession in July 2013, 
for example, the City of Zagreb installed a new monument in the shape of a star on Europski trg 
(Europe Square), marking its new orientation toward Brussels and the future and away from 
Yugoslavia and the past (although the star – red – served as a symbol of the SFRJ that the state now 
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eschews). In March 2017, the street sign marking the square also received an additional plaque 
dedicated to the sixtieth anniversary of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which established the European 
Economic Community (Grad Zagreb 2017) (Figure 6.8). 
 
Figure 6.8: Remembering Europe, Europski trg, Zagreb 
   
Left: Monument to Croatia’s accession to the European Union, Zagreb, 21 August 2017. Right: Small plaque below 
red-framed street sign dedicating the square to the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, Zagreb, 21 August 2017. 
 
Conversely, as a new EU member state, Croatia may now “upload” its own memories to the 
mainstream European narrative (Milošević and Touquet 2018, 384), giving it greater leverage to 
challenge Serbia as a candidate country to accept its version of the history of 1990s in the former 
Yugoslavia. Croatia, however, is not alone in transforming its memory politics to align with 
European expectations in ways that are merely performative but brush aside culpability in its more 
sinister past. Slovenia, an EU member state since the 2004 enlargement, has also adopted the 
European anti-totalitarian narrative, which has manifested in the construction of a monument to 
“Victims of All Wars” in the centre of Ljubljana, which, while depoliticising the deaths of those 
who died in the various wars of the twentieth century, avoids a condemnation of domestic actors 
like the Slovensko domobranstvo/“Slovene Home Guard,” which collaborated with the Axis 
powers in the Second World War. In his speech at the dedication of the monument in July 2017, 
Slovenian President Borut Pahor noted,  
 
With the creation of its own state, the Slovenian people established itself as 
a nation. With the unveiling of this central national memorial to all victims 
of wars and war-related violence, it now establishes itself as a mature 
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nation. […] This memorial […] invites all of us, all Slovenian men and 
women, to pacification and reconciliation (Pahor 2017). 
 
Serbia, too, dedicated a monument “to the victims of the wars and the defenders of the fatherland 
from 1990-1999” on Savski trg (Sava Square) outside the former central railway station of 
Belgrade in 2012, after a decade-long debate on the construction of a memorial to one of the most 
tumultuous periods in Serbia’s recent past. David (2014) notes the contested nature of the 
monument and how various groups, including survivors, victims’ families, veterans, local and 
national politicians vied to implement their views on the events of the 1990s as manifested in what 
ultimately became a rather lacklustre and neutered memorial space. The superficially 
reconciliatory nature of this art of commemoration belies the malleability of memory in the hands 
of “memory entrepreneurs” who present their memories as truth (Pollak 1993, 30). Jan Assmann 
has described the “reconstructivity” of cultural memory (J. Assmann and Hölscher 1988, 13), that 
is those shared memories common to a defined group, whether delineated by language, religion, 
nation or other. This “reconstructivity” provides those with the ability to form the content of a 
cultural (national), or further, collective (European), memory room to manipulate the meaning and 
relevance of a particular person, place or event commemorated (McConnell 2019).  
 
Thus, the twisting of the European anti-totalitarian narrative, detailed more closely in the 
following section, not only allows states like Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia to conform to the 
European memory framework of remembrance established by member states of the European 
Union but also to reframe it in a way that supports nationalist ambitions at home. Here, power 
asymmetries between established and candidate member states and the East-West divide (not to 
say that post-Warsaw Pact and post-Yugoslav memory politics greatly overlap) come into play. 
David describes this phenomenon as a transaction located “in the power gap between local and 
political forces” (David 2017, 74), wherein Croatia (and, in related contexts, Serbia) treats its 
“memory content as a trade currency,” something that can be exchanged for personal or political 
gain. Several Croatian politicians, among them most notably former Minister of Culture Zlatko 
Hasanbegović and current Mayor of Zagreb Milan Bandić, have undertaken the initiative to 
eradicate references to Tito throughout the country, and in 2017 successfully renamed one of 
Zagreb’s main squares, Trg maršala Tita/“Marshall Tito Square,” to the Trg republike 
Hrvatske/“Republic of Croatia Square.” In Karlovac, too, the square named in honour of Tito was 
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renamed to the Square of Croatian Defenders, in line with the predominant narrative of the 
liberation of Croatia in the Homeland War by the Croatian branitelji (Milekić 2017d). Tito, as 
head of the socialist state that conservative lawmakers seek to remove from the Croatian memory 
landscape, is framed as a ruthless, totalitarian dictator who suppressed Croatian national identity 
in the early years of the SFRJ’s existence by sentencing his opponents to lengthy terms at the Goli 
otok prison camp; by removing him from their picture of Croatia’s past, these actors can 
perpetuate their own narrative of Croatia’s perpetual victimhood under the Yugoslav regime(s).  
 
Does Europeanisation of memory politics strictly mean de-nationalising memory? In the case of 
Croatia, the answer is no. Any quasi-permanent changes in Croatia’s mnemonic landscape have 
come as a result of “dressing up” to appease the powerholders of the European memory project, 
but domestic applications of European memory norms have been selective and tactical. This has 
been demonstrated most clearly in recent attempts to relativize the fascist past in places where its 
consequences were most damaging – Jasenovac and Bleiburg, discussed below. As well, 
government officials’ denial or reluctance to acknowledge crimes committed by Croatian forces 
during the 1991-1995 Homeland War, an event within the living memory of current EU 
policymakers, highlights the problematic relationship the Croatian state has with coming to terms 
with the past. Instead, conservative governments have adapted the Europeanisation of Croatian 
memory in ways that perpetuate nationalist and anti-reconciliatory narratives. My argument here 
has been that the Europeanisation process, as it has played out in Croatia, has been more 
superficial and performative than fundamentally progressive and transformative, and that despite 
external pressures to conform to standards of remembrance agreed upon in Brussels, these have 
been resisted at the domestic level by influential actors and institutions who have sought to create 
or revitalise nationalist narratives of the Croatian past. This examination of the EU’s role in 
forming Croatian memory and identity, which appears quite limited in examination of the public 
face of memory in Croatia, serves to provide contrast to the greater prevalence of nationalist 
symbols that I discuss in the following two sections on “anti-totalitarianism” and fascism, which 
clash with the EU’s vision of victim-oriented remembrance and reconciliation. 
 
Nothing borrowed? Rejecting Croatia’s Yugoslav past 
In this section, I continue to look at identity and memory construction in Croatia in the aftermath 
of the Homeland War as compared to the construction of cultural memory in Tito’s Yugoslavia 
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after the Second World War. I contend that much of the framework of the post-Homeland War 
Croatian narrative (independence after a struggle against aggressive [Serb] nationalism, faith in 
the state as a construct, formation of a cult of personality around a political figurehead) mirrors 
that of Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s. As well, I discuss how Croatian identity is one defined 
in its opposition rather than an affirmation of its unique qualities beyond the millennial statehood 
narrative. This involves a discussion of the origins of Croatian nationalism as a form of resistance 
against the Napoleonic Empire and later Magyarisation in the nineteenth century and how this 
resistance is mirrored in the public face of memory today. 
 
Croatian memory politics, “anti-totalitarianism” and the erasure of Yugoslavia 
Like other Yugoslav republics, the Croatian experience of single-party socialist government 
differed in important ways from that of other European communist states. The Tito-Stalin split of 
1948 and Yugoslavia’s dismissal from Cominform provided the country greater leeway in 
positioning itself as a space both between East and West and as a centre of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Croatia’s tourism industry benefitted heavily from the lack of visa requirements for 
visitors to Yugoslavia, and along with Slovenia and Vojvodina, Croatia qualified as a “More 
Developed Region (MDR)” (Milanović 1985). Yugoslav citizens had greater freedoms to travel 
and work abroad, with many participating in the Gastarbeiter programmes in Germany and Austria 
in the 1960s and 1970s (partly due to economic conditions in post-war Yugoslavia), and on the 
whole enjoyed a greater standard of living than citizens of the Warsaw Pact countries.  
 
However, the repression of the Croatian Spring and of Croatian national identity more widely 
during the Yugoslav period (see Chapter 2) has been framed today as a form of totalitarianism, and 
several conservative politicians have attempted to force an equivalence between Yugoslav 
communism and fascist rule by the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and the Ustaša 
paramilitaries in the 1940s. While oddly no monuments to the Croatian Spring were found in my 
fieldwork, new monuments across Croatia have been built to commemorate “victims of 
communism,” often in reference to NDH soldiers and their families killed by Partisans in Bleiburg 
in May 1945 (see HRT 2011; Rogoz-Šola 2011). These include the “Sinking Head” monument 
in Đakovo, installed in 2008, and various, privately donated memorial bricks of the wall 
surrounding the Church of the Croatian Martyrs in Udbina, still seemingly under construction 
(Figure 6.9). 
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Figure 6.9: Monuments to “Victims of Communism”: Đakovo, Udbina 
   
Left: “Sinking Head” monument to “Victims of Communism of Đakovo and Đakovština [Đakovo Region],” 
Đakovo, 17 November 2017. Right: Privately donated stones lining memorial wall at Church of the Croatian 
Martyrs, including to “Victims of Communism” or “Communist Terror” of Dubrovnik and the Peršinovec Forest 
(near Zagreb), Udbina, 29 August 2019.  
 
During the 2016 commemoration in Knin of Operation Storm, which brought about the end of 
the Croatian War of Independence and remains a point of mnemonic contention between Serbia 
and Croatia, Ivica Glavota, a representative of the Defenders of the Homeland War, noted, “… we 
soldiers are anti-fascist contemporaries opposed to Greater Fascism, but we are certainly not 
members of the totalitarian communist regime condemned in contemporary Europe together with 
all other totalitarian ideologies and systems” (FRAMNAT 2016). Such commemorations on the 
one hand conform to the wider European narrative of anti-totalitarianism and the necessity of 
remembering mass crimes committed during the Second World War, but on the other hand they 
relativise the communist past as equal or worse than the fascist past. This has the consequence of 
either passively or actively framing fascists and fascist sympathisers as the ultimate victims of the 
war, despite claims to the contrary. By engaging in the performative nature of European memory 
politics, Croatian leaders in recent years have enabled a revision of the Yugoslav past as a 
totalitarian one, overlooking the legacy of anti-fascism on which the Partisan movement and 
ultimately Tito’s Yugoslav state was founded (see Cipek 2017; Radonić 2010). This “anti-anti-
fascism” (see Kuljić 2002), if unintentional, is a result of Croatian memory politics targeting a past 
in which Croatian national identity was undermined, and if intentional ultimately contradicts the 
European norm of anti-totalitarianism (see Radonić 2013). Indeed, the last “independent” 
  270 
Croatian state to exist prior to Croatia’s declaration of independence from the SFRJ in 1991 was 
the NDH, a state premised on genocidal anti-Serb and anti-Semitic ideology (Dulić 2006). 
 
Nonetheless, Croatian memory and identity after the Homeland War appear to have borrowed 
from patterns of memorialisation that emerged in Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the Second World 
War. The clearest link between Croatian and Yugoslav cultural memory is the installation of 
charismatic leaders – Tuđman and Tito – as the vanguards of the state, without whom it would not 
have survived. The cult of Tito that emerged in the 1940s and 1950s was reflected in the renaming 
of streets, squares and even entire cities (in Croatia, Titova Korenica near Plitvice Lakes), the 
construction of monuments in his honour, some of which remain visible today (Figure 6.10), and 
the total eradication of memory of his opponents (fascists and Stalinists).  
 
Figure 6.10: Extant statues of Josip Broz Tito: Pula, Kumrovec 
   
Left: Bust of Tito in “Tito park,” Pula, 7 May 2019. Right: Statue of Tito before his birth house, Kumrovec, 18 
March 2018. The statue had been previously destroyed with explosives in December 2004 and was quickly restored. 
 
With the death of Tito in 1980 and the destruction of Yugoslavia in the decade thereafter, the 
image of Tito was rapidly replaced by the image of the new designated leader of the Croatian 
nation, Franjo Tuđman (whose own cult-like worship I discuss in the next section). Similarly, the 
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fall of Yugoslavia meant the fall of its monuments and the removal of its memorial spaces, now seen 
as foreign to the Croatian narrative of independence and the more exclusive nature of Croatian 
nationalism as practiced by the HDZ of the Tuđman era. During the existence of the SFRJ, Croatia 
and other Yugoslav republics saw the construction of massive, elaborately crafted monuments 
remembering the “National Liberation War.” Now known by the Serbo-Croatian term spomenik 
(spomenici in plural), these monuments marked major battles – whether victories or defeats – and 
the sites of NDH concentration camps primarily in the Croatian countryside and Dalmatian 
hinterlands. Significant work has been undertaken to document the history of these spaces; for 
example, the Spomenik Database website by Donald Niebyl records in great detail the origins, 
design, symbolism and ultimate fate of the memorials and provides a valuable resource for 
contemporary memory and architecture scholars (see i.e. Niebyl 2016; 2017a; 2017b; 2017c). 
Beyond the grandiose spomenici designed by renowned architects like Bogdan Bogdanović, Vojan 
Bakić and Dušan Džamonja, hundreds, if not thousands, of smaller memorial placards on buildings 
or along once-important backroads recall smaller skirmishes, massacres or locals who fought and 
died elsewhere during the Second World War, or authors and artists of renown who entered the 
public eye during the Yugoslav period (Niebyl 2020). 
 
When the Homeland War erupted in 1991, anything remotely Yugoslav was seen as a target for 
removal. Guilty by association with the now Serb-centric rump Yugoslav state and the Yugoslav 
People’s Army (JNA), monuments were destroyed in Kamenska (Niebyl 2017b) (Figure 6.11) and 
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Figure 6.11: Monument to the Revolutionary Victory of the People of Slavonia, Kamenska 
   
Above: The Monument to the Revolutionary Victory of the People of Slavonia in Kamenska, dedicated in 1968, 
before and after its destruction by the 123rd Požega Brigade (Croatian Army) in February 1992. Source: Niebyl 
2017a, “Kamenska.” 
 
Throughout the war, smaller memorial placards and monuments faced a similar fate, whether 
through demolition or vandalism, this trend continuing after the war’s end in 1995. Between 1995 
and 2008, four more large spomenici in Petrova Gora (Figure 6.12), Korenica, Drvar and Knin, 
the site of Croatia’s final victory in “Operation Storm” were destroyed, and several more 
abandoned to nature. Many have been defaced with fascist graffiti (Figure 6.13), symbolically 
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Figure 6.12: The abandonment of Petrova Gora  
   
Left: The Monument to the Uprising of the People of Kordun and Banija, showing external stainless steel panels 
stolen since its abandonment, Petrova Gora, 29 August 2019. Right: The former recreational area at the base of the 
monument, with picnic tables still intact, Petrova Gora, 29 August 2019. 
 
Figure 6.13: Fascist graffiti at Yugoslav memorial sites: Petrova Gora, Žažvić, Zrmanja 
     
Left: Ustaša graffiti at the Petrova Gora memorial complex, Petrova Gora, 29 August 2019. Middle: A defaced 
monument to locals killed by the Ustaša in the Second World War, Žažvić, 20 March 2018. Right: A similarly 
defaced and bullet-riddled monument to the 6th Dalmatian Brigade, attacked by German soldiers in October 1943, 
Zrmanja, 19 March 2018. 
 
The purpose of destroying a monument is to condemn what it recalls to oblivion, damnatio 
memoriae (see Whitling 2010). Denying the existence of Croatia’s Yugoslav past meant rejecting 
the values that underpinned post-war Yugoslavia: anti-fascism, anti-nationalism, socialism, 
workers’ self-management, peace, brotherhood and unity. The resurgence of nationalist discourse 
from the mid-1970s in Croatia and in Serbia from the mid-1980s marked the gradual reshaping 
of their respective ethnic identities in opposition to the supranational “Yugoslav” identity that had 
emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War (Godina 2004). Modern Croatian war 
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narratives do borrow heavily in their structure from Yugoslavia – the Homeland War was seen as a 
“liberation” and “defence” from “Greater Serbian aggression,” much as the Second World War 
was a “people’s liberation struggle” from fascism; Croatian “defenders” receive the same elevated 
praise as Tito’s Partisan fighters; the Yugoslav past was an artifice, as the disunity of the South 
Slavs was to the originators of the Yugoslav project. These reformulations seek to replace and 
ultimately eradicate Yugoslavia from the history Croatia has written for itself, in doing so restoring 
a degree of continuity to the “thousand-year dream” of Croatian independence. The memorial 
construction boom in Croatia I have documented throughout this thesis, particularly in the 
aftermath of the Homeland War (see Figures 6.16 and 6.17 below), demonstrates the need to 
reaffirm Croatian identity in physical form through the removal of errant elements of the past that 
challenge its supposed infallibility.  
The Second World War, Croatian Spring and Homeland War all served to crystallise Croatian 
identity around the desire for national autonomy and ultimately for continuity of the millennial 
Croatian state, lost in the creation of the first Yugoslav kingdom in 1918. By framing Yugoslavia, 
primarily in the form of the SFRJ, as a totalitarian state while overlooking the hypertotalitarianism 
of the NDH, which I discuss below, Croatian memory makers today can justify the removal of the 
Yugoslav past from their own view of cultural memory. The extension of this view of all things 
Yugoslavia to all things Serb in the lead up to the Homeland War through the narrative of liberation 
from “Greater Serbian aggression” and Serbs as “enemies” also builds from Starčević’s anti-Serb 
rhetoric from the late Austro-Hungarian period (Trbovich 2008, 136), a dark note ignored in the 
monuments built in his name. As I discussed in Chapter 5, the legacy of this rhetoric has 
manifested in protest against the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in Vukovar in the aftermath of the 
2011 Croatian census, the destruction of socialist monuments to “brotherhood and unity” 
amongst Yugoslavia’s constituent peoples and to the Serb victims of the Homeland War, and the 
refusal by state and municipal authorities to fund the reconstruction of formerly Serb spaces in 
Croatia like Islam Grčki. By defining Croatian identity as what it is not, that is, by refusing to 
incorporate various elements of its past and current realities, those with exercising power over 
memory bolster the need to define the “Other” more clearly than themselves. Rather than 
presenting its unique features – a rich literary, artistic and culinary heritage, for instance – these 
expressions of nationalism in memorial spaces has led to the definition of Croatian identity as one 
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in opposition – against its occupiers, its neighbours, its enemies, and in the case of Yugoslavia, its 
own past. Thus the question remains: what is Croatia? 
Everything (black and) blue: Fascism, conservatism and the modern Croatian state 
The proximity of the fascist past to modern conservatism and of nationalists’ embrace of various 
elements of the NDH legacy in Croatia have been some of the greatest sources of political 
controversy since the country’s accession to the European Union. This proximity has manifested, 
for example, in the presence of HDZ leaders at commemorations of the Bleiburg repatriations, 
public relativisation of the NDH past at sites like Jasenovac and the installation of monuments and 
historical plaques that selectively address the “independence” of the Croatian state during the 
Second World War rather than critically deal with the nature of the state’s government at that time. 
In spite of the inherent polyphony in the creation of a wider cultural conscience, conservative 
voices continue to crowd the field of Croatia’s public mnemonic processes. While this is a result 
of the decades of Croatian resistance to external rule (namely since the mid-nineteenth century), 
national conservatism continues to dominate. How this is reflected in contemporary memory 
practices – for example in the December 2018 dedication of a new memorial to Franjo Tuđman in 
Zagreb – and in political discourse about Croatia’s recent past will be expounded in this section.  
 
The discussion below is divided first into an evaluation of the links between fascism and the current 
conservative view of Croatian identity, as demonstrated through the controversial figure of Alojzije 
Cardinal Stepinac and the memorial landscape developed around him in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. I follow with a parallel example of Franjo Tuđman and how his cult of 
personality during his presidency from 1990 to 1999 has elevated him in the eyes of the HDZ and 
its supporters to an infallible demi-god. This portion of the chapter revisits my research question 
on who has the power to construct divisive memories (as Tuđman himself remains a highly divisive 
figure in Croatia and the former Yugoslavia today) and how such memorial constructs impact the 
public performance of memory. I then end this chapter with the problems Istria presents to the 
conservative narratives of independence and wider of Croatia’s twentieth-century history with 
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Fascism and the Croatian conservative narrative 
The link between modern conservatism and historical fascism in Croatia is murky, yet the public 
embrace of certain elements of the fascist past by political and social actors in and around the HDZ 
and other national conservative parties has become more visible in recent years. Above all, the 
perceived need to justify the existence of the modern independent Croatian state as one with a 
nearly unbroken heritage of independence has led to a brushing aside of the darker elements of 
this legacy. Despite assurances to comply with European memorial norms through membership in 
the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance and similar measures to “download” 
European memory (see Milošević and Touquet 2018), Croatia – through the power of hardened 
nationalists and conservatives -  has resisted a full Europeanisation of its cultural memory vis-à-vis 
the Second World War. 
 
The challenge to Europe’s power over memory in Croatia by conservative actors in politics and 
society has become increasingly evident through post-accession commemorative practices, mostly 
stemming from nationalist narratives underpinning the memory of the Homeland War. The 
gradual removal of all things Yugoslav from the Croatian retelling of its past highlights the power 
of partial remembrance and the performativity of transnational memory-making. Here, I analyse 
Croatian deviation from the framework of European memory of the Holocaust after its 2013 
accession to the European Union and how the use of nominally European narratives has instead 
reinforced divisive, nationalist interpretations of the past.  
 
In the years leading up to and following its EU accession, Croatia has made efforts to conform to 
the European framework of Holocaust remembrance, joining the International Holocaust 
Remembrance Alliance in 2005, and, as illuminated above, celebrating the defeat of 
totalitarianism in Europe. However, conservative forces in Croatia, who have been in power for 
the greatest part since the first multi-party elections in 1990, have used the “European memory 
framework” in a way to advance their own narratives, which have gained wide currency since the 
end of the Homeland War in 1995. In many ways, the narratives that dominate are highly 
masculine, defender-centric and exclude the voices of women, victims and minorities – most 
notably Serbs, as I have argued in Chapter 4 and 5. This begs the question, then, how can Croatia 
both conform to and ignore the European standardisation of memory simultaneously? 
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The mnemonic tensions that exist between Serbia and Croatia can be traced to the Second World 
War, driven primarily by the mass murder of Serb civilians by the Ustaša paramilitaries and in 
NDH-run concentration camps in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. The most notorious 
of these camps, Jasenovac, saw the murder of Serbs, Jews, Roma and opponents of the NDH 
regime, the final tally of victims a source of conflict through present day22. Today, three 
commemorations mark the suffering that occurred in Jasenovac – one hosted by the Croatian 
government, one by the Serb National Council and anti-fascist organisations in Croatia, and one 
by the Jewish community in Croatia and Serbia. The latter two have emerged from a boycott of 
government-sponsored events, which in recent years has funded research that challenges the 
historical understanding of Jasenovac as an NDH camp, instead seeking “evidence” of the camp’s 
continued operation by the Yugoslav government as a prison after the war, a fact that is not 
supported by contemporary research (Milekić 2018c; Milošević and Touquet 2018, 390).  
 
The problematic treatment of the fascist past can be illuminated by a closer examination of one of 
the key figures in the period of NDH rule, Alojzije Cardinal Stepinac, the Archbishop of Zagreb 
from 1937 until his death while under house arrest in Krašić, a village southwest of the capital, in 
1960. Here, I discuss how the mnemonic behaviours regarding Stepinac highlight tensions 
between historical revisionism and the recognition of the dark side of Croatian history. I 
demonstrate these behaviours using monuments dedicated both to Stepinac as a religious figure 
and a symbol of Croatian identity and monuments to the fascist past which represent barriers to a 
holistic appreciation of the legacy of the Croatian pursuit of independence.  
 
Stepinac, as noted in Chapter 2, maintained a relatively close relationship with the NDH 
authorities and the leaders of the Ustaše, supporting the notion of Croatian independence though 
levering some criticism against the regime throughout its rule. While professing loyalty to the 
NDH, he also lamented the destruction of synagogues and appeared to be aware of the crimes 
committed against Jews, Serbs and Roma in Croatia during the Second World War (Tanner 2010, 
                                                
22 The relativizing of the fascist past by the HDZ also mirrors recent actions by the ruling Law and 
Justice (PiS) party in Poland, whose judicial reforms in the mid- to late 2010s have seen a denial 
of Polish complicity in the Holocaust, punishing those who call into question the prescribed victim 
status of all Poles during the Second World War (Bucholc 2019). Despite threats of sanction by 
the European Union, little has been done at the transnational level to force a reversal of this pattern 
of erasure and denial. 
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155-156). Despite his apprehensive nature, Stepinac became a cultural figurehead for his support 
of Croatian independence and a symbol of the importance of the Catholic faith to Croatian identity. 
After the war, the majority of church-held property was nationalised and fascist collaborators 
prosecuted by the Yugoslav authorities, with Stepinac accused of undermining the new state; 
ultimately, he was sentenced to sixteen years’ imprisonment for high treason and war crimes, 
serving all but five years under house arrest (Tanner 2010, 186). Under NDH rule, Serbs and 
Jews, if they were not immediately killed, tortured or deported, were forcibly converted to the 
Catholic faith, marking an unwilling break with their personal, religious and ethnic identities. 
While Stepinac had made attempts to prevent forced conversions from taking place and was 
credited with saving Jewish lives where he could, his power was limited to the churches in his 
diocese, if any, given the unruly nature of the NDH’s administration. Nevertheless, some 240,000 
Serbs, Jews and others had been converted by 1943, including in the Jasenovac camp (Tomasevich 
2001, 541). Stepinac remained a symbolic figurehead, particularly in diasporic communities for 
his prosecution by the Yugoslav authorities, and upon his death, he came to be seen as a martyr, a 
view confirmed through his beatification by Pope John Paul II in 1997 (Vasović 2016). John Paul 
II reiterated that Stepinac was indeed a martyr for the Catholic faith, and his wax effigy was installed 
prominently near the altar of the Zagreb Cathedral. His tomb, designed by renowned Croatian 
artist Ivan Meštrović, was donated by the Croatian Chamber of Commerce in Detroit, Michigan, 
USA, again reinforcing the link between the diaspora and the “homeland.” I documented several 
busts of Stepinac in Benkovac, Gospić, and Obrovac, all installed since Croatian independence 
(Figure 6.14); before the Homeland War, the populations of Benkovac and Obrovac were majority 
Serb, but now Serbs form a small minority23. The installation of monuments to as controversial a 
figure as Stepinac marks another attempt at othering those who fled their homes during the 1940s 
and again in the 1990s and signifies a reclaiming not only of Croatian, but specifically of Croat, 
territory. It, too, demonstrates an uncritical approach to the past that only advances the nationalist 
interest of independence without acknowledging the human cost incurred in the pursuit of this 




                                                
23 For example, in 1991, the population of Obrovac was 75.48% Serb and 17.16% Croat, while in 
2011, the town’s population was 84.0% Croat and 12.8% Serb (DZS RH 2005; 2011). 
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Figure 6.14: Monuments to Alojzije Cardinal Stepinac: Zagreb, Benkovac, Gospić, Obrovac 
   
   
Top left: Memorial engraving on the sarcophagus around the wax effigy of Stepinac, Zagreb Cathedral, 27 August 
2019. Top right: Monument to Stepinac dedicated on 13 May 2017, Benkovac, 20 March 2018. Bottom left: Bust 
of Stepinac with memorial candles, Gospić, 6 August 2017. Bottom right: Monument to Stepinac, featuring 
Croatian pleter pattern around its base, Obrovac, 6 August 2017. 
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Again, this pattern of relativizing Croatia’s tumultuous past by the Croatian government – headed 
once more by the Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, founded by Tuđman in 1989 – fits the 
attempted “national reconciliation” narrative predominant in the 1990s that sought to rationalise 
the NDH/Ustaša regime and demonise the Yugoslav Partisans, the most successful resistance 
force in Europe during the Second World War. Instead of reconciling, however, the government’s 
support of counterfactual research in order to legitimise its own nationalist narrative contradicts 
the European standard of post-nationalism while simultaneously conforming to a wider 
condemnation of the communist era common in Central and Eastern European Union member 
states (see Radonić 2014). The antagonism of Serbs in Croatia by the Croatian government 
perpetuates divisions that in the European Union are actively rebuked.  
 
A further problem that emerges in the contemporary Croatian commemorative process, 
particularly in memorial events held in remembrance of 1995’s Operation Storm in Knin and the 
1991 Siege of Vukovar, through the elevation of the defender narrative is the acceptance and 
promotion of symbols adopted in the course of the Homeland War that recall imagery and slogans 
from the NDH, including the use of Za dom spremni! and the white-then red šahovnica by the 
HOS paramilitary discussed in the previous chapter. “HOS” was also the acronym of the post-
1944 Croatian Armed Forces that existed during NDH rule, its revival during the Homeland War 
inviting continued controversy over the modern state’s relationship to its fascist past. The white-
then-red šahovnica has also been incorporated into memorials to the victims of the Bleiburg 
repatriations and soldiers of the NDH in the Mirogoj cemetery in Zagreb, where they are regularly 
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Figure 6.15: Fascist imagery in NDH memorials, Mirogoj cemetery, Zagreb 
  
Left: The white-then-red šahovnica prominently featured on the monument to the victims of the Bleiburg 
repatriations, 28 August 2019. Right: Memorial cross to the “Croatian soldiers fallen for the Homeland, 1941-
1945,” with similar šahovnica, 28 August 2019. 
 
The relativisation of the fascist past initiated by Tuđman and his supporters from the 1980s 
onward demonstrates the reluctance of Croatia’s conservatives to acknowledge the damaging 
elements of their heritage of independence and continues to challenge European norms of 
memorialising the totalitarian past.  
 
Tuđman: Demagogue and demigod 
The central figure of this conservative identity is undoubtedly former Croatian President Franjo 
Tuđman. Nearly every town I visited had a street named after him, many statues dotted the main 
squares of villages and cities across Croatia, and his positioning as not only a spiritual successor 
but as a total replacement of Josip Broz Tito (military caps and all) is prominently displayed in the 
public sphere. Upon the opening of the new passenger terminal in 2017, Zagreb Airport, too, was 
renamed after Tuđman. As the first democratically-elected president of an independent Croatian 
state, he played a crucial role in revitalising nationalist discourse in spaces where it had been earlier 
silenced. As discussed in Chapter 5, among his key mnemonic ambitions was the “reconciliation” 
of the descendants of fascist and partisan fighters from the Second World War for the sake of the 
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survival of the Croatian nation in the face of “Greater Serbian aggression.” While the principle of 
reconciliation is quintessential to durable peace-making, its implementation in Croatia during and 
after the Homeland War has primarily served to create greater space for division by reopening 
painful questions of national, ethnic, political, social and religious identities. This incorporation 
of the NDH as a “legitimate expression of Croatian statehood” has been seen by the Serb and 
Jewish communities, in contrast to desires of reconciliation, as a provocation (Bellamy 2003, 52). 
My analysis of the proximity of fascist memory to conservative identity today has pointed at some 
of these consequences and their manifestations in memorial form. Here, too, I focus the discussion 
on the cult-like worship of Franjo Tuđman in conservative circles and its implications for the 
creation of contemporary identity in Croatia, again highlighting Tuđman’s elevated role in the 
public face of memory. 
 
“Tuđmanism” as a term describes the set of policies put into place in the 1990s under Tuđman’s 
leadership that aimed at reviving Croatian identity through this “reconciliation” – forcing a false 
equivalence between the totalitarianisms of fascism and communism – and a strong embrace of 
diasporic communities, many of which grew in the aftermath of the Second World War. As a former 
high-ranking communist official purged from the KPJ after his involvement in the Croatian Spring 
movement, Tuđman explored in various texts his vision of Croatian history, in his words a “re-
examination” of the past (Macdonald 2002, 100). This involved controversially challenging 
official victim counts of the Holocaust and the Second World War in Yugoslavia, noted in Chapter 
2 (see Kolstø 2011 and Tuđman 1989). More importantly, however, Tuđman’s outreach to Croat 
communities abroad, most successfully in North America, provided valuable funds for the 
(ultimately partial) realisation of his and the HDZ’s ambitions to forge a new sense of national 
solidarity. The donations proffered by these diasporic communities supported the Croatian war 
effort throughout the Homeland War, and many young men from places like Canada, the United 
States and Australia, who had never been to Yugoslavia, left their homes to fight for the 
independence of their ancestral state. Such émigrés, like Gojko Šušak, an Ottawa pizza shop owner 
whose father and brother fought for the NDH, also served in key government posts during the war, 
in Šušak’s case as Minister of Defence (Macdonald 2002, 100). This connection between the 
Croat diaspora and the Republic of Croatia has been maintained through various associations and 
political linkages today. In 2016, for example, the short-lived Orešković government under 
President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović was led by Canadian pharmaceutical executive Tihomir 
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Orešković until his ousting for his deviation from the HDZ’s expectations of his policymaking in a 
vote of no confidence after just under nine months in office. 
 
Franjo Tuđman’s role as the key statesman of modern Croatian history has faced challenges from 
both the HDZ and Social Democrat governments that emerged after his death in December 1999, 
and many of his nationalist policies were reversed or blocked during a brief wave of 
“detudjmanisation.” In a process that ended quite dissimilarly to destalinisation in the Soviet 
Union during the 1950s, detudjmanisation represented softer attempts to place agency for the 
creation and survival of the Croatian state in the hands of other political and social actors than 
Tuđman alone. The HDZ undertook reforms to move away from its “nationalist authoritarian” 
position of the 1990s to evolve into a more classical conservative party under the leadership of Ivo 
Sanader, Croatian Prime Minister from 2003 to 2009 (Bieber 2017, 50). During this time, the 
HDZ shifted toward a stronger pro-European platform, eschewing the somewhat isolationist 
nationalism of its early years, and though Croatia’s application for EU membership was submitted 
under the SDP government of Ivica Račan, much of the work taken to meet accession criteria was 
undertaken by Sanader’s governments. Sanader, however, was ultimately arrested on corruption 
charges upon his resignation from office in 2009, tarnishing the HDZ’s reputation and reminding 
the electorate of the earlier years of privatisation under Tuđman that concentrated much of the 
state’s production in the hands of a small number of his associates. In the end, Sanader was 
convicted of war profiteering in 2018 and sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison (Ilić 2018).  
 
During the Sanader years, a handful of monuments to Franjo Tuđman were installed across the 
country, yet in the aftermath of Sanader’s fall from grace and the revival of Tuđman’s legacy under 
President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović since Croatia’s accession to the EU, images of Tuđman have 
come back to the foreground of the public face of memory. Figure 6.16 below shows the general 
pattern of monument construction in Croatia from 1990 to 2018, the last year I documented any 
newly dedicated memorials, while Figure 6.17 zooms in on the construction of monuments that 
recall events in the same timeframe, noting the frequency at which busts of Tuđman began to 
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Figure 6.16: Monument construction in Croatia by historical era commemorated, 1990 to 2018 
 
 
Figure 6.17: Construction of monuments to the era of the Republic of Croatia, 1990 to 2018 
 
 
Of the monuments I documented, fifteen were dedicated to Tuđman alone, the most to any one 
individual and primarily in the form of busts with a generally standard appearance and text, often 
“Dr. Franjo Tuđman, first Croatian President, 1990-1999” or some small variation thereupon. 
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The oldest I noted was dedicated in 1999, the year of Tuđman’s death from cancer, built in the 
village of his birth, Veliko Trgovišće. The bust, a simple sculpture of his head on a marble plinth, 
stands outside a reconstructed version of his birth house and childhood home, now a museum 
featuring images of Tuđman and his books in various translations (Figure 6.18). The museum, 
however, is built in an architectural style more reminiscent of the urban bourgeoisie in Zagreb than 
the home of Zagorje peasants, having been built over the decaying remnants of his real home. 
Inside, no mention is made of Tuđman or his father Stjepan’s roles in the Communist leadership 
of Croatia during and after the Second World War. The monument to Stjepan Tuđman and 
Partisan fighters in the main square of Veliko Trgovišće, dedicated in 1965, was added to in 2007 
through funds provided by the HDZ by inscribing the names of defenders from the village who 
“gave their lives for the freedom of Croatia” (Šimičević 2019). 
 
Figure 6.18: Birthplace of Franjo Tuđman, Veliko Trgovišće 
   
Left: Bust of Tuđman. Right: Birth house of Franjo Tuđman, currently housing a small exhibit on his life and 
publications, Veliko Trgovišće, 18 March 2018. 
 
Tuđman’s grave also has become a key memorial site in Zagreb, its central location behind the main 
entrance to the massive Mirogoj cemetery facilitating access. In his lifetime, Tuđman positioned 
himself and was viewed by many as a “messianic type of leader” (Drakulić 2004 [2015], 117) and 
a “demigod” (Jordan 2000), and in death, he has become a mythologised father of the nation, like 
Starčević, Strossmayer, Dobrila and Kvaternik. During each of my three visits to Mirogoj, flowers 
had been freshly lain and memorial candles lit by Tuđman’s grave, and the black marble tomb 
always appeared to have been freshly polished. The grave, one of the largest in the massive 
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cemetery complex, stands in direct line of sight from a memorial sculpture dedicated to the soldiers 
and victims of the First World War, awkwardly placed next to the Bleiburg monument discussed 
in the previous chapter. As with other memorials to Tuđman, the grave simply states, “Dr. Franjo 
Tuđman, 1922-1999, First President of the Republic of Croatia,” with his quote, “Always 
everything for Croatia, and our only and eternal Croatia for nothing [that is, at all cost]!”24 
prominently displayed on the rear in gold block lettering (Figure 6.19).  
 
Figure 6.19: Grave of Franjo Tuđman, Mirogoj cemetery, Zagreb 
   
Left: Grave site with recently lit memorial candles in the colours of the Croatian flag. Right: “Always and everything 
for Croatia…” quote on rear of tomb, Zagreb, 18 July 2017. 
 
Like his grave, other monuments to Tuđman across Croatia are decorated around key holidays, 
particularly on 5 August, the Day of Homeland Victory and Thanksgiving and the Day of Croatian 
Defenders. Some, like the bust in the southern Lika town of Gračac, featured memorial wreaths 
with ribbons in the colours of the Croatian flag. Other monuments similarly decorated have been 
placed in central squares or before important public buildings like schools and municipal offices, 
as in Korenica and Vukovar, and perhaps the most recognisable statue is found atop the Knin 
Fortress, planted where Tuđman stood as he kissed the Croatian flag in a sign of victory after 




                                                
24 Original text in Croatian: “Uvijek i sve za Hrvatsku, a našu jedinu i vječnu Hrvatsku ni za što!”  
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Figure 6.20: Statues of Franjo Tuđman: Gračac, Korenica, Vukovar, Knin 
  
   
Top left: Bust of Tuđman with wreaths and memorial candles, dedicated on 16 October 1999, two months before his 
death, Gračac, 6 August 2017. Top right: Similar bust of Tuđman with fresh flowers, Korenica, 29 August 2019. 
Bottom left: Larger bust of Tuđman on the eponymous Square of Dr. Franjo Tuđman, Vukovar, 2 July 2017. 
Bottom right: Statue of Tuđman atop the Knin Fortress, 31 August 2019. 
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In Zagreb, however, the installation of a sculpture of Tuđman was not possible until December 
2018. Zagreb as the capital and most urbanised region in the country has been a space of more 
progressive politics relative to the more conservative areas in its immediate environs, albeit to a 
lesser degree than longer held bastions of socialist and later social-democratic policy like Rijeka 
and Pula. However, the rather sudden reintroduction of Tuđman to conservative, and ultimately 
national, political and social discourse after the fall of Sanader was mirrored in the local politics of 
the city despite the leadership of former Social Democrat, now populist mayor Milan Bandić. 
While the office of the mayor may act independently in promoting various social and infrastructural 
projects, Bandić’s power is checked by the Zagreb Assembly, a multiparty body elected every four 
years by city residents. While the HDZ represents the third largest voting bloc in the Assembly 
elected in May 2017, after Bandić’s Labour and Solidarity coalition with populists and green 
councillors, and independents, key conservative figures like Zlatko Hasanbegović (eventually 
dismissed from the HDZ) have wielded their power to remake the public face of memory across the 
city. As part of the coalition forged with Bandić (himself a controversial figure for his public 
behaviour and potential corruption allegations), Hasanbegović and the HDZ only agreed to form 
an Assembly majority on the condition that the Square of Marshal Tito was renamed the Square of 
the Republic of Croatia. By removing Tito, space again was created for Tuđman, whose monument 
was dedicated on the nineteenth anniversary of his death on the space one occupied by the “Zagreb 
1094” monument installed on the nine-hundredth anniversary of the city’s founding. Bandić 
himself commissioned the sculpture at a cost of €530,000, including the removal of the Zagreb 
1094 monument to a location two-and-a-half kilometres down the main north-south axis between 
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Figure 6.21: Zagreb 1094 and Franjo Tuđman monuments, Ulica grada Vukovara, Zagreb 
   
Left: The Zagreb 1094 monument prior to its removal, 21 March 2018. Right: The new statue of Franjo Tuđman 
installed in its place, 15 June 2019. 
 
Though Tuđman remains a forceful presence in the mnemonic landscape of Croatia, some 
resistance to his policies and, above all, to his cult of personality remained, particularly in the 
north-western regions of Istria and Kvarner. These areas most notably were not directly impacted 
by the Homeland War until the influx of refugees in the midst of the conflict. The following section 
presents the case of Istria as one that breaks the mould of memorialisation in Croatia, instead 
showing us a space where Yugoslav memory has remained intact or even flourished in the past three 
decades. 
 
Istria and the break from Croatian nationalism  
Despite the prevalence of conservative images of the Croatian nation in the spaces directly 
impacted by the Homeland War, Istria presents itself as a clear exception to the patterns of identity 
making and memorialisation that have been documented elsewhere in the country. When planning 
this research, I initially resisted conducting fieldwork in Istria, given its exclusion from the 
violence of the 1990s. While many refugees and internally displaced persons settled in Istria and 
other regions unscathed by combat, Istria itself was seldom attacked by the JNA or Serb 
paramilitary forces; only the Vrsar airport on the Adriatic coast was carpet bombed in December 
1991, with two deaths reported (La Repubblica 1991). Istria is known, too, as a resilient 
stronghold for left-wing politics, so adding the peninsula to my initial plans would have deflected 
my attention from discovering the “big picture” of the public face of memory in the rest of the 
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country, where visual representation of cultural memory fit neatly into a coherent, national 
narrative of the past. Ultimately, I decided to travel to Pula in May 2019, initially for a long 
weekend on the coast, but as the weather turned sour, I piled once more into my rental car and 
drove around the entire peninsula over four days. As I expected, I discovered many intact 
monuments and historical plaques installed during the Yugoslav period, but what I did not 
anticipate was the degree to which these memorial spaces were actively preserved in recent years. 
 
Over that weekend, I documented an additional 130 monuments, arguably the greatest 
concentration outside of Vukovar or Zagreb and the capital region. Of these, only five were 
constructed after Croatian independence or recall events from 1991 onward, and none made 
reference to people, places or events during the Homeland War. This total rupture from what I had 
seen as standardised memory elsewhere in Croatia was simultaneously bewildering and promising, 
as it indicated a potential future for Croatian memory free of war. While many of the Yugoslav 
monuments, matching the pattern of others across Croatia and the region, were dedicated to the 
fallen fighters and victims of fascist terror from the Second World War, the very fact that no new 
war monuments had been built in over thirty years was one of the greatest excitements of my 
fieldwork. Rather than celebrating soldiers and politicians, newer monuments (that is, post-Tito) 
celebrated famous visitors, artists, authors, race car drivers (Figure 6.22) and charitable grannies 
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Figure 6.22: Istrian non-war monuments: Pula, Opatija, Motovun 
  
 
Top left: Historical plaque marking the visit of Irish author James Joyce to Pula in 1904-05, Pula, 3 May 2019. Top 
right: Sculpture of American-French ballerina Isadora Duncan, Opatija, 6 May 2019. Bottom: Plaque marking the 
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Figure 6.23: Granny Ljubica’s house, Motovun 
 
“Secret history of the Festival” plaque marking the house of Granny Ljubica, the generous host of artists and visitors 
to Motovun, 4 May 2019. My favourite monument. 
 
Istrian identity, like Croatian, has long been resistant to more dominant groups, such as the 
Venetians and the Habsburgs, that formerly controlled the region, and the period of Yugoslav rule 
and the creation of the modern Croatian state have proven little different. Despite the flight of the 
large Italian-speaking population in the aftermath of the Second World War in the face of violent 
reprisals from Yugoslav authorities, Istria remains a multilingual region today, and all town signs 
are printed in Croatian and Italian, with locals sometimes interchanging the names in 
conversation. The regional identity that has developed in Istria over the past century is a result of 
the constant movement of people and empires, ultimately one defining itself through its opposition 
to a “centralizing national core” (Ashbrook 2011, 872). Istrian identity is marked by its “strong 
sense of multiculturality, hybridity, emotional attachment to the territory, and shared, interethnic 
cooperation” (ibid.), in a sense presenting itself as a neat microcosm of the Yugoslav ideal without 
the violence of the past. This multiculturalism, especially when extended to Serbs in Croatia, was 
the very same attacked by Tuđman and the HDZ in its early years, therefore casting Istria as the 
antithesis to Croatian nationalist conservatism. By rejecting such exclusivist nationalism that re-
emerged in the 1960s and came to the fore in the 1990s, Istrian social and political actors sought 
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to preserve the remains of a multi-ethnic state without resorting to violence against the central 
state of which it was nonetheless an integral part. Ashbrook notes, however, that “Istrian 
regionalism is just another of the myriad dividing lines distinguishing one group from another” 
(2011, 887), so while this uniqueness appears inclusive, it belies another boundary between the 
in-group and the “Other.” While tensions remain between regionalists who see Istria as a part of 
Croatia and nationalists seeking either full autonomy (Istrian) or full integration (Croat), as well as 
the pervasive urban/rural divide found elsewhere in Croatia, the way Istria presents itself and its 
identity through the public face of memory challenges the creation of a singular, “Croatian” 
cultural memory.  
 
Yugoslav monuments in Istria, above all, have weathered the past thirty years with little damage, 
certainly unlike that seen in the memorials described above in Dalmatia, Slavonia and Lika that 
have been repeatedly vandalised or destroyed, and some even have been rebuilt or renovated in the 
past decade. More so than in other regions, Istrian monuments to the Yugoslav past (many in 
Italian and Croatian) have been freshly adorned with flowers and wreaths, and the plaques appear 
to be recently polished, as evinced by their clear legibility; Tito’s name has also been preserved in 
















  294 
Figure 6.24: Yugoslav monuments in Istria: Pula, Umag, Vižindana, Plovanija 
    
   
Top left: Memorial plaque in Italian and Croatian dedicated to the victims of Italian militarism of 1920, Pula, 3 May 
2019. Top right: Bilingual street signs at Josip Broz Tito Quay, Umag, 4 May 2019. Bottom left: Freshly lain wreath 
at monument to “fallen fighters and victims of fascist terror,” Vižindana, 4 May 2019. Bottom right: Monument to 
Fallen Soldiers and Victims of Fascism, located at a major traffic intersection near the Croatian-Slovene border, 
Plovanija, 4 May 2019. 
 
The patterns of memorialisation found in Istria suggest greater power of counter-narratives to 
resist mainstream interpretations of the past found elsewhere in Croatia. The recent wave of 
“retudjmanisation,” however, does appear to limit the potential spread of this sort of 
Yugonostalgia that has been preserved in Istria, but the January 2020 election of former Prime 
Minister Zoran Milanović (SDP) as Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović’s successor may signal yet another 
turn away from the virulent nationalism of the past.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has presented what I suggest are the core elements of contemporary Croatian identity 
as they are reflected in its public memorial spaces. Each section demonstrated various constituent 
concepts that have been incorporated into monuments, museums and commemorative events 
across the country, predominantly under the leadership of Franjo Tuđman and the HDZ from the 
1990s onward. This structure also allowed me to address various core research questions through 
an analysis of various monuments and memorial practices around key historical events or 
personalities, like Alojzije Cardinal Stepniac and Franjo Tuđman. 
 
“Something old” highlighted the minimal role ascribed to the first nine-hundred of the thousand-
years of Croatia’s millennial statehood narrative. Though monuments have been built in memory 
of the early medieval kings and to the cultural figures active during Hungarian rule from the twelfth 
century onwards, little of the social heritage of that era has been incorporated into contemporary 
Croatian identity and cultural memory. Here, I addressed my fifth research question, “How do 
processes of social differentiation elevate or exclude specific historical narratives from 
commemorative processes?” by demonstrating how Croatian identity has been one historically 
defined by its opposition to external forces, whether French, Austro-Hungarian, Yugoslav or 
ultimately Serb. In doing so, I advance my arguments on the process of “othering” as a compontent 
of memory and identity formation by providing physical examples of the selective incorporation of 
particular narratives favourable to holders of the power over memory. 
 
“Something new” similarly suggested that newer elements of Croatian identity, acquired through 
its accession to the European Union in July 2013, are also downplayed through the power 
structures over memory in place since the Homeland War, in doing so providing space for the 
relativisation of past crimes committed in the name of the Croatian nation. The manipulation of 
the European anti-totalitarian narrative has manifested itself in the memorialisation of the victims 
of the Bleiburg repatriations by public officials, whose presence at controversial ceremonies 
exacerbate extant tensions between Serb, Jewish and Croat communities. Such twisting of 
historical narratives, I argue, represents an abuse of memory as it advances an untruthful image of 
the fascist past and the institutions of the NDH as preservers of Croatian statehood rather than as 
perpetrators of a genocide under a totalitarian regime, instead spreading blame to the SFRJ. This 
addresses my third research question on memory abuse itself and how resistance to certain forms 
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of memorialisation, in this case European, appear in post-conflict settings like Croatia. I show how 
the malleable nature of memory, especially in stages of transition, allows memory to be abused in 
this manner. 
 
The fate of Yugoslav memory discussed in “Nothing borrowed?” reinforces this understanding of 
the Croatian use of the European anti-totalitarianism narrative. Here, I address my second 
research question on the interrelations between power, memory, identity and violence and their 
visual manifestations in Croatia by showing how the memory of the Yugoslav past has been 
ignored, if not forcefully removed, by those seeking to construct a nationalist past free of the 
“blemishes” of the socialist period. Nonetheless, much of the framework of contemporary cultural 
memory in Croatia derives from the patterns of memorialisation that emerged in the aftermath of 
the Second World War. Despite best efforts to deny, erase or destroy this legacy, Yugoslavia was 
as much a part of Croatia as Croatia a part of Yugoslavia, and this is reflected in today’s mnemonic 
landscape. 
 
Finally, in “Everything (black and) blue,” I also address this second research question on power 
and memory and have shown how Croatia’s conservatives and nationalists (which represent a near 
total overlap of political communities) seek to preserve the continuity of the narrative of millennial 
independence as a means of strengthening the collective national identity (see Sani et al. 2007). 
This, unfortunately, has forced the relativisation and disarming of the fascist past as a minor 
aberration rather than a consequence of genocidal manifestations of nationalism that trace their 
origins in part to nineteenth-century literary-cum-political movements promoting the creation of 
a Croatian identity defined in opposition to Hungarians, Habsburgs, and ultimately Serbs, Jews 
and Roma.  
 
The inclusion of Istria as a unique point of contrast to the predominant nationalist interpretations 
of the past served as an anchor for the conclusion of this thesis. Though Istria remains a bastion of 
Yugoslav memory, the upkeep of monuments from the mid-twentieth century is not enough to 
fundamentally challenge the framework of cultural memory that has emerged elsewhere in Croatia 
since 1991, 1995 or even 2013. Nevertheless, it represents one of a handful of powerful counter-
narratives that have developed as a form of resistance to the nationalist discourse of the HDZ and 
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the branitelji, who, as I have argued throughout this work, still hold the most power over memory 
and its institutions.  
 
While others, including the FRAMNAT research group and Donald Niebyl in his Spomenik 
Database project, have documented commemorations and monuments in Croatia and elsewhere 
in the former Yugoslavia, my work in this chapter as in Chapters 4 and 5 has gone beyond specific 
commemorative practices toward both the Second World War and the Homeland War to give as 
holistic an impression of how Croatia’s “public face of memory” appears. Here, I have shown how 
narrative continuities have been forged by groups exercising some degree of power over cultural 
memory and the construction of Croatian or other identities throughout the twentieth and twenty-
first centuries. This reinforces the argument I made in Chapter 1 that, at least in Croatia, no 
common, collective memory (as defined by Halbwachs [1941, 1952] 1992) has emerged but 
rather various iterations of cultural memory, defined by political affiliation, ethnic or religious 
background, sexuality or any other constructed boundary, exist, clash and overlap. The “public 
face of memory” is indeed made up of many individual faces, but by taking stock of what all can be 
and is still remembered through my approach to this thesis, I have demonstrated how power and 
violence play transformative roles in determining the outward appearance of Croatia’s mnemonic 
landscape.  
 
The conclusion revisits possible alternatives to mainstream memory discourses in Croatia, 
presents the lingering challenges to resolving mnemonic tensions in the former Yugoslavia and 
offers a somewhat hopeful - but hesitant - look toward the future of memory and identity in Croatia. 
★	
	 	
  298 
  

















  300 
 
Source: Flickr user Emily Soljic (2013). Plaque outside Tito’s bunker, Konjic, Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
 
Forward to the futuristic past 
The history of Croatia is a complicated story of the peoples, places, events and ideas that have in 
one way or another contributed to the creation of a modern state premised on an age-old belief in 
its millennial independence. How this history is reflected in memorial spaces across the country 
speaks volumes to the patterns of remembrance – and forgetting – established, adapted or 
eliminated by various social groups over time. Ultimately, this thesis has been an examination of 
memory and the consequences of violence on mnemonic communities in one country at one 
particular time in its long history, but the wider significance of this research can be demonstrated 
through the application of theories on memory, power, violence and identity to empirical studies 
of transient objects and spaces, like monuments and commemorations. Here, I revisit the original 
ambitions of this research and provide answers to the questions that guided my work over the past 
four years, discuss in greater detail its social and political implications and suggest routes for the 
afterlife of this project, while acknowledging the various limitations that emerged in the process.  
 
Revisiting the research questions 
At the start of my work, I wanted to know if memory could be “abused,” as suggested by Todorov 
(1995), and if so, how, why and by whom. However, answering this question necessitated a wider 
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exploration of the nature of memory and how it is created by or itself creates identity, power in 
various forms and, ultimately, violence. The use of Croatia as a case study of living, post-conflict 
memory allowed me to address the research questions that I posed around the role of memory in 
shaping identity and effecting social change, for better or worse. These were namely: 
 
• How is memory visualised in public spaces, and how does the construction of particular 
monuments or the commemoration of certain events reflect social behaviours toward the 
past?  
• How does Croatia’s visual culture of remembrance illustrate the relationships between 
power, violence, memory and identity? 
• How, and by whom, is memory constructed to perpetuate social divisions, based on 
nationality, ethnicity or religion?  
• Using a concept of “memory abuse” in post-conflict settings, what are the normative 
expectations of remembrance and what form does resistance to specific memorialisations 
take? 
• How do processes of social differentiation elevate or exclude specific historical narratives 
from commemorative processes? 
 
To put a quick answer to another question that has been in the background of this research since 
its inception, “Can memory be abused?” Yes. But given the subjective nature of memory and its 
roots in social interactions rather than individual recollections, a more appropriate answer is the 
German jein, more an “it depends” than strictly “yes and no.” To give a more thorough answer, I 
turn to the first inquiry, “How is memory visualised in public places, and how does the 
construction of particular monuments or the commemoration of certain events reflect social 
behaviours toward the past?” The diverse representations of cultural memory – monuments, 
museums, street art and commemorative events – I discuss in this thesis demonstrate just some of 
the many ways how memory is visualised in public settings. That is, the “public face of memory” is 
a composite image of what is deemed memorable by various actors with some degree of influence 
over the construction, repurposing or destruction of memorial sites. It is also a dynamic image 
shaped by competing narratives of the past, each of which leaves its own mark on the ground, on a 
wall or in a museum when and where possible. This ability to influence visual representations of 
the past signals the “power over memory” (Müller 2009) that is a crucial piece of the identity-
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making process, as noted in Chapter 1. My substantive analyses of the public face of memory in 
Croatia in Chapters 4 to 6 suggest that the strategic use of religious, ethnic or other group symbols 
in memorial spaces allows such groups to reaffirm and to legitimise their own identities and to 
forge narrative links to a remote past, outside the realm of living memory. Certain elements of that 
past and monuments recalling people or events that have since fallen out of favour may be rejected, 
revised or erased, as has been the case in Croatia since the 1990s coming to terms with its 
experience as a sub-state political unit in various iterations of “Yugoslavia” during the twentieth 
century. The fight for independence during the 1991-1995 Homeland War then marks a turning 
point away from the rejected Yugoslav past and occupies today the greatest share of the Croatian 
public face of memory. This is physically reflected in the construction of hundreds of monuments 
to the “defenders” of the Croatian nation, a new victor celebrated by nationalist and conservative 
actors who are able to exercise considerable power over the content of public-facing cultural 
memory.  
 
This leads immediately to my second question, “How does Croatia’s visual culture of 
remembrance illustrate the relationships between power, violence, memory and identity?” 
Memory is dependent on social context for meaning and, as Halbwachs argued (1925; [1941] 
1971), individual memory, if it exists, is informed inherently by external forces and values. Gaining 
power over memory (see Müller 2009) allows social actors – in the case of Croatia, most notably 
defenders’ associations and the HDZ – to mould cultural memory in ways that suit their visions of 
the world and narratives of the past. In Chapter 1, I suggested how the transitions between various 
forms or manifestations of memory create spaces for interventions by various actors who may 
exercise power to “reconstruct” memory in their own ways. These forms of memory include those 
presented by Aleida Assmann (1999; 2006) and Jan Assmann (2000; with Tonio Hölscher, 
1988), namely communicative, cultural and collective. As noted, it is difficult to argue that 
“collective memory” as a term is suitable to address intergroup forms of memory that depend on 
the ability to reconcile conflicting visions of the past; rather, “transcultural” memory (see Erll 
2011), one that builds from these multiple, co-existing “cultural” memories, serves as a more 
fitting analytical concept. The “malleable” and “plastic” features of memory (J. Assmann and 
Hölscher 1988, 13) give way to misappropriations of historical events as fodder for present 
grievances, as employed by nationalist causes in Serbia, Croatia and elsewhere in the former 
Yugoslavia in the build up to its destruction in the 1990s. This, then, necessitated an examination 
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of how memory can be used in violent ways or how historical narratives are informed by violence. I 
argued that violence, seen as a scale of “diverse practives” that ultimately inflict harm (Malešević 
2017b, 10), can be used by those with relative power over memory as a transformative force to 
assure the power of the group (in its identity, its memories, and so on) to endure (Hearn 2018). 
Cultural memory can be used in these instances as a motivating factor to persuade others to act in 
ways to avenge perceived historical grievances, as my discussion of the links between the memories 
of the Second World War and the Homeland War, in particular of the mnemonic behaviours 
around the NDH and the Ustaše, demonstrates. Further, the blurring of lines between victim and 
victor in the context of the Croatian branitelji, as I discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, has shown how 
this interplay of power, memory, violence and identity is manifested in the form of monuments and 
commemorations.  
 
Legitimising violence temporally distant from the origins of these grievances represents an abuse 
of memory, as using memory to beget further suffering rather than to preserve stories and spaces 
from the past is manifestly dangerous and unnecessary. I argue that memory studies ought to 
represent a form of activism rather than a field of passive observers who only seek to document and 
rationalise such abuses, although I am aware that this is not a consensus view (see Gutman 2017; 
Rigney 2018). Nonetheless, it is important to identifty how the exercise of power directly impacts 
group identity, which in and of itself may be a source of power to be further exercised in the process 
of memory formation. As Foucault argues and as I demonstrate through the application of my 
model of memory, identity and violence from Chapter 1 in my empirical analyses in Chapters 4 to 
6, power is productive (Foucault 1978). Violence, itself an exercise of power, serves as a 
transformative, or as Bergholz states, “generative” (Bergholz 2016), force in the formation of 
national identity. Memorials marking violent pasts also mark mnemonic territories and reinforce 
the boundaries between the in-group and the “Other,” thus perpetuating this cycle. 
 
To address memory abuse empirically, though, is different than doing so theoretically. I proceed 
here to the fourth research question, which framed much of my documentary work in Croatia of 
memorial spaces and events, that is, “Using a concept of ‘memory abuse’ in post-conflict 
settings, what are the normative expectations of remembrance and what forms does 
resistance to specific memorialisations take?” Not all monuments, museums, street art, public 
commemorations or press outlets are accorded the same value as the other, and this is reflected in 
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the “public face of memory,” an analytical concept I developed to capture the visual elements of 
Croatian cultural memory. The public face of memory is what we are allowed to see, hear, taste, 
smell or touch – the text and design of monuments, the layout and content of museums, the flags, 
shirts and banners participants wear to mass commemorations of the Homeland War, and the tone 
of their speech as they remember the past. Memory construction itself is a constantly evolving 
process that depends on relative balances of power between politicians – domestic or international 
– and civilians, in the case of Croatia, also adding in former combatants as influential gatekeepers 
of public memory. Through the intentional inclusion of certain voices and the exclusion of others 
(for example, of civilian war victims, Serbs, Jews, women or LGBT+) in memorial spaces, the 
potential for memory abuse and the incitement of violence against the outgroup(s) grows. While 
external influences like European norms of Holocaust remembrance or non-governmental pacifist 
coalitions can challenge such manipulations from afar, they can just as easily be ignored, as my 
study of the Croatian adoption of the “anti-totalitarian” narrative in Chapter 6 has demonstrated.  
 
Abuse is in the eye of the beholder. In Chapter 1, I acknowledged the normative positioning of the 
concept of “memory abuse” but maintained that it is adamant we take steps to mitigate violent uses 
of the past to justify present and future harm, and this term is one that further widens the 
perspective of memory studies in the realm of sociology and psychology. Abuse is a process and a 
spectrum, not just a static injury; in the context of my research, then, I aruge that the wider patterns 
of behaviour that allow for historical revisionism and fascist apologia by public figures represent a 
form of “memory abuse.” These figures wield great power over memory and use that position to 
strengthen boundaries of identity between their in-group (Croats, nationalists, patriots) and the 
“Other” – most clearly in this case study in the form of Serbs. The process of othering, I argued, 
is itself violence, as violence begins where unity forcibly ends, and this has had injurious results in 
spaces like Vukovar that continue to the present day. 
 
Resistance was documented in the form of counter-narratives to the prevailing vision of Croatian 
cultural memory as primarily shaped by the defenders and the HDZ. The case of Istria most clearly 
demonstrated that wide-spread opposition to more destructive and exclusive forms of nationalism 
is possible, which challenges to those narratives by civil society groups and even former defenders, 
like Marko, further underpin. However, resistance to normative expectations of memory can also 
be seen in the continued commemoration of the victims of the Bleiburg repatriations, mostly 
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Ustaše soldiers who fought for the establishment of an ethnically pure Croatian state, premised on 
the eradication of Serbs, Jews, Roma and other minorities. Despite the nature of the NDH as a 
totalitarian, puppet regime of the Axis powers, much of the dark part is brushed aside for sake of 
narrative continuity of the “millennial” Croatian state, as espoused by Petra, the museum guide at 
the Memorial Centre of the Rocket Attacks in Zagreb and, more crucially, demonstrated by the 
support of state officials for the continued relativisation of the fascist past. This and the historical 
revision surrounding the nature of the Jasenovac concentration camp as described in Chapters 5 
and 6 fly in the face of European norms of Holocaust memory, to which Croatia subscribed as part 
of its EU accession process. 
 
Again, the struggle between subjective truths and objective facts is blurred where an imbalance of 
power can lead to a brushing under the rug of those objective facts that threaten the subjective 
truths. Relevant to this discussion is the relativisation of the fascist past in Croatia as one that, 
despite its genocidal consequences, was one that “preserved” Croatian independence, one of the 
core elements of this national identity. This, then, necessitated a more thorough, empirical 
examination of war memory in Croatia and the development of my third research question, “How, 
and by whom, is memory constructed to perpetuate social divisions, based on nationality, 
ethnicity or religion?” 
 
In the past, the forced erasure of national identity within Yugoslav spaces acted to solidify a new, 
Yugoslav identity, in line with socialist ideals of brotherhood and unity, but the manner in which 
cultural memory was shaped in the aftermath of the Second World War did exacerbate unresolved 
tensions that emerged in the course of violence. Bergholz (2016) has demonstrated how violence 
as worked as a “generative force” in dividing and hardening identities in the case of Kulen Vakuf 
(BiH). I widen my own analyses to incorporate cultural memory of the kinds of violence he 
described, showing how it is not just violence in the instant but also cultural memories of violence 
that generate and consolidate identities in this way. The critical factor in constructing divisive 
memories is to identify one or more “enemies” perceived as a clear and present danger to the 
existence of the group to be defended. Using first Yugoslavia and later Serbs and Serbia as 
collective scapegoats for all of Croatia’s harms in the past, those with relative power over memory 
have crafted the content of cultural memory around such a narrative of opposition. While 
monuments built during the socialist Yugoslav era clearly deflect from such narratives (partly as 
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those who espoused them were imprisoned in the immediate post-war era), newly dedicated busts 
and plaques across the country decry the criminal acts of the communist state and, in the case of 
Croatia after the Homeland War, of “Greater Serbian aggressors.” The standardisation of memory 
since the 1990s to conform to conservative views of the nation and of its long and complicated 
history (see Chapter 6) has only furthered these tensions by excluding the voices of Serb victims, 
and of civilian victims more generally (Chapter 5), and by presenting an overtly masculine image 
of the “Homeland,” despite the contributions of women to its survival (Chapter 4).  
 
To answer “who exercises the power,” then, I looked at the structure of power in place at the time 
various monuments were constructed and more directly, where possible, at who funded their 
construction and designed or sculpted the statues that have come to dot both the physical and 
mnemonic landscape of Croatia. In the context of Homeland War memory, it was defenders’ 
associations and the HDZ that exercised the greatest power over the construction of Croatian 
identity through the strategic funding of memorial sites and public commemorations of the 1990s 
conflicts to assure the perpetuation of their narratives of the past. The matter of memory’s public 
performance, however, was more closely addressed by my case studies of the commemorations of 
1995’s Operation Storm in Knin and the fall of Vukovar by JNA forces and Serb paramilitaries in 
1991. The comparison of these two cases has shown that, despite their difference in tones and 
speeches, defender groups, the Catholic Church and conservative politicians have done the most 
to construct the narratives around the Homeland War that continue to be rehearsed in these annual 
performances of memory. The installation of provocative monuments or the refusal to invest in 
social infrastructure in spaces formerly (and still marginally) populated by Serbs in Croatia also 
demonstrates how certain memories can be constructed to perpetuate the social divisions between 
Serbs and Croats in the post-war era.  
 
This leads finally to the question, “How do processes of social differentiation elevate or exclude 
specific historical narratives from commemorative processes?” In Chapter 5, I discussed how 
the voices of civilian victims, and of Serbs in particular, were left out of the wider picture of 
Croatian post-conflict memory, which can be attributed to the desire of those with the power over 
memory to avoid public contradictions to their narratives. The elevation of the defenders through 
their symbiotic relationship with the HDZ in the early years of the Republic of Croatia, most 
crucially under the leadership of Franjo Tuđman, left little room for any form of “counter-memory” 
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(Foucault 1980) or “counter-narrative” (Y. Zerubavel, 1995) to emerge in the public sphere. The 
heavy reliance on the process of othering to exclude perceived “enemies” or “traitors,” here 
recalling the extreme reaction of local politicians to the Youth Initiative for Human Rights’ 
#ISPRIKE campaign, has reaffirmed the conservative vision of the Croat(ian) nation as the state’s 
sole source of legitimacy. Other challenges to the defender-centric narrative of the Homeland 
War, including the EU’s demand that the Croatian government ensure the handover of “heroes” 
indicted by the ICTY for war crimes, were met with severe backlash and intense protests 
throughout the 2000s and into the last decade, as further evinced by the reaction to Bojan 
Glavašević’s claim that Serb victims of the war be treated on equal terms as their Croat neighbours. 
As these critical elements of civil society do not conform to the vision of the nation by such 
powerholders, they are cast aside and excluded from the mainstream commemorative process. 
Only in recent years has significant work been undertaken by these marginalised groups to 
demonstrate their exclusion, as the counter-commemorations of the Jasenovac concentration 
camp and of Operation Storm in Uzdolje and Busije (though the latter is more a project of the 
Serbian state) show. As I discuss below, however, there is hope that such treatment of marginalised 
groups, including women, LGBT+, ethnic minorities and reconciliatory voices more widely, will 




The focus of much of my analysis has been on objects and spaces, rather than people, but these 
monuments, fortresses, battlefields, museums, train stations, parks and squares have been built by 
and for people. Their use, abuse, repurposing or destruction illuminate patterns of the past, 
present and future and demonstrate the critical importance of visual studies of memory to 
understanding its construction and role in shaping social identities. Memorial spaces, I contend, 
are equally as important piece of social infrastructure as roads, schools and hospitals, as they reflect 
who we are and what we believe, but they are often overlooked as they are seldom sought out, at 
least in the Croatian case. Obscured placards stand above new cinemas, and rural museums must 
rely on state support to stay alive. This, however, does not mean that their existence is meaningless 
– these spaces were created for a reason, and it is necessary for those reasons to be documented, 
as I have tried to show throughout this work.  
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The two major contributions to the field of memory studies and of sociology more widely I make in 
this work are the reintroduction of the term “memory abuse” for the theoretical examination of the 
interactions between power, memory, violence and identity and the methodological concept of the 
“public face of memory,” around which much comparative empirical work can be framed. Memory 
abuse combines various conceptual elements, most crucially the sociological visions of violence 
(Foucault 1978; Malešević 2013; 2017b) and memory (A. Assmann 1999; 2006; J. Assmann 
2000), to envision a process of manipulating historical narratives to force violence on the present 
or future. It is also a tool for memory activists to identify and address wrongdoings by those with 
the power over memory (see Gutman 2017) or those who desire to exercise even more power in 
order to secure their own identities through harmful means (Hearn 2018). The importance of this 
term has only become more evident to me throughout the course of my research given the rapid 
dissolution of political accord in Europe and the United States since I began my studies in 2016. 
The Trumpian slogan “Make America Great Again” only strengthens the link between memory of 
the past and action of the present by suggesting to an easily suggestible audience that the present 
is the “Other” and those progressives who have contributed to the modern world are the “enemy.” 
I witnessed similar rhetoric in the campaign for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the 
European Union from 2015 onward, where legal guardians of the state were slandered as 
“enemies of the people,” where necessary institutions of functional democracy, however flawed, 
were also framed as the “Other,” the undesirable. The memories of a past empire – one built on 
oppression and exploitation – were invoked to create a “brighter” future for Britain, but this vision 
of the world could only be realised through division and violence, and Jo Cox’s future was stolen 
as a result. 
 
The second major contribution of this work, the “public face of memory,” presents researchers 
opportunities to frame analyses of memory around its visual manifestations. The approaches to the 
public face of memory, however, can be drawn not only from visual sociology, but also from politics 
(keeping in mind the question of power), psychology (gauging individuals’ reactions to the visual), 
history (tracing the origin and adaptations of monuments) and, perhaps more obviously, the world 
of art and activism, where my project emerged. The documentation of the public face of memory 
itself presents new methodological opportunities for a wide range of scholars and activists, either 
through random acts of “monument hunting” or more systematic investigations of local 
monuments, museums and commemorations; this project relied on a blend of both approaches, 
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the former along rural roads and the latter in more urban settings. More importantly, this project 
has resulted not only in this thesis but also in an interactive map of the 614 monuments I 
documented and a thorough accompanying database with thousands of cells recording the 
condition, text, origin and political context of each monument (see Appendix 4). This work, 
however, was not comprehensive, as to capture the entire public face of memory, an ever-changing 
entity, would require a much greater project team and visiting every single last village in Croatia to 
document even the smallest of monuments. In later work, I hope to develop this database into a 
public resource to preserve these historical sites for posterity lest they disappear forever, 
something that has been similarly undertaken (and more successfully) on the Yugoslav spomenici 
by Donald Niebyl and his Spomenik Database, an invaluable resource for my own project.  
 
In total, this thesis advances sociological considerations on cultural memory and its construction 
and destruction by zooming in on a case study of public, post-conflict memory that shares 
characteristics with other post-conflict settings both in its immediate vicinity and (much) further 
afield. I have given extensive attention to Müller’s concept of “power over memory” (2009), which 
plays a central role in my vision of memory abuse and its real-world implications on social 
identities. By combining the visual with the theoretical, I have shed light on the processes of 
commemoration and identified key actors in determining the content and repercussions of cultural 
memory, no matter how deleterious, in a defined space or community. 
 
Of course, my work is limited in that I have only looked at the public face of memory, as it is the 
most physically demonstrative form of memory that one can study. However, addressing how 
public performances of memory reflect other social phenomena like the process of identity 
formation and the exercise of power in the transitions between forms of memory, is a key area in 
which sociologists can contribute to the ever-growing field of memory studies. Given the politics 
of power over memory in shaping its public face, that is, a series of decisions made at an outward-
facing level, we have to question what the content of private faces of memory is. While private, 
communicative memory can become public through various negotiations of power and 
publication, for the most part, what we see in the streets is not wholly representative of personal 
remembrances of the past. Some of the conversations with museum guides, former combatants or 
friends I have included in this thesis point at the multidimensional nature of memory and highlight 
the problem of focusing on just one of its forms. My decision to look at the public face of memory 
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was in part inspired by the demand for more visual research on the topic but also in part by my 
limited ability to communicate in naški. Incorporating structured or semi-structured interviews 
into this research would have required additional years of language training or costly translations 
and transcriptions, which I could not afford during this project.  
 
However, that I could at least read and write Croatian to an intermediate level did allow me to 
satisfactorily complete the work I set out for myself in documenting memorial spaces and events. 
This helped me to provide an additional contribution to the preservation of historical memory 
through the development of an ever-evolving database of monuments and street art in Croatia, 
which I hope will continue to serve as an archive for others to continue this study of public memory 
in Croatia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. There is nonetheless great work on 
communicative memory of the war, even if it is not framed as such, undertaken by native speakers 
that is published in English to bring attention to the conflicted nature of memory in Croatia and 
the former Yugoslavia to a wider audience (see, for example, Sokolić 2017). 
 
At the outset of this research, I wanted to conduct more comparative work between Serbia and 
Croatia to highlight how their respective “Other” is framed in memorial spaces and public 
commemorations of their shared pasts. This proved untenable given the extent of fieldwork needed 
in Croatia alone, but the detail I was able to achieve in a single country study of memory has created 
a solid framework for comparative work within and beyond the region.  
 
Remaining challenges 
Combatting memory abuse remains one of the greatest challenges to post-conflict societies still 
burdened with the legacy of past violence, and future research should aim to develop clear, 
actionable strategies for the third sector to identity, address and rectify malicious attempts to 
rewrite history in ways that hinder constructive dialogue. Memory abuse is most visible in 
contemporary commemorative events, particularly in Croatia, where symbols of the past clash with 
modern aspirations and the demand to come to terms with historical injustices. As I acknowledge 
in Chapter 1, memory and memory abuse are two loaded, emotional concepts that demand a 
thorough examination of their constituent parts, not just of the visual. My work here has just 
scratched the surface of the issues that manipulations of memory reveal, in one country, at one 
particular time span. By engaging with a wider array of stakeholders in the commemorative 
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process, not just the memory entrepreneurs in Zagreb, Belgrade, Brussels or other seats of power, 
we can try to prevent or mitigate some of the suffering that results from the exclusion of the weak 
and voiceless.  
 
Throughout my research, I have attempted to document as many historical sites as possible for 
posterity, lest they disappear in the near future. However, more work could be done on 
documenting the stories of the witnesses who can still tell them, and several project have already 
taken action to do so. These include the “Croatian Memories: Unveiling Personal Memories on 
War and Detention” project by Croatian NGO Documenta, which has developed an extensive 
video archive of testimonies from detainees and their family members, including personal 
recollections of the Second World War and the Homeland War; the documentary work of the 
FRAMNAT research group from 2014 to 2019, which I have cited throughout this thesis; the 
Post-Conflict Research Center’s “Ordinary Heroes” video series and educational outreach 
programme, retelling tales of rescuers and active bystanders during the wars in Bosnia-
Herzegovina; anti-war activism of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights and the Women in Black; 
and the cross-community work of the Image of War Photography Museum in Zagreb. 
 
Final word 
Balancing the demand to remember with the needs of the present and hopes for the future is a task 
not to be undertaken lightly. While the current political climate worldwide might lead some to 
despair, there is always hope that counter-narratives that seek to correct historical injustices and 
create spaces for mutual recognition of shared, traumatic pasts will prevail, something desperately 
needed not only in Croatia but in many other post-conflict spaces facing present threats from past 
harm. 
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Epilogue 
“The Story about the Enemies,” Siniša Glavašević (1960-1991), Voices from Vukovar 
 
Image: Vukovar, July 2017.  
 
Life is full of puzzles, but what is most puzzling is how a friend becomes an enemy. Have you ever 
thought about how it’s easier to make a friend than an enemy? I wanted my whole life long to be 
surrounded by good, diligent people who are respected and loved. Luck was on my side, at least 
until now. I stayed in the ruins of Vukovar but with people with their heads held high. Many of 
these people I have never met in my life. Many of them were unaware of their own strength until 
yesterday. Believe me – the most beautiful thing that can happen to you in Vukovar is to enter a 
room full of people who all know you and greet you.  
 
You often don’t know it, but it happens that your greetings, your honest and well-intended wishes 
stay in the shadow of someone’s hate. The only thing that you can do is to ask if you have deserved 
it. On the one hand, that won’t impair the existing animosity, but it will lessen your worry, and it 
can happen that hate erupts into anger and turns itself into ash, into nothing. It can happen that 
the darkness suffocates every hateful thought.  
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But that can only happen when there is a little love in this world.  
 
Therefore, if you have love in you, don’t use it sparingly. Share it, give a bit of your love to the 
person nearest you, and there will be fewer enemies. That’s enough for the beginning. 
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Figure 4.10 
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Appendix 1: Field visit itineraries  
 
1. 7 – 14 May 2017  
A. Dubrovnik 
 







3. 1 – 11 August 2017 
A. Split 
B. Šibenik/Raslina/Varivode/Central and Nothern Dalmatia 
C. Knin/Biočić/Pakovo Selo 
D. Gospić/Smiljan/Veliki Žitnik/Korenica/Udbina/Gračac/Obrovac/Lika region 
E. Maslenica/Islam Grčki/Islam Latinski 
F. Vis 
 
4. 20 August – 3 September 2017 
A. Zagreb 
B. Jasenovac/Pakrac/Podgarić/Bjelovar 
C. Vinkovci/Vukovar/Eastern Slavonia and Syrmia 




H. Stari Grad (Hvar) 
 
5. 14 – 23 November 2017 
A. Zagreb 
B. Slavonski Brod 
C. Vukovar 
D. Osijek/Đakovo/Beli Manastir/Našice/Eastern Slavonia and Syrmia 
 
6. 14 – 22 March 2018 
A. Zagreb 
B. Vukovar/Ilok/Eastern Slavonia and Syrmia 
C. Virovitica/Koprivnica/Varaždin/Northern, Western and Central Slavonia 
D. Vidovec/Kumrovec/Karlovac/Rastoke/Rakovica 
E. Knin/Kijevo/Krka National Park 
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F. Benkovac 
 
7. 8 – 13 May 2018 
A. Dubrovnik 
 
8. 12 – 14 October 2018  
A. Zagreb 
 
9. 3 – 6 May 2019 
A.  Southern Istria: Pula, Barban, Kanfanar 
B. Western Istria: Buje, Umag, Poreč, Rovinj 
C. Northern Istria: Plovanija, Motovun, Buzet, Pazin 
D. Eastern Istria: Labin, Opatija 
 
10. 13 – 17 June 2019 
A. Zagreb 
 
11. 27 August – 3 September 2019 
A. Zagreb 
B. Lasinja/Vojnić/Petrova Gora/Vojnić/Udbina 
C. Vir/Nin 
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Appendix 2: Museum visits, May 2017 to August 2019  
 
1. Srđ Fortress, Dubrovnik, exhibit on Homeland War in Dubrovnik – May 2017 
2. Memorial Centre for the Homeland War, Vukovar – July 2017 
3. Croatian History Museum, Zagreb, exhibit on Homeland War in Dubrovnik (truncated 
version of display in Srđ Fortress) – July 2017 
4. St. Michael’s Fortress, Šibenik – August 2017 
5. Museum of Yugoslavia, Belgrade – August 2017 
6. Vukovar City Museum – August 2017 
7. Jasenovac Memorial Museum – August 2017 
8. Hrvatski dom Glina – August 2017 
9. Sisak City Museum – August 2017 
10. Karlovac City Museum – August 2017 
11. Memorial Centre for the Rocket Attacks in Zagreb – August 2017 
12. Zagreb City Museum – August 2017 
13. Ovčara Memorial Centre – August 2017 
14. Nikola Tesla Memorial Centre, Smiljan – August 2017 
15. Mimara, Zagreb – November 2017 
16. Croatian Museum of Contemporary Art, Zagreb – November 2017 
17. Ethnographic Museum, Zagreb – November 2017 
18. Museum of Slavonia, Osijek – November 2017 
19. Nikola Tesla: Mind from the Future, Meštrovićev paviljon, Zagreb – March 2018 
20. Ilok City Museum – March 2018 
21. Muzej Staro Selo Kumrovec – March 2018 
22. Birth House of Dr. Franjo Tuđman, Veliko Trgovišće – March 2018  
23. Collection of Weapons and Military Vehicles of the Homeland War (Future Museum of the 
Homeland War), Turanj/Karlovac – March 2018  
24. Image of War Photography Museum, Zagreb – October 2018 
25. Croatian Museum of Naïve Art, Zagreb – October 2018  
26. Strossmayer Gallery of Old Masters, Zagreb – October 2018  
27. Operation Storm exhibition, Knin Fortress – August 2019 
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Appendix 3: Newspapers  
 
Knin commemoration, 05.08.2017 – Croatia 
1. Globus (weekly political newspaper, owned by same company as Jutarnji list and 
Slobodna Dalmacija – Europapress Holding d.o.o., circ. 28,000 in 2009) 
2. 7dnevno (weekly political newspaper founded 2013, circ. 40,000 in Oct. 2014) 
3. Slobodna Dalmacija (centre-left/regional, circ. 37,000 in 2010) 
4. 24sata (tabloid, aimed at younger audience, circ. 116,000 in 2013) 
5. Jutarnji list (liberal/social-democratic, circ. 66,000 in 2014) 
 
Knin commemoration, 05.08.2017 – Serbia 
1. Informer (pro-government/SNS tabloid, circ. 100,000) 
2. Politika (centre/centre-right, often pro-government newspaper of record, circ. 45,000 
in 2016) 
3. Večernje novosti (right-wing, daily tabloid, circ. 68,000 in 2016) 
4. Blic (middle-market, centre-left tabloid, circ. 58,000 in 2016) 
5. Srpski telegraf (presumably pro-government tabloid) 
 
Vukovar commemoration, 18.11.2017 
1. Glas Slavonije (regional, circ. 9,303 in 2011) 
2. Jutarnji list 




Mladić sentencing reactions, 23.11.2017 
1. 24sata 
2. Večernji list 
3. Slobodna Dalmacija 
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Appendix 4: Monument and memorial database coding legend 
 
Each data point receives a two- to four-letter code with alternating numbers and letters, which 
together signify a particular focus (or multiple foci) of the monument or memorial. For example, 
the code 1A3-A, arguably the most common signifier, refers to soldiers or fighters in the 
Croatian War of Independence. 
 
The code 1A3-A breaks down as: 
1 – Person/People 
A – War 
3 – 1990s wars 
A – Soldiers 
 
Most monuments only feature a three-letter code, such as 1B3 (person – arts and sciences – 
science), and the -A/-B/-C qualifier is only used in reference to people involved in war and 








Second and Third Level 
A. War 
1. WW1 
2. WW2/Yugoslav “National Liberation War” 
3. 1990s wars 
4. Other 
B. Arts and Science 




5. Other (including media) 
C. Religion 
1. Catholicism 
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2. Independence/Croatian millennial identity 




Fourth Level  
Note: only for war memorials and only when specified on monument/corroborating evidence 
A. Soldiers (defenders, fighters, knights, etc.) 
B. Victims (civilians) 
C. Both 
 
Coding for Dates 
Numerical codes have been assigned to particular eras in Croatian history, from ancient times to 
today.  
The codes are as follows: 
 
1. Ancient (Greco-Roman era) 
2. Kingdom of Croatia (925 – 1102 CE) 
3. Union with Hungary and/or Venice (1102 – 1527 CE) 
4. Austria-Hungary/Habsburg (1527 – 1918 CE) 
5. Kingdom of Yugoslavia or Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1918 – 1941 CE) 
6. Second World War/Independent State of Croatia (1941 – 1945 CE) 
7. Socialist Yugoslavia, FNRJ/SFRJ (1945 – 1991 CE) 
8. Croatia in the Homeland War (1991 – 1995 CE) 
9. Post-war Croatia (1995 – 2013 CE) 
10. Croatia in the European Union (2013 CE to present) 
 
These codes feature in the columns signifying when the monument or memorial was built and 
which era is remembered.    
  350 
Još Hrvatska ni propala dok mi živimo, 
visoko se bude stala kad ju zbudimo. 
Ak je dugo tvrdo spala, jača hoće bit, 
ak je sada u snu mala, će se prostranit. 
 
Hura! nek se ori i hrvatski govori! 
 
Ni li skoro skrajnje vrijeme da nju zvisimo, 
ter da stransko teško breme iz nas bacimo? 
Stari smo i mi Hrvati, nismo zabili 
da smo vaši pravi brati, zlo prebavili. 
 
Hura! nek se ori i hrvatski govori! 
 
Oj, Hrvati braćo mila, čujte našu riječ, 
razdružit nas neće sila baš nikakva već! 
Nas je nekad jedna majka draga rodila, 
hrvatskim nas, Bog joj plati, mlijekom dojila. 
 
Hura! nek se ori i hrvatski govori! 
 
 
“Još Hrvatska ni propala” 
Ljudevit Gaj, 1809-1872 
it is done 
Croatia has not yet fallen while we live, 
it will rise high when we revive it. 
If it’s slept this hard and long, it will grow stronger, 
if it’s so small in its sleep, it will expand. 
 
Hurrah! Let it resound, spoken in Croatian! 
 
Isn’t it high time to uplift her, 
and throw away the heavy foreign burden? 
We Croats, we are old too, we did not forget 
that we are your true brethren, regardless of the evil. 
 
Hurrah! Let it resound, spoken in Croatian! 
 
Oh, Croats, dear brothers, hear us when we say, 
there is no force that will separate us now! 
One dear mother gave birth to us once, 
breastfed us Croatian milk, thank God for that. 
 
Hurrah! Let it resound, spoken in Croatian! 
 
